Abstract
The present chapter concludes on the legal ramifications of AWS’s as factors for endangering the collective security system, by focusing on their impact on IHL mainly and parenthetically on human rights too. The chapter intends to indicate how and why IHL can impose crucial guarantees on the evolution of AWS's, in order for fundamental values of international law and of human-centrism to be guaranteed. Standards of compliance with IHL, in relation to AWS’s development are examined. The chapter also parenthetically examines aspects of the relationship between AWS’s and human rights law, with the main difference being the impact of human dignity on AWS’s activities. The argument therefore of the chapter is that human rights law would outlaw AWS’s, from areas of conduct outside the battlefield, in the first place, as on top of legal interpretation, AWS’s are not necessary in domestic affairs and could lead to the imposition of oppressive regimes.
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Notes
- 1.
For various definitions and descriptions of wat, see: van der Dennen (1981), pp. 128–189.
- 2.
- 3.
Parenthetically- speaking, from the perspective of state responsibility, the issue of AWS’s, is more straightforward legally speaking, since state responsibility from a weapon system can be identified objectively regardless of any subjective element.
- 4.
Marchant et al. (2011), pp. 275, 280.
- 5.
- 6.
Stewart, X New Technology And The Law Of Armed Conflict, at p. 282.
- 7.
Arkin (2009), p. 16.
- 8.
Kastan (2013), p. 62.
- 9.
- 10.
As the US Department of Defense held : ” Because the DoD complies with the Law of Armed Conflict, there are many issues requiring resolution associated with employment of weapons by an unmanned system. For a significant period into the future, the decision to pull the trigger or launch a missile from an unmanned system will not be fully automated, but it will remain under the full control of a human operator. Many aspects of the firing sequence will be fully automated but the decision to fire will not likely be fully automated until legal, rules of engagement, and safety concerns have all been thoroughly examined and resolved.”
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (2d ed. 2009), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/psa/docs/UMSIntegratedRoadmap2009.pdf.
- 11.
Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots 37 (2012).
- 12.
The two types of law are distinct but still maintain critical interlink age. The focus here is on IHL as it refers mainly to conflict circumstances. Still human rights are applicable too, both in terms of the necessity to respect them during conflict but also because of the potential use of AWS’s in non-conflict zones- i.e. police operations.
- 13.
ICRC Article 36.
- 14.
Sassòli (2011), p. 1.
- 15.
Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, at pp. 636–638; Nuclear advisory opinion, 66, 78.
- 16.
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama Administration and International Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Wash., D.C., Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
- 17.
- 18.
Press (2017), p. 1347.
- 19.
Toscano (2015), pp. 216–218.
- 20.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), opened for signature 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) art 48 (‘API 1977’).
- 21.
Melzer (2008), p. 1039; Prosecutor v Galic (Judgement and Opinion) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I, Case No IT-98-29-T, 5 December 2003) [51].
- 22.
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ‘Final Report to the Prosecutor’ (Report, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2000) [29] (‘NATO Bombing against Yugoslavia Report’). Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987) 682 [2198].
- 23.
- 24.
API 1977 art 51(5)(b).
- 25.
Wagner (2014), p. 1398.
- 26.
Hague Convention No IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and Annex (Regulations), 18 October 1907, 1 Bevans 631 art. 22.
- 27.
Additional Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, art. 51.
- 28.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005).
- 29.
- 30.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 35 [78]-[79].
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
Parks (1990), p. 173.
- 34.
Meier (2016), p. 124.
- 35.
That is another reason, proving the need to come up with a model of international governance.
- 36.
DEP‘T OF THE A.F. INSTRUCTION 51-402, LEGAL REVIEWS OF WEAPONS AND CYBER CAPABILITIES (2011), at paras. , § 1.5.1; § 3.1.1; . § 3.1.2.1; § 6.2.2.
- 37.
Boothby, Weapons And The Law Of Armed Conflict, at pp. 345–346.
- 38.
Meier (2016), p. 121, https://sites.temple.edu/ticlj/files/2017/02/30.1.Meier-TICLJ.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/PP8G-ULAU.
- 39.
CCW/MSP/2015/3, Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, (2015, June 2), at https://undocs.org/ccw/msp/2015/3.
- 40.
“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”. Additional Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1977, Article 1, para 2.
- 41.
CCW/MSP/2015/3, Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects at paras. 60–66.
- 42.
Ibid at para. 51.
- 43.
CCW/MSP/2014/3, Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, (2014, June 11), at para. 20, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/048/96/pdf/G1404896.pdf?OpenElement.
- 44.
UN: Decisive Action Needed to Ban Killer Robots – Before It’s Too Late, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/un-decisive-action-needed-to-ban-killer-robots-before-its-too-late/, archived at https://perma.cc/78XB-CFHK.
- 45.
The case of complete autonomy of AWS’s or of the fourth loop is also assessed on other grounds too, namely the one of human dignity and human rights, below.
- 46.
Sharkey (2012), pp. 788–789.
- 47.
Stewart (1901–2011), p. 275.
- 48.
Pagallo (2011), p. 312.
- 49.
Ugo Pagallo, What Robots Want: Autonomous Machines, Codes and New Frontiers of Legal Responsibility, in 25 Human Law And Computer Law: Comparative Perspectives 47, 51 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Jeanne Gaakeer eds., 2013).
- 50.
- 51.
Sharkey (2012), p. 789.
- 52.
Floridi and Sanders (2004), pp. 74–76.
- 53.
Thurnher (2012), available at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-67/JFQ-67_77-84_Thurnher.pdf.
- 54.
CCW/CONF.V/2 Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, (2016, Decemver, 12–16), at paras. 61–69.
- 55.
The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Concerns, Characteristics and Definitional Approaches , at p. 15.
- 56.
- 57.
Klein (1999), pp. 92, 99,100.
- 58.
- 59.
Asaro (2012), pp. 699–708.
- 60.
Jimmy So, ‘Can Robots Fall in Love, and Why Would They?’, The Daily Beast (online), 31 December 2013 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/31/can-robots-fall-in-love-and-why-would-they.html.
- 61.
Sparrow (2009), p. 181.
- 62.
This argumentation is based on findings of neurologists. Damasio (1994), p. xiv.
- 63.
Asaro, “On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making”, at p. 699.
- 64.
Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, Preface.
- 65.
- 66.
Marchant et al. (2011), p. 283.
- 67.
Additional Protocol I, art. 57.2.
- 68.
D.G. Johnson, ‘Technology with No Human Responsibility?’, at p. 714.
- 69.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/HRC/23/47, 9 April 2013, page 17, para 94.
- 70.
ICRC, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications of Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of Weapons, at p. 44.
- 71.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF/183/9, 17 July 1998, article 25.1.
- 72.
ICRC, Autonomous weapons: States must agree on what human control means in practice, (2018, November 20), (https://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapons-states-must-agree-what-human-control-means-practice, access. 08-02-2020).
- 73.
- 74.
Damaska (2001), pp. 461–462. ICTY, Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, ¶¶ 333“[M]ilitary commanders and other persons occupying positions of superior authority may be held criminally responsible for the unlawful conduct of their subordinates [as] a well-established norm of customary and conventional international law.”
- 75.
1 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law at p. 327 (2d rev. ed. 2013). Regarding cases: Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 515 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 270 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901e.pdf). Prosecutor v. Blas#ki#, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 166 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf (emphasis added); see also Kordic, No. IT-95-14/2-A, ¶ 30.
- 76.
Reitinger, Algorithmic Choice And Superior Responsibility: Closing The Gap Between Liability And Lethal Autonomy By Defining The Line Between Actors And Tools, at p. 105.
- 77.
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 256 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v. Blas#ki#, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 375 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf.
- 78.
Delalic, No. IT-96-21-A, ¶ 238.
- 79.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law: International Enforcement § 4.1, at 459 (3d ed. 2008).
- 80.
Sassòli (2014), p. 323.
- 81.
Sharkey (2012), p. 791.
- 82.
- 83.
“In this writer’s opinion, it is both more probable and more desirable that the law will develop in this evolutionary way than by any radical change. With the law of weaponry, as with most of the law of armed conflict, the most important humanitarian gain would come not from the adoption of new law but the effective implementation of the law that we have. That should be the priority for the next century.” Christopher Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry’ at the Start of the New Millennium, inTHE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 185, 221 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (Vol. 71, US Naval War College International Law Studies).
- 84.
Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb and Thirteen Others (German High Command Trial) (United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg), 76 (Dec. 30, 1947-Oct. 28, 1948).
- 85.
ICC Statute, Article 30.
- 86.
ICC St atute, Article 30.
- 87.
“In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court: (a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where: (i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and (ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 28, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002). Also: Kai Ambos, Superior Responsibility, in 1 The Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court: A Commentary § 21 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002).
- 88.
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 423-426 (Int'l Crim. Court June 15, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf.
- 89.
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment, 54, 57 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003.
- 90.
Prosecutor v. Galic, at para. 54.
- 91.
David Ohlin, THE COMBATANT'S STANCE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD at p. 3.
- 92.
Characteristic of this approach is the Borkum Island case. The case referred to the crew of a U.S. warplane that was shot down over the German island of Borkum in 1944. The members of the crew who were arrested by the Germans got lynched both by German soldiers as well as by locals. After the war, several of the perpetrators were prosecuted before a U.S. military court, the prosecutor of which referred to them as “cogs in the wheel of common design, all equally important, each cog doing the part assigned to it. And the wheel of wholesale murder could not turn without all the cogs.” Since the prosecutor could not assign individual responsibility for each specific act within the general criminal behavior, given the number of the participants he chose the attribution of responsibility on a collective basis. Similar was the Ponzano case findings. Jens David Ohlin, The Combatant’s Stance: Autonomous Weapons On The Battlefield, at pp.4-5. Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 202 (2d ed. 2008).
- 93.
Hector Olasolo, The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders as Principals to International Crimes 20 (2010); Michael Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law 163 (2009).
- 94.
Roxin (2011).
- 95.
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 210 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadiś Appeal Judgment].
- 96.
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002), ¶ 67 (holding that “[i]f the agreed crime is committed by one or other of the participants in a joint criminal enterprise such as has already been discussed, all of the participants in that enterprise are equally guilty of the crime regardless of the part played by each in its commission”). Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction To International Criminal Law 400 (2d Rev. Ed. 2013).
- 97.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
- 98.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment Appeals, at para. 227.
- 99.
ICTY, Statute, art. 7(1), (3); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), art. 6(1), (3).
- 100.
Lippmann (1995), pp. 214–221, 239–249, 267. Nuremberg Charter, Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Charter II, art. 6, entered into force Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
- 101.
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 249 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
- 102.
David Ohlin, The Combatant’s Stance: Autonomous Weapons On The Battlefield, at p. 9; Neha Jain, Perpetrators and Accessories In International Criminal Law: Individual Modes of Responsibility for Collective Crimes 125–140 (2014).
- 103.
Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers, Policy Review (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/research/law-and-ethics-robot-soldiers. Crootof (2015).
- 104.
Dunlap Jr (2016), pp. 69–70.
- 105.
Michael Schmitt, Regulating Autonomous Weapons Might be Smarter Than Banning Them, JsT Security (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/25333/regulatingautonomous-weapons-smarter-banning/.
- 106.
Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality And Ethicality Of Autonomous Weapons 105 (2009).
- 107.
Peter Margulies, Making Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command Responsibility for Computer-Guided Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts, Research Handbook on Remote Warfare 19 (Jens David Ohlin ed., 2016), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2734900.
- 108.
Anthony Finn & Steve Scheding, Developments and Challenges for Autonomous Unmanned Vehicles: AAA Compendium (2010), at p. 183.
- 109.
Stewart (2011), p. 290.
- 110.
Patrick et al. (2008).
- 111.
UNIDIR, The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Considering how Meaningful Human Control might move the discussion forward, 2014, at pp. 6–7.
- 112.
Geoffrey S. Corn, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing the Inevitability of “Taking the Man out of the Loop” at p. 23, (June 14, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2450640.
- 113.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment Appeals, at para. 187, 203, 220.
- 114.
CCW/MSP/2014/3 - 2014 Report of the Informal Meeting of Experts, at para. 27.
- 115.
CCW/MSP/2014/3 - 2014 Report of the Informal Meeting of Experts, at para. 20.
- 116.
Johnson (2014), pp. 1–9: www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/3774-johnson-d-technology-with-no-responsibility.
- 117.
Article 36, Structuring debate on autonomous weapons systems, Article 36 briefing paper, November 2013: www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Autonomous-weapons-memo-for-CCW.pdf.
- 118.
McAllister (2017), pp. 2563–2564.
- 119.
CCW/MSP/2015/3—2015 Report of the Informal Meeting of Experts, at para. 37.
- 120.
CCW/MSP/2015/3—2015 Report of the Informal Meeting of Experts, at paras. 44–46.
- 121.
CCW/CONF.V/2—2016 Report and recommendations of the Informal Meeting of Experts, at paras. 32–34.
- 122.
UNIDIR, 2016, Safety, Unintentional Risk and Accidents in the Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies, UNIDIR Resources no. 5, p. 1, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/safety-unintentional-risk-and-accidents-en-668.pdf.
- 123.
Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, ‘Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can’ (Research Paper, Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, Stanford University, 9 April 2013) 12–13. Damasio (1994), p. xiv; Castel and Castel (2016), p. 5.
- 124.
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, art. 3(a), adopted by Security Council on May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
- 125.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, preamble, opened for signature on July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute of the ICC].
- 126.
First Committee Weighs Potential Risks of New Technologies as Members Exchange Views on How to Control Lethal Autonomous Weapons, Cyberattacks, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gadis3611.doc.htm.
- 127.
M.R. Endsley, ‘Building resilient systems via strong human systems integration’, Defense AT&L, (Jan–Feb 2016), at pp. 6–12, 11: dau.dodlive.mil/files/2015/12/Endsley.pdf; UNIDIR, Safety, Unintentional Risk and Accidents in the Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies, 2016, AT P. 3.
- 128.
Here there is no general analysis of the role of human rights in relation to AI, as it is analyzed in Chap. 4, above.
- 129.
Sandesh Sivakumaran, International Humanitarian Law, in International Human Rights Law 535 (Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, and Sandesh Sivakumaran eds., 2013).
- 130.
Heyns (2016), pp. 353–354.
- 131.
“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 6 (1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
- 132.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, adopted 29 Mar. 2004, ¶¶ 16, 18 available at http://www.umn.edu/humanarts/gencomm/hrcom31.html; UNHRC, General Comment No. 6 (1982), ¶ 4; UN 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on a Right to a Remedy and Reparation, McCann and others v. The United Kingdom, No. 18984/91, ¶ 169, ECtHR (1995).
- 133.
Christof Heyns, Autonomous Weapons Systems and Human Rights law (16 May 2014), available at http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/speeches/heyns%20ccw%20presentation%20aws%20and%20human%20rights.pdf.
- 134.
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Universal Declaration of Human Rights—In six cross-cutting themes, (https://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/crosscuttingthemes.aspx); Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, in The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, supra note 39, at 133. (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). Human dignity transcends if properly interpreted of course, IHL as well.
- 135.
Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001), p. 13.
- 136.
McCrudden (2008), pp. 655, 670.
- 137.
Pablo Gilabert, Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Power, in Rowan Cruft et al. eds., Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, (2015), a t pp. 196–197.
- 138.
Monsalve and Román (2009), pp. 45–4.
- 139.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 6 (1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] Pmbl, arts. 7, 9. Article 5 of the African Charter; Article 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Right.
- 140.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
- 141.
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, arts. 17(1), 70, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, pmbl., arts. 1, 3(a), 8(1)(a), 16(4), 24(1)(a), 25(d), Jan. 24, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, arts. 19(2), 24(5)(c), Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3.
- 142.
Kotzmann and Seery (2017), pp. 14–16.
- 143.
United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jurisprudence, OHCHR, http://juris.ohchr.org; Human Rights Council, General Comment No. 21: Article 10, Humane Treatment of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty, ¶ 3 (Apr. 10, 1992); Human Rights Council, General Comment No. 21: Article 10, Humane Treatment of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty, ¶ 3 (Apr. 10, 1992).
- 144.
Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication 1486/2006, ¶ 4.16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1486/2006 (Aug. 5, 2008); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1791/2008, ¶ 3.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/107/D/1791/2008 (July 5, 2013).
- 145.
Zardiashvili and Fosch-Villaronga (2020), p. 123. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-019-09514-6; ICCPR Second Optional Protocol. (1989). Aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, GA Res 44/128 https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/2ndopccpr.aspx. Accessed 8 Oct 2019; United Nations (1993a) The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18. https://undocs.org/A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18; United Nations (1993b) Standard rules on the equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities. https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r096.htm; United Nations. (2007). Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html.
- 146.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, pmbl., Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
- 147.
O’Mahony (2012), pp. 551–574.
- 148.
Dieter Birnbacher, Ambiguities in the Concept of Menschenwude, in sAncTiTy of lifE And huMAn digniTy 107 (Kurt Bayertz ed., 1996); Bernhard Schlink, The Concept of Human Dignity: Current Usages, Future Discourses, in understanding human dignity (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) at p. 632. Dicke (2002), pp. 111–112.
- 149.
The term concept has also been used. Zardiashvili and Fosch-Villaronga (2020), p. 123 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-019-09514-6.
- 150.
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Tzimas, T. (2021). Legal Ramifications of the Use of AWS’s- the Role of IHL and Human Rights. In: Legal and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence from an International Law Perspective. Law, Governance and Technology Series(), vol 46. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78585-7_8
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