Skip to main content

Introduction: The Fundamental Economic Problem of the Military

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Defense Economics
  • 485 Accesses

Abstract

Contemporary military organizations are anything but private companies. Both military and civilian bureaucracies who do not function according to free-market principles administer them. Quite the contrary: As these bureaucracies control all economic activity in the armed forces, a planned economy system is established. Any economic analysis that ignores this fundamental problem not only leads to false conclusions, but also to irrelevant policy recommendations.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    An initial small mistake is a big one in the end (Thomas Aquinas 2001).

  2. 2.

    Ironically, this situation is quite advantageous for defense economists. If state bureaucrats could manage any armed force just like a private business, the field of defense economics would not exist; a primer on strategic management and cost accounting would suffice.

  3. 3.

    Here and in the following, the term ‘residents’ denotes all inhabitants of a state, irrespective of their citizenship or political rights, whose taxes, duties and levies fund the armed forces. In contrast, ‘citizens’ here and in the following refers to the subpopulation of residents that have political rights.

  4. 4.

    The extent to which the international law of war can protect residents in this case is very much a question of how the occupation force behaves.

  5. 5.

    Although the capital stock can remain unharmed during wartime, it might still be reduced after defeat. For example, between 1945 and 1952, the Soviet Union expropriated and deconstructed industrial assets in the East German occupation zone in order to add these assets to its own capital stock.

  6. 6.

    The net capital stock is the sum of all replacement values for all capital goods used for production in the economy. These assets include civilian buildings, machinery, equipment, livestock, crops, research and development and computer programs. Both physical and cyber warfare may damage and destroy all of them.

  7. 7.

    The statistical value of a life is estimated at not less than two million US$ (Viscusi and Aldy 2003; Doucouliagos et al. 2012), so a violent end of life or permanent disability significantly reduces the productivity that human beings can realize over the course of their working life. This reduction also diminishes the tax base of the nation state (Holcombe 2008).

  8. 8.

    For example, between 1945 and 1947, the United States expropriated all German patents and deported German scientists to the USA (Gimbel 1986, 1990).

  9. 9.

    From hereon, the terms ‘armed forces’ and ‘military organization’ will be used interchangeably.

  10. 10.

    For example, in the battles of Salamis (480 BC), Agincourt (1415), Galveston (1863) and Longewala (1971).

  11. 11.

    The use of the term ‘institution’ among economics differs from its colloquial usage as ‘important organization’ or ‘authority’. In the remainder of this book, the term is used exclusively in the economic sense explained here.

Bibliography

  • Acemoglu D, Robinson J (2012) Why nations fail. Crown, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson J (2001) The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91:1369–1401

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alptekin A, Levine P (2012) Military expenditure and economic growth: A meta-analysis. European Journal of Political Economy 28:636–650

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amit R, Schoemaker PJ (1993) Strategic assets and organizational rent. Strategic Management Journal 14: 33–46

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arkes J, Cunha JM (2015) Workplace goals and output quality: evidence from time-constrained recruiting goals in the US navy. Defence and Peace Economics 26:491-515

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod A (2014) Mercenaries: A guide to private armies and private military companies. Sage, Los Angeles

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin D (1997) The concept of security. Review of Economic Studies 23: 5-26

    Google Scholar 

  • Barney JB (1992) Integrating organisational behavior and strategy formulation research: A resource based analysis. In: Shrivastava P, Huff A, Dutton J (eds.), Advances in Strategic Management. JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 8:39-62

    Google Scholar 

  • Bates RH, Grief A, Levi M, Rosenthal JL, Weingast BR (1998) Analytic narratives. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ

    Google Scholar 

  • Bator FM (1958) The anatomy of market failure. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 72(3):351-379

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beeres R, Bogers M (2012) Ranking the performance of European armed forces. Defence and Peace Economics 23:1-16

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bellais R, Foucault M, Oudot JM (2014) Économie de la défense. La Découverte, Paris

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Billyard AP, Donohue JJ (2016) A practical organisational efficiency measure. Defence and Peace Economics 27:794-819

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blagden D (2009) Strategic thinking for the age of austerity. The RUSI Journal 154:60-66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blanken LJ, Lepore JJ (2015) Performance measurement in military operations: information versus incentives. Defence and Peace Economics 26:516-535

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke PJ, Coyne C, Leeson P (2013) Comparative historical political economy. Journal of Institutional Economics 9:285–301

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke PJ, Storr V (2002) Post-classical political economy: Polity, society, and economy. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 61:161–191

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke P, Fink A (2011) Institutions first. Journal of Institutional Economics 7(4): 499-504

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM (1968) The demand and supply of public goods. Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan JM (2004) The status of the status quo. Constitutional Political Economy 15:133-144

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caruso R (2010) Butter, guns and ice-cream: Theory and evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. Defence and Peace Economics 21(3):269-283

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chardigny C (2013) Contrats et marchés publics de défense. Bruyland, Bruxelles

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen PF, Lee CC, Chiu YB (2014) The nexus between defense expenditure and economic growth: New global evidence. Economic Modelling 36:474–483

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cowen T (1985) Public good definitions and their institutional context: A critique of public goods theory. Review of Social Economy 43(1): 53-63

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coyne CJ (2015) Lobotomizing the defense brain. The Review of Austrian Economics 28: 371-396

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coyne CJ, Hall AH (2014) Perfecting tyranny: Foreign intervention as experimentation in social control. The Independent Review 19: 1-25

    Google Scholar 

  • Coyne CJ, Mathers RL (eds.) (2011) The handbook on the political economy of war. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis DM (2011) Designing a viable prediction market to forecast defense acquisition cost and schedule outcomes. Defence and Peace Economics 22:351-366

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dikici E (2015) Guns versus butter tradeoff: The theory of defense quality factor. Journal of Economics, Business and Management 3:704-709

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Djankov S, Glaeser E, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2003) The new comparative economics. Journal of Comparative Economics 31:595–619

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dorobek S (2013) Public supply chain management. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Doucouliagos C, Stanley TD, Giles M (2012) Are estimates of the value of a statistical life exaggerated? Journal of Health Economics 31:197-206

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Driessnack J, King D (2004) An initial look at technology and institutions on defense industry consolidation. Acquisition Review Journal 35:63-77

    Google Scholar 

  • Duelfer, C. 2016. WMD elimination in Iraq, 2003. The Nonproliferation Review 23: 163-184

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Engerer H (2011) Security as a public, private or club good: Some fundamental considerations. Defense and Peace Economics 22:135-145

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Federal Statistical Office (2020). Net non-financial capital stock (geometrical method). Neuchâtel: Federal Statistical Office

    Google Scholar 

  • Felin T, Foss NJ, Heimeriks KH, Madsen TL (2012) Microfoundations of routines and capabilities: Individuals, processes, and structure. Journal of Management Studies 49:1351-1374

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Firth R (2013) Elements of social organisation. Routledge, London

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Forte F (2010) Principles of public economics: A public choice approach. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Franklin JH (1973) Jean Bodin and the rise of absolutist theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman D (1973) The machinery of freedom: Guide to radical capitalism. Harper and Row, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman M (1953) Comments on monetary policy. In: Essays in positive economics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 263-276

    Google Scholar 

  • Furubotn EG, Richter R (2005) Institutions and economic theory: The contribution of the new institutional economics. University of Michigan Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Gebicke S., Magid, S. (2010). Lessons from around the world: Benchmarking performance in defense. McKinsey & Company, San Francisco and Copenhagen

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillard S., Anderhalden D (2020) Insurability of critical infrastructures, in: Keupp, MM (Ed.), The Security of Critical Infrastructures, Cham: SpringerNature, 33-43

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Gimbel J (1986) U.S. Policy and German scientists: The early cold war. Political Science Quarterly 101(3):433-451

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gimbel J (1990) Science, technology, and reparations: Exploitation and plunder in postwar Germany. Stanford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Grant RM (1996) Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: Organizational capability as knowledge co-integration. Organization Science 7: 359–467

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greif A (2006) Institutions and the path to the modern economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hall R (1993) A framework linking intangible resources and capabilities to sustainable competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal 14:607-618

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardin R (1982) Collective Action. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore

    Google Scholar 

  • Harmon DJ, Haack P, Roulet TJ (2019) Microfoundations of institutions: A matter of structure versus agency or level of analysis? Academy of Management Review 44: 464–467

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harreld, D. (Ed.). 2015. A companion to the Hanseatic League. Leiden and Boston: Brill

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrison WR (1975) National Defense as a collective good. In Craig L, Loehr W, McCamant J (Eds.) Comparative public policy: Issues, theories, and methods. Wiley, New York, 199–221

    Google Scholar 

  • Hartley K (2010). The case for defence. Defence and Peace Economics 21: 409-426

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hartley K (1995) Industrial policies in the defense sector. In Hartley K, Sandler T, Handbook of defense economics. Amsterdam et al., Elsevier, 459-489

    Google Scholar 

  • Hartley K (1997) Defense markets. Economic Affairs 17:22-27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hartley K, Sandler T (Eds.) (1995) Handbook of defense economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek FA (1944) The Road to Serfdom. Chicago University Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Head JG, Shoup CS (1969) Public goods, private goods, and ambiguous goods. The Economic Journal 79:567-572

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henderson RM, Cockburn I (1994) Measuring competence: Exploring firm effects in pharmaceutical research. Strategic Management Journal, Winter Special Issue 15

    Google Scholar 

  • Herrera RA (2013) A People and its soldiers: The American citizen as soldier, 1775–1861. International Bibliography of Military History 33:9-34

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hildebrandt GG (1999) The military production function. Defence and Peace Economics 10:247-272

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hinge A. (2000) Australian Defence Preparedness. Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobbes T (2006) Leviathan. A&C Black, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson G (1988) Economics and institutions. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson G (1993) Economics and evolution: Bringing life back into economics. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Holcombe R (2008) Why does government produce national defense? Public Choice 137:11-19

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hummel JR (1990) National goods versus public goods: Defense, disarmament, and free riders. Review of Austrian Economics 4: 88-122

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hummel JR, Lavoie D (1990) National defense and the public-goods problem. In Higgs R (Ed.) Arms, politics, and the economy: Historical and contemporary perspectives. Holmes and Meier, New York, 37-60

    Google Scholar 

  • Hutt WH (1971) Politically impossible? Institute of Economic Affairs, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Isely JA, Crowl PA (1951) The US Marines and amphibious war: Its theory, and its practice in the Pacific. Princeton University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones E (2003) The European miracle. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kasper W, Streit ME (1999) Institutional economics: Social order and public policy. Edward Elgar, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Kempers B, Jackson B (1992) Painting, power and patronage: The rise of the professional artist in the Italian Renaissance. Penguin Books, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Kern EM, Richter G (2014) Neue Planungs-und Steuerungsinstrumente in der Bundeswehr. SpringerGabler, Potsdam

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kerr C, Phaal R, Probert D (2008) A strategic capabilities-based representation of the future British armed forces. International Journal of Intelligent Defence Support Systems 1:27-42

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keupp MM, Schöb R (2015) The potential of container vessel operation on the Northern Sea Route: Nautical, regulatory, and operative issues. In Keupp MM (Ed.), The Northern Sea Route, Wiesbaden: SpringerGabler, 53-68

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kinnaird M, Early L, Schofield, B (2003) Defence Procurement Review. Australian Government, Department of Defense, Canberra

    Google Scholar 

  • Klingen B (2011) Die politische Ökonomie der Verteidigungs- und Bündnispolitik. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Koblentz, G.D. 2018. Saddam versus the inspectors: The impact of regime security on the verification of Iraq’s WMD disarmament. Journal of Strategic Studies 41: 372-409

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kruys GP (2001) Combat readiness with specific reference to armies. Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria

    Google Scholar 

  • Kusunoki K, Nonaka I, Nagata A (1998) Organisational capabilities in product development of Japanese firms: A conceptual framework and empirical findings. Organisation Science 9: 699–718

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lipow J, Plessner Y (2008) Tax efficiency and quality/quantity trade-offs in defense procurement. Defence and Peace Economics 19:21-26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Macchiavelli N (2008) The Prince. Hackett, Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Malešič M, Kümmel G (Eds.) (2011) Security and the military between reality and perception. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Malizard J (2014) Dépenses militaires et croissance économique dans un contexte non linéaire. Revue économique, 65:601-618

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malizard J (2015) Analyse économique du désarmement: une revue de littérature. Stratégique 108:71-93

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mallett M (2009) Mercenaries and the masters. Warfare in Renaissance Italy. Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley

    Google Scholar 

  • Martines L (1988) Power and imagination. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore

    Google Scholar 

  • Matthews R (1986) The economics of institutions and the sources of growth. Economic Journal 96: 903–918

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McConnell T (1984) The nature and basis of inalienable rights. Law and Philosophy 3: 25-59

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGuire MC (2007) Economics of defense in a globalized world. In Sandler T, Hartley K (Eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 2, 623-648

    Google Scholar 

  • Milgate M (2008) Goods and commodities. In Eatwell J, Milgate M, Newman P (Eds.) The new Palgrave dictionary of economics. Macmillan, London, 546-548

    Google Scholar 

  • Millett AR, Murray W, Watman KH (1986) The effectiveness of military organisations. International Security 11:37-71

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mintz A (Ed.) (1992) The political economy of military spending in the United States. Routledge, London, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore BA, Barnett JE (Eds.) (2014) Military psychologists' desk reference. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore SC, Stockfisch JA, Goldberg MS, Holroyd SM, Hildebrandt GG (1991) Measuring military readiness and sustainability. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica

    Google Scholar 

  • Moran M (2006) Modern military force structures. Council on Foreign Relations, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Musgrave RA (1959) The theory of public finance. McGraw-Hill, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • NATO (2019) Defence expenditure of NATO countries (2013–2019). Communique PR/CP(2019)123. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Bruxelles

    Google Scholar 

  • Navarro-Galera A, Ortúzar-Maturana RI, Muñoz-Leiva F (2011) The application of life cycle costing in evaluating military investments: An empirical study at an international scale. Defence and Peace Economics 22:509-543

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nordhaus WR, Oneal JR, Russett, B (2012) The effects of the international security environment on national military expenditures: a multicountry study. International Organisation 66: 491-513

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • North DC (2005) Understanding the process of economic change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Oestreich G (1957) Soldatenbild, Heeresreform und Heeresgestaltung im Zeitalter des Absolutismus (Schicksalsfragen der Gegenwart, Band 1). Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson M (1965) The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Oman C (1991) A history of the art of war in the sixteenth century. Greenhill Books, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom E (2005) Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Pahlavi P, Ouellet É (2009) Guerre irrégulière et analyse institutionnelle : le cas de la guerre révolutionnaire de l'armée française en Algérie. Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains 3:131-144

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Panagariya A, Shibata H (2000) Defense and welfare under rivalry. International Economic Review 41:951-969

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paparone C (2013) The sociology of military science. Continuum, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Papke G (1975) Von der Miliz zum Stehenden Heer 1648-1789. In Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Hrsg) Handbuch zur Deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648-1939. Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Pavlac, B.A., Lott, E.S. 2019. The Holy Roman Empire: A historical encyclopedia. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO

    Google Scholar 

  • Platteau JP (2000) Institutions, social norms, and economic development. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Poast P (2006) The economics of war. McGraw-Hill, Irwin

    Google Scholar 

  • Potter D (2008) Renaissance France at war: Armies, culture and society. Woodbridge, The Boydell Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell B, Coyne C (2003) Do pessimistic assumptions about human behavior justify government? Journal of Libertarian Studies 17:17-38

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell W, DiMaggio P (Eds.) (1991) The new institutionalism in organisational analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell B, Stringham E (2009) Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: A survey. Public Choice 140: 503-38

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pyman M, Wilson R, Scott D (2009) The extent of single sourcing in defence procurement and its relevance as a corruption risk: A first look. Defence and Peace Economics 20:215-232

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ravichandran T, Lertwongsatien C (2005) Effect of information systems resources and capabilities on firm performance: A resource-based perspective. Journal of Management Information Systems 21:237-276

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reppy J (1991) On the nature and scope of Defence and Peace Economics: A comment. Defense Economics 2:269-271

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Richter G (Hrsg) (2007) Die ökonomische Modernisierung der Bundeswehr: Sachstand, Konzeptionen und Perspektiven. Springer, Wiesbaden

    Google Scholar 

  • Ritchie N (2011) Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. International Affairs 87:355-376

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roberts M (1995) The military revolution, 1560–1660. In: Clifford J. Rogers (Eds) The military revolution debate. Westview Press, Boulder, 13–35

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodrik D (2007) One economics, many recipes: Globalization, institutions, and economic growth. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rodrik D, Subramanian A, Trebbi F (2004) Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and co-integration in economic development. Journal of Economic Growth, 9:131-165

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rohlfs C, Sullivan R (2013) The cost-effectiveness of armored tactical wheeled vehicles for overseas US Armed forces operations. Defence and Peace Economics 24:293-316

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rohlfs C (2006) The government’s valuation of military life-saving in war: A cost-minimization approach. American Economic Review 96:39-44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Röpke W (1963) Economics of the free society. Henry Regnery, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothbard MN (1973) For a new liberty: Libertarian Manifesto. Macmillan, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothbard MN (2002) The ethics of liberty. New York University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothkopf MH (2007) Thirteen reasons why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves process is not practical. Operations Research 55: 191-197

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rubin EL (2007) Beyond Camelot: Rethinking politics and law for the modern state. Princeton University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson PA (1954) The pure theory of public expenditure. The Review of Economics and Statistics 36:387-389

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson PA (1955) Diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public expenditure. The Review of Economics and Statistics 37:350-356

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sandler T, Hartley S (Eds) (2007) Handbook of defense economics: Defense in a globalized world. Elsevier, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandler T, Tschirhart J (1997) Club theory: Thirty years later. Public Choice 93:335-355

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scully GW (1992) Constitutional environments and economic growth. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sechrest LJ (2007) Privately funded and built US warships in the quasi-war of 1797–1801. The Independent Review 12:101-113

    Google Scholar 

  • Sechrest LJ (2004) Public goods and private solutions in maritime history. The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 7:3–27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Solomon B, Stone C (2013) Accrual budgeting and defence funding: Theory and simulations. Defence and Peace Economics 24:211-227

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Solow RM (1956) A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 70:65–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spadafora A (2015) Georg Jellinek on values and objectivity in the legal and political sciences. Modern Intellectual History 14: 747-776

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sumption J (1990) Trial by battle: The Hundred Years War I. Faber and Faber, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Teece D (2019) A capability theory of the firm: An economics and (strategic) management perspective. New Zealand Economic Papers 53: 1–43

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tellis AJ, Bially J, Layne C, McPherson M (2000) Measuring national power in the postindustrial age. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica

    Google Scholar 

  • The Military Balance (2021). London: Institute of Strategic Studies

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomas d’Aquin (2001) Prooemium. In Alarcón E (Ed) Corpus Thomisticum, De ente et essentia. Ad Universitatis Studiorum Navarrensis, Pamplona

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson EA (1974) Taxation and national defense. Journal of Political Economy 82:755-782

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tiebout CM (1956) A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64:416-424

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vaubel R (2007) Realistische Politikberatung. Schweizer Monatshefte 87:30-31

    Google Scholar 

  • Viscusi K, Aldy JE (2003). The value of a statistical life: A critical review of market estimates throughout the world. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27: 5-76

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Watson T (2017) Sociology, work and organisation. Taylor & Francis

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright PM, Dunford BB, Snell SA (2001) Human resources and the resource based view of the firm. Journal of Management 27:701-721

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yeoh PL, Roth K (1999) An empirical analysis of sustained advantage in the US pharmaceutical industry: Impact of firm resources and capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 20:637-653

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zucker L (1987) Institutional theories of organisation. American Review of Sociology 13:443-464

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Keupp, M.M. (2021). Introduction: The Fundamental Economic Problem of the Military. In: Defense Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73815-0_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics