Designs of the Four: Comparing African Strategies of Russia, China, US, and EU Against the Backdrop of the (Re)emerging Bipolarity

Abstract

The role of Africa as a geostrategically vital region is steadily growing. The leading states and economic centers of power, the United States (US), the European Union (EU), People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Russian Federation (RF), clearly realize the high importance of the resource, human, and growing economic potential of Africa in the transition from the monopolar world order of the beginning of the century towards other possible configurations—bipolarity or multipolarity. As a result, the states claiming to be significant actors in the world arena or important forces in the future world economy, increased their ideological, economic, and military–political expansion into this actively transforming region with a huge potential. The coronavirus pandemic and the global economic crisis certainly added some new elements to the global and regional African strategies of the leading states. The new African strategies adopted by each of the four heavyweights of the global politics, as well as their economic, military, and strategic rivalry on and around the African continent should be compared in order to identify similarities and differences, irreconcilable contradictions, and possible constructive interactions. In the context of the emerging global bipolarity, the strategies of the USA and China represent antagonistic programs based on fundamentally different initial messages. In the case of the US, the line is to deter by denial the spread of the competitor’s influence using tough policies, including forceful (while not necessarily military) confrontational actions, like sanctions and trade wars. The Chinese strategy seeks, while resorting to minimal direct confrontation possible, to neutralize the US–EU obstruction to Beijing’s expansion on the continent and its freedom of interaction with partners in Africa. The Russian and EU African strategies are more passive and retroactive. The interests of those power centers are not intrinsically antagonistic, but having reconciled themselves to the role of the second in the bipolar combat formation, the two actors would not cooperate but rather snatch from each other the bits and pieces remaining from the scramble of the hegemons.