Abstract
The present chapter focuses on profitability and liability from AI. By analyzing the theme of intellectual property rights -IP rights- and patent-eligibility it delineates not only the arguments advocating the use of AI within and by the prevalent, capitalist model but it attempts to -at least- partially de-construct them in favor of the proposition for a wide public sphere dedicated to AI inventories. Some theories about patent-eligibility are presented and relevant legal practices from national legal systems.
In terms of liability, the chapter addresses the theme of how legal certainty and safety can be promoted without undermining research and evolution of AI. In order to do so, the analysis moves on to the different stages of responsibility, addressing the potential responsibility of software designer or manufacturer, of the user and for the persons or entities which conduct machine-learning procedure.
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Notes
- 1.
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook, (2014), at p. 3.
According to the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), “intellectual property shall include rights relating to: - literary, artistic and scientific works,- performances of performing artists, phonograms and broadcasts,- inventions in all fields of human endeavor,- scientific discoveries, - industrial designs,- trademarks, service marks and commercial names and designations,- protection against unfair competition, and all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields.”
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (as amended on September 28, 1979) (Authentic text), (https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/textdetails/12412).
- 2.
Laurent Manderieux, Secured Transactions as a Tool for Better Use of Intellectual Property Rights and of Intellectual Property Licensing (including Patent Licensing), (2010), Rev. dr. unif, p. 447, at p. 447.
- 3.
Regarding AI, copyright also could be relevant given that it refers to “computerized systems for the storage and retrieval of information.”
WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook, (2014), at p. 40.
- 4.
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook, (2014), at p. 3.
- 5.
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook, (2014), at p. 4.
The Geneva Treaty on the International Recording of Scientific Discoveries, Article 1.
- 6.
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook, (2014), at p. 17.
- 7.
WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook, at pp. 18–22.
- 8.
To mention some of these complicated distinctions, as Oliver Gassmann explains them in his relevant book: “Genes and nucleic acid molecules (e.g., disease-related genes for diagnostics or for the antisense procedure, siRNA molecules for therapy)… Proteins (e.g., insulin, erythropoietin for therapy, cell receptors for drug screening)… Enzymes (e.g., proteases for washing powder, cellulose-degrading enzymes for the production of biofuels) Antibodies (e.g., for cancer treatment, pregnancy tests or diagnostics) Viruses and virus sequences (e.g., hepatitis C virus and HIV for blood tests and for the development of vaccines and therapies) Cells (e.g., hematopoietic stem cells for the treatment of leukemia) Microorganisms (e.g., bacteria for bioremediation, yeast for food production) Plants (e.g., herbicide-resistant soybeans, “golden rice” with a high content of provitamin A, drought-resistant plants and algae that extract CO2 from the atmosphere) Animals (e.g., disease models for research purposes such as the genetically modified “cancer mouse,” donor animals for xenotransplantation, milkproducing animals that excrete medicinal substances in their milk)” are patentable. On the contrary, “ DNA sequences without known function (e.g., expressed sequence tags (ESTs) as a result of automatic sequencing) Genetically modified animals that have to suffer without there being a significant medical benefit, e.g., a genetically modified animal that is only used for cosmetic tests, Plant varieties (already protected by the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, e.g., apples of the “Golden Delicious” variety), Animal breeds (e.g., Holstein cattle)… Human embryos… Procedures that inevitably involve the use and destruction of human embryos… Human germ cells (sperm, ova)… Human–animal chimeras”. Gassmann et al. (2021).
- 9.
Khoury (2016–2017), p. 648.
- 10.
Fisher (2001), pp. 168–199.
- 11.
United Nations The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries. E. 75. II. D. 6, 1975.
- 12.
- 13.
Krauss (1989), pp. 308–309.
- 14.
Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in The Future of the Public Domain 121 (L. Guibault & P.B. Hugenholtz, eds. 2006).
Eli Salzberger, Economic Analysis of the Public Domain, in The Future of the Public Domain 27–59 (2006), http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934127.
- 15.
Khoury, Intellectual Property Rights for “Hubots”: On the Legal Implications of Human-Like Robots As Innovators and Creators, at p. 658.
- 16.
Bethards (2004), p. 86.
- 17.
Sobel (2017), p. 60.
- 18.
Hashiguchi (2017a), p. 9.
- 19.
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
- 20.
Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2351-2353, 2355, 2357, 2359.
- 21.
Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 2351-2359. In re TLI Communications LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F.3d 607- 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
- 22.
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1302-1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
- 23.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012) (“The question before us is whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe these natural relations. To put the matter more precisely, do the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?”).
- 24.
Fitbit Inc. v. AliphCom, No. 16-cv-00118-BLF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2017) at 10, 22.
- 25.
In re Sesame Active System, 15/01962, Cour d'Appel de Paris [Court of Appeal of Paris] (26 fevrier 2016 [Feb. 26, 2016]); In re Dassault Systèmes, 14/06444, Cour d'Appel de Paris [Court of Appeal of Paris] (16 décembre 2016 [Dec. 16, 2016]). Hashiguchi (2017b), pp. 8–9.
- 26.
European Patent Office, Patentability requirements, https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/g_i_1.htm.
- 27.
European Patent Office, Convention on the Grant of European Patents 108 (16th ed. June 2016), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2020/e/ar52.html (compiling the European Patent Convention articles) [hereinafter European Patent Convention].
- 28.
European Patent Office, Convention on the Grant of European Patents 108.
- 29.
Decision of the European Patent Office, Technical Board of Appeal, Case T 258/03 - 3.5.1, Reasons for the Decision ¶¶ 3.3, 3.7, 4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 4.7,. (Apr. 21, 2004), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/_pdf/t030258ep1.pdf.
- 30.
Decision of the European Patent Office, Technical Board of Appeal, Case T 22/85 - 3.5.1, Reasons for the Decision ¶ 5 (Oct. 5, 1988), http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t850022ep1.pdf.
- 31.
Decision of the European Patent Office, Technical Board of Appeal, Case T 0605/93 - 3.5.1, 5.3, 5.7,Reasons for the Decision ¶ 5.9 (Jan. 20, 1995), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t930605eu1.pdf.
- 32.
Hashiguchi (2017a), p. 23.
- 33.
Hashiguchi (2017b), p. 26.
- 34.
Indicatively, one may see the case of French legal framework, which in section 1 of Article L611-10 defines patentable inventions, in all technological areas, as new inventions which involve an inventive step and can be applied industrially, whereas the subject matters that are excluded from patents are discoveries, scientific theories, and mathematical methods, aesthetic creations, schemes, rules, and methods for performing mental acts, playing games, or conducting economic activities, as well as computer programs and presentations of information. Hashiguchi (2017a), p. 20.
- 35.
Alice Corp. Pty., 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)).
- 36.
Hashiguchi (2017a), p. 17.
- 37.
Hattenbach and Snyder (2018), p. 318.
- 38.
Hashiguchi (2017a), p. 29.
- 39.
Hashiguchi (2017b), pp. 10–11.
- 40.
Spector (2006), p. 1252; Aaron Sloman, What is Artificial Intelligence?, Sch. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of birmingham, 2007, http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/aiforschools.html.
- 41.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
Larry Hauser, Artificial Intelligence, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/artinte/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2017).
- 42.
- 43.
U.S. Copyright Office, Sixty-Eighth Annual Report of the Register Of Copyrights 5 (1965), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-I965.pdf[https://perma.cc/E55P-XEUF]; Nat'l Comm'n On New Tech. Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report of the National Commission On New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 44–45 (1978),https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015026832934 [https://perma-cc/RUA7-AT2J].
- 44.
Kelly Shi, Beats by Al, IBM RES. (July 27, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research2016/07/beats-by-ai [https://permacc/S32U-8LBP]; Aaron van den Oord et al., WaveNet: A Generative Model for Raw Audio, DEEPMIND (Sept. 8, 2016), https:/deepmind.comiblog/wavenet-generative-model-raw-audio/ [https://permacc/9HW6-AY72].
- 45.
Alexander Mordvintsev et al., Inceptionism: Going Deeper into Neural Networks, GOOGLE RES. BLOG (June 17, 2015), https://research.googleblog.com/2015/06/inceptionismgoing-deeper-into-neural.html [https://perma.cc/YQ5X-2NE9].
- 46.
Opinion Artificial Intelligence, A robot wrote this entire article. Are you scared yet, human?, The Guardian, (2020, September 8), (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/08/robot-wrote-this-article-gpt-3).
- 47.
Abott (2016), p. 1080.
- 48.
Kim (2018), p. 21.
Characteristically, the US copyright office back in the year 1956 had determined that the author of any copyrightable work must be human, a position which was reiterated again in relevant, future, cases, in front of both of the courts and of the copyright office. With a similar understanding, when the US patent law was adopted, It was stated in the US Congress that it involved “anything under the sun that is made by man.”
Pearlman (2018), p. 20.
- 49.
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012).
- 50.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CONPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d ed. 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [https://permacc/RY7TG6KE].
- 51.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co./Sarony, Supreme Court 1884, III US 53, 4 S Ct. 279; Berne Convention for the protection of Literary and Artistic works, as amended on 1979, WIPO, TRT/BERNE/00.1; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), as quoted in Madeleine e Cock Buning 1998, supra note 43, at p. 183.
- 52.
“Although (...) the human input as regards the creation of machine-generated Programs may be relatively modest, and will be increasingly modest in the future [...] nevertheless, a human ‘author’ in the widest sense is always present, and must have the right to claim authorship in the program.”
Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs, COM (88) 816 final, Article 1.
- 53.
- 54.
Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection For Computergenerated Works, at p. 272.
- 55.
Grimmelmann (2016), p. 408.
- 56.
Mario Tremblay, Should Robots Have Legal Rights?, ROBOTSHOP (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.robotshop.com/blog/en/should-robots-have-legal-rights-17333; Palacet (2019), p. 235.
- 57.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Chapter 48, § 9.3.
- 58.
Case C-5/08, Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECR I-06569, at para. 35; Case C-393/09, Bezpecnostní softwarová asociace [2010] ECR 2010 I-13971, para. 45; Case C-403/08 and C-429/08, FA Premier League/Karen Murphy [2011] ECR 2011 I-09083, at para. 97; Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer/Standard Verlags [2011] at para. 94; Case C-604/10, Football Dataco/Yahoo [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:115, at para. 38.
- 59.
Case C-393/09, Bezpecnostní softwarová asociace, supra note 24, para 49. See also Case C-403/08 and C-429/08, FA Premier League/Karen Murphy, supra note 24, para. 98.
- 60.
Jonathon Keats, John Koza Has Built an Invention Machine, Popular Science (Apr. 18, 2006), http:// www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2006-04/john-koza-has-builtinvention-machine [http://perma.cc/C644-PR8R].
- 61.
Bridy (2012), pp. 21–26.
Perhaps the best reason to allocate ownership interests to someone, however, is that someone must be motivated, if not to create the work, then to bring it into public circulation.
Samuelson (1986), p. 1226.
Contract arrangements between the copyright owner of a computer program and those who use the program to create new works can be relied upon to allocate rights in the works created.
Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 2.2.2 (3d ed. 2014).
- 62.
Jason Tanz, Soon We Won't Program Computers. We'll Train Them Like Dogs, WIRED (May 17, 2016, 6:50 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/the-end-of-code/, https://perma.cc/UBA7-D8EH (last visited Mar. 27, 2018); Elissa Gilbert, Artificial Intelligence: Teaching Machines to Learn Like Humans, INTEL, Aug. 21, 2017, https://iq.intel.com/artificial-intelligence-teaching-machines-to-learn-like-humans/, https://perma.cc/9NTW-T5JN (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
- 63.
Going back to the US Copyright Office, it is characteristic that it states it “will not register works produced by a machine.., that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a human author.”
U.S. Copyright Office, Conpendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 313.2] (3d ed. 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [https://permacc/RY7TG6KE].
What if such creative input however can be externalized by a non- human actor? DeepMind indicates for example some extent of creativity.
Alexander Mordvintsev et al., Inceptionism: Going Deeper into Neural Networks,GOOGLE RES. BLOG (June 17, 2015), https://research.googleblog.com/2015/06/inceptionismgoing-deeper-into-neural.html [https://perma.cc/YQ5X-2NE9].
- 64.
Gaut (2010), p. 1039.
- 65.
Arnheim (2001), p. 24; Buning, Autonomous Intelligent Systems as Creative Agents under the EU Framework for Intellectual Property, at p. 315.
- 66.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2164.
- 67.
de Cock Buning (2016), p. 317.
- 68.
Pearlman (2018), p. 35.
- 69.
Ryan Abbott, Hal the Inventor: Big Data and Its Use by Artificial Intelligence, in Big Data is Not a MonolitH (Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Hamid R. Ekbia & Michael Mattioli eds., forthcoming Oct. 2016).
- 70.
Abott (2016), p. 1081.
- 71.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345,363.
- 72.
Ritchie (2007), pp. 67–99.
- 73.
Abott (2016), p. 1104.
- 74.
Robert Sachs, The Mind as Computer Metaphor: Benson and the Mistaken Application of Mental Steps to Software (Part 3), BILSKIBLOG (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/04/the-mind-as-computer-metaphor-benson-and-the-mistaken-applicationof-mental-steps-to-software-part-3.htm.
- 75.
Raquel Acosta, Artificial Intelligence and Authorship RightsJOLTDIGEST (Feb. 17, 2012), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/artificial-intelligence-and-authorship-rights. Miller (1993), p. 1073.
- 76.
Palacet (2019), p. 230.
- 77.
Pearlman (2018), pp. 42, 44.
- 78.
Pearlman, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Authors And Inventors Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, at p. 43.
- 79.
Ralston (2005), pp. 292–293.
- 80.
Khoury, Intellectual Property Rights for “Hubots”: On The Legal Implications of Human-Like Robots As Innovators And Creators, at p. 651.
- 81.
Hristov (2017), pp. 440–441.
- 82.
- 83.
The public has no inherent interest in who owns the copyright so long as works are placed into the marketplace. Under this instrumental approach to copyright, “author” is a construct denoting merely the initial owner of all rights. That initial owner may be the actual individual who created the work, but *277 need not be. 2 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § § 3:19 (2016).
- 84.
Abott (2016), pp. 1094–1095.
- 85.
Michael Schuster (2018), p. 1960.
- 86.
Palacet (2019), p. 237.
- 87.
Abrams (2009), p. 1613.
- 88.
Robert Plotkin, The Genie in the Machine: How Computer-Automated Inventing Is Revolutionizing Law and Business, (2009), at p. 111.
- 89.
Samore (2013), p. 142.
- 90.
Madeleine de Cock Buning, Chair, Dutch Media Authority/Utrecht University Centre for Intellectual Property Law, Keynote Address at the 16th Eur. Intell. Prop. Inst. Network Congress 2014/2015 (Jan. 29-31, 2015) (as reported by Muzdalifah Faried Bakry & Zhilang He, Autonomous Creation - Creation by Robots: Who owns the IP Rights?, Maastricht University Blog Intell. Prop. & Knowledge Mgmt. (Mar. 15, 2015), https://law.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ipkm/autonomouscreation-creation-by-robots-who-owns-the-ip-rights/; Clifford (1997), pp. 1702–1703.
- 91.
The role is to “serve an essential purpose in democratic society by providing a common reservoir of information upon which an informed citizenry can make choices.”
Erickson (2016), p. 1, http://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/1951/1986.
- 92.
Bekey et al. (2011), p. 323 ff.
- 93.
Nersessian and Mancha (2021), p. 66.
- 94.
Ibid at pp. 67–68.
- 95.
de Bruin (2016), p. 490.
- 96.
Indicatively see the US relevant legislation “Article 6(1) PLD. These circumstances include “(a) the presentation of the product, (b) the use to which it would reasonably be expected that the product would be put”, and “(c) the time when the product was put into circulation”.
- 97.
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of torts 6 (5th ed. 1984); MacCoun (1993), pp. 2–3.
- 98.
Scherer (2016), pp. 359–360.
- 99.
Hildebrandt (2008), p. 169.
- 100.
Barfield (2015), p. 43.
- 101.
Ryan Calo (2011), p. 597.
- 102.
Ibid at pp. 75–76.
- 103.
Marchant and Lindor (2012), p. 1328.
- 104.
Solow-Niederman (2020), p. 641.
- 105.
Regarding the impact of such situation in issues of bias, indicatively see: Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Pre-Trial Risk Assessment Tools, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://Epic.Org/Algorithmic-Transparency/Crim-Justice [https://Perma.Cc/K9XHGMV4]; Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, And Punish The Poor (2017).
- 106.
Vladeck (2014), p. 128.
- 107.
Bathae (2020), p. 148.
- 108.
European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (27 January 2017), paras. Z-AI http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2017–0005+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
- 109.
European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, at paras. 49–51.
- 110.
European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, at para. 56.
- 111.
“Calls on the Commission, when carrying out an impact assessment of its future legislative instrument, to explore, analyse and consider the implications of all possible legal solutions, such as:a) establishing a compulsory insurance scheme where relevant and necessary for specific categories of robots whereby, similarly to what already happens with cars, producers, or owners of robots would be required to take out insurance cover for the damage potentially caused by their robots;b) ensuring that a compensation fund would not only serve the purpose of guaranteeing compensation if the damage caused by a robot was not covered by insurance;c) allowing the manufacturer, the programmer, the owner or the user to benefit from limited liability if they contribute to a compensation fund, as well as if they jointly take out insurance to guarantee compensation where damage is caused by a robot;d) deciding whether to create a general fund for all smart autonomous robots or to create an individual fund for each and every robot category, and whether a contribution should be paid as a one-off fee when placing the robot on the market or whether periodic contributions should be paid during the lifetime of the robot;e) ensuring that the link between a robot and its fund would be made visible by an individual registration number appearing in a specific Union register, which would allow anyone interacting with the robot to be informed about the nature of the fund, the limits of its liability in case of damage to property, the names and the functions of the contributors and all other relevant details;f) creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently;g) introducing a suitable instrument for consumers who wish to collectively claim compensation for damages deriving from the malfunction of intelligent machines from the manufacturing companies responsible;”.
- 112.
European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, at paras. 52-55.
- 113.
Karnow (1996), pp. 170–174.
- 114.
Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co., 765 F.2d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 1985).
- 115.
See below, the relevant analysis in the conclusions.
- 116.
Bathae, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OPINION LIABILITY, at pp. 154–164. Rudina Seseri, The Problem winh "Eplainable"Al, TECHCRUNCH (June 14, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/14/the-problem-with-explainable-ai/ [https://perma.cc/QE8R-7VU6]; Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of Al, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/QNG2-XSYJ]; Browne and Harrison-Spoerl (2008), pp. 1132–1133.
- 117.
Such is the determination of responsibility also, once the malfunction is an outcome of hardware.
- 118.
Solum (1992), p. 1231.
- 119.
Hallevy, The Criminal Liability Of Artificial Intelligence Entities--From Science Fiction To Legal Social Control, at p. 181.
- 120.
Decker (2014), pp. 65–86.
- 121.
Karnow (1996), pp. 176–177.
- 122.
Jason Tanz, Soon We Won't Program Computers. We'll Train Them Like Dogs., WIRED (May 17, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/the-end-of-code/ [https://perma.cc/NJ4E-XALV].
- 123.
Scherer (2016), p. 365.
- 124.
Robolaw, Regulating Emerging Robotic Technologies in Europe: Robotics facing Law and Ethics, at p. 23.
- 125.
Kowert (2017), pp. 181–182.
- 126.
Matthias (2004), pp. 175–183.
- 127.
Wallach (2011), 185. At p. 194;
- 128.
Karnow (1996), pp. 180–181.
- 129.
There is also the issue of criminal liability. That is analyzed below in the framework of potential, AI, legal personality.
- 130.
The right to self-determination in all its manifestations, equality, right to work, trade unions’ participation, social security and insurance, adequate standard of living could be promoted more efficiently if such technological developments produce wealth for the wider public, instead for a small number of private companies, in oligopolist terms and economic framework.
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Tzimas, T. (2021). AI, Issues of Ownership, Liability and the Role of International Law. In: Legal and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence from an International Law Perspective. Law, Governance and Technology Series(), vol 46. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78585-7_9
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