Abstract
Even in relation to human rights treaties, a large part of the doctrine argues that different and innovative rules apply compared to the traditional rules of the law of treaties. In this sense it maintains that human rights treaties are “special” compared to other treaties. This “special” character is justified by different, sometimes alternative and sometimes cumulative opinions or motivations: (a) the erga omnes character of the obligations undertaken by States Parties; (b) the “objective” character of the same obligations and their collective guarantee; (c) the peremptory character of conventional human rights norms; (d) the theory that human rights treaties would have a “constitutional” nature; (e) the theory that human rights treaties would be formally addressed to individuals alongside States.
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Notes
- 1.
See, e.g., Focarelli (2013), p. 101.
- 2.
On these various opinions see the excellent analysis of Russo (2012), pp. 280–304.
- 3.
For this theory see Sudre (2006), pp. 58–60.
- 4.
See above, Sect. 2.2.
- 5.
See Sudre (2006), pp. 57 ff. and 189 ff.
- 6.
ICJ, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, p. 23.
- 7.
HRCtee, General Comment No. 24, 4 November 1994, para. 19.
- 8.
See, e.g., IACtHR, Ivcher Bronstein, para. 42.
- 9.
See Simma (1994), p. 369.
- 10.
ECtHR, Ireland v. UK, p. 90, para. 239.
- 11.
Simma (1994), p. 369.
- 12.
See above, Sect. 2.3.3.1.
- 13.
See above, Sect. 2.3.4.1.
- 14.
ECmHR, Austria v. Italy, pp. 18–19.
- 15.
ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), Judgment of 23 March 1995, paras. 70 and 75; Ireland v. UK, para. 239.
- 16.
IACtHR, Ivcher Bronstein, para. 42.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
See above, Sect. 2.3.3.
- 21.
- 22.
Scheinin (2009), p. 30.
- 23.
See, for example, ECtHR, Banković, para. 80.
- 24.
See above, Sect. 4.1.2.
- 25.
Russo (2012), p. 295.
- 26.
See below, Part IV.
- 27.
See above, Sect. 2.3.3.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
Through special rules on reservations, State succession in treaties, causes of treaty termination and withdrawal. See below, Sect. 4.2.
- 31.
Through special rules on dynamic interpretation, autonomous legal notions, positive obligations, “horizontal effects” of human rights. See below, Sect. 4.3.
- 32.
HRCtee, General Comment No. 26, 8 December 1997, para. 3. The Committee also seems to be based on principles such as good faith or the recognition of acquired rights or the territorial link between human rights treaties and individuals. On the analogy between the regime of acquired rights and the regime of human rights treaties see Mullerson (1993).
- 33.
See below, Sect. 10.4.
- 34.
- 35.
ICJ, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
- 36.
Art. 19 of the Vienna Convention.
- 37.
Art. 20(4)(b) of the Vienna Convention.
- 38.
- 39.
HRCtee, General Comment No. 24, 4 November 1994, para. 18.
- 40.
ECtHR, Belilos, para. 60; ECtHR, Weber, paras. 38–40; ECtHR, Loizidou (preliminary objections), Judgment of 23 March 1995, paras. 90–98.
- 41.
HRCtee, General Comment No. 24, 4 November 1994; HRCtee, Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, para. 6. See also the practice cited by Russo (2012), pp. 53–60.
- 42.
Conforti (2018), p. 110.
- 43.
IACtHR, Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago (preliminary exceptions), paras. 93–94.
- 44.
HRCtee, General Comment No. 24, 4 November 1994, para. 19. See also Russo (2012), pp. 56 and 60.
- 45.
- 46.
See the resolutions of 5 March 1993, 25 February 1994 and 24 February 1995, cited by Russo (2012), p. 253.
- 47.
CmHR, Resolution No. 18 of 24 February 1995 (emphasis added).
- 48.
See the Committee’s practice cited by Russo (2012), pp. 254–259.
- 49.
HRCtee, General Comment No. 26, 8 December 1997, para. 4.
- 50.
CteeAT, General Recommendation No. 12, 20 March 1993. See also the practice cited by Russo (2012), pp. 259–60.
- 51.
ECtHR, Matter v. Slovakia, para. 52; Chovancik v. Slovakia, para. 18; Konečný v. Czech Republic, para. 62.
- 52.
ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Judgment of 11 July 1996, p. 595.
- 53.
Ibidem, Separate Opinions of Judges Shahabuddeen (p. 635 ff.), Weeramantry (p. 640 ff.) and Parra-Aranguren (p. 656).
- 54.
ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, para. 94; ICJ, Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, para. 46.
- 55.
However, it is controversial in doctrine whether the rule derives from the law of treaties or that of State responsibility or from one or the other area depending on the circumstances and the type of reaction to the treaty breach. See, among others, Simma (1970); Pisillo Mazzeschi (1984); Sicilianos (1993); Forlati (2005).
- 56.
See Pisillo Mazzeschi (1984), pp. 147–154.
- 57.
On this point see Russo (2012), pp. 88–90.
- 58.
ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, para. 122.
- 59.
See Russo (2012), pp. 106–122.
- 60.
See the doctrine cited by Russo (2012), pp. 106–109.
- 61.
See ILC, Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, 17 May 2011.
- 62.
ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 24; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, para. 106.
- 63.
HRCtee, General Comment No. 31, 26 May 2004, para. 11.
- 64.
It can also be noted that human rights treaties sometimes provide for the possibility of suspending certain human rights, but not fundamental ones, in situations of necessity and emergency, which may include armed conflict (see below, Sect. 4.4.3). This may mean that, outside the operation of such express clauses, the continuity of human rights norms is the general rule.
- 65.
See Russo (2012), pp. 137–165.
- 66.
The ICJ judgment concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros project can be interpreted in this sense, since the Court stated that the permanent nature of the treaty concluded between Hungary and Czechoslovakia excluded the possibility of withdrawal by Hungary. See ICJ, Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, para. 100.
- 67.
See the practice cited by Russo (2012), pp. 149–159. See also HRCtee, General Comment No. 26, 8 December 1997, paras. 3–4.
- 68.
See below, Part IV.
- 69.
- 70.
ECtHR, Wemhoff, para. 8.
- 71.
ECtHR, Golder, paras. 33–35.
- 72.
ECtHR, Tyrer, para. 31.
- 73.
ECtHR, Marckx, para. 41.
- 74.
ECtHR, Stafford, para. 68; Goodwin Christine, para. 74.
- 75.
- 76.
- 77.
HRCtee, Judge v. Canada, para. 10.3.
- 78.
CteeERD, Hagan v. Australia, para. 7.3.
- 79.
ECteeSR, FIDH v. France, para. 27.
- 80.
See, for all, IACtHR, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni (Merits), paras. 146–155. See also below, Sect. 25.2.
- 81.
See Sudre (2006), p. 234.
- 82.
See Articles 33 and 31(3) of the Vienna Convention.
- 83.
See below, Part IV.
- 84.
Sudre (2006), p. 236.
- 85.
See Pustorino (1998), pp. 135–144.
- 86.
ECtHR, Kruslin.
- 87.
See, e.g., ECtHR, Klass and Others; Norris.
- 88.
See, e.g., ECtHR, Engel and Others; Ozturk; Adolf; Bloch.
- 89.
See, e.g., ECtHR, König.
- 90.
ECtHR, Engel and Others.
- 91.
See, e.g., ECtHR, Great Stevens and Others.
- 92.
However, it should be pointed out that sometimes the European Court, when interpreting certain concepts not well defined by the European Convention, tries to check whether there is a “European consensus”, to be identified by comparing different national legislations.
- 93.
See, for example, HRCtee, Gordon C. Van Duzen v. Canada, para. 10.2; Wallmann and Others.
- 94.
See below, Sect. 8.1.2.
- 95.
See Pisillo Mazzeschi (2008).
- 96.
Sudre (2006), p. 240.
- 97.
See above, Sect. 2.3.3.
- 98.
See Pisillo Mazzeschi (2008), chaps. III, IV, V.
- 99.
ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, paras. 24–25.
- 100.
ECtHR, Marckx, para. 31.
- 101.
IACtHR, Castillo Petruzzi, para. 202.
- 102.
- 103.
- 104.
See below, Sect. 4.3.4.
- 105.
See, e.g., ECtHR, McCann and Others.
- 106.
See, e.g., ECtHR, Osman.
- 107.
See, among others, Sudre (2006), pp. 244–245.
- 108.
See, among the first cases, ECtHR, Young, James and Webster; X and Y v. The Netherlands.
- 109.
For this practice see Sudre (2006), p. 247.
- 110.
See Pustorino (1998), pp. 48–50 and the authors cited therein.
- 111.
ECtHR, Young, James and Webster; Sigurjónsson; VgT Verein gegen Tierfrabriken; Pla and Puncernau; Sciacca.
- 112.
See (above, Sect. 4.2) the rules on reservations, on State succession, on the causes of treaty termination.
- 113.
See (above, Sect. 4.3) the rules on dynamic and evolutionary interpretation, on “autonomous” legal notions, on positive obligations and positive “procedural” obligations, on “horizontal effects” of human rights.
- 114.
Tomuschat (2014), p. 103.
- 115.
ECtHR, Belgian Linguistic Case, para. 10 (Interprétation retenue par la Cour).
- 116.
ECtHR, Handyside, para. 48.
- 117.
See Tomuschat (2014), p. 103 and the case-law cited in note 46.
- 118.
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Declaration of Brighton, 20 April 2012, paras. 3, 7–9.
- 119.
Art. 1 of Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Strasbourg, 24 June 2013.
- 120.
ACmHPR, Garreth Anver Prince v. South Africa, para. 50.
- 121.
On the subject in general, see Pisillo Mazzeschi (2004a).
- 122.
See also Articles 11(3) and 14(7)(a) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Articles 21(1)(c) and 22(5)(b) of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
- 123.
See Pisillo Mazzeschi (2004a), passim and esp. pp. 38–53.
- 124.
See Pisillo Mazzeschi (2004a), pp. 81–94.
- 125.
See Pisillo Mazzeschi (2004a), chap. IV, pp. 171–194.
- 126.
For the case-law of the European Court, see, e.g., ECtHR, Aksoy; Akdivar and Others, Judgment of 16 September 1996; Selmouni; Scordino and Others, Decision of 27 March 2003.
- 127.
In my view, the right to an effective domestic remedy against human rights violations, now absorbed by the right of access to justice, is also protected by customary international law. See below, Sect. 17.1.
- 128.
See the practice cited by Pisillo Mazzeschi (2004a), p. 198, notes 190, 191, 192.
- 129.
See below, Sect. 17.1.
- 130.
- 131.
See below, Sect. 13.3.2.
- 132.
See, for example, CCPR, Articles 6(1), 9(1) and 17(1).
- 133.
See Tomuschat (2014), pp. 105–106 and the practice cited therein.
- 134.
For one of the first applications of this method see ECtHR, Sunday Times.
- 135.
The definition of the term “necessary” was provided by the European Court in the Handyside case. The Court specified that the adjective “necessary” does not mean “indispensable”, but neither does it have milder meanings such as “permissible”, “normal”, “useful”, “reasonable” or “appropriate”. According to Tomuschat (2014), p. 105, the necessity test requires a “pressing social need” of the State.
- 136.
See Tomuschat (2014), p. 106.
- 137.
For obligations “of progressive realization”, see below, Sect. 8.2.3.
- 138.
Below, Sect. 8.2.3.
- 139.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 June 2008, Art. 8(4): “When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance with part II of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant”.
- 140.
On these obligations see Pisillo Mazzeschi (2008), pp. 429–489.
- 141.
- 142.
For these concepts see also below, Sect. 13.3.
- 143.
Art. 15: “1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law […]”.
- 144.
ECmHR, Lawless v. Ireland, Report of 12 April 1960; ECtHR, Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Judgment of 1 July 1961; ECtHR, Greek case.
- 145.
ECtHR, A. and Others v. UK, para. 216.
- 146.
ECmHR, Lawless v. Ireland; ECtHR, Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), paras. 27–30 and 36.
- 147.
ECtHR, A. and Others v. UK, para. 180.
- 148.
High Court of Justice, Serdar Mohammed, paras. 155–158.
- 149.
ECtHR, Hassan v. UK, para. 101 ff.
- 150.
See, e.g., ECmHR, France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands v. Turkey; ECtHR, Sakik and Others v. Turkey.
- 151.
However, various authors do not distinguish between necessity and proportionality. Even in case-law, the distinction is often not clear-cut.
- 152.
See, e.g., Cataldi (2012), pp. 558–559. The State’s obligation to control derogation measures implicitly results also from some decisions of the European Court (ECtHR, Ireland v. UK; Brannigan and McBride). Moreover, from the temporary nature of the state of emergency and the derogation measures, the doctrine also deduces that Article 15 is by its very nature unsuitable for regulating situations in which a State often repeats declarations of derogation over time. In fact, many Member States of the European Convention have challenged the practice of Turkey which, in the 1980s, had many times repeated over time the declarations of derogation. In 1985, on the basis of an action brought by five States against Turkey, the Commission agreed that the continued use of Article 15 measures distorted the State’s participation in the Convention (ECmHR, France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands v. Turkey).
- 153.
ECtHR, A. and Others v. UK, para. 178.
- 154.
- 155.
ECHR, Art. 4(1) and (2).
- 156.
ACHR, Art. 27(1) and (2).
- 157.
See below, Sect. 13.3.3.
- 158.
See ECHR, Art. 15(1); CCPR, Art. 4; ACHR, Art. 27(1).
- 159.
According to Kälin, Künzli (2009), p. 146, the human rights lists contained in Art. 75 of Additional Protocol I and Art. 4 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions are particularly relevant.
- 160.
On the norms of general international law of human rights, see below, Sect. 13.3.4.
- 161.
ECtHR, Hassan. In this judgment, which concerned the conduct of British military personnel in Iraq during an international armed conflict, the Court stated that, even if the United Kingdom had not submitted a formal derogation under Article 15, this did not prevent the interpretation of Article 5 of the European Convention, on personal freedom, taking into account the context of the armed conflict in Iraq and international humanitarian law. It therefore concluded that Article 5 had not been violated. See also above, Sect. 2.4.1.
- 162.
High Court of Justice, Serdar Mohammed. The British High Court of Justice, in this case which concerned the behavior of British military personnel in Afghanistan in the post-conflict phase, strongly rejected the idea that, in times of armed conflict, international humanitarian law could derogate from Article 5 of the European Convention. The Court said that Article 5, which prohibits arrest and detention except in certain listed cases, is a specific rule, which does not allow an exception under humanitarian law. It also rejected the argument that, during an armed conflict, humanitarian law, as a special law, may derogate from the European Convention. The Court therefore concluded that Article 5 had been infringed.
- 163.
See, e.g., De Schutter (2010), p. 547 ff. Article 4 of the Covenant expressly provides that derogation measures must not lead to discrimination. See also, in a similar sense, Article 27 of the American Convention.
- 164.
On the prohibition of discrimination see below, Sect. 18.1.
- 165.
See, e.g., ECtHR, Aksoy; Brannigan and McBride.
- 166.
For example, in the case of Turkey.
- 167.
On this topic see Pustorino (2020), pp. 43–44.
- 168.
However, I think it is preferable to treat the notion of margin of appreciation separately, since it has its own characteristics and its own autonomy with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, although it has a link with the latter.
- 169.
See the practice cited by Tomuschat (2014), p. 109.
- 170.
Protocol No. 15 amending the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 24 June 2013, Article 1.
- 171.
See Tomuschat (2014), p. 107.
- 172.
See Sudre (2006), p. 217.
- 173.
ECtHR, Handyside, para. 48.
- 174.
See the case-law cited by Tomuschat (2014), p. 107, note 75.
- 175.
ACmHPR, Garreth Anver Prince v. South Africa, para. 51.
- 176.
See Sudre (2006), pp. 217–219.
- 177.
See ECtHR, Sunday Times, para. 61, where it is stated that the Court cannot “négliger les caractéristiques de fond et de procédure (des) droits internes respectifs”.
- 178.
See ECtHR, Casado Coke, para. 54.
- 179.
See ECtHR, Gitonas, para. 39.
- 180.
ECtHR, Sunday Times, para. 61.
- 181.
ECtHR, Handyside, para. 48.
- 182.
ECtHR, Otto-Preminger-Institut, para. 50.
- 183.
ECtHR, Open Door v. Ireland, para. 63.
- 184.
ECtHR, Hatton, para. 97.
- 185.
- 186.
ECtHR, X, Y and Z v. UK.
- 187.
See ECtHR, Fretté, para. 41.
- 188.
See ECtHR, Leyla Şahin, paras. 109–110; Lautsi and Others.
- 189.
ECtHR, Marckx.
- 190.
ECtHR, Goodwin.
- 191.
This criterion is highlighted by Sudre (2006), p. 221.
- 192.
ECtHR, Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann.
- 193.
ECtHR, Sporrong and Lönnroth.
- 194.
See Svensson-McCarthy (1998), esp. pp. 313–319 and 324–325.
- 195.
- 196.
See the case-law cited by Tomuschat (2014), p. 109, notes 87, 88 and 89.
- 197.
This is even more true in the framework of regional human rights protection systems, where there is greater homogeneity among States Parties.
- 198.
See also Benvenisti (2018).
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Pisillo Mazzeschi, R. (2021). Treaties. In: International Human Rights Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77032-7_4
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