Abstract
The introduction sets the stage by explaining the goals of conceptual jurisprudence and providing a summary of the essays.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Hart (2012).
- 3.
For the classical expression of this view, see Kantorowicz (1958).
- 4.
- 5.
Hart (2012), chap. 1.
- 6.
Ibid., p. 6.
- 7.
Mainly based on certain historical connections with the school of Oxford’s ordinary language philosophy, Hart was taken “to be engaged in a familiar philosophical project of conceptual analysis”—that is, according to this interpretation, he was “doing the same kind of philosophical work that his peers in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, ethics and epistemology were doing.” Coleman (2001), p. 175. Similarly, according to Nicos Stavropoulos, “Rather than seeking rules for using the key expressions, or setting out to list the situations in which users apply the expressions, Hart’s method was usually called conceptual analysis.” Stavropolous (2001), p. 69. Others, however, have rejected such a connection. See, for example, Green (2012); Marmor (2013).
- 8.
Hart (2012), pp. 239–40.
- 9.
Langlinais and Leiter (2016), p. 671.
- 10.
Hart (1983b).
- 11.
Raz (1999), pp. 10–1.
- 12.
See, e.g., Burgess and Plunkett (2013).
- 13.
See, e.g., Flathman (1973).
- 14.
- 15.
As an illustration of the richness of the notion analysis, see Beaney (2014). For the different understandings of “conceptual analysis” in jurisprudence, see the first Chapter by Pierluigi Chiassioni.
- 16.
Giudice (2015).
- 17.
- 18.
William Twining offers a useful catalogue of the tools available to legal theory, with references to secondary literature. Twining (2009), pp. 40–1.
- 19.
See, e.g., the chapters by Lucas Miotto and Andrés Molina-Ochoa.
- 20.
de Santos (2002), p. 86.
- 21.
Teubner (1997), p. 14.
- 22.
This view is discussed in the chapters by José Juan Moreso and Sari Kisilevsky, among others.
- 23.
HLA Hart, for example, suggests that this notion is the “most powerful tool for the analysis of much that has puzzled both the jurist and the political theorist.” Hart (2012), p. 98.
- 24.
Schauer (2015).
- 25.
There are numerous statements from legal philosophers suggesting that this is the central question of jurisprudence. For example, as noted above, one of Hart’s central questions concerns explaining how legal obligations differ from and are related to moral obligations. Hart (2012), pp. 7–8. Brian Leiter similarly diagnose legal philosophers as having “been preoccupied with specifying the differences between two systems of normative guidance that are omnipresent in all human societies: law and morality. In the last 100 years… the problem of how to distinguish these two normative systems has been the dominant problem in jurisprudence…” Leiter (2011), p. 664.
- 26.
- 27.
Aquinas (1981), Finnis (2011), and Murphy (2003) are examples of classical natural lawyers, who generally endorse a specific conception of basic goods. In turn, Dworkin (1986) and Alexy (2002) are examples of self-styled "non-positivists," who differ from natural lawyers by not endorsing a classical conception of basic goods.
- 28.
See, e.g., Waluchow (1994).
- 29.
See, e.g., Raz (1994).
- 30.
Hart (2012), pp. 238–276.
- 31.
Ibid., p. 210.
- 32.
For the classical formulation, see Raz (1999).
- 33.
Plunkett and Shapiro (2017).
- 34.
For a classical formulation, see Marmor (2006).
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Fabra-Zamora, J.L., Villa Rosas, G. (2021). Introduction. In: Fabra-Zamora, J.L., Villa Rosas, G. (eds) Conceptual Jurisprudence. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 137. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78803-2_1
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