Skip to main content

From Wanting to Acting: Pathways to Personal Desire

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
General Human Psychology

Part of the book series: Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences ((THHSS))

  • 555 Accesses

Abstract

How do we want something? What is the psychological system that makes wanting in different forms an act of change of the present status quo? Why do we all not become thieves or road robbers when overwhelmed with the feeling “I want THAT”(what another person or society has). Our internalized social norm system makes such act impossible. Yet the norms are different in a war context—a victorious army becomes into a band of looters taking everything they want from the captured cities. Interestingly there is a time—it happens over 2 days, after which the regular military discipline is restored. Thus—the acts of personal wanting are redundantly covered by social norms of how wanting can lead to obtaining the wanted, as well as regulating what objects are not to be wanted. The societal norm system frames the personal motivational process of moving from “I detect X” to “I want X” to “I need X!”. The goal in this chapter is to elaborate how these processes work.

G. Bernini Abduction of Proserpina

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    In the sense of Kurt Lewin who introduced a dynamic system of field forces operating on existential field structures (Lewin, 1933, 1936). These topological structures included directional vectors that encoded the notion of forces onto the topological maps.

  2. 2.

    Brentano, 1874, p. 127. This is “a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything similar” (Brentano, 1995, p. 102). Mental phenomena are available only in the internal perception (innere Wahrnehmung) and thus differ from objects “out there.”

  3. 3.

    Gibson’s concept is functionally close to the notion of demand character (Aufforderungscharakter—Lewin, 1926, p 351), yet it did not directly originate in the latter.

  4. 4.

    There are two distinguishing features of kleptomania—the act of stealing as a special thrill, often nonconscious, and the making of collections of the stolen objects that are personally valued. Shop-stealing for existing material need is not included in kleptomania.

  5. 5.

    The social class specificity of the stealing act became recognized in the United States even as legitimate for law: “Stores lost merchandise from many sources-professional thieves, clerks, delivery men, and others-but only the middle-class female shoplifter was thought to be acting out of a medical disability. A large proportion of these women were excused either in the store or in the courtroom because they claimed to be kleptomaniacs or because they cited general malaise and physical debility” (Abelson, 1983, p. 140). These claims were successful in their defense as they reclassified the shoplifting from crime to medically inevitable condition.

  6. 6.

    The dispute around what is scientific in psychology has been going on for two centuries, and it misses the point—instead of phenomena-relevant approaches (consider the methodology in Chap. 12), psychologists dispute the labeling of what they do as “science” (Valsiner, 2012).

  7. 7.

    Their research—carried out in American context—has not used the single-subject-based introspective techniques, but rather varies the conditions for goal-binding through experimental manipulations of situations (see Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2019). Despite this limitation the impacts of goal binding have been so strong as to show up even in traditional experimental studies using correlational and group comparison tactics. Final proof of these effects requires within-subject microgenetic study (Molenaar, 2004, Wagoner, 2009).

  8. 8.

    Most elaborated by the “Rochester School” of motivation studies (Deci, 1975, Ryan, 2019).

  9. 9.

    Deci (1971).

  10. 10.

    Deci and Ryan, 1980, 2014, Ryan et al., 2019.

  11. 11.

    When that step is taken—as in the Self-Determination Theory of motivation (Ryan et al, 2019, p. 92, Fig. 6.1)—one can observe the increasing undifferentiated nature of phenomena when the description of the motivation processes moves from extrinsic towards the internalized (intrinsic) side.

  12. 12.

    In line with the general energetistic philosophy propagated by Wilhelm Ostwald from the beginning of the twentieth century (Hakfoort, 1992, Ostwald, 1908).

  13. 13.

    In the sense of Alexius Meinong and the “Graz School” (Albertazzi et al., 2001). Such subsisting notions of no material existence (“love”,”justice,” etc.) are central for human psychological functioning while remaining unspecifiable.

References

  • Abelson, E. S. (1983), The invention of kleptomania. Signs, 15, 1, 123–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ach, N. (1905). Über die Willenstätigkeit und das Denken. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ach, N. (1928). Über die Entstehung des Bewusstseins der Willensfreiheit. In E. Becker (Ed.), Bericht über den X Kongresse für experimentelle Psychologie in Bonn, 1927. (pp. 91–97). Jena: Gustav Fischer

    Google Scholar 

  • Ach, N. (1935). Analyse des Willens. Berlin: Urban & Schwartzenberg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Albertazzi, L, , Macquette, D., and Poli, R. /Eds.) (2001). The school of Alexius Meinong. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berlyne, D. (1960). Conflict, arousal and curiosity. New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bisgaard, C. H. (2021), Locus of Control in Dynamic Settings: a Semiotic Extension of an Old Theory. Human Arenas. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42087-020-00127-5

  • Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie von empirische Standpunkte. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brentano, F. (1995). Psychology from the empirical standpoint. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deci, E. L (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 105–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. (1980). Self-determination theory: When mind mediates behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 1, 1, 33–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. (2014). Levels of analysis, regnant causes of behavior and well-being: The role of psychological needs. Psychological Inquiry,22, 17–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., and Ryan, R. (2001). External rewards and intrinsic motivation in education: reconsidered once again. Review of Educational research, 21, 1, 1–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gollwitzer, P. M. (2003). Why we thought that action mind-sets affect illusions of control. Psychological Inquiry, 14, 3–4, 261–269.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gollwitzer, P. M., and Oettingen, G. (2019). Goal attainment. In R. M. Ryan (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of Human Motivation (pp. 247–267). New York, NY: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Hakfoort C. (1992). Science deified: Wilhelm Ostwald’s energeticist world-view and the history of scientism. Annals of Science, 49, 525–544.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Janet, P. (1925). Psychological healing: A historical and clinical study. New York: McMillan

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewin, K. (1926). Vorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis. Psychologische Forschung, 7, 330–385.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of topological Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewin, K. (1933). Environmental forces. In C. Murchison (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology (pp. 590–626). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Molenaar P (2004). A manifesto on psychology as idiographic science: Bringing the person back into scientific psychology, this time forever. Measurement, 2, 201–218.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Brien, P. (1983). The kleptomania diagnosis: Bourgeois women and theft in late Nineteenth-Century France. Journal of Social History, 17, 1, 65–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostwald, W. (1908) Die Energie. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth

    Google Scholar 

  • Valsiner, J. ( 2007) Culture in minds and societies. New Delhi: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Valsiner, J. (2012). Guided science. New Brunswick, NJ: transaction Publidshers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Valsiner, J. (2014). Invitation to cultural psychology. London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagoner, B.( 2009). The experimental methodology of constructive microgenesis. In J. Valsiner, P. Molenaar, M., Lyra., and N.Chaudhary (Eds.) . Dynamic process methodology in the social and developmental sciences. New York: Springer

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Valsiner, J. (2021). From Wanting to Acting: Pathways to Personal Desire. In: General Human Psychology. Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75851-6_11

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics