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The World View of Physics I: Presuppositions

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Physical Reality – Construction or Discovery?
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Abstract

The basic requirements for an appropriate representation of the properties of physical methods and knowledge are briefly described, and shown to be in distinct contrast to empiricist views. A comprehensive understanding of physics requires one to include metaphysical and sociological elements in addition to factual and procedural knowledge. The philosophical basis of physics is defined as a “constructive realism” that is subsequently specified and extended by a number of implicit or “tacit” assumptions. A preliminary explication of the conception of a theory is exemplified by Bohr’s theory. The method of consistent adjustment, which is of crucial importance to understanding the relations between theory and experience, is elucidated using a simple mathematical example.

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Correspondence to Michael Grodzicki .

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Grodzicki, M. (2021). The World View of Physics I: Presuppositions. In: Physical Reality – Construction or Discovery?. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74579-0_1

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