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Effectiveness of Military Performance

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Defense Economics

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Abstract

Before an actual conflict begins, it is unknown whether and to what extent the military capabilities generated in peacetime can actually provide effective military performance. Only real conflicts allow the armed forces to test the effectiveness of any military capabilities they have generated in the past. Just like a private firm does not know actual turnover until shops report sales figures, information about the effectiveness of military conflicts is not created until an actual conflict begins.

Omnis arbor quae non facit fructum bonum exciditur et in ignem mittitur (Matthew 7:19)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Politicians and lobbyists could produce better forecasts if they could access classified information, join professional committees, or benefit from personal qualifications. Unfortunately, they are not immune to mistakes. It is also questionable whether they can assert their views, even if they are correct, in political discourse with uninformed peers.

  2. 2.

    A transfer of zero means that the capability is terminated since funds required for its generation are cut off. Hence, a transfer of zero over all capabilities is economically equivalent to the abolition of the armed forces. In economic terms, this extreme point is an admissible solution.

  3. 3.

    To simplify the presentation, all following diagrams refer to the acquisition of material resources. However, they can also inform the analysis of human resource requirements by interpreting q as the quantity of labor required and A as the labor supply curve.

  4. 4.

    There is no guarantee that arms producers will meet this demand at all, as they might also internationally ration their production volume, or auction it to the highest bidder.

  5. 5.

    Until the middle of the nineteenth century, combatants in Europe regularly served in foreign armies. For example, German commanders Clausewitz, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Yorck temporarily served in the Russian Armed Forces. Today, however, the idea of the French Revolution that only citizens can join the national armed forces has prevailed. Contemporary exceptions to this rule are, for example, the armed forces of Luxembourg or the French Foreign Legion, which also or exclusively accept foreigners as combatants.

  6. 6.

    Arithmetically speaking, this effect increases the equipment ratio, because fewer combatants now share the same number of systems. However, capability generation still degrades since there is no compensation for the decrease in labor input.

  7. 7.

    Provided that these assets have not yet been fully depreciated, such that a residual value still exists that may generate positive liquidation proceeds.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Military Academy, Birmensdorf ZH, Switzerland

    Marcus Matthias Keupp

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Keupp, M.M. (2021). Effectiveness of Military Performance. In: Defense Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73815-0_3

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