The New National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland

Abstract

The approval of the new security strategy of the Republic of Poland in May 2020 required paying attention to the terminological aspects of the concepts used in this document, as well as to legal issues, which were mainly connected with the problem of whether this act should be formally countersigned or not. An equally important issue was to draw attention to the fact that, in practice, two strategies were being developed in Poland’s legal system—one approved by the President of the Republic of Poland in his decision of May 12, 2020, and the other, which was in the form of a resolution of the Council of Ministers, applicable from 9 April 2013. The current strategy was preceded by earlier strategies and the White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland. The strategy of May 12, 2020 is a comprehensive document that sheds light on all elements of national security. Its content addresses such phenomena as hybridity, operation in cyberspace, the need for new technologies, and artificial intelligence.

1 Terminology Issues

Pursuant to Article 4a(1)(1) of the Act of 21 November 1967 on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland,¹ the President of the Republic of Poland, to safeguard the sovereignty and security of the state, and the integrity and indivisibility of its territory, at the request of the Prime Minister, approves the National Security Strategy.² The legislator did not provide a precise definition of “security strategy” and the “Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland”, leaving these issues to the legal commentators. In the literature, the term “strategy” refers to all measures taken to achieve a certain goal.³ More precisely, “strategy” is a domain of military science, which involves preparation for and carrying out war operations, and the respective campaigns and battles.⁴ A strategy specifies the quantity and quality of the resources needed to achieve military goals, and the quantity and quality of all types of reserves, in terms of both staff and materials, as well as the organisation and preparation methods of the armed forces, the devising of plans and their use in warfare, and the development of the areas of operations and strategic directions.⁵ A strategy involves defining long-term objectives, and the methods for achieving them through adopting specific courses of action and distributing resources.⁶

A “national security strategy” is usually understood as “a choice made on the basis of intelligence and strategic analyses of the appropriate and essential measures available to the state in order to achieve its goals and fulfil the tasks specified in the security policy⁷”. A strategy is also defined as “the theory and practice of state operations with a view to achieving set goals in the domain of security, general and long-term”. It is also perceived as “a domain of the national strategy encompassing its creation and preparation, and the use of the state’s potential in order to prevent any threats to its existence and development” and as “the theory and practice oriented towards advancing and deploying the state’s potential in order to achieve the objective of counteracting any threats to its existence and development, general and long-term⁸”. W. Kitler views the national security strategy as “a national strategy domain understood as a choice made on the basis of the strategic analysis of the appropriate and necessary measures available to the state in order to achieve its goals and satisfy the interests specified in the national security policy, general and long-term”.⁹ D. Robertson points out that, unlike tactics, a strategy requires long-term preparations, and both terms can be used in each conflict situation. He emphasises that in the contemporary defence terminology, strategies are considered to be political, and tactics are viewed as purely technical decisions by the army aimed at a better achievement of the strategic goals set by the political leaders.¹⁰ Some literature sources consider strategy as a praxeological category, i.e. serving to combine the available documents, instruments, and methods of efficient operations in order to achieve the set goal.¹¹

In analysing the notion of “a national strategy”, R. Kuźniar concluded that a strategy does not set political goals, and yet a strategic instinct and discipline, characteristic of the constraints of a strategic approach, is an obligatory (though insufficient) condition for the optimum realisation of the state’s interests (security and development), which should not depend on the whims of politics.¹²

The notion of the “security of the state” was not defined in the Act itself. The legal commentators have pointed out that, despite the term’s being universally associated with national security, it is not synonymous with it. In the literature, “national security” is defined as “an objective state of the certainty of physical survival and the freedom to develop, at the same time being a vital need, and thus also a national goal and interest (raison d’état), which assumes the securing and strengthening of vital values (…) achieved in the external and internal spheres”.¹³ “The security of the state” is understood as a guarantee of the territorial integrity of the state and its sovereignty,¹⁴ as well as its political, social, and economic development.¹⁵ It is also pointed out that “the security of the state” is “the state’s and society’s ability to ensure the conditions for its survival as a civic community institution, the biological survival of the population, territorial integrity, political independence, internal stability, and quality of life” (…) it is shaped by activities including taking opportunities, undertaking challenges, reducing risk, and eliminating external and internal threats to ensure continuance, identity, functioning, and the freedom to develop for the state and the nation (society)”.¹⁶ Attention is drawn to the fact that security also has an international dimension.¹⁷ Building a security strategy is a difficult task due to the dynamically changing international environment. Currently it is interpreted as a guarantee of meeting broadly defined needs, rights and aspirations of a nation (society) referring to the way and quality of life, systemic and cultural identity and development opportunities.¹⁸

2 The Countersignature Issue

The wording of Article 4a(1)(1) of the Act on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland can raise doubts as to the nature of the Act, especially whether the authorisation referred to in these provisions has the nature of a countersignature. Undoubtedly, in line with Article 144 of the Constitution, the President’s official acts issued exercising his/her constitutional and statutory powers require the signature of the Prime Minister, who, by such a signature, accepts responsibility therefor to the Sejm. There is no doubt that the President cannot issue state leadership acts without a suitable mandate in legal regulations. The basis of such a mandate can be the Constitution and the Acts. These official laws can take the form of regulations, decrees, and decisions, and the legal commentators agree on this matter. It is pointed out that not every action of the President expressed in the form of a specific document should be regarded as an official act, as the name “act” is reserved for documents for which the President resolves an issue. Not every time the President’s activity takes a written form addressed to a specific group of recipients can one speak of a President’s official act as stipulated in Article 144 of the Constitution. If such a document addressed to a specific group of recipients does not contain any Resolution on rights or responsibilities, it is not a President’s official act but only a manifestation of his/her official activities as the Head of the State. These may include congratulatory letters, speeches, and so-called official addresses.¹⁹ Therefore, P. Sarnecki distinguishes President’s official acts and written acts of the Head of the State. Their shared feature is that they contain information on the Presidential office, but do not bear any characteristics of legally binding decisions.²⁰

The situation described in Article 4a(1)(1) of the Act of 21 November 1967 on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland differs significantly from that described in Article 144(2) of the Constitution, which states that a President’s official act should be signed by the Prime Minister in order to be valid, whereas in the case of the National Security Strategy the President receives the text of the Strategy from the Prime Minister for approval. Thus, it is the Prime Minister who presents the strategy to the President for approval. The wording of the quoted provision of the Act of 21 November 1967 shows that the Strategy is not binding without approval, being only a draft. Assessing the legal situation, one can venture the statement that the President is the one who countersigns an Act presented to him/her by the Prime Minister. The literature emphasises that the President is not always the initiator of the issuing of an official act, as he/she may receive such an act from the Prime Minister. K. Kozłowski points out that most official acts of the Head of the State subject to countersignature are prepared by the government, and subsequently presented to the President for approval. As Kozłowski mentions, this also refers to defence in general. He also indicates, referring to the position presented by P. Sarnecki, “the countersignature requirement should not cover the actions of the President, being ‘a continuation’ of certain official acts clearly exempt from the countersignature requirement, i.e. such which can be referred to as ‘secondary’²¹”.

The approval of the National Security Strategy was not mentioned among official acts exempt from a countersignature, i.e. those identified in Article 144(3) of the Constitution, which specifies the powers of the President exercised outside the political control system of the Sejm. However, it is worth mentioning that the literature sources emphasise the fact that authorisations corresponding to any of the powers mentioned in the provision with the same ratio legis for their exclusion should also be excluded from the countersignature requirement, despite the lack of a specific provision in Article 144(3) of the Constitution.²² It thus can be claimed that if the President’s legislative initiative and the decree on the promulgation of an act is exempt from the countersignature obligation, the same should apply to the National Security Strategy. Another argument is that, without the decision of the Prime Minister on submitting a request to the President for the approval of the Strategy, the President is unable to approve the Strategy.²³ Also, the President is not authorised to announce a Strategy independently without the request of the Prime Minister. In practice, the National Security Strategy is approved by a decision of the President of the Republic of Poland announced in the Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland. The Strategy document is appended to the decision.²⁴

3 Security Strategies of the Republic of Poland 1990–2007

The literature sources emphasise that one of the most important and urgent challenges for Poland after 1989 was the formulation of a national strategy, and developing a suitable independent security policy, including a defence policy.²⁵ At the turn of 1990, the Defence Doctrine of the Republic of Poland was developed and adopted by Resolution of the State Defence Committee of 21 February 1990. A change in the political situation as a result of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in the adoption of two documents at the State Defence Committee meeting on 2 November 1992: Assumptions in the Polish Security Policy and the Security and Defence Strategy Policy of the Republic of Poland. After becoming a member of NATO, Poland created a new holistic draft of a new security and defence strategy.²⁶ On 4 January 2000, the Council of Ministers adopted the Security Strategy, and 5 months later, on 23 May 2000, the Defence Strategy.²⁷ Both documents were announced within one year from accession, and the adoption of NATO’s strategic concept at the Washington summit in 1999.

Another strategy entitled the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland was developed in 2003. However, it was assessed as a much-needed and useful document, coming up against the new trends in the domain of international and national security which began to form after 11 September 2001 (9/11), despite its undoubted flaws. The new Strategy was adopted at the session of the Council of Ministers in April 2007, and the President of the Republic of Poland approved it on 13 November 2007.²⁸ The document aimed at an integrated approach to national security, stating that Poland’s security was impacted on by processes and events in the state, the region, and Europe. It indicated three tiers of national interests—vital, important, and significant. However, as stated by S. Koziej and A. Brzozowski, it does have structural shortcomings.²⁹ The National Security Strategy was met with a lively response from legal commentators, and a quite-critical assessment from academic circles.³⁰

The 2007 strategy was replaced by another, which on 5 November 2014 was approved by President Bronisław Komorowski. Before the strategy was developed, the Strategic National Security Review and the White Book on National Security were prepared in 2013.³¹

4 The White Book on the National Security of the Republic of Poland

The White Book on National Security was presented on 24 May 2013 in the Presidential Palace as the outcome of two years of work by almost 200 experts appointed in November 2010. The work was conducted within the Strategic National Security Review and Report, which ended in September 2012. The outcome of the work was the classified Report of the Committee on the Strategic National Security Review, and it contained key conclusions and recommendations on the security policy of the Republic of Poland, which constituted the basis of the White Book. Its primary role in principle was to disseminate knowledge on security and spreading public awareness in this area.

The book is an extensive study containing 265 pages, which began with a synthesis containing a diagnosis of the state of security, a projection of the security environment development, and a concept of preparing security systems. The next parts comprised an introduction explaining the methodology and the principles of the study, and four chapters. These included a diagnosis of the state of national security, with a quite detailed account of the historical evolution of Poland’s security,³² Poland’s potential in the domain of security, national interests, and strategic goals in the field of security. The subsequent part presented a projection of the security environment development in the global, regional, and national dimensions and security conditions development scenarios. The third chapter presented the concept of strategic activities, i.e. operational strategies, discussing the basis of and the fundamental idea behind the operational strategies, and also the strategic tasks of subsystems: national security operational and support subsystems. The last chapter contained a formulation of the concept for the preparation of national security systems, i.e. a preparatory strategy. The discussed issues included the bases of and the fundamental ideas behind the preparatory strategies, and the preparation of three national security subsystems: national and operational security management, and support. The book ends with a summarised conclusion and is supplemented with an extract of the main strategic recommendations of the national security review, a list of the main conceptual categories, a list of primary laws relating to national security and a list of individuals participating in the strategic security review.

Without going into a detailed presentation of the content of the White Book, it is worth emphasising that, in addition to so-called hard security issues, covering state defence and protection, special attention is drawn to new social and economic domains and sectors, as well as cross-sector security fields which are bringing new challenges and threats to the state, associated with financial, energy, demographic, cybernetic, climate and environmental security. Attention should also be paid to the main conceptual categories, contained in Annex No. 2. A characterisation was provided, i.a., of the following notions: security,³³ security environment, the state’s strategic goals in the sphere of security, the national security strategy,³⁴ and the national security system.³⁵ This terminological arrangement seems quite crucial, taking into consideration the fact that scientific studies, political commentary journalism, and normative acts of law include a number of concepts and attempts to define specific notions. The volume limits of this article do not allow a presentation of all the definitions formulated in the White Book, obliging the author to focus on the most important ones.

Unfortunately, the White Book seems to be rather unfamiliar to the public, as well as to the specialists, lawyers, and academics dealing with national security. The expectations of the White Book’s authors have not been fulfilled, as they hoped that its publication would contribute to and stimulate a broad social debate and transformational activities, strengthening the synergy of the national security system through the integration of the national security management subsystem.

5 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2014

The Strategy was developed by the Interdepartmental Group for the Development of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland appointed by way of Decree No. 63 of the Prime Minister of 4 September 2013.³⁶ By establishing the Interdepartmental Group for the Development of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, the Prime Minister indicated that its task would be to define the national interests and strategic objectives of the Republic of Poland in the sphere of security, analysing and projecting the development of external and internal national security circumstances, and formulating the main directions and the operating methods of the state and the preparations of its security systems, with the objective of developing a draft national security strategy of the Republic of Poland, and submitting it to the Council of Ministers.

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland is a quite extensive document divided into four chapters, each divided into smaller sections, and preceded by a brief introduction presenting the objective and the composition of the Strategy. The subsequent chapters present Poland as a subject of security, characterise Poland’s security environment in the global, regional, and national dimensions, and the concept of strategic actions, i.e. operational strategy; the chapter discusses defensive actions, protective actions, as well as social and economic actions in the area of security. The last, fourth chapter, is devoted to the concept of strategic preparations, i.e. a preparedness strategy, discussing the national security management subsystem, and the concomitant defence, protection, social, and economic subsystems. The document ends with a brief conclusion identifying the entities responsible for the Strategy’s implementation, and explaining that its content was developed in the Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland and the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland, specifying the long- and mid-term strategy of the country’s development. It was also stated that the verification of arrangements included in the document would take place as part of strategic national security reviews. The publication replaces the Strategy approved by the President of the Republic of Poland of 13 November 2007.³⁷

The adopted framework of the study does not allow a thorough analysis or a more-detailed description of the content of the mentioned strategy, which has already been studied by legal commentators in the above-mentioned texts. It is also worth noting the considerable progress of the content of the subsequent documents, and that in each of the subsequent strategies the concept of the security of the state was rendered differently, which resulted, on the one hand, from a change in external conditions, and on the other, the situation of the western security structures of both NATO and the European Union.

6 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2020

The next National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland was approved by way of the decision of the President of 12 May 2020.³⁸ At the same time, it was clearly stated that the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2014 had been rendered null and void. The text of the Strategy begins with an introduction, in which it is explained that the Strategy defines a comprehensive vision of shaping the national security of the Republic of Poland in all its dimensions. The Strategy takes into consideration the subject-oriented aspect, i.e. the internal dimension of national security, and the international community, i.e. regional cooperation, collaborations on the global scale and within international organisations. It stresses that it also takes into account the object-oriented aspect, encompassing all dimensions of the national security system. As emphasised in the document, national interests and strategic objectives within the domain of national security are expressed in line with the national values as stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.³⁹ The strategy also states that “the provisions of the Strategy should be further extended and reflected in the national strategic documents pertaining to the national security and development of Poland”. As noted, the Strategy considers the context of Poland’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union.

The introduction to the Strategy determines the security environment, pointing out that the greatest threat is the neo-imperial policy of the authorities of the Russian Federation, pursued by means that include military force. It affirms that the aggression against Georgia, the illegal annexation of Crimea,⁴⁰ and the hostilities in eastern Ukraine, all violated the basic principles of international law, and undermined the pillars of the European security system. As noted in the document, the Russian Federation is intensively developing its offensive military capabilities, conducting large-scale military exercises based on scenarios assuming a conflict with the NATO Member States, activities of a hybrid nature below the threshold of war which pose the risk of the outbreak of a conflict, undertaking comprehensive actions using non-military means, including cyber attacks and disinformation, with the aim of rebuilding its power and spheres of influence.⁴¹

It is argued that the primary factor shaping Poland’s security is its strong embedding in the transatlantic and European structures, and the development of bilateral and regional cooperation with key partners. As noted in the document, the bonds between the United States of America and its European allies are evolving, and there is a risk of undermining the coherence of positions and actions. Another risk factor is perceived in persistent regional and internal conflicts in the Southern European Neighbourhood, and the growing migration pressure. At the global level, a significant risk-posing phenomenon is that of the increasing strategic rivalry between the United States of America, the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian Federation.

It is concluded that the development of new technologies, both civilian and military, contributes to a significant increase in the deployment of unmanned and autonomous systems, automated and robotised weapon platforms using artificial intelligence, and long-range precision weapon systems. The rapid development of digital technologies generates previously unknown threats. The strategy states that as fixed and mobile communication networks can pose a threat to security, it is necessary to develop modern and secure telecommunication networks. In the context of the digital revolution, it is asserted that the specific role of cyberspace and information space should be considered, as they create conditions for disinformation and the manipulation of information, which necessitate effective strategic communication activities.⁴²

Ensuring energy security is considered of key importance for Poland, and the perceived challenge is to maintain the competitiveness of electricity production in Poland, in line with the climate and energy policies of the European Union.⁴³ The document highlights the significance of the state’s financial security and economic stability. The identified threats include the long-term deficit in the replacement level fertility rate in Poland, and the significant increase in the number of elderly people, which present a challenge for public finance.

The strategy recognises threats to the healthcare system, and the necessity to counteract the effects of lifestyle diseases and eliminate social inequalities in access to healthcare. It identifies the accelerating climate change, prolonged droughts, pollution, and the emissions of harmful substances as threats to security. It also indicates the need to improve the management of national security and to integrate a number of fragmented solutions. The authors further argue that, faced with progressing globalisation, the Polish economy has to face up to increasingly strong competition on foreign markets. As stated in the document, the strength of the Polish economy translates into the strength of the state’s defence potential. The strategy strongly emphasises that Poland should strive to reinforce the external pillars of its security through its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union, and the strategic partnership with the United States of America, as well as regional cooperation for security. It recognises the positive impact of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy and the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation.⁴⁴ It concludes that Poland attaches great importance to the development of regional cooperation, e.g. within the Bucharest Nine, the Visegrad Group,⁴⁵ the Weimar Triangle, the Three Seas Initiative, and collaboration with the countries of the Baltic Sea region.⁴⁶

The subsequent part of the Strategy presents values, national interests, and strategic objectives in the domain of national security. The abovementioned primary national interests in the field of national security include safeguarding independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and security of the state and its citizens. Other interests include shaping the international order, based on solidarity and respect for international law, strengthening national identity, and preserving national heritage, and ensuring conditions for sustainable and balanced social and economic development and environmental protection. The main values include the independence and sovereignty of the state, the security of its citizens, human and civil liberties and rights, human dignity, justice, national identity and heritage, the democratic state of law, solidarity, international order based on the principles of international law and environmental protection. Finally, the authors state that the said aspects of the national interest form the pillars of Poland’s national security.

This concept inspires the subsequent part of the Strategy, which presents the first pillar as concerning the security of the state and its citizens, and the second as Poland’s situation in the national security system. The third pillar is national identity and heritage, and the fourth involves social and economic development and environmental protection.

The issues within the first pillar include the necessity for integrating national security management, including state-defence management and the building of adaptation capabilities. The numerous elements in these activities cover attempts to integrate the national security management system and to develop the ability for swift adaptation to new challenges and threats.⁴⁷ This is to lead to creating an interagency coordination mechanism for the management of national security through setting up a committee of the Council of Ministers, responsible, at the strategic level, for dealing with issues in the sphere of policies, strategies, and programmes pertaining to national security management, in a manner ensuring their consistent and coherent implementation. The committee should be linked with the new role and responsibilities of the Government Crisis Management Team and the Government Centre for Security. It is stated as necessary to involve the Marshals (Speakers) of the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland in this preparation for the sake of managing national security, by adjusting the mechanisms and instruments supporting the President of the Republic of Poland in a way which reflects changes in the spheres of security and defence, including state-defence management. It is also seen as necessary to adjust the national crisis management system to the NATO Crisis Response System, by also extending it to the field of political and military conflict, and facilitating the smooth transition from the state of peace to the state of crisis and war, as well as ensuring that it provides effective tools to prevent and combat threats, including hybrid situations.⁴⁸ Further, it is considered necessary to review, prioritise, and interlink strategy and planning documents, and also to implement mechanisms in the areas of national security and defence, and the socio-economic development of the country. It is posited that the preparation and implementation of a communication system is essential for the purpose of managing the national security system, including state-defence management; also for ensuring, within the framework of a comprehensive and integrated national security system, at all levels of government and local government administration, the cohesion of civil and defence planning, as well as the possibility of the selective implementation of tasks, as required. The document states that the Act on National Security Management will be developed to implement the above-described measures.

As part of further activities under the first pillar, i.e. the security of the state and its citizens, the Strategy focuses on state defence and common defence. It asserts that it is necessary to increase the state’s resilience to threats by creating a system of common civil defence, based on the efforts of the entire nation, and building an understanding for the development of the Republic of Poland’s resilience and defence capabilities. It places special emphasis on building a system of common civil defence and resilience to threats, including hybrid threats, through ensuring the universal nature of civil defence and the protection of the population.⁴⁹ The strategy sees it necessary to develop the capacity of the health system and public administration structures to fight against epidemic threats, especially against highly infectious and particularly dangerous diseases. As noted, it is also necessary to develop diagnostic facilities and the strategic reserve programme. The strategy recognises the need for the transfer of know-how and capacities allowing the shaping of national security, based on the broad involvement of public authorities, including local government, educational, higher educational and scientific institutions, and the economy. It approaches building social capital by developing cooperation skills, networks of formal and non-formal social organisations, and by shaping the community of values within Polish society. It identifies the need to redefine the civil-defence system and the population-protection system by making it universal, and to develop a law comprehensively regulating the subject matter of civil defence. The document describes plans of increasing resilience to threats by ensuring effective energy supplies, preventing the uncontrolled movement of people and the relocation of the population, and the collection, protection, and management of food and water resources. Further goals include the creation of resilient telecommunication networks and Information and Communications Technology systems, population information and alert systems, and resilient transport networks. This is associated with the assumption of implementing a homogeneous system of human resources management, including the administration of personnel reserves.

The document expresses the need to develop the state’s capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist threats and to fight organised crime, including criminal activities in cyberspace. The authors consider it appropriate to strengthen legal certainty by ensuring effective legal protection for citizens, an efficient judiciary system, and the proper enforcement of court decisions. They recognise the necessity to continue to strengthen the counter-intelligence protection of the state authorities and critical infrastructure in a way commensurate with increasing activities of foreign intelligence services, in both the military and civilian domains.

The strategy states that it is crucial to develop the capacities of national intelligence services to identify risks at an early stage. It also points to the necessity to create conditions, in the area of spatial planning and development, allowing the effective and efficient analysis of the requirements of national security, and to provide optimal legal and organisational conditions for acting flexibly in the event of an external threat to state security in times of peace, crisis, and war.⁵⁰ The authors consider it appropriate to strengthen interagency coordination with a view to developing the capabilities of the national industrial and technological defence base within state security, including the selective launching of actions to mobilise the economy, and to meet the needs of the Polish Armed Forces. Finally, they identify the need to increase capabilities in the fields of cryptology and the production of telecommunication appliances equipped with cryptographic modules, and to build capacities for technological development and the production of strategic resources in times of peace, crisis and war.

Another issue discussed within the first pillar is the need to strengthen the Polish Armed Forces and their operational capabilities. The strategy assumes efforts to increase the growth rate of defence spending, to reach 2.5% of GDP in 2024. It points to the necessity of continuing the adaptation of the command structure of the Polish Armed Forces to reflect the needs resulting from changes in the security environment. It also describes it as vital to supplement the personnel and equipment of the Armed Forces, and to adapt training programmes and capabilities to conduct asymmetric operations. It provides for enhancing the mobility of troops and the efficiency of their support and logistics systems. The authors consider it essential to improve the management of personnel resources and to streamline the qualification and recruitment processes, as well as education and professional training. They stress that there is a necessity to build a national integrated situational awareness system, based on various means of reconnaissance, communication, command, and control, including national Earth observation satellite systems, and unmanned aerial vehicle systems. The strategy recognises the need to ensure the state’s capability for effective air defence, as well as operational capabilities, including long-range missile defences. It is also thought appropriate to develop the operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces, in particular of the Special Operations Forces. Another task is to gain operational capabilities to conduct military operations in cyberspace, and develop Cyber Defence Forces. The document points to the need to improve the mobilisation system, including the training of personnel reserves, also noting the necessity to build the operational capabilities of the Navy. It expresses the decision to implement the programme of building the Territorial Defence Forces, so that the Polish defence industry could meet the long-term needs of the Polish Armed Forces.

A lot of attention is paid to cybersecurity.⁵¹ It was determined to increase resilience and information protection levels in the military sector, while promoting practices enabling citizens to better protect their information.

The strategy also declares that it is necessary to ensure the safe operation of the state and citizens in information space. This involves creating the ability to protect this space, and the systemic response to disinformation. It was thought necessary to create a uniform system of state strategic communication, simultaneously creating procedures defining cooperation to counteract disinformation.

As part of the second pillar, strengthening the capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union is considered necessary. Among numerous measures to attain this objective, the decision made to pursue the increase and consolidation of the military presence of NATO on its Eastern flank is worth noting. Maintaining a dual-track policy towards the Russian Federation within the framework of NATO, consisting of enhanced deterrence and defence, combined with the readiness to engage in a conditions-based dialogue, is considered advisable, and so is engaging in the development of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy, including within the framework of the European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund. The document declares that divisions among European Union Member States should be prevented.⁵²

Within this pillar, the strategy also discussed the need to develop cooperation in bilateral, regional, and global formats, including with the United States and key European partners. It promises actions aimed at strengthening the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova, including support for their efforts to fulfil their European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. It also raises the need to take steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.⁵³ It stresses that national interests will be pursued in the spirit of solidarity with allies and partners. Finally, it assumes expanding the transport network and seaports, extending the inland waters development programme, and building the Solidarity Transport Hub.

As part of the third pillar, the document emphasises the need to strengthen national identity, rooted in the Christian heritage and universal values. It highlights the notions of shaping and developing patriotic attitudes, refining instruments and procedures for the protection of cultural heritage, and promoting the development and protection of traditional family values, Polish national identity, culture, and traditions. It promises to strengthen the links between the Polish diaspora and the home country, and also to strive to increase the involvement of the former in activities related to the promotion of Poland.

Another objective established within the pillar involves strengthening the positive image of the Republic of Poland, and its cultural and economic attractiveness. It is pointed out that this should be pursued through public and cultural diplomacy, along with social communication technology, taking into account the state’s historical policy.⁵⁴ The document suggests it is vital to promote the Polish language, culture, science, and history, and the nation’s Christian heritage. In addition, it recognises the need to strengthen the “brand” of the Polish economy and to support Polish companies in the process of internationalisation. Last but not least, the strategy highlights the need to improve cooperation with Polish community social organisations, in order to promote Polish culture and economy.

As part of the fourth pillar, the strategy holds as fundamental that steps should be taken to improve the conditions for the protection and development of families, and to increase the health security of citizens. It also identifies the need to take measures to improve the demographic situation, including an increase in the birth rate.⁵⁵ It concludes that a policy dedicated to senior citizens must be implemented to ensure social and health security for the elderly, and to mobilise this group to remain professionally active.⁵⁶ It points to the need of improving patient care in the healthcare system, including by increasing the quality and availability of healthcare services, together with taking action in illness prevention and health education, and early diagnosis and rehabilitation. The document recognises the need to increase the number of health professionals and enhance their expertise, while preventing their migration abroad.⁵⁷ Finally, the authors consider it essential to continue to develop physical culture, by ensuring universal access to sport, and by modernising the existing sports and leisure infrastructure, and constructing new facilities.

The document also draws attention to coordinating migration policy with the economic, social, and security policies by considering both the current and projected needs on the labour market. At the same time, it emphasises the need to integrate migrants within Polish society, to ensure social cohesion, and to counteract possible threats to public order and security related to migration processes.

Further elements in the fourth pillar include economic and energy security. In terms of economic security, the strategy aims to support measures to increase resilience to international financial crises, in particular by strengthening the stability of the public finance system. It highlights the need to continue working towards a change to the structure of public expenditure, and to increase resources for development-oriented activities. It recognises the importance of ensuring efficient cash flows in times of disruption to the functioning of the banking system. It promises to strengthen the supervisory capacity and ability to counter threats related to the destabilisation of financial markets, speculative attacks on the Polish currency, and capital drain.

The document also points to the need to ensure the energy security of the state, based on traditional energy sources, by creating the conditions for the development of alternatives. It assumes increasing the diversification of oil and gas supply sources, and expanding the existing natural gas import capacities. It considers it advisable to carry out further work on extending the transmission system, and to continue diplomatic, legal, and administrative efforts to halt the construction of the transmission infrastructure which is increasing the dependence of Central Europe on gas supplies from the Russian Federation.⁵⁸

Moreover, as part of the fourth pillar, the strategy refers to the need to protect the natural environment.⁵⁹ It highlights the urgency to create the conditions for the effective enforcement of environment-related legislation, and to establish a coherent policy for the protection, restoring, and management of water resources. It also recognises the need to intensify efforts to combat air pollution, to develop electromobility, and to promote the use of alternative fuels. It stresses the necessity of adjusting national policies and actions to the climate objectives agreed on in the fora of international organisations and attempting to preserve all the functions of the natural environment, including forests as one of the key elements in the country’s ecological safety.

It recognises the need to manage human capital, and scientific and technological potential for the economic development of the country. It promises to provide the conditions conducive to the development of innovation, to promote exact sciences in order to increase technological expertise, especially in the field of security, and to promote the development and implementation of modern technologies, and the use of their effects for national security.⁶⁰ The document also highlights the need to increase investment in research and development to reach the European average, and to enhance the effectiveness of the use and commercialisation of its results.

In the concluding section of the strategy, the authors state that the mechanisms for the implementation of its provisions will be further defined in the Act on National Security Management. Pending its adoption, the strategy is intended to be implemented within the framework of the currently binding law. The persons implementing the provisions included in the strategy are obliged to consider the national interests and strategic objectives in the domain of national security in all projects planned for implementation, and in day-to-day operations.⁶¹ It is stressed that the verification of the implementation of the tasks set out in this Strategy, and the development of proposals to update it, may take place as part of national security strategic reviews.

The mere fact that this strategy has been developed should be regarded as favourable, as it was quite clear that the provisions of the previous strategy (of 2014) were neither approved nor actually implemented by the government. This strategy, however, was not preceded by any debate involving non-governmental third-party experts or representatives of various political powers. This seems to contradict the obligation arising from the previous document, which envisaged a strategic review of national security. It can be noted that the National Security Strategy of 2020 has a slightly different layout and structure compared to the documents of 2007 and 2014. This seems to clash with the logic of a strategic cycle which assumes four stages of formulating a strategic concept, i.e. identifying national interests as the starting point for further discussions; assessing and projecting the security environment; developing a concept of the objectives and duties of an operational strategy, i.e. the means to ensure the implementation of national interests; and determining the concept of the so-called preparatory strategy, i.e. the means to prepare an independent security system. It is worth noting that the Strategy fails to specify the strategic measures which Poland could and should take under various threat scenarios. The national interests of the Republic of Poland can thus be only presumed. An unquestionable strength of the Strategy is the accurate definition of existing national, regional, and global military and economic threats. Another positive aspect is the fact that it addresses such phenomena as hybridity, activities in cyberspace, and the demand for new technologies, including artificial intelligence. The intent to build an integrated security management system, which was expressed in the Strategy, and issues regarding the state’s resilience and defence universality, are also noteworthy. The duties regarding the capacities of the armed forces are fairly ambitious and justifiable, but there is no mention of the order in which they will be implemented. As regards the third pillar, one can get the impression that this is a presentation of some political agenda which has already been discussed many times. Given the purpose of this document, its frequent references to the Christian heritage appear quite striking. Moreover, in contrast to previous documents, it fails to refer to the Constitution and its axiological system, which can be regarded as an omission. Definitely too little space is devoted to what appears the most important in the long run, i.e. the armed forces and their defence capacities. Finally, the promise to develop the Act on National Security Management is noteworthy, but it should be preceded with a wider discussion, attended also by those who are perhaps the most concerned with this issue, i.e. the representatives of armed forces.

7 Conclusions

The new National Security Strategy is an interesting, yet not flawless, document, which was preceded by earlier documents dealing with the same issues. It imposes highly ambitious and interesting obligations whose justifiability is hard to question, in terms of both the government and society as a whole. However, while the Strategy is of much significance, its ranking within the normative acts system is rather low. The Act of 6 December 2006 on the Principles of Conducting the Development Policy⁶² should also be borne in mind. Within the framework of their statutory duties, the Council of Ministers have passed a number of resolutions formulating development strategies for various fields of the state’s functioning and economic sectors.⁶³ The objectives and duties envisaged in those strategies clearly correspond to those presented in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland approved on 12 May 2020. Additionally, by way of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 9 April 2013, passed under Article 14(3) of the Act of 6 December 2006 on the Principles of Conducting the Development Policy, the Strategy of the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022⁶⁴ was adopted. It contains a diagnosis of the national security system in the context of internal and external conditions, along with the challenges, development trends, and visions of the national security system, the Strategy’s objectives and interventions, the Strategy’s implementation system, and the financial framework. In the author’s opinion, the Strategy adopted by way of Resolution No. 67 is more detailed, and focused on the defensive potential, than the Strategy adopted on 12 May 2020, and there is the impression that both Strategies appear competitive to each other. At this point, any more detailed considerations on the subject matter can hardly be presented, but one cannot ignore a certain dualism resulting from the fact that the Strategy of 2013 was adopted by way of a Resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Strategy of 12 May 2020 was by way of the President’s decision passed on the motion of the Council of Ministers. Clarifying potential doubts when the provisions of these two documents are found to be contradictory is likely to pose serious problems for lawyers.