Abstract
A key prerequisite for drawing the quantity implicature from ‘three’ to ‘not more than three’ in e.g. ‘Nigel has three children’ is the assumption that the speaker knows the exact number of Nigel’s children. This led to the assumption that ‘more than n’ constructions generate no implicatures as the comparative quantifier ‘more than’ signals that the speaker lacks sufficient knowledge for making a more precise statement (Krifka 2009). However, experimental results from Cummins et al. (2012) show that scalar implicatures are available from these constructions. For example, the size of the interval defined by the estimated lower and upper bounds for the number of people getting married is much higher for More than 100 people got married today than for More than 110 people got married today, in spite of 100 being smaller than 110. This led some researchers (Cummins et al. 2012; Cummins 2013; Benz 2015) to assume that the estimated most likely true value and distance to the upper bound of a modified numeral n is determined by the roundness level of n (Jansen & Pollmann 2001). However, the experimental study by Hesse & Benz (2020) showed that the most likely value is determined by a fixed 10% rule, and that the distance to the upper bound is determined by the distance to the next rounder number. In this paper we explore the implications of this finding for semantic and pragmatic theory. In particular, we will argue that the interpretation of numerals recruits general cognitive mechanisms that make an analysis of modified numerals along the lines of alternative semantics or a Hornian theory of scalar alternatives unsuitable.
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Notes
- 1.
In the neo-Gricean tradition (Horn 1972; Gazdar 1979; Levinson 1983; Horn 1989), it was assumed that a numeral \(n\) means \(n\)-or-more, i.e. at least \(n\). For convenience, we adopt this semantics for numerals. There are, however, strong arguments that tell against it, see, for example (Geurts 2006; Breheny 2008).
- 2.
This depends, of course, on additional assumptions about the speaker’s epistemic state. The speaker should either know the true number, or have, at least, a reliable estimate of it.
- 3.
The aim was to test the models of Cummins and Benz . Already the pre-tests showed that, in particular, Benz (2015) is not consistent with the data. The main experiments were then run as an explorative study.
- 4.
The police actually reported first that about 20,000 people took part. This was later corrected to more than 20,000, and then to fewer than 30,000 (see Tagesspiegel 28.08.2020). This just confirms that there is a certain margin of uncertainty in these estimates.
- 5.
Assuming the speaker has no preference for either rounding or accurate estimates.
- 6.
In neither experiment participants were instructed to assume that speakers know the exact, true numbers. For example, (Cummins et al. 2012, p. 166) asked participants only to assume that the speaker is well-informed, telling the truth, and being co-operative in each case.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Grant Nrs. BE 4348/4-2 and BE 4348/5-1). Informed consent was obtained for experimentation with human subjects and their privacy rights are observed by anonymising. We would like to thank Stephanie Solt, Uli Suaerland, Chris Cummins, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments, and the editors of this volume. Both authors have contributed equally.
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Benz, A., Hesse, C. (2022). Modified Numerals, Vagueness, and Scale Granularity. In: Gotzner, N., Sauerland, U. (eds) Measurements, Numerals and Scales. Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73323-0_3
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