Abstract
In this article, I survey the relation between Wolff’s conceptions of empirical psychology and obligation. He tries to distinguish his positions from the voluntaristic concept of obligation defended by Pufendorf and Thomasius, both of whom based obligation of the natural law on god’s will. This leads Wolff to derive obligations from the nature of the human soul. He himself thinks this to be adequate and without alternative; therefore, he claims that empirical psychology provides the foundation of moral philosophy. In doing so, Wolff links the identification of the psychological motive of the will with the natural obligation, a claim which turns out to be his weak point. Furthermore, Wolff’s ideas are related to his controversy with Hallensian pietists. I will broach the issue of this controversy using the example of the problem of indifference. On the other hand, Wolff makes a substantial contribution to an autonomous understanding of morality through his theory of moral obligation.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Regarding Wolff’s critique of Pufendorf, see also Wolff (1738/1971, I, §.63 nota).
- 4.
Elsewhere, Wolff clarifies that he understands the will “in a narrow sense” like the Scholastics as “rational desire” (appetitus rationalis) (Wolff, 1740/1983, §.155). See also the definition of the will in Wolff (1738/1968a, §.880). Regarding the systematic problems connected to this intellectualist conception of the freedom of the will, cf. H. Wolff (1949, pp. 109ff.).
- 5.
- 6.
See also Wolff (1738/1971, §.118).
- 7.
- 8.
That this conception of objective morality (moralitas objectiva) or the intrinsic goodness or malice of an action (bonitas ac malitia intrinseca actionum) (Wolff, 1738/1971, §§.55ff.) derives from Scholasticism, as emphasized by Wolff himself (Wolff, 1733/1973a, §.137). For his views on perseitas, also cf. Wolff (1738/1971, §.172; 1754/1980, §.15).
- 9.
Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. II.6; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II, 2, qu. 57 a, 2 ad 2; Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis I, 1, §.10,5. For a critique of this view, cf. already Hobbes, De Cive VI, 19.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
See also Wolff (1738/1968a, §§.554, 564, and 565).
- 13.
On Wolff’s concept of perfection, cf. Schwaiger (1995, 93ff.), who particularly emphasizes the influence of Leibniz’s critique of Wolff’s early conception of ethics.
- 14.
On the concept of hypothetical atheism, cf. Schröder (1998, pp. 162f.), who shows that Grotius’ formula was already used in the seventeenth century to justify atheist doctrines.
- 15.
Also cf. Wolff (1733/1976, §.29).
- 16.
- 17.
And in this sense, Clara Joesten (1931, pp. 26ff.) speaks of the “autonomy of morality” in Wolff.
- 18.
That the establishment of an autonomous morality (in the sense of combating other theological moral principles) must be differentiated from Kant’s positing of the principle of the autonomy of the will as the sole principle of morality has been stressed empathically by Klaus Reich (1989, pp. 86f.).
- 19.
For this distinction between self-obligation and autonomy, which is decisive for understanding the difference between the practical philosophies of Wolff and Kant, cf. Geismann (2000, pp. 441f.). On the relation of Wolff’s principle of perfection to Kant’s concept of autonomy, also cf. Schröer (1988, pp. 196–206).
- 20.
See also Wolff (1739/1978, §.975 nota, 944).
- 21.
Also cf. Lange’s critique in this respect: “It is also wrong when it is said in §.520 that, since intelligence notes the interconnection of things, reason is the ground of freedom. For the will is the ground of freedom: and reason directs the free will to the right use of freedom” (Lange, 1724/1998, §.8).
- 22.
In the context of the present contribution, I cannot go further into some distinctions important to empirical psychology, e.g., that between the higher and the lower part of the soul (Wolff, 1726/1985, §.35), between appetitus sensitivus (Wolff, 1738/1968a, §§.579ff.) and appetitus rationalis, and between the idea boni confusa (confused idea of the good) and idea boni distincta (distinct idea of the good) (Wolff, 1738/1968a, §.890).
- 23.
“Spontaneity is the intrinsic principle of self-determination to act” (Wolff, 1738/1968a, §.933, p. 702). The consensus among interpreters is paradigmatically expressed by Arndt (1976, p. viii): “On the ontological level, it may be the case that contingency negates the absolute necessity connected to things’ essences, which is the same in all possible worlds. Yet, this ‘contingency’ is merely another name for the ‘hypothetical’ necessity everything existing in this world is subject to, including everything that happens, which is determined by the real order of succeeding states of the world as premised on a first state of the world created by God. Wolff was not able to overcome, any more than Leibniz, the discrepancy in his philosophy between his assertion of the spontaneity of all our acts of will and actions on the one hand and the complete determination of all events and states of things in the real order on the other.”
- 24.
Cf. Leibniz’s letter to des Bosses on February 8, 1711 (Leibniz, 1890a, p. 420). Hence, Wolff’s criticism of what, on his view, is a false concept of freedom as the overcoming of indifference: “Therefore, those are in error who explain freedom as a capacity to choose, from two conflicting things, either one or the other, without the presence of a motive why one chooses the one over the other. As has been extensively discussed, such a capacity is contrary both to reason (§.369) and to experience (§.325)” (Wolff, 1751/2003, §.511, pp. 312–313).
- 25.
“Just as there can be no tipping of the scales, due to the principle of sufficient reason, if one of the weights is not increased by adding to it, so the soul cannot choose either of the two if nothing is added on one side to the already existing motives” (Wolff, 1751/2003, §.510, p. 311).
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
Leibniz disputes that “a complete indifference between moral actions, as in those of Buridan’s ass” is possible at all. Such an assertion of complete indifference ultimately rests on the fact that those “impressions which are capable of tipping the balance” are insensible, that is, unnoticeable. “For even if I do not always see the reason for an inclination that makes me choose between two things that appear equal, there is always some impression, however imperceptible, which determines us” (Leibniz, 1885, pp. 297–298). Also cf. a view of Leibniz followed by Wolff in this context: “Between things absolutely indifferent, there simply is no choice, and consequently no selecting or deciding, since a choice requires some reason or principle” (Leibniz, 1890b, p. 371).
- 29.
“Yet I see that among those who speak of freedom there are those who do not take account of those insensible impressions, which are capable of tipping the balance, and imagine a complete indifference between moral actions, as in the case of Buridan’s ass which is torn between two meadows” (Leibniz, 1882, p. 105). Wolff similarly argues: “For it is well comprehensible that specific motives do not always catch everyone’s eye but are sometimes so hidden that they are only discernible by the astute, who are used to examine things thoroughly, as has been recalled above (§. cit [498])” (Wolff, 1751/2003, §.508, p. 310).
- 30.
“It is true that Reasons have in the mind of the sage, and Motives in some mind that has them, which is the same, the effect that weights have on a scale. One objects that this notion tends toward necessity and fate” (Leibniz 1890b, p. 389).
- 31.
“The core of the deterministic reasoning [that is articulated in the allegory of the scale] is [...] this: Just as the scale cannot incline more to one side than the other when the opposing weights are equal, so a human being cannot come to a decision when the differing motives are of equal value” (Dorschel, 1992, pp. 86, 96f.).
- 32.
“By rejecting the Indifferentiam perfecti aequilibri, I make use of, as have others before me, the allegory of the scale. But to avoid the thought that in doing so one attempts to infer from material things to the soul, I have explicitly raised this objection in detail and shown how this allegory can serve to elucidate the will without committing such an inference, which I do not at all condone. Hence it comes across as strange when one comes up with this objection against me as an issue I supposedly have not seen and that others had to hold up to me in the first place. Even more fantastical does it come across, however, when Mr. D. Lange does this and draws dangerous consequences from it, since he explains this allegory in his Medicina mentis in the objectionable sense that he wants to burden me with” (Wolff, 1733/1973a, §.96, pp. 265–266). Also cf. Karl Ferdinand Hommel’s critique of using the allegory of the scale for illustrating free decisions of the will: “I have no idea what spirit of quackery drove the scholars to represent the scale as an image of freedom. It is true, if no weights lie in it, I would say: the scale hangs freely. For it is able to stir or not to stir. Yet alone it does not have a capacity to move itself, which is after all all that matters. For if I place a weight on it, the scale necessarily has to move. In consideration of this, I know of no better model to indicate compulsion and necessity than the scale, which one miraculously deploys as an example of freedom. [...] Nothing is easier to move than a scale, and the lowering of the tray so unavoidable that its opposite is not even thinkable. Moreover, it is not a self-moving thing, as is the soul according to common opinion, of which one believes that it has its principle of movement within itself. Thus, the scale is a completely inept symbol. This tool, which cannot even resist a downy feather, is supposed to signify freedom. Compulsion, fate, necessity can be signified by it, but not freedom. [...] What is the weight in the case of a scale, is in the mental realm and in the case of the will a certain representation of the mind that something is good to do; or even more often the constitution of my body, namely animal drives, as they derive from the humors and blood. [...] The true concept of freedom therefore does not consist in the ability to will or not to will something, to move or not to move, to desire or not desire something, but in the capacity to will something without an inlaid weight and to self-move without external drives, in short without all cause. The former I call passive, the latter active freedom [...]” (Hommel, 1772/1970, §.20). In contrast to Wolff, Hommel consistently interprets the allegory of the scale in terms of determinism while recognizing the principle of sufficient reason: “Thus, the true question is: whether our soul has a capacity to act from itself without any representation caused in it from outside? Such a capacity cannot be found in it, for otherwise something would happen without sufficient reason; but just as the scale would forever stand still without an inlaid weight, so the human will would be eternally dead if not certain representations originating from close by things would enliven it from outside. [...] I ask, however, whether there exists apart from God one self-moving thing in the world, i.e. one, that has the principle of movement solely in itself?” (Hommel, 1772/1970, §.22) Our “feeling of freedom” Hommel (1772/1970, §§.22f.) considers a mere epiphenomenon.
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Hüning, D. (2021). In-Between Psychology and Moral Philosophy: Christian Wolff’s Principle of Natural Obligation. In: Araujo, S.d.F., Pereira, T.C.R., Sturm, T. (eds) The Force of an Idea. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 50. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74435-9_10
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