Abstract
Asserting and understanding the impact of local government on EU decisions is key to validating the idea of an integration cycle. The chapter therefore examines whether, to what extent and under which conditions local government can effectively influence European policy-making. It engages in a conceptual and methodological discussion and examines the impact of local actors through formal and informal mobilisation. The chapter provides evidence to show how local government has become an effective territorial interest group in the EU’s system of multilevel governance. It then introduces a causal model of local influence reflecting the scope, conditions, lobbying structure and opportunity structure in the context of the European political arena.
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Notes
- 1.
Tatham’s study of regional interest representation in the EU (2015) confirmed the limits to the influence of regions as a generic territorial interest group. Their self-reported influence, however, is contingent upon size (a representational logic) and the supranational embeddedness of leading officials (a Matthew effect or cumulative advantage logic).
- 2.
Our analysis rests on the basic premise that local actors should be aware of the given policy process and willing to change it as they see fit. This precludes cases where despite the apparent impact of EU decisions on local government, local actors did not mobilise to influence the decision, which de facto rules out influence as we have conceptualised it (see also Chap. 7). A marked example of such a case concerns the European harmonisation of public document recognition, whereby local authorities failed to identify subsidiarity concerns and consequently did not get involved in the decision process that would impact strongly and directly on their working (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp. 97–101).
- 3.
The interplay between formal and informal powers is here reflected by the fact that until today, the CoR has not yet made use of the ‘nuclear option’ of going to court to defend local interests on the basis of the constitutionalised principles (cf. Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p. 100). An unsuccessful complaint would also risk taking away some of the Committee’s threat potential.
- 4.
According to Bergeret-Cassagne (in Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p. 57), the CEMR is further inflicted by the inherent political tension between members who prefer the CEMR to act as an intergovernmental organisation (the European umbrella of national associations) and members who perceive the CEMR as an instrument to foster a federal Europe (as codified in the 1953 Charter of Municipal Liberties).
- 5.
Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts.
- 6.
Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors.
- 7.
The 2014 revision of the public procurement acquis is discussed below.
- 8.
Additionality is one of the main principles of the European Structural and Investment Funds according to which EU funding must not replace, but add to public spending.
- 9.
Van Bever and Verhelst (2013, pp. 9–10) found that the large majority of municipalities in Flanders (around 80%) perceived their impact on EU policies as little to none. Yet, a small number (6.7%) of proactive authorities, which lobbied European institutions, were moderately satisfied with the outcome of their actions. In most cases, these were undertaken by larger cities and targeted cohesion policy and funding (Verhelst, 2019, pp. 97–98).
- 10.
UK local government, for instance, failed to lobby for reforms of the Structural Funds due to opposition between the London authorities and local authorities in North England, which forced their local government association to adopt only a vague position on this matter. At the same time, local authorities in London could not change the definition of the Objective 2 areas of the Structural Funds in the Maastricht Treaty because their effort was ill-prepared and less concise (John, 1994, pp. 916–918).
- 11.
The establishment of the European Social Dialogue as such, however, was considered a successful case of policy entrepreneurialism by the CEMR .
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
Directive 2014/24/EU on Public Procurement; Directive 2014/23/EU on the Award of Concession Contracts; and Directive 2014/25/EU on Procurement for Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services.
- 15.
The aim of the business lobby to abolish any exemption from the directives was less strategic as it conflicted with the Commission ’s goal to provide legal clarity, as well as the path dependency of EU policy-making which makes it difficult to reverse certain legislative ambitions once they are set into motion.
- 16.
This ‘pro-EU urban mobility policy community’ also was disproportionally included in the pre-legislative stage, evoking fierce complaints from local actors (ibid., pp. 94–95).
- 17.
This overview is partly based on the authors’ interviews with local government lobbyists involved in this case.
- 18.
The status in the EU is particularly important for British local authorities, because in the absence of a codified constitution, they do not enjoy any guarantee to their local autonomy. In Germany, local actors were concerned that losing their European status would give the Länder extra control over them.
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Guderjan, M., Verhelst, T. (2021). Closing the Cycle: The Impact of Formal and Informal Mobilisation. In: Local Government in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6_8
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