Keywords

Uruguay is one of the highest-scoring Latin American countries in social indicators such as transparency (Transparency International, 2016), political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2016), and social progress (Porter et al., 2015). Accordingly, it has been closer to Western European countries rather than other Latin American countries with regard to institutional performance, collective vision, and demographic composition (Roniger, 2016, p. 416; Transparency International, 2016; Porter et al., 2015). It has been the exception compared to the rest of Latin America due to its stable democratic institutions, great political stability, and prosperity (Klaiber, 1997). Therefore, Uruguay has been praised as “the Switzerland of Latin America” (Fitzgibbon, 1956; Roniger, 2016, p. 416).

Uruguay has enjoyed a positive reputation and good performance for most of its life as an independent nation. However, the sixteenth-century Spanish colonisers considered this small country a “land without any profit”, due to its lack of precious metals and modest indigenous civilisations (Corbo, 2011, p. 284; Da Costa, 2009, p. 140). Consequently, the Spaniards’ colonial extractive institutions (e.g. the feudal structures of the Roman Catholic Church-State) never became deeply rooted in Uruguay, unlike in the rest of the continent (Fitzgibbon, 1956; Klaiber, 1997; Da Costa, 2009; Corbo, 2011). This coincides with what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have called a “reversal of fortune”, where the weakness of extractive institutions has decisively “flipped the coin”.

As a result, the Roman Catholic Church-State never gained the social importance in Uruguay than it has had in the rest of Latin America. This facilitated various liberal social measures in Uruguay, largely due to the absence of an institutional apparatus and power quotas considered fundamental and asserted by the Roman Church-State in other parts of the world (Da Costa, 2009, p. 140; Corbo, 2011, p. 285). The following sections briefly explain the progressive secularisation (anti-clerical) that led to the liberal institutions of the Uruguayan (welfare) state.

1 Religion and Secularisation in Uruguay

Secularisation and religiosity levels in Uruguay are closer to Western European levels than to Latin American averages. Among Latin American countries, Uruguay has by far the lowest proportion of Roman Catholics (42%), yet the highest proportion of religiously unaffiliated adults (37%) (Pew Research Center, 2014). Such high levels of secularisation (and low relative Catholicism) are understandable when considering the historical laicising process that began in the nineteenth-century Uruguay (Caetano & Geymonat, 1997; Guigou, 2005; Da Costa, 2003 as cited in Da Costa, 2016, p. 229).

The idea of medieval “Christendom” inherited from Hispanic times became obsolete and residual in Uruguay already during the nineteenth century (which is early compared to the rest of Latin America). Roman Catholicism represented a religious and political culture that legitimised social and racial asymmetries. Therefore, the country’s intellectual and political leadership agreed that totalising religion (the Old Regime) needed to be overcome. Consequently, “critical” religious and philosophical thinking succeeded—but did not entirely oust—the Old Regime (Hernández, 2017, p. 111).

In this way, Uruguay closely followed the laïcité model of the French Revolution without ever completely replicating it (i.e. including pluralist connotations). This process resulted in the widespread secularisation of institutional fields, displaced religion to the domestic sphere, and guaranteed the freedom of consciousness and religion (Roniger, 2016, p. 414).

Like Switzerland, the Uruguayan understanding of laïcité also implied a mode of collective life legitimated by state neutrality and popular sovereignty (Blancarte, 2006; Da Costa 2011 as cited in Roniger, 2016, p. 415). Table 19.1 summarises the historical process towards secularisation in Uruguay.

Table 19.1 Historical steps of the secularisation process in Uruguay adapted from (Da Costa, 2009, pp. 138–140; Caetano and Geymonat as cited in Roniger, 2016, p. 414)
Full size table

A central and early innovation involved placing public education in Uruguay under civic control and the total absence of any religious content in school curricula since the nineteenth century (Asiaín, 2010). This process was related to persistent human capital building and prosperity (Becker & Woessmann, 2009).

Roman Catholicism interpreted the 1917 Constitution as a severe blow to its intentions. It became aware of the definitive loss of the old and longed-for medieval “Christendom” and of the irreversible reality of living in a pluralistic and secular society. This led to the Church retreating from public life and gradually reduced its sociocultural influence (Corbo, 2011, p. 303).

2 Role of Protestantism in Secularisation (Nineteenth Century)

The modernisation of the Uruguayan state and society involved the promotion of several core values, including religious pluralisation, freedom of worship, and the desacralisation of political and civic activities. The legitimisation of the role of religion in modern society became the subject of an intense polemic between Catholics, Protestants, and liberals in Uruguay (Hernández, 2017, p. 143).

Anti-clericalism became the link between Protestants, liberals, and Freemasons in their fight against Roman Catholicism as the common enemy. The objectives of this alliance were fourfold: (1) absolute separation of church and state; (2) elimination of all religious education from state schools; (3) creation of a secular registry of births; (4) reduction of religious holidays to no more than four dates according to the French model (the other holidays were suppressed as they were considered harmful to trade and commerce) (Hernández, 2017, pp. 128–129; Da Costa, 2009, pp. 138–140).

Protestantism opposed the corporate conception of traditional Roman Catholic society (corporatism). Consequently, Protestantism emerged as a religious alternative upholding the values of freedom, republicanism, and democracy. Its principal interest was to achieve specific changes in social organisation in line with the Anglo-American model (Amestoy, 1994, p. 617; Hernández, 2017, p. 116). Particularly significant was the missionary activity of Methodism within Protestantism. Methodism portrayed and compared itself with Roman Catholicism in the terms expressed in Table 19.2.

Table 19.2 Self-portraits of Protestantism (Methodism) compared to Roman Catholicism in the nineteenth-century Uruguay (adapted from Mann as cited in Hernández, 2017, p. 116)
Full size table

Thus, Protestantism became coupled with the anti-clerical secularist programme of liberalism. The dilemma of Protestantism as an ally of liberalism was, however, dealing with the most radical liberal postures that considered religion (in general) opposed to social progress. In this respect, Protestantism maintained a critical attitude towards ideological radicalism within liberalism. This manifested itself later in the inclusion of the freedom of religion and consciousness in the constitution, as opposed to the French model of laïcité (which radically subordinated any religious expression) (Hernández, 2017, p. 143; Roniger, 2016, p. 414).

3 The Role of Roman Catholicism

In the particular dispute that Roman Catholicism maintained with Protestantism, the Roman Church-State resorted to political power. Roman Catholicism claimed that it was the duty of the state to safeguard national religion against Protestantism and liberalism. Therefore, according to the prevailing Roman Catholic opinion, religious freedom was to be rejected. The Roman Church-State demanded eradicating biblical and apologetic literature of Protestant origin, which in extreme cases resulted in the burning of bibles (Hernández, 2017, pp. 127, 136, 144). However, the government did not impede dissenting proselytism and refrained from intervening in the ensuing anti-clerical demonstrations. Therefore, the state was no longer the “extended hand” of the Church (Hernández, 2017, pp. 144–145).

The Roman Church-State made numerous attempts to reverse secularisation. These, however, did not succeed in Uruguay (unlike in Argentina) due to the Church-State receiving little support in Uruguay. The measures included: (1) creation of a national clergy to promote the introduction of “regular corporations” and the development of Catholic associationism; (2) establishing a press and media loyal to the Church (i.e. opposed to the liberal press); (3) rural missions; (4) Catholic congresses and a Catholic club; and above all (5) the foundation of educational institutions to counteract secularism and anti-clericalism in education (Corbo, 2011).

4 Present-Day State-Church Relations

More recent controversies have revolved around the question of whether the Uruguayan Republic is regressing in its secular traditions. Examples of ample discussion have been the state-funded installation of a cross on a public road to celebrate the papal visit (1987), erecting a statue of John Paul II (2005), and other Roman Catholic icons in public spaces (Da Costa, 2009, p. 142).

5 Empirical Analysis and CDA (Prosperity)

5.1 Textual Analysis (Theological)

None of the stakeholders interviewed referred directly to a Christian (i.e. biblical) principle of prosperity being connected to obedience to the Commandments (Moral Law). However, Protestant stakeholders provided the closest direct references to biblical concepts (Table 19.3).

Table 19.3 Principles of prosperity according to stakeholders interviewed in Uruguay (Source: Author’s figure)
Full size table

The Protestant Free Pastor 1 (f) refers to spiritual prosperity (in the heavenly kingdom; John 14: 3, King James Bible, 1769) rather than to physical prosperity in this world. Similarly, the Independent Free Protestant Believer (n) mentions that after becoming prosperous (‘too well’), they forget about God, which implicitly refers to the Old Testament proverb:

… feed me with food convenient for me: lest I be full, and deny thee, and say, Who is the Lord? … (King James Bible, 1769, Proverbs 30:8–9).

The other stakeholders prefer a more secular (non-theological) approach to prosperity in Uruguay. None referred directly to a biblical principle. This contrasts with the other three cases (Switzerland, Colombia, Cuba), but can be expected considering Uruguay’s high secularisation.

5.2 Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation)

The Ecumenical Academic Theologian (i) links trustworthiness, the respect for the law, and prosperity (housing), similarly to Fukuyama (1995). When the Independent Free Protestant Believer (n) mentions that after becoming prosperous (‘too well’), they forget God, he is also referring implicitly to the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). This theory explains why societies become more secularised when enough freedom and security exist, but become more religious in times of crisis (see Sect. 7.2.1).

For the Independent Free Protestant Believer, causality tends to run from prosperity to secularism. This view, however, denies the historic “reverse of fortune” resulting from progressive secularisation and subsequent human capital building in Uruguay.

5.3 Analysis of Social Practice

Three stakeholders provide largely similar general descriptions of the different colonies (towns with different religious backgrounds). Despite some minor differences, they generally identify Waldensians and Swiss colony inhabitants as “hard workers” and “prosperous”, whereas Rosarians (Catholics) are seen as “not progressive” and “carnivalesque”. These perceptions point to a Weberian Protestant work ethic in the Colonia province, in line with the global trend discussed in this study (Table 19.4).

Table 19.4 Perceptions of three stakeholders on the prosperity and performance of towns with different religious and cultural backgrounds in Uruguay (Source: Author’s figure)
Full size table