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Challenging the Cartesian Mind Paradigm

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Rethinking Descartes’s Substance Dualism

Part of the book series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind ((SHPM,volume 29))

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Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that, for Descartes, the faculty of imagination belongs to the essence of the mind. As imagination needs the body to occur, this claim conflicts with the separatist interpretation of real distinction argument. Furthermore, Descartes’s view of imagination leads to reconsider whether, for Descartes, the mind depends, in a certain way, on the body.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Gaudemard (2018).

  2. 2.

    According to Descartes, any voluntary thought is an action of the soul: CSM I, 366/AT XI, 344, 17-345, 5.

  3. 3.

    CSM I, 336/AT XI, 344,17-345, 5.

  4. 4.

    CSM II, 51/AT VII, 73, 1; CSMK, 345/AT V, 163; CSM I, 335/AT XI, 343, 12-17.

  5. 5.

    CSMK, 344/AT V, 162; ‘For imagining is simply contemplating the shape or image of a corporeal thing’. See also CSM, II 19/AT VII, 28, 4-5; CSM II, 265/AT VII, 387, 11–14; CSM I, 42/AT X 416, 2–4 and 8–10.

  6. 6.

    CSM I, 42/AT X, 416, 2-4. In the Rules, Descartes uses ‘to conceive’ and ‘to imagine’ interchangeably.

  7. 7.

    CSM I, 26/AT X, 389, 3-6; CSM I, 42/AT X, 416, 2–4.

  8. 8.

    CSM I, 40-41/AT X, 413, 21-414, 4.

  9. 9.

    AT X, 230, 9; CSM I, 47/AT X, 423, 4, 13; CSM I, 65/AT X, 453, 6-7; CSM II, 62/AT VII, 90, 1; CSM II, 93/AT VII, 129, 7.

  10. 10.

    CSM II, 40-41/AT X, 413, 21-414, 12; CSM II, 58/AT X, 440, 29; CSM II, 117/AT VII, 165, 22-23; CSM II, 127/AT VII, 181, 10-14; CSM II, 129/AT VII, 183, 24; CSM II, 251/AT VII, 364, 1; CSM II, 253/AT VII, 366, 19-20.

  11. 11.

    While the common sense is distinguished from the corporeal imagination in the Regulae, Descartes will identify them in the Meditations. See CSM II, 22/AT VII, 32, 18-19.

  12. 12.

    CSM I, 40-41/AT X, 412, 14-413, 2.

  13. 13.

    CSM I, 42/AT X, 414, 22-24.

  14. 14.

    CSM I, 41-42/AT X, 414, 25-415, 7; CSM I, 139/AT VI, 55, 19-29.

  15. 15.

    CSM I, 41-42/AT X, 414, 19–24. In the Treatise on Man (CSM I, 106/AT XI, 176, 29–31; CSM I, 106-107/AT XI, 177, 23–178, 14; CSM I, 108/AT XI, 202, 5–8), and in The Description of the Human Body (CSM I, 316/AT XI, 227, 14–17), imagination is located in the pineal gland with the common sense.

  16. 16.

    CSM I, 41-42/AT X, 414, 25–415, 7.

  17. 17.

    CSM II, 265/AT VII, 387, 11-14.

  18. 18.

    AT X, 411, 7-10/CSM I, 39.

  19. 19.

    AT X, 415, 22-416, 8/CSM I, 42.

  20. 20.

    AT X, 415, 7-12/CSM I, 42. Guéroult (1968, 41) distinguishes the psychological imagination, which can be intellectual and sensible, from the corporeal imagination. As there are four kinds of memories (intellectual memory, sensible memory, corporeal memory in the brain, and corporal memory in every organ), there are four kinds of imagination. Descartes identifies the corporeal imagination with the corporeal memory in the Regulae; but in the Treatise on Man, he will locate them at different places in the brain.

  21. 21.

    Descartes to Mersenne first April 1640, CSMK, 146/AT III, 48, 27-30. See also Descartes to Mesland 2 May 1644, CSMK, 233/AT IV, 114, 20-25.

  22. 22.

    CSMK, 180/AT III, 361, 9-15.

  23. 23.

    CSM I, 43/AT X, 416, 17-21.

  24. 24.

    CSM I, 42/AT X, 416, 8-10.

  25. 25.

    CSM II, 56/AT VII, 82, 29-83, 2.

  26. 26.

    CSM I, 29-30/AT X, 395, 25-396, 1; CSM I, 31/AT X, 398, 26-29; CSM I, 42-43/AT X, 416, 23-417, 3. The epistemological function of imagination is to help the mind to conceive physical things; this view can be traced back to the Olympica probably written by Descartes between 1619-1622, before the Rules: ‘Just as the imagination employs figures in order to conceive of bodies, so, in order to frame ideas of spiritual things, the intellect makes use of certain bodies which are perceived through the senses, such as wind and light.’ (AT X, 217, 12-16/CSM I, 4). For detailed studies focused on Descartes’s treatment of imagination, see Boutroux (1900), Roy (1944), Bergoffen (1976), Rathmann (1981), Fòti (1986), Jullien (1996), Sepper (1989, 1996), Lyons (1999), Bouriau (2000).

  27. 27.

    CSM I, 59/AT X, 442, 17-443, 10.

  28. 28.

    CSM I, 139/AT VI, 37, 1-9. See also CSM I, 220/AT VIII-A, 37, 15-17.

  29. 29.

    CSM II, 54/AT VII, 78, 21-22.

  30. 30.

    CSMK, 97/AT II, 36, 12.

  31. 31.

    CSM II, 56/AT VII, 81, 4 and 13.

  32. 32.

    CSM II, 54/AT VII, 78, 21-23.

  33. 33.

    CSM II, 11/AT VII, 15, 20-24.

  34. 34.

    Trans. in English by J. Bennett, 58 (https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1619_2.pdf); AT I, 513, 24-514, 3.

  35. 35.

    CSM I, 141/AT VI, 59, 8-60, 3.

  36. 36.

    CSM II, 113/AT VII, 160, 7-8.

  37. 37.

    CSM I, 195/AT VIII-A, 7, 20-22.

  38. 38.

    CSM I, 210-211/AT VIII-A, 25, 25-27.

  39. 39.

    CSM I, 195/AT VIII-A, 7, 22–24.

  40. 40.

    CSM, II, 54/AT VII, 78, 21–28.

  41. 41.

    As mentioned above, I use the verb ‘to inhere’ to mean that, for Descartes, the modes ontologically depend on the substance.

  42. 42.

    CSM I, 216/AT VIII-A, 32, 1–6.

  43. 43.

    CSM I, 213-214/AT VIII-A, 29, 16-27.

  44. 44.

    CSM I, 210/AT VIII-A, 24, 21–23.

  45. 45.

    CSM II, 114/AT VII, 161, 14–17.

  46. 46.

    CSM I, 210/AT VIII-A, 25, 12–27.

  47. 47.

    CSM I, 211/AT VIII-A, 26, 19–25.

  48. 48.

    CSM I, 211/AT VIII-A, 25, 25–27.

  49. 49.

    CSM II, 21/AT VII 31, 22-28.

  50. 50.

    See chap. 2.2.

  51. 51.

    CSMK, 361/AT V, 268, 27–269, 6.

  52. 52.

    CSM I, 211/AT VIII-A, 26, 11-15.

  53. 53.

    Ibid.

  54. 54.

    Liard (1882), 254; Roy 1944; Laporte (2000), 57–59; Guéroult (1968), 41; Caton (1973), 65 f.; Marion (2000), § 20; Rathmann (1981), 65; Fòti (1986); Sepper (1989, 1996); Lyons (1999); Schouls (2000), 58.

  55. 55.

    Gouhier (1962); Laporte (2000); Broughton and Mattern (1978); Schmaltz (1992).

  56. 56.

    Cottingham (1985) argues that, according to Descartes, sensation is a third type of mode which belongs to the mind-body union, and that Descartes is inconsistent. For Cottingham, there is no third type of substance.

  57. 57.

    Contrary to Cottingham, Schmaltz (1992, 286–288), claims that there is a third kind of substance, the mind-body union, in addition to the mind and the body. For a defence of the claim that a human being is a substance according to Descartes, see Hoffman (1986;2009).

  58. 58.

    CSMK, 218/AT III, 665, 9-24. See Descartes to Elisabeth 26 June 1643, CSMK, 226/AT III, 691, 3–8: ‘Dont les principales me semblent être qu’après avoir distingué trois genres d’idées ou de notions primitives qui se connaissent chacune d’une façon particulière et non par la comparaison de l’une à l’autre, à savoir la notion que nous avons de l’âme, celle du corps, et celle de l’union qui est entre l’âme et le corps.’

  59. 59.

    189. See also Rozemond (2006), 56.

  60. 60.

    See Rozemond (2006), 53: ‘Descartes’ principal argument for dualism is generally regarded as based on a conception of thought in his broad sense, but in fact it should be understood as focused only on intellectual activity. This is strongly suggested by his remarks, right after the conclusion of the argument in Meditation VI (…). Sensation and imagination are modes of the mind, but the argument for dualism had been based on a conception of its essence which Descartes presents as intellectual.’

  61. 61.

    CSMK, 203/AT III, 479, 10–16.

  62. 62.

    P. 173.

  63. 63.

    CSMK, 380/AT V, 402, 6.

  64. 64.

    Most of the issues adressed in this text concern the nature of the mind and the nature of knowledge.

  65. 65.

    CSM I, 51/AT VII, 73, 10–13.

  66. 66.

    CSMK, 344/AT V, 162.

  67. 67.

    CSM II, 141–143/AT VII, 203, 20–26.

  68. 68.

    Descartes to Gibieuf 19 January 1642, CSMK, 202/AT III, 475, 1-5; Descartes to Mesland 2 May 1644, CSMK, 236/AT IV, 120, 7-20.

  69. 69.

    I also disagree with Rozemond’s assumption that the mind can think before being united to the body. This will be explored in more depth in chap. 4.

  70. 70.

    Descartes to Mersenne March 1637, CSMK, 53/AT I, 349, 31-350, 1.

  71. 71.

    CSMK, 217-218/AT III, 664, 23–27.

  72. 72.

    CSM II, 56/AT VII, 81, 6. See also Descartes to Regius January 1642, CSMK, 206/AT III, 493, 10–17.

  73. 73.

    CSM I, 57/AT X, 439, 1-10.

  74. 74.

    CSM I, 57/AT X 439, 1–10; CSMK, 206/AT III, 493, 10–17.

  75. 75.

    CSM II, 56/AT VII, 81, 1-14; CSM I, 224/AT VIII, 41, 14-22.

  76. 76.

    CSM II, 10/AT VII, 14, 4–11.

  77. 77.

    Alanen (2003), 57, rightly pointed out that, according to Descartes, there was a distinction between the pure mind and the embodied mind: ‘Descartes hence draws a distinction between the nature or essence of the mind in a strict sense and the nature of the mind in a broader sense: the latter includes modes of thinking (imagination and sense perception) that are not essential to the mind in itself but belong to it only as a consequence of its union with the body […]. These faculties (= sensation and imagination) are modes of thought and as such belong to the mind, but insofar as they depend on the body they are, with regard to the mind alone, accidental properties. But if they are accidental modes of the mind when considered in itself, they are nonetheless necessary properties of the embodied, human mind that is, ‘as it were, intermingled’ with the body.’ Alanen considers that sensation and imagination are essential properties of the human mind.

  78. 78.

    CSM II, 56/AT VII, 81, 1-5.

  79. 79.

    For example: Descartes to Gibieuf 19 January 1642, CSMK, 203/AT III, 479, 10-16; Descartes to Regius Janurary 1642, CSMK, 206/AT III, 493, 10-17.

  80. 80.

    CSM I, 224/AT VIII-A, 41, 14-23.

  81. 81.

    For a defence of this view, see Alanen (2003).

  82. 82.

    CSM II, 4/AT VII, 3, 10-11: ‘[…] mentemque humanam a corpore distingui’.

  83. 83.

    ‘I tried to remove the ambiguity of the word ‘thought’ in articles 63 and 64 of Part One of the Principles’, CSMK, 357/AT V, 221, 10-11.

  84. 84.

    CSM I, 215/AT VIII-A, 30, 19-25.

  85. 85.

    This interpretation is supported by Beck (1965); Garber (1983); Seager (1988); Kenny (1968); Radner (1971); Rozemond (1998); Yandell (1999); Secada (2000); Wilson (1978).

  86. 86.

    CSM II, 56/AT VII, 81, 1-14.

  87. 87.

    CSM II, 160/AT VII, 227, 23-228, 3.

  88. 88.

    Gouhier (1962), 364 argues that Descartes did not want to prove union but only to prove that union is substantial. Descartes’s argument is about the nature of union, not about its possibility. The substantial union was supported by Aquinas.

  89. 89.

    Descartes to Arnauld, 29 July 1648, CSMK, 358/AT V, 222, 9-20.

  90. 90.

    Descartes to Elisabeth 21 May 1643, CSMK, 219/AT III, 665 9-24.

  91. 91.

    See Radner (1971) who argues that, for Descartes, the notion of mind-body is not a primitive notion.

  92. 92.

    CSM I, 44/AT X, 418, 3-13. In the Rules, Descartes claims that things are represented by simple and composite natures constituting the ground of knowledge.

  93. 93.

    Descartes to Regius January 1642, CSMK, 206/AT III, 493, 10-17.

  94. 94.

    CSMK, 345/AT V, 163.

  95. 95.

    CSM I, 240/AT VIII-A, 61, 21-29.

  96. 96.

    CSMK, 226/AT III, 691, 15-16.

  97. 97.

    AT X, 68, 10-18.

  98. 98.

    Descartes to Elisabeth 21 May 1643, CSMK, 219/AT III, 668, 1-4.

  99. 99.

    In 1662, More published in London his correspondence with Descartes in A Collection of Several Writings, 55-108. This correspondence was also published in Opera Omnia in 1679 (2 vols.). Gabbey (1982, 1995), Schmaltz (2007), and Agostini (2008) provide insightful contributions to understand the consequences of this correspondence on Cartesianism. Leech (2013) shows that modern atheism has its roots in the correspondence between Descartes and More. Most of scholars consider that More has never been Cartesian, even when he seemed to share common views with Descartes. See Koyré (1973, 139-155; Gabbey (1982), 225-228 and (1995); Rogers (1985); Hall (2002, pp. 146-167); Bondì (2001, pp. 134-141); Agostini (2008, p. 212). Concerning the discussion between Descartes and More regarding to the animal’s soul, see Bitbol-Héspèries (1991).

  100. 100.

    Descartes to Elisabeth 28 June 1643, CSMK, 226/AT III, 691, 22-26.

  101. 101.

    See Rozemond (2003) and Anfray (2014) who provide enlightening studies of the historical background of this view.

  102. 102.

    CSM I, 232/AT VIII-A, 52, 24-53, 2.

  103. 103.

    CSMK, 372-373/AT V, 343, 8-12.

  104. 104.

    CSM I, 59/AT X, 442, 17-19.

  105. 105.

    Descartes to Gibieuf 19 January 1642, CSMK, 203/AT III, 478, 17-20; CSM I, 224/AT VIII-A, 42, 7-8.

  106. 106.

    Descartes to Plempius for Fromondus 03 October 1637, CSMK, 65/AT I, 422, 9-10.

  107. 107.

    Descartes to Ciermans 23 March 1638, AT II, 71; CSM I, 247/AT VIII-A, 78, 26-79,8.

  108. 108.

    Descartes to Elisabeth 28 June 1643, CSMK, 226/AT III, 691, 22-26.

  109. 109.

    CSM I, 232/AT VIII, 52, 3-12.

  110. 110.

    CSM I, 59/AT X, 442, 20-21.

  111. 111.

    More to Descartes 11 December 1648, AT V, 238, 20-25.

  112. 112.

    AT V, 302, 14-22.

  113. 113.

    AT V, 305, 7-17.

  114. 114.

    Garber (1982), 144-148 provides an illuminating detailed account of the issue of impenetrability in this correspondence.

  115. 115.

    AT V, 302, 19-25.

  116. 116.

    The claim that God is wholly present in every part of the world will be later rejected by More. See Rozemond (2003) and Agostini (2006).

  117. 117.

    CSMK, 361/AT V, 269, 25-31.

  118. 118.

    CSM I, 59/AT X, 442, 25-26; CSM I, 60-61/AT X, 445, 1-10; CSM I, 61/AT X, 445, 12-22.

  119. 119.

    CSMK, 362/AT V, 271, 6-12.

  120. 120.

    CSM I, 60/AT X, 444, 3-9. Imagination enables us to rectify some intellect’s misconceptions. From the Rules until the end of Descartes’s life, imagination plays a significant role for the knowledge of corporeal substances. The claim that imagination provides clear and distinct ideas of extension will be rejected by Spinoza, Ethics, I, 14, scol.

  121. 121.

    CSMK, 361-362/AT V, 270, 12-31.

  122. 122.

    CSMK, 361/AT V, 270, 1-2.

  123. 123.

    Alquié (1981), 119.

  124. 124.

    CSM I, 24/AT X, 387, 17-388,7 As it is the faculty of Mathematics, imagination is crucial for the constitution of Descartes’s mathematical physics. See Descartes to Mersenne 13 November 1639, CSMK, 141/AT II, 622, 13-16.

  125. 125.

    CSM II, 50-51/AT VII, 72-73.

  126. 126.

    This distinction has its roots in the scholastic tradition according to which God can be present regarding his essence, his power and his presence. See Rozemond (2003) and Anfray (2014).

  127. 127.

    CSMK, 361/AT V, 270, 19-20.

  128. 128.

    CSMK, 190/AT III, 424, 25-425,3.

  129. 129.

    CSMK, 226/AT III, 691, 15-16.

  130. 130.

    AT V, 303, 7-10.

  131. 131.

    CSMK, 372-373/AT V 342, 13-17.

  132. 132.

    CSMK III, 373/AT V, 343, 14-22.

  133. 133.

    CSMK, III, 381/AT V 403, 12-17.

  134. 134.

    About the ambiguities found in Descartes’s three letters, see Agostini (2008).

  135. 135.

    I, 6, §6, p. 31.

  136. 136.

    CSMK, 373/AT V 343, 8-12.

  137. 137.

    This was the intepretation provided by Poiret (1677), 33; for Poiret, God is ubiquitous only regarding to his power, if ‘power’ refers to the effect caused by God. This effect exists and is genuinely extended in the physical world.

  138. 138.

    CSMK, 217-218/AT III, 664, 23-27.

  139. 139.

    CSMK, 372-373/AT V, 342, 13-17.

  140. 140.

    As it is not an episodic capacity, I prefer the term ‘disposition’. For a clarification of the distinction between capacity and disposition in contemporary metaphysics, see Cartwright (2007).

  141. 141.

    CSMK, 381/AT V 403, 28-404, 5.

  142. 142.

    See Des Chene (1996), 388.

  143. 143.

    AT V 379, 6-25.

  144. 144.

    See chap. 2.2.

  145. 145.

    See Casey (1997) n.4, 400, who argues that, for Descartes, the power to affect bodies is not in nonphysical substances.

  146. 146.

    CSMK, 375/AT V 347, 23-26.

  147. 147.

    For example, Reid (2012), 152, argues that Descartes was forced to admit that God is literally present everywhere.

  148. 148.

    See chap. 4.3.

  149. 149.

    See Machamer and McGuire (2009).

  150. 150.

    This argument in favour of realism of dispositions is provided by Kistler (2005) who argues that dispositions are occurrent even during the periods they are not actualised.

  151. 151.

    Anfray (2014) sucessfully demonstrates that the views Descartes defended in this corrpondence enabled him to support persistence through time.

  152. 152.

    See the interpretation defended by Carriero (1990).

  153. 153.

    CSM II, 56/AT VII, 80, 1-14; CSM I, 223/AT VIII-A, 41; Descartes to Gibieuf January 1642,  CSMK, 203/AT III, 479, 10-16; Descartes to Regius January 1642, CSMK, 206/AT III, 493, 14-17.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Institute of History of Philosophy, Aix-Marseille University, Aix-en-Provence, France

    Lynda Gaudemard

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Gaudemard, L. (2021). Challenging the Cartesian Mind Paradigm. In: Rethinking Descartes’s Substance Dualism. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75414-3_3

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