Abstract
Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations lends itself to be seen as an egoistic or self-centred exercise of self-care. I will argue against this view and show that caring for others also plays a central role in this work. In order to do so, I will first discuss what caring for someone else entails according to Marcus Aurelius. Second, I will show that this kind of care can be directed at all human beings without becoming too vague or abstract, for it implies a form of universal love that directly determines one’s relation to those closest to oneself. Third, I will argue that, despite emphasizing the self and one’s virtue, Marcus Aurelius adopts an objective and highly metaphysical standpoint that establishes the equal importance of the self and others. Finally, I will consider the possibility of separating Marcus Aurelius’ views on care from some of his main metaphysical claims.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Cp. Foucault 2001.
- 4.
For the notion of retreating into oneself (εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναχωρεῖν) or retreating into one’s own soul or mind (ἀναχωρεῖν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχήν), see 4.3. The references to Marcus Aurelius’ text (as well as the translations) are all based on Farquharson’s edition (1944).
- 5.
See 2.15, 12.8, 12.22, 12.26.
- 6.
Cp. e.g. 5.26, 6.8, 9.7, 12.33.
- 7.
Cp. e.g. 12.1.
- 8.
Cp. e.g. 7.31: “Make yourself glad in simplicity, self-respect, and indifference to what lies between virtue and vice.”
- 9.
See e.g. 3.11. For more on Marcus Aurelius’ stance with respect to the so-called indifferents (τὰ ἀδιάφορα), cp. e.g. Gourinat 2012: 424–425.
- 10.
This is clearly stated in 8.56: “To my will the will of a neighbour is as indifferent as his vital spirit and his flesh. For even though we were brought into the world more than anything else for the sake of one another, still each of our governing selves has its own sovereign right; for otherwise the evil of my neighbour would surely be evil of mine, and that was not God’s good pleasure, in order that my unhappiness might not depend on someone other than myself.” For similar ideas, cp. 2.1, 2.9, 4.39, 8.1, 11.34.
- 11.
- 12.
See e.g. 8.59, 9.11, 10.4, 11.13, 12.16.
- 13.
For the idea of being an example, see e.g. 10.15.
- 14.
See in particular 9.11.
- 15.
Cp. 7.54, 9.1, 10.11, 11.20, 12.1.
- 16.
Cp. e.g. 7.13, 8.26, 9.27, 11.13.
- 17.
Cp. e.g. 2.1, 5.20, 9.22.
- 18.
Cp. in particular 11.18, which enumerates the different arguments against anger.
- 19.
In fact, one must be even prepared to lose the other at any time. This is what is implied in 11.34: “Epictetus used to say, as you kissed your child, you should say in your heart: ‘to-morrow maybe you will die.’”
- 20.
This is the Stoic view on love or friendship (φιλία) and it gives rise to many complex questions. For a discussion of this, see e.g. Lesses 1993.
- 21.
See 5.36: “Don’t be carried away by imagination which sees only the surface, but help men as best you may and as they deserve, even though their loss be of something indifferent. Do not, however, imagine the loss to be an injury, for that habit is bad. Like the old man who, when he went away, used to ask for his foster-child’s top, but did not forget that it was a top; so you should act also in this instance.” Cp. also 6.27: “How inhuman it is to forbid men to set out after what appears suitable and advantageous to themselves. Yet, in a way, you are not allowing them to do this, whenever you are indignant because they do wrong; for certainly they are moved to what looks to be suitable and advantageous to themselves. ‘But it is, in fact, not so.’ Very well, instruct them and make it plain; don’t be indignant.”
- 22.
See 9.11 and 9.27.
- 23.
See 9. 29.
- 24.
See in particular 4.4: “If mind is common to us all, then also the reason, whereby we are reasoning beings, is common. If this be so, then also the reason which enjoins what is to be done or left undone is common. If this be so, law also is common; if this be so, we are citizens; if this be so, we are partakers in one constitution; if this be so, the Universe [κόσμος] is a kind of Commonwealth [πόλις].” Cp. also 2.16, 3.11, 4.3, 6.44, 10.15, 10.33, 12.36. For more on the notion of cosmic πόλις and Marcus Aurelius’ cosmopolitanism, see e.g. Stanton 1968 and Hammer 2014.
- 25.
For this alternative between a tension towards unity and the attempt to sever oneself, cp. 8.34, 9.9, 9.23, 11.8.
- 26.
See in particular 5.20: “(...) man is the nearest creature to ourselves [ἡμῖν ἐστιν οἰκειότατον ἄνθρωπος] (...).”
- 27.
Cp. e.g. 12.26: “(...) the great kinship [συγγένεια] of man with all mankind (...).”
- 28.
This is a central component of the idea that there is a cosmic city to which we all belong.
- 29.
For the notion of citadel (ἀκρόπολις), see 8.48.
- 30.
See in particular 6.39: “Fit yourself into accord with the things in which your portion has been cast, and love the men among whom your lot has fallen [οἷς συνείληχας ἀνθρώποις], but love them truly.”
- 31.
Cp. e.g. 9.27, 10.36.
- 32.
See 6.48.
- 33.
See 3.4: “(...) he remembers that all reasonable beings are akin to himself, and that although to care for all man is in accord with man’s nature (...).”
- 34.
Cp. e.g. 6.1, 7.5, 9.23, 11.21, 12.20.
- 35.
Cp. 12.4: “I often wonder how it is that every one loves himself more than all the world (...).”
- 36.
Cp. 6.7, 6.48, 7.13, 7.74.
- 37.
For the idea of being drawn to each other, cp. in particular 9.9.
- 38.
Cp. 4.3, 7.55, 8.56, etc.
- 39.
Cp. 9.23, 10.6, 11.21, 12.20.
- 40.
The distinction of these two levels could also be used to explain why one may be indifferent to others (insofar as they do not directly affect one’s virtue) and at the same time be concerned with them. On this topic, cp. Wolf 2016.
- 41.
To be more precise, the guidance of nature or reason and the objective standpoint that corresponds to it is the basis of the ideal form of social appropriation (οἰκείωσις), which involves identifying ourselves with all others or regarding them as our own (οἰκεῖοι). This blurring of the boundaries between one’s identity and others is in turn the basis of a moral stance that is neither egoistic nor altruistic. For more on this, cp. in particular Algra 2003.
- 42.
See 10.6: “Whether there are Atoms or Nature , the first postulate must be: ‘I am part of the Whole which is governed by Nature’; the second: ‘I am allied in some way to the parts that are of the same kind with me.’ (...) By remembering that I am a part of a Whole so characterized, I shall be well-affected to all that results from it, and in as much as I am allied in some way to the parts of the same kind as myself, I will do no unsocial act, rather I will study the good of my kind and direct every impulse to the common benefit and divert it from what opposes that benefit.” See also 12.14: “Either the Necessity of destiny and an order none may transgress, or Providence that hears intercession, or an ungoverned welter without a purpose. (...) If an undirected welter, be glad that in so great a flood of waves you have yourself within you a directing mind ; and, if the flood carry you away, let it carry away flesh, vital-spirit, the rest of you; for your mind [νοῦς] it shall not carry away.”
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Telo, H. (2021). The Care of Others in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. In: Braga, J., Santiago de Carvalho, M. (eds) Philosophy of Care. Advancing Global Bioethics, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75478-5_9
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