Emerging from Crisis

Abstract

Analysis shows that had the WCWSS system been operated in strict accordance with the operating rules and the assumptions governing the system yield, dams could have been 18% fuller at the start of the 2017 hydrological year. This is not an insignificant volume of water. It would have meant that on 1 November 2017, instead of 38%, dam storage levels would have been closer to 56% and the panic of the water crisis would have been largely avoided. Harsher restrictions would still undoubtedly have been imposed and demand significantly reduced, but the disruption would hardly have been noteworthy, let alone have captured international attention. As it happened, rainfall in June of 2018 was such that there was a real risk that at least some of the dams would spill, prompting the development of a drought recovery plan. Given the depth of demand interventions implemented, it wasn’t possible simply to undo restrictions in Cape Town. The financial impact had to be carefully managed as the revenue was balanced with sales volume. If much less water was sold at a far lower tariff, the water budget would no longer have been cost-reflective. This had to be balanced with the customers elated by healthier storage levels and seeking instant relief from restriction tariffs.

A river cuts through rock not because of its power but because of its persistence

–Jim Watkins