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Opportunities for Reform

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Defense Economics

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Abstract

In principle, any economic system can be reformed in two ways: by changing the existing inventory of institutions or by replacing this inventory with an alternative one (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Buchanan 1990). A military organization can try to implement reforms within the planned economy system, or it can abandon this system and adopt an alternative instead. However, reforms within a planned economy system are possible only to a limited extent.

Nihil commune habet proprietas cum possessione (Property and possession have nothing in common (Dig. 41.2.12.1, Ulpianus 70 ad ed.))

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This accumulated capital might even serve as collateral, such that the armed forces could borrow from banks or investors, or raise equity in capital markets.

  2. 2.

    For example, the Thai land forces own three television channels (Thai TV 5, Thai Global Network, BBTV Channel 7).

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  1. Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Military Academy, Birmensdorf ZH, Switzerland

    Marcus Matthias Keupp

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Keupp, M.M. (2021). Opportunities for Reform. In: Defense Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73815-0_5

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