1 Introduction

In the wake of the violent White Supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, Mayor Catherine Pugh decided that Baltimore’s 1887 statue of Roger B. Taney, a Supreme Court Justice who argued that free Blacks had no claim to citizenship, was out of sync with contemporary American attitudes. Against intense backlash from activist groups across the US, Pugh skirted the bureaucracy needed for consensus on removing the Taney statue and unilaterally ordered the city’s four monuments commemorating the Confederate cause in the US Civil War removed in the middle of the night on August 15 (Associated Press, 2018).

Two years later and three-thousand miles away, outside the New Westminster courthouse in Canada’s westernmost province of British Columbia, the statue of a bearded and simply dressed man named Matthew Begbie, celebrated as British Columbia’s first chief justice, faced a similar fate. Begbie is also known for overseeing a trial in the 1860s that led to the hanging of six Tsilhqot’in chiefs, heads of one of Canada’s indigenous groups, or “First Nations” (Lirette, 2019). In May 2019, the New Westminster council voted to remove that statue from New Westminster and thus rewrite history, a history that commemorates White settlers and overlooks their atrocities.

The controversies and cultural clashes in both Baltimore and New Westminster reflect larger debates over population change in the US and Canada. As this chapter shows, the demographics of both have changed along multiple dimensions, including age and generation, national origin and race, and even ideology and linguistic heritage. Along with those population changes, the economic power and political voices of various demographic groups have changed as well. If politics is about who gets what, then the distribution of economic resources, political power and even social or cultural capital are relevant to understanding the political consequences of demographic change. In line with the other chapters in this volume, this chapter explores what the political consequences of demographic change in the US and Canada have been since 1990, and what trends today portend for future political developments to 2040.

Over the last 40 years, the populations of both the US and Canada have grown larger and more diverse. Along with the inevitable generational shifts, the passage of time has brought a shift in proportions of young and old. Fertility rates have declined, while immigration has been robust. Sources and proportions of immigrants have been changing dramatically and, along with natural changes in fertility and mortality, are shifting the composition of various ethnic and racial groups. The politics of population change in both the US and Canada have been prominent, but dissimilar. For example, the decision in New Westminster, British Columbia, came just a few months after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau formally apologized to the Tsilhqot’in community for the hangings (Lirette, 2019). No such apologies have issued from a US head of state, although local leaders across the US have made decisions similar to Mayor Pugh’s and Confederate monuments have toppled like dominos.

In the US, given projected fertility, mortality, and migration trends, the ageing of the US population will be one of the top two population-related issues there over the next 30 years, primarily because of the insolvency of America’s pay-as-you-go social security system. The other will be the shrinking White population and increasing proportions of Hispanics and Asians, which, if past is precedent, will elevate racial issues within political debates (see Hudson [2012] for an US-centred discussion of ageing).

Canadian society will continue to have difficult debates over the meaning of multiculturalism as the population grows less White, although multiculturalism has general support in most of the country. Similar to the US, population ageing is likely to take centre stage as low fertility continues and policies to address support for those at different ages and stages of life are politicized.

The following sections of this chapter progress from a general introduction to demographic trends and projections in the US and Canada between 1990 and 2040, to sections on the economic fortunes of various groups, their mobilization capacity, influence of institutions and a discussion of the rhetoric of population change. Despite similar demographics, the political outcomes are different. In particular, this chapter shows that the mobilization capacity of US minorities is hampered by voter eligibility rules, an issue less relevant in Canada. In both, federalist institutions devolve power to state or provincial levels, but when combined with demographics yield different political impacts in the two countries. The tenor of rhetoric surrounding demographics has been nearly opposite in the two countries, although demographics are important in both. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the continued salience of population issues in the political arena in the coming decades.

2 Demographic Context

The demographics of the US and Canada mimic those of other developed countries in terms of declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy over time, but the two countries stand out for higher population growth than most of their peers. The US and Canada have grown at a hearty clip over the last three decades: the US population has increased by 27% and Canada’s by 30%. In terms of median age, the US and Canada are the youngest G-7 countriesFootnote 1—in part due to near-replacement fertility in the US case, and robust immigration in both cases.

Understanding why US fertility stayed higher than its peers’ is complicated, as is understanding why it may be starting to fall. However, some have argued that BlackFootnote 2 and Hispanic fertility was just high enough, and White fertility at around 1.8 children per woman on average—not too low—to keep the country’s total fertility rate around replacement level of 2.0 for the last several decades (Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2006: 693). This exceptionality seems to be fading. Births in the US are now at a 30-year low and its total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.76 is the lowest in 40 years (Hamilton et al., 2021). Births are even rarer in Canada . The last time Canadian fertility was at replacement level was in 1971 and since 1999 immigration has been the primary driver of population growth . In fact, natural increase (births over deaths) only accounted for one-third of population growth in Canada in 2018 (Statistics Canada, 2018b). As Fig. 1 shows, the population is concentrated in prime working ages, but the narrowing base of the pyramid indicates low fertility and a future of population ageing.

Fig. 1
figure 1

(Note Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. Source Computations by Richard Cincotta)

Population pyramids for US and Canada

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What has changed? As is the case across most developed countries, women in the US and Canada seem to be postponing childbearing in order to complete their education and begin a career, as we know from rising ages at first marriage and first birth (Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2006: 669). In Canada, data clearly show that actual age-specific fertility rates peak from 30–35 years, which is relatively “old” for childbearing, demographically speaking (Statistics Canada, 2018a). US fertility has trended downward, in part because births among adolescents and teenagers have fallen over the past several years—the birth rate among those aged 15 to 19 was down 8 percent in 2020 alone (Hamilton et al., 2021).

Populations in the US and Canada have also grown because of immigration. As Table 1 shows, both the US and Canada are net recipients of migrants. Compared to the US, the annual influx of migrants as a proportion of population in Canada is over twice as high as in the US. By the mid-1990s, immigration, not natural increase, was the key driver of growth in America’s potential workforce, even with near-replacement fertility (Passel & Cohn, 2017). This trend is not new—historically, the US and Canada are countries of immigration. European settlers displaced native people centuries ago and high numbers of immigrants from diverse continents have since sought both North American countries out as lands of promise. The US and Canada remain top destinations for migrants worldwide and today 13.5% of the US population (Zong et al., 2018) and more than one in five Canadians are first-generation immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2017). Immigration is relevant to fertility as well; in Canada’s case, immigrant fertility has been about 20% higher than native-born (Adserà & Ferrer, 2013: 18), helping drive Canada’s population growth.

Table 1 Key demographic statistics, US and Canada, 1990–2040
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While younger than their peers, Canada’s and America’s populations are still ageing. As Table 1 shows, the proportion of Canadians ages 0–17 will have decreased by 7% between 1990 and 2040; Americans of that same age group will have decreased by 4.5%. In contrast, the proportion of those at the opposite end of the age spectrum have ballooned, and at an increasing rate. The proportion of the US population over 65 years of age will be 9% higher in 2040 than in 1990, but most of that growth will take place between 2015 and 2040. Canada’s population aged 65+ is growing even more rapidly, from 11.2% of the total population in 1990 to 25.3% by 2040. Proportions of the “oldest-old”, those aged 80+, will reach 7.2% and 9.2% in the US and Canada, respectively. In 2017, for the first time, there were more seniors aged 65 and over in Canada than children aged 0–14 (Ciolfe, 2017).

In the US, non-White groups have lower median ages than Whites, but all racial groups in the US are ageing. In 2015, the median age for Asians was 36 years, for Blacks was 34 years and for Hispanics was 28 years, although the lowest median age, still up from 25 in 2000. For Whites, it was significantly older: 43 years (Flores, 2017). In Canada, 2011 data showed that non-White groups—what Canada terms ‘visible minorities’—followed a similar pattern to the US. While the population as a whole had a median age of 40.1, Blacks had the youngest median age, at 29.5 years, Arabs second youngest at 30.2, South Asians at 32.8 and Chinese at 38.6 (Ministry of Finance, 2016).Footnote 3

Together, these trends in fertility, mortality and migration are leading to a shift towards mixed-race, non-White populations in both the US and Canada. Although Hispanics were still the fastest growing ethnic group in the US as of 2015, growth has slowed because of both reduced immigration and falling Hispanic fertility rates. The proportion of Hispanics of Mexican origin peaked in 2008 and other Latin American countries, such as El Salvador and Honduras, are increasingly important in shaping the makeup of US Hispanics. The share of US-born as opposed to foreign-born Hispanics is increasing as well, from 59.9% in 2000 to 65.6% in 2015 (Flores, 2017). Over the next decades, those of Asian descent will see some of the most remarkable growth—since 1990, Asians have increasingly comprised a greater proportion of new US immigrants. India was the top country of origin for new US immigrants in 2015 with 110,000 immigrants, followed by Mexico with 109,000, China with 90,000 and Canada with 35,000 (Lopez & Bialik, 2017). Taken together, these trends mean that non-Hispanic Whites will lose their majority status in the US by 2055 (Pew Research Center, 2015); that shift will happen sooner in certain US states. By 2010, 22 of the biggest 100 metropolitan areas in the US were majority non-White. Racially, Canada is relatively White, but like the US, by 2050, will be majority-minority. That shift has already happened in the greater Toronto area and Vancouver is on the cusp (Kaufmann, 2018).

As the following sections will show, the ageing populations and increasing minority populations of the US and Canada are important drivers of political rhetoric and policy change. Age and race also correlate with economic power.

3 Economic Clout

The economic fortunes of those in Canada and the US are intimately tied to broader demographic trends. There are vast differences between the socioeconomic attainments of subgroups in the US and in Canada. In the US, especially, non-White populations have less wealth than the White population; younger generations have been slower to accumulate wealth than preceding generations were. These trends are intertwined, as younger generations are more diverse than older ones. While such differences by race or generation are less pronounced in Canada, in both countries generational issues are exacerbated by ageing populations. Over time, greater proportions of older people and fewer workers magnify the impact of socioeconomic differences among generations.

Increasing wealth disparities track age and racial lines in the US. Fortunes for minorities have trended downward over the last few decades—the wealth of Black and Latino families decreased by 75% and 50%, respectively, between 1983 and 2013. During that same time period, White families saw a 14% increase in their median wealth from $102,200 to $116,800 (Collins et al., 2017: 5). The Institute for Policy Studies calculated that other than the value of their durable goods like furniture and cars, in 2013 the median US Black family had net wealth of $1,700, the median Latino family $2,000 and the median White family $116,800 (Collins et al., 2017). A 2015 study in Boston, one of America’s major cities, found that the wealth of the median White family was $247,500, while the wealth of the median Black family was a mere $8 (2018). In a country where wealth yields political influence, as in the US, these disparities have meant that political power continues to be concentrated in the hands of a shrinking White population, even as the proportion of non-Whites increases.

If we look just along age lines, not, we see major differences in economic clout among various generations in the US as well. In general, US Millennials, those born between 1981 and 1996, are hitting the milestones of adulthood—like moving out of their parents’ homes, starting a career, getting married and having kids—about five to seven years later than did their Baby Boomer parents (Benedict-Nelson & Taylor 2012). This “failure to launch” is especially pronounced among Blacks and Hispanics. Fortunes for younger generations have gotten worse in the last few decades, in part because of macroeconomic changes, such as the 2008 financial crisis. While 55% of those aged 25–34 years owned homes in 1980, only 39% did by 2015 (Frey, 2018: 9). Millennials are poorer, too (Frey, 2018: 14). Among those aged 18–24, poverty rates have increased from 12% in 1980 to 20% in 2015, and for those aged 25–34 from 8% to 15% over the same time period.

The relatively low levels of wealth younger generations are accumulating are likely to affect their old-age income security, meaning that today’s economic problems will reverberate for decades to come. For example, Black and Hispanic US Millennials, aged between 18 and 34 in 2015, have low savings rates and low credit so their purchasing power is stunted. The 2008 housing crash and economic recession affected Millennials of all races and their parents. Financial losses of the latter affect the ability to pass on wealth to younger generations (Frey, 2018: 40). It is too early to tell whether Millennials’ slow start in asset accumulation will hinder the wealth positions of their own children. In their favour is the higher education rate among Millennials, which could end up offsetting negative effects. Working against them and the generation that follows them is the economic downturn expected from the 2020 COVID-19.

According to the OECD, in 2015, the average American household had wealth of $411,044 while the median wealth was $56,724 and the bottom quintile was negative $19,059—meaning that there are incredibly high rates of debt among America’s poorest (OECD, 2018). Taking the difference in wealth between the top 5% and the median household as a share of the median wealth, the US has a wealth ratio of 90.7, which is well above the OECD’s 18-country average of 20 (OECD, 2015). In Canada, that ratio is only 15.1—almost 5 points below the average (OECD, 2015: 249).

In Canada, wealth inequality is not nearly as high as in the US and younger Canadians are much more economically secure than American youth. In terms of markers of adulthood and accumulation of wealth, Canadian Millennials are nearly the opposite of US Millennials. Despite the extraordinary price of homes in Canada (where the average price is almost six times higher than income), over half of Canadian Millennials owned a home in mid-2015, and notably, they achieved this milestone at a younger age than did their parents. As Caranci and Petramala (2015: 1) point out, job conditions post-2008 recession were better for Canadian Millennials than for American ones, and they have much lower student debt than their US counterparts, who often have crushing burdens. Still, the gap between the unemployment rates of youths and adults has not decreased since the early 1990s. The 2008 recession, while not as bad for Canadian Millennials as for American ones, exacerbated youth unemployment, which in 2012 was 2.4 times that of workers aged 25–54, the widest gap since 1977 (Bernard, 2013: 1). Globally, it is common for youth unemployment to be higher than for older age groups, and it seems that as Canadians enter their late twenties they have found job security.

While wealth inequality is not as big of an issue generally in Canada as it is in the US, there are racial gaps. A study of university-educated and Canadian-born groups found that those of ‘visible minority’ status earned 87.4 cents for every dollar earned by Whites. Quebec had the highest racial wage gap of any of the provinces (defined as gap in earnings between ‘visible minorities’ and Caucasians), nearly 20%. The gap in the province of Nova Scotia was only 7.3%. With the exception of Canadian-born individuals of Japanese ethnic ancestry, ‘visible minorities’ earned less than Whites (2017). Worst off were those of Latin American heritage born in Canada, who earned 31.7% less than Whites (2017).

In sum, socioeconomic issues in the US are also demographic issues; in Canada, the same dynamics exist but are much less pronounced. In both, though, population ageing adds strains to the economic fortunes of the various generations. In particular, the large size of the US and Canadian Baby Boomer generations will have tremendous impact on economic dynamics in both countries in the next several decades. Population ageing in the US is not as intense as in Japan and Western Europe, but although the US population is still growing due to both population momentum and continued immigration, the growth rate of the US workforce will still slow down. According to estimates by demographers Passel and Cohn, adults aged 25–64 will grow only from 173 million in 2015 to 183 million in 2035. Although that number is positive, it is the lowest since the Baby Boomers entered the workforce in the 1960s (ibid., 2017). Because the US social security system is pay-as-you-go, the current workers contribute to a pot of money from which retirees draw. When the proportion of workers is declining relative to retirees, the system is strained. As is the case for any ageing country, Canada will face rising health care and pension costs over the next several decades. In both the US and Canada, a wide gap between life expectancy and age of eligibility for social services means that the entitlements systems are strained and policymakers in both countries have shown little will or ability to narrow the gap and make the systems more solvent.

By 2035, the youngest Baby Boomers will be 71 years old, meaning they will all be eligible to draw social security benefits, and in fact, by that time those on the upper end of the following generational cohort (Generation X) will have approached retirement age. Whether they will expect to retire in their 60s or expect to work into their 70s will depend on several factors—cultural, economic and political.

4 Mobilization Capacity

In this and the following section, we turn our attention to politics. The relative sizes of demographic groups can indicate what authors in this volume (Vanhuysse & Goerres, this volume and other contributions) are discussing as ‘mobilization capacity’, or the ability of demographic groups to translate their numbers into political power. As we see in this section, voting patterns reflect that youth are less likely to vote in elections than are older people. The existence of that gap has remained steady over time—the size of the gap, though, has fluctuated.

US voter turnout is extremely low compared with its OECD peers, and in the US, mid-term voting (between general elections for the President) has far lower turnout rates across age groups than years in which a president is being elected. In 2016 (a presidential election year), only 55.7% of the voting age population voted. There are also racial and ethnic disparities: as Table 2 shows, Hispanics have the lowest voting rates of the major racial groups in the US and Whites the highest.

Table 2 US election data by race (select presidential election years)
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Turnout is one aspect of mobilization; eligibility to vote is another. Voter eligibility in the US is highly political and, as with wealth, correlates with demographics. Compared to their overall percentage of the US population, Hispanics are relatively disenfranchised because relatively more are under age 18 (the US legal voting age) than are Whites and because a higher proportion of Hispanics are non-citizens, and thus ineligible to vote. In 2012, Hispanics were 11% of eligible voters but 17% of the US population. In contrast, Whites were overrepresented in the electorate: 71% of eligible voters but only 63% of the US population (Frey, 2016). US Blacks are also underrepresented, but for a different reason. The US is well known for having one of the highest felony conviction and incarceration rates in the world, an issue that is both political and demographic, as it disproportionately affects the Black population. One in 13 Blacks has no voting rights due to felonies, versus 1 of every 56 non-Blacks (The Sentencing Project, 2017). In 2012, 69% of the US Black population was eligible to vote, compared to 79% of Whites (Frey, 2016: 267–268). When non-citizens and ineligible felons are removed from the equation and overseas voters are added, voter turnout of the eligible population in 2016 is 3.6% higher than the number reported in Table 2, at 59.3% (McDonald, 2018). In large part, that’s because in 2016, 3,249,802 felons were ineligible to vote, the vast majority non-White (The Sentencing Project, 2017). From this review, we can conclude that mobilization capacity of Blacks and Hispanics in the US is constrained by political institutions, namely by citizenship and felony status and the lack of voting rights such statuses confer.

Mobilization capacity in the US is not just a racial issue, it is also an age issue. In the US, youth consistently have lower turnout rates than older voters, but the gap between older and younger citizens differs across elections. Youth were particularly inclined to show at the polls for the 2008 election of Barack Obama, as Table 3 shows. Still, in recent mid-term (non-presidential) elections, turnout of voters under age 30 was close to the lowest rate in the last 50 years. Baby Boomers’ voting rates were 30 percentage points higher than Millennials’ (Thompson, 2016). The gap is even more pronounced at the local level, as researchers from Portland State University found—the median age of voters in mayoral elections is 60 years (Keisling, 2015). To the extent that political power is concentrated in the hands of those who actually show at the polls, White, older Americans have the lion’s share of influence in the US.

Table 3 US election data by age (select presidential election years)
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In the US, voter turnout also differs by educational level, with highly educated voters overrepresented and the least educated underrepresented. Those with post-graduate education turn out at the highest levels, although as a share of the electorate they are generally under 15%, the second smallest group. Those with less than high school education are the smallest share of the electorate and have the lowest turnout rates of any educational group, typically under a 40% turnout rate (McDonald, 2018). Since younger cohorts are more educated than older ones, if past is precedent, then that generation may end up with high voter turnout when they reach older ages, meaning that their mobilization capacity will increase between now and 2040.

Although Millennials are on the cusp of becoming the largest generation in the electorate, they are far underrepresented in national elected offices. People who were born after 1981 are 46% of the US population. While in 2016 Millennials comprised 27% of the voting-eligible population, just 4% less than Baby Boomers, as of 2018 there were no Millennials in the US Senate, whose youngest member is 40-year-old Tom Cotton, a Republican from Arkansas (Fry, 2018, 2018b). There were only five elected Millennials in the House of Representatives, while there were 117 of Generation X, 270 of the Baby Boomers and 42 of the eldest generation (the Silent Generation) (Frey, 2018). Boomers are far overrepresented at 62% of the House of Representatives although they only make up 23% of the population. To the extent that having policymakers in place who share one’s background confers political influence, the proportion of representatives of different generations means younger generations are absent from the echelons of power. However, we should recognize that elected leaders represent the interests of all of their constituents, in theory, and the demographics of the representative are not necessarily indicative of their favouritism towards particular groups, age or otherwise.

Similar to Americans, Canadian youth also have lower voter turnout than older Canadians and minority populations have lower turnout than the White majority. Among Canadians aged 35 and older, only 10% report not voting in federal and provincial elections, but 31% of those aged 25–34 and 47% of those 18–24 claim not to vote. Only 14% of majority Canadians report not voting but 29% of ‘visible minorities’ do (Bilodeau & Turgeon, 2015: 4). There are competing research findings on the role of minority status, though. Using a 2002 survey, Bevelander and Penndakur (2009), for example, found that immigration status and ethnicity are unimportant determinants of voting at the federal and provincial levels, but that age, level of schooling and level of civic engagement determined propensity to vote.

Lending support to the preceding claim, studies show that younger Canadians feel less connected to political parties than do older Canadians, and that proclivity intersects with immigration status as well (Bilodeau & Turgeon 2015: 6). Of course, as the section on demographic context showed, age and minority status are related, as ‘visible minorities’ tend to be younger than majority Canadians. The effect of immigration status dissipates over time: recent immigrants are less likely to vote than immigrants who have been in Canada at least 10 years. The latter group shows no voting differences compared to the native-born population (Bilodeau & Turgeon 2015).

In contrast to dynamics in the US, where minorities are often politically marginalized, the high numbers of those with an immigrant background in Canada elevate ‘visible minority’ status politically. Canada has a diverse electorate—Elections Canada provides information in 26 heritage and 11 Aboriginal languages (Bevelander & Pendakur 2009). To be viable at the polls, Canadian political parties have to demonstrate openness to immigration issues. As one analyst argued, “[s]ince 40 percent of voters in Canada are either first- or second-generation immigrants, any party that questions the value of immigration for Canada would either sink in the polls or have to quickly revise its message” (Hiebert, 2016: 11).

In sum, while the non-White populations are growing as a proportion of Canada’s and America’s total populations, they have not expressed themselves to the full extent of their voice by voting at the polls. ‘Visible minority’ status in Canada is a less significant predictor of voting than in the US and immigrant status may even confer some political privileges. For Canada then, increasing diversity and a growing ‘visible minority’ population are likely to influence political outcomes. In the US, the disenfranchisement of non-White populations may mean continued political and economic marginalization over the next few decades.

5 Institutions

In both the US and Canada, population characteristics—such as age and race—confer little political influence on their own. Instead, each country’s particular political institutions magnify or minimize particular voices. In the US, the two-party system and the Electoral College boost the voices of rural and White Americans, with the opposite effect for residents of large cities and for non-Whites. Canada’s federal structure gives greater power and voice to certain regions and its residents, over others. Multiculturalism functions as an institution, shaping political discourse and policy outcomes.

In the US, the two-party system of Democrats and Republicans gives outsized influence to the rural, White population, which played the key role in the 2016 presidential election of Republican Donald Trump, who received 63.2% of the rural vote, compared to 31.3% for Democrat Hillary Clinton. Trump’s vote share increased with increasing levels of rurality—a pattern common for Republicans in recent decades. Such voters are only 15% of the US population (and were about that percentage of voters in 2016) but US institutions magnify their voices, as Donald Trump’s successful candidacy shows. National distribution is one reason: more than 4 out of 10 rural persons live in the Southern US. These rural areas have dire challenges, with declines in economic and social conditions, and reductions in life expectancy (Monnat & Brown, 2017: 229). Trump performed better in 2016 in counties with such struggles. Some scholars have invoked reference group theory to explain these voting dynamics because Whites are doing worse than their reference group (the previous generation) and Blacks and Hispanics are doing comparatively better than those Whites (Monnat & Brown, 2017: 233). If the lot of non-Whites continues to improve relative to rural Whites, the latter group’s support for Trump-like populist candidates will likely continue.

Another institution that magnifies the power of some demographic groups and minimizes others is the US Electoral College. In the US, as of 2018 there were 538 electoral votes apportioned among the 50 US states according to the state’s total number of Congressional representatives. Rather than awarding the presidential election to the winner of the nationwide popular vote, a candidate must get half (270) of the electoral votes in order to win. Dionne et al. have noted that “[i]n the case of the 2016 election, the Electoral College’s distance from the popular vote was aggravated because so many Clinton voters cast ballots in large, reliably Democratic states like California and New York. Her big margins in these states had no payoff in the electoral vote” (ibid., 2017: 29). Because of the electoral system, presidential candidates perform best when they focus their efforts on key states, rather than on winning a pure majority of votes. Unless the presidential election system changes, presidential politics will likely look similar in 2040.

People of an immigrant background also have their power as a voting bloc tempered by the US electoral system. Immigrants have disproportionately settled in US urban areas. In 2015, the top 20 metro areas held 65% of the nation’s total migrants, according to the Pew Research Center (Lopez & Bialik, 2017). As the preceding section showed, this dilution is in sharp contrast to dynamics in Canada, where political parties must show sympathies with immigrant heritage to gain popular support. The state of California had the largest number of immigrants as of 2015, nearly 11 million. However, while immigrants tended to settle in just four main states—California, Florida, Texas and New York—after liberalization of immigration policies in 1965, they began to disperse more widely across the US. Indeed, since 1960, “the foreign-born populations in Georgia, Nevada and North Carolina have increased more than 30-fold” (Pew Research Center, 2015: 72–73). Between 2015 and 2040, these new settlement patterns are likely to influence political control, although it is as of now unclear how exactly.

Certainly, Canada’s start as a bilingual country with strong Francophone elements shaped the country’s institutions from then to now. In Canada, federalism significantly influences policymaking. One way is by empowering and legitimizing the cultural and linguistic claims of Quebec province, which has a strong French heritage. Population changes in Quebec have played a role in both the call for an independence referendum and the failure of that referendum to pass. When a 1995 referendum on sovereignty for Quebec failed to pass, with “no” votes receiving 50.6%, many thought the issue disappeared, in part because of demographic defeat of low-fertility francophones. Yet, the issue continues to resurface in Canadian politics and separatist factions remain (Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998: 117f.). In Quebec, these divisions “add another layer of anxiety about numbers, relative power, and cultural hegemony […]” (Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998: 180).

In Canada, federalism helps shape the form immigration policies take. For example, Quebec has had autonomy over its immigration and refugee policy since 1991 (Hiebert, 2016: 13). But even beyond Quebec, provincial and local governments and the private sector help decide whom to admit and civil society helps provide integration services in partnership with the government. According to Hiebert (2016: 13), “[t]his decentralized approach has created a wider sense of ownership over immigration and integration […] and greatly facilitates the legitimacy of immigration policy and provides a kind of insulation against the potential demands of populist groups […]”. The contrast with the US is striking, as Kaufmann states: “As in other Western nations, there is an important constituency of conservative and authoritarian voters in English Canada who want fewer immigrants in the country. The difference is there are no political vehicles channelling this at the federal level” (2018: 276). Again, the institution of federalism, which devolves power away from the core, means that different issues will resonate at the local versus national level and calls for anti-immigrant measures or discrimination against non-Whites have a harder time gaining traction in federal policymaking.

While federalism is an important institution in Canadian political demography, the party system is less influential, particularly when compared with the US. Much of the Canadian electorate is unattached to particular political parties, as evidenced by the significant number of Canadians who support different parties in federal and provincial politics and who have changed their party identifications over time. As related by Kaufmann, Professor “Joshua Gordon at Simon Fraser University, remarks that the English-French divide splits the anti-immigration constituency between Anglo-Canadians who vote for the Conservative Party and French-Canadians who vote for the separatist Bloc Quebecois. This means the federal Conservatives can’t pool Anglo and French anti-immigration voters into a united voting bloc” (ibid., 2018: 277). These party dynamics mean that Canada is likely to remain sanguine on immigration over the next several decades.

One of the most influential institutions in Canada is multiculturalism, a norm that pervades Anglo-Canada and has been codified as an official government policy at the national level. As the Canadian Government defines it, the purpose of multiculturalism is “ensuring that all citizens keep their identities, take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging” (Government of Canada, 2018a: n.p.). Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s formal apology to the Tsilhqot’in chiefs for Canada’s past atrocities was one example of many where Trudeau, as head of state, has drawn attention to Canada’s First Nations as equal and important members of Canada’s population. Bringing these two institutions, federalism and multiculturalism, together, is controversial among many, including French-Canadians, who “were not interested in being demoted to one of many ‘cultures’” (Kaufmann, 2018: 275). In fact, Quebec rejects multiculturalism and instead uses an integration policy of interculturalism. As Kaufmann describes, “[w]here Quebec identity is territorial, historical and cultural, the contemporary Anglo-defined Canadian identity is futuristic: a missionary nationalism centred on the left-modernist ideology of multiculturalism” (ibid., 2018: 282).

Institutions in the US and Canada, then, seem to create opposing politics of demographic change. In the US, the two-party system for a long time remained neutral on immigration, with neither party adopting an overly pro- or anti-immigrant stance. In recent years, though, and in concert with electoral institutions, the Republican Party has capitalized on existing pockets of anti-immigrant sentiment among the citizenry and scored important victories at the polls. Canada remains fairly pro-immigration, in part because of its political institutions, namely federalism and multiculturalism.

6 Rhetoric

The final area this chapter charts is the politics of population in political rhetoric. Rhetoric surrounding changes in the ethnic and racial composition of the US has been consistently hostile, although that rhetoric has only sometimes translated into restrictive laws, in part because it has been difficult to get those changes passed through the US Congress. In Canada, rhetoric has been more sanguine, in part because the influence of multiculturalism is so pervasive—institutions matter.

In the US, there is a generational divide in opinions on immigration. According to the Pew Research Center, “[y]ounger Americans are more likely than older Americans to see the impact of immigrants on the U.S. in the long run positively: 54% of those ages 18–29 say this, compared with 44% of those ages 30–49, 41% of those ages 50–64 and 39% of those ages 65 and older” (ibid., 2015: 54). As in Canada, though, younger generations are more ethnically and racially diverse than older ones. Since people with an immigrant background comprise greater proportions of younger generations, it makes sense that they would be more favourable to immigration issues.

In recent US history, there is no greater example of hostile rhetoric towards particular segments of the population than in the statements of candidate, then President, Donald Trump. In his first month in office in January 2017, President Trump issued a series of executive orders on immigration. One of these was an order to build a border wall with Mexico; construction commenced in February 2018. Another was designed to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the US. In effect from January 25 until 16 March 2017, the order reduced the number of refugees that could be resettled in the US in 2017 to 50,000, suspended the US refugee programme for 120 days, suspended the entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely and suspended entry of those from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. Historically, the US has resettled more refugees than any other country, about 3 million since the 1980 creation of the refugee resettlement programme (Lopez & Bialik, 2017). Compared with countries bordering intense conflict, that number is minuscule. The more remarkable aspect of this policy change is the shift in tone surrounding immigration. Trump’s executive order restricting entry of those who might be “foreign terrorists” became nicknamed the “Muslim Ban” and discussed in the media as such. Trump has used incendiary language and slurs towards non-Whites throughout his time in the political spotlight and in doing has found favour among his White, rural base. Religion also plays a role in determining how the American populace reacts to ethnic change, as Trump has lamented that the US is moving away from its Christian heritage (Whitehead et al., 2018: 5).

Discourse on multiculturalismFootnote 4 in Canada has undergone significant changes since the policy was enacted in 1971. Elke Winter, analysing media and government discourses along with policy changes , found that Québécois nationalism played a major role in constructing Canadian multicultural identity in the 1990s, mainly in opposition to what Winter found was termed “Quebec’s allegedly backward-oriented nationalism ” (ibid., 2015: 637–638). In the decades following, though, the rhetoric of multiculturalism has been less about overall Canadian identity and more about minority identity. As part of this ongoing change, “multiculturalism is no longer viewed as dealing with majority–minority relations, but rather portrayed as an ‘intra-minority affair’ to be managed by the dominant group” (ibid.: 638). One group that has resisted the multicultural frame is the First Nations, some of whom want to be recognized as separate and have their land and other rights strengthened. Multiculturalism can dilute their message (Guo & Guo, 2015). But with all of its problems, Hiebert (2016) says multiculturalism at least provides a framework for resolving cultural conflicts. There has been some backlash against Muslim immigrants in Quebec but “[a]s elsewhere, it’s still taboo to openly defend majority ethnicity or ethno-traditional nationalism . Instead, ethnic conservatism is sublimated into state-nationalist and liberal rationales such as protecting women’s equality, secularism or defending the language” (Kaufmann, 2018: 284). Kaufmann says the salience of immigration in Canada is best explained by “the boundaries of acceptable discourse in English Canada”. In particular, Canada’s media is united “behind a set of liberal norms ”, with no conservative tabloid like Fox in the US (ibid.: 277–278).

Reitz argues that “[m]ost Canadians support the longstanding high rates of immigration, and few see immigration as one of Canada’s most significant problems. Majority Canadian support for high levels of immigration has been remarkably stable over time and relatively unaffected by recessions, the threat of terrorism and negative reports on specific immigrant groups” (ibid., 2011: n.p.). Population ageing is a serious concern among Canadians, and intergenerational issues—if we count health care and education as such—are the top concerns. In polls taken in 2016 and 2017, Canadians listed health care as the most important issue, followed by education and then population ageing. A 2015 poll, taken during the tenure of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, showed similar results, but with jobs and the environment tied with ageing for third place (Nanos). Immigration, in contrast, is not a top issue. Reitz found that Canadians’ personal beliefs that immigrants are an economic benefit and their support for multiculturalism boost support for immigration. Reitz says that “many Canadians would like immigrants to blend into society rather than form separate communities; however, pride in multiculturalism helps to allay this concern” (2011: n.p.). Hiebert agrees and adds that Canada still has racial and ethnic tensions, but percentages of those with immigrant backgrounds or non-European heritage are so high in some areas that it has become normalized: “[…] in the contemporary era, cultural complexity and change are no longer considered exceptional developments to be feared” (Hiebert, 2016: 3). In 2014, Canada admitted permanent residents from almost 200 countries—that diversity means there is no single conception of “the immigrant” and it helps dilute antagonism (ibid.: 3). Hiebert also notes that Canada also does not have immigrant-related terrorist attacks like Europe and US, so immigration as a national security rhetoric is less present (ibid.: 4).

Of course, there is still some resistance to immigration in Canada, particularly in French-Canada (Quebec). In 2011, the city of Gatineau, Quebec “published a ‘statement of values’ for new immigrants that cautioned against ‘strong odors emanating from cooking’ and […] informed migrants that, in Canada, it was not OK to bribe city officials” (Mehta, 2017). In Canada’s 2015 election campaign, the press and the major parties debated the circumstances in which Muslim women could wear a veil (niqab), but the general public were mostly disinterested in that issue or other cultural concerns (Clarke et al., 2017). For the most part, the rhetoric around immigration in Canada is neutral, in stark contrast to the US and most of Europe (Hiebert, 2016: 1–2).

Certainly, trends in rhetoric about political demography are hard to project to 2040. We cannot know how technology will continue to develop the media and communications landscape, nor how those changes will interact with the rapidly shifting demographics of the US and Canada. However, if we consider rhetoric as a product of demographic change or a reaction to that change, then we can more confidently predict that in concert with the economic changes outlined in an early section of this chapter, and tempered by the political institutions discussed previously, rhetoric about demographic change in the US is likely to remain inflammatory in the near future; Canada will be more insulated from such fires.

7 Conclusion

In both the US and Canada, population change—assumptions about it, fears of it and actual change—shapes policies about social security and retirement, about family benefits and about immigration, among other areas.

Racial tensions across the US have not abated even with greater diversity of the population. As the opening vignette of this chapter related, winds are shifting in the US towards acknowledging the legacy of enslaving and then restricting the rights of Blacks. As with any cultural change, though, resistance is strong. As the Confederate monuments have been removed across the US, protests and counter-protests accompany the cranes sent to remove the statues. If immigration continues at a robust level, immigrants and their descendants will be an increasing proportion of the US workforce as the large Baby-Boom generation continues to move into retirement (Passel & Cohn, 2017). But if it does not, the working-age population in the US will actually shrink by over 17 million people between 2015 and 2035 (Passel & Cohn, 2017). Even though the US is a populous country, it is remarkable that the US alone holds one-fifth of the world’s total migrants (Pew Research Center, 2015). The country has been a desirable destination since its genesis, but its identity as a ‘country of immigration’ is still controversial. And those migration numbers do not necessarily translate into more political power for non-White groups. US demographics are changing so dramatically and rapidly that American institutions will have to change in order to preserve—or initiate—economic growth. The first large Baby Boomer cohort collected its first social security checks in 2008, and to keep a sizeable labour force, immigrants need to step into fill the spots on the manufacturing floor or the engineer’s draft table.

Continuing high immigration is a policy choice, made by politicians balancing demands from the political left and right, which simultaneously pressure politicians to open and close the borders. Comprehensive immigration reform in the US is at an impasse because immigration does not fall along the traditional left-right divide. Unions pressure Democrats to restrict immigrants who might fill their jobs and provide non-union employees. Nativists pressure Republicans to restrict immigration of non-Whites and non-Christians who further ‘muddle’ American identity. We can be sure that demographic change will continue to shape US politics, but the direction in which it will do so is unclear.

The Canadian population is growing increasingly diverse, and identity politics are fading compared with the US so issues around immigration are much less political. Issues with how to simultaneously support ageing Canadians and ensure economic growth, however, will grow in importance as Canada’s population ageing intensifies over the coming decades. In both countries, the political institutions, particularly federalism and in the US the electoral system, and the population distribution across the territory will play a significant role in the policies that will be out at the polls.