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Legality and Law of Economic Warfare

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The International Law of Economic Warfare

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 16))

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Abstract

Drawing on the previous findings, this chapter finds that there exists a jus ad bellum oeconomicum in the sense that waging economic warfare is neither illegal nor legal, but extra-legal. A body of jus in bello oeconomico is identified, however, with a view to the numerous previously discussed rules of international economic law that regulate specific measures of economic warfare. It is argued that—in parallel to the development of the prohibition of the threat or use of force—a prohibition of the threat or use of economic force could develop in the future from the body of jus in bello oeconomico.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    While it is always difficult to pin down the origin of such dicta, first use of “jus ad bellum economicum [sic]” can apparently be credited to W. Michael Reisman of the Yale Law School, who used it in his keynote address for the Intercultural Human Rights Law Review Annual Symposium in late October 2008 (Reisman 2009, p. 16). The term was later taken up by Milaninia (2015), pp. 104, 109. Both authors focus on (UN) sanctions, whereas this work proposes to use the term more generally for all kinds of economic warfare within its definition.

  2. 2.

    For instance Bothe (2016b), pp. 596, 599–600 (paras 2, 9).

  3. 3.

    As remarked above, while “war” carries the connotation of illegality in the contemporary international legal order, “economic war” does not (above Sect. 2.2.5).

  4. 4.

    Neff (2005), pp. 161, 163–164 (on the concept of war generally see pp. 14–29); Detter Delupis (1994), pp. 253–254; Bothe (2016b), p. 597 (para. 3) and the references in Chap. 2 fn. 75 and 99 above. On the historic necessity of a just cause for war see Henderson (2018), pp. 10–12; Shaw (2017), pp. 851–854.

  5. 5.

    Schachter (1991), pp. 135 et seqq.; Bothe (2016b), pp. 605–614 (paras 18–24).

  6. 6.

    Neff (2005), p. 315, see also p. 164; cf. Malanczuk (1997), p. 309; Detter Delupis (1994), p. 256.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Neff (2005), pp. 161–162, 164; for war see Henderson (2018), p. 11. A contemporary source notes (Kaltenborn (1847), p. 278, see also pp. 302, 311–312, 315–316): “War shall not […] be viewed as organic condition on equal terms with peace, but merely a procedural remedy for international life, and […] war should […] be viewed as part of formal international law.” (Ger).

  8. 8.

    See Bleckmann (1978) and the references in Chap. 6 fn. 120 above. Cf. also Vos (2013), p. 1.

  9. 9.

    Fastenrath (1991), p. 251. See also the references in fn. 21 below.

  10. 10.

    Cf. Bleckmann (1978), pp. 177–183 with further references.

  11. 11.

    See, for instance, Vos (2013) and Fastenrath (1991). Perhaps the question is unanswerable, perhaps there is no “correct” answer to it (in this direction Weil 1984, p. 33; Menzel 2011, p. 228).

  12. 12.

    Specifically with regard to the employment of extraterritorial laws a rule seems to have crystallized (above Sect. 6.3.1). Such partial solidifications of rules are not uncommon in international law, see Bleckmann (1978), p. 191.

  13. 13.

    Fastenrath (1991), pp. 244–248; Meng (1994), pp. 486–487, 489; Meng (1997), p. 295; Elagab (1988), pp. 203, 208–209, 212; Vos (2013), pp. 111–112, 118–122 and Bleckmann (1978), pp. 174–183 for a good overview of the competing positions.

  14. 14.

    See Fastenrath (1991), pp. 213 et seqq. for a study of different types of gaps in international law.

  15. 15.

    Cf. Art. 2 (1) Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany or Art. 13 of the Constitution of Japan (日本国憲法).

  16. 16.

    Meng (1997), pp. 296–297; Henkin (1979), p. 23; Fastenrath (1991), pp. 24–25.

  17. 17.

    Fastenrath (1991), pp. 251–252 (critical of the binary lawful/unlawful scheme because it looses sight of establishing an (ideally) just international legal order).

  18. 18.

    Cf. Elagab (1988), p. 212.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Elagab (1988), p. 212: “Thus, the issue of the legality will depend on the operation of particular rules of international law in particular contexts.”

  20. 20.

    Bothe (2016b), p. 597 (para. 3): “A right to wage war was not assumed, but war was also not forbidden.” (Ger). See also Neff (2005), pp. 161, 163–164; Simon (2018), p. 123; Verdebout (2014), pp. 224–225.

  21. 21.

    Cf. Rauber (2018), pp. 327–328; Neuss (1989), p. 81; Kewenig (1982), p. 11; Buchheit (1974), p. 984; Garçon (1997), p. 153; see Bleckmann (1978), p. 174 (fn. 1) with further references.

  22. 22.

    Cf. Elagab (1988), pp. 203, 212.

  23. 23.

    Peters (2016), pp. 9 (para. 20), 33 (para. 21); Orakhelashvili (2019), p. 9.

  24. 24.

    Bowett (1972), pp. 2–5; Bowett (1976), pp. 249–254.

  25. 25.

    Neff (1990a), pp. 89–90.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Verdebout (2014), p. 224; Simon (2018), p. 131 for the similar practice of states in the nineteenth century regarding war.

  27. 27.

    Cf. Malanczuk (1997), pp. 306, 342; Neff (2005), pp. 315–316. This dichotomy was indeed symptomatic during times when resort to war was not restricted by international law, see Neff (2005), pp. 163, 345; Simon (2018), p. 123.

  28. 28.

    Art. 19 Charter of the Organization of American States (concluded 1962, entry into force 1965)—OAS Charter—552 U.N.T.S. 15 (emphasis added).

  29. 29.

    Art. 20 OAS Charter (emphasis added).

  30. 30.

    Some authors believe that the Latin American member states saw their vulnerability to measures of economic force due to their less diversified and dependent economies and thus wanted to limit its use by including the cited provisions, see van Thomas and Thomas (1972), p. 90; Voitovich (1991–1992), pp. 33–34; Bockslaff (1987), p. 42. For the lacking specificity see Carter (2018), para. 5.

  31. 31.

    Lowenfeld (2008), p. 891 notes: “this provision has not been observed”. See also Stoetzer (1993), pp. 272–291 and pp. 199 et seqq.

  32. 32.

    That is, if one accepts that customary international law can play a role in economic relations, cf. Zamora (1989), p. 41.

  33. 33.

    The following draws extensively on Neff (1990a).

  34. 34.

    Neff (1990a), pp. 70–85.

  35. 35.

    Neff (1990a), p. 84.

  36. 36.

    Neff (1990a), pp. 85–90.

  37. 37.

    For the current state of the law of neutrality see Bothe (2013).

  38. 38.

    Neff (1990a), p. 92.

  39. 39.

    The term evidence refers to the substance of customary international law, namely state practice, underpinned by opinio juris (cf. Jennings et al. 1992a, pp. 26–28 (para. 10)) to support that states feel entitled to wage economic war.

  40. 40.

    For instance, the Turkish president announced that Turkey will not lose the economic war (ekonomik savaşı) waged by the United States (referring to the increased tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum by the United States, see Chap. 3 fn. 192 above), Hürriyet (2018). Similarly, Venezuela’s president blames the dire condition of the state’s economy on economic war (guerra económica) waged by “imperialist” powers and understands his administration’s reforms as counteroffensive (The Economist (2018cc); for a pertinent statement by Iran’s leadership see Hafezi (2019). See also Chap. 5 fn. 1 above for a pertinent statement by Brazil’s former finance minister and Chap. 3 fn. 1 above for the German Federal Government’s reaction to the United States embargo against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. Reversely, Fidel Castro called for “economic war of the whole people” (Castro 1985, p. 25).

  41. 41.

    A statement of the President of the United States in his speech during the general debate of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2018 shows that ISCM are understood to be ramparts against foreign influence (UN (2018) (emphasis added)): “Here in the Western Hemisphere, we are committed to maintaining our independence from the encroachment of expansionist foreign powers. It has been the formal policy of our country since President Monroe that we reject the interference of foreign nations in this hemisphere and in our own affairs. The United States has recently strengthened our laws to better screen foreign investments in our country for national security threats, and we welcome cooperation with countries in this region and around the world that wish to do the same. You need to do it for your own protection.”

  42. 42.

    ICJ (20 November 1950) Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 276.

  43. 43.

    Cf. Popper (2005), pp. 16–18, 54 et seqq.

  44. 44.

    As will also be seen in the next section, many states do not seem to assume legality of economic warfare (similarly to war in the late nineteenth century, cf. Simon 2018, p. 131), which supports the thesis of extra-legality advocated in this work (cf. above Sect. 7.1.1). Remarkably, it is deduced by some from states’ right to nationalize a presumption of legality of such nationalizations (see Sornarajah 2017, pp. 431, 482). This approach will not be taken here, for it would contradict the assumption that there is no rule in international law that dictates freedom of action for states.

  45. 45.

    Cf. Dicke (1988), p. 188: “To argue that there could be a rule of customary law prohibiting economic coercion is ridiculous.”. See also Dicke (1978), p. 261; Shihata (1974), p. 626; Carter (2018), para. 11; Bothe (2016a), p. 35.

  46. 46.

    Henkin (1979), p. 23 (emphasis added) (fn. omitted). This is not surprising, given the (as far as international legal developments go) relatively short time span that has lapsed since Neff’s writing.

  47. 47.

    If economic warfare were prohibited (above Sect. 7.1.1), the following would be grounds of justification, which, among others, would frame the spectrum of permissible recourse to economic warfare.

  48. 48.

    Above Sect. 7.1.2. This could be related to reputational benefits, cf. Guzman (2008), pp. 34–35.

  49. 49.

    Cf. Kewenig (1982), p. 21. This includes the case when states for some reason have to prove that their resort to economic war is legal (for instance to rebut an international wrong in context of state responsibility), Henderson (2018), pp. 32–33.

  50. 50.

    Art. 25 UN Charter. See also Cassese (2005), p. 347 and the references in Chap. 2 fn. 174 above.

  51. 51.

    See Thouvenin (2005), pp. 2142–2143.

  52. 52.

    Thouvenin (2005), p. 2131; Lowenfeld (2008), pp. 859–860; Peters (2016), p. 138 (para. 106); Hahn (1996), p. 290.

  53. 53.

    Cf. Gazzini (2004), pp. 296–307; Forlati (2004), pp. 186–192; Orakhelashvili (2016), p. 33.

  54. 54.

    Tzanakopoulos (2015a), pp. 148–149; Cremer (2016a), paras 7–8; Hindelang (2009), pp. 314–315; Gestri (2016), p. 74.

  55. 55.

    Forlati (2004), p. 135; Schröder (2016), p. 586 (para. 114); Orakhelashvili (2016), pp. 34–36; Dupont (2016), pp. 40–52.

  56. 56.

    Tzanakopoulos (2015a), p. 158 focuses on the law of countermeasures’ justifying quality for EU sanctions (see also Tzanakopoulos 2016, pp. 69–73); Schröder (2016), p. 590 (para. 123).

  57. 57.

    For IMF practice see Kewenig (1982), pp. 19–20 and International Monetary Fund Executive Board (1952) (emphasis added): “Article VIII, Section 2(a), in conformity with its language, applies to all restrictions on current payments and transfers, irrespective of their motivation and the circumstances in which they are imposed. Sometimes members impose such restrictions solely for the preservation of national or international security. The Fund does not, however, provide a suitable forum for discussion of the political and military considerations leading to actions of this kind. In view of the fact that it is not possible to draw a precise line between cases involving only considerations of this nature and cases involving, in whole or in part, economic motivations and effects for which the Fund does provide the appropriate forum for discussion, and the further fact that the Fund must exercise the jurisdiction conferred by the Fund Agreement in order to perform its duties and protect the legitimate interests of its members, the following policy decision is taken: […]”

  58. 58.

    Bowett (1972), p. 7: “The State would have to show that it was reacting to a delict by another State, posing an immediate danger to its security or independence in a situation affording no alternative means of protection and, lastly, that the reaction was proportionate to the harm threatened.”; Blum (1977), p. 14; Kißler (1984), pp. 103–104.

  59. 59.

    Greenwood (2018), para. 9; Milaninia (2015), pp. 109–110; cf. Henderson (2018), p. 208.

  60. 60.

    Cf. Bothe (2016b), p. 606 (para. 19); Pickett and Lux (2015), p. 4.

  61. 61.

    Cf. Schachter (1986), p. 127 (fn. 63).

  62. 62.

    As is argued by Neff (above Sect. 7.1.2.2.1).

  63. 63.

    Cf. Roberts et al. (2019), pp. 672–673, 676.

  64. 64.

    As is argued by Neff (above Sect. 7.1.2.2.1). The value of this narrative is somewhat limited by the fact that it is usually employed in the context of agreements which forbid or restrict the measure of economic warfare in question. Whether it is possible to deduce from a treaty-related justification narrative that states view economic warfare illegal even beyond the scope of relevant treaties, is unclear.

  65. 65.

    W. Michael Reisman coined this term, see the reference in fn. 1 above.

  66. 66.

    Muir (1974), p. 192 (emphasis added).

  67. 67.

    See Blanar and Arcand (1989), pp. 308–309 for the economic theory underlying the GATT (and its criticism).

  68. 68.

    A different question is how these gains are distributed within states; if the governing caste can expect higher benefits for itself from an overall loss-making concession, there is an obvious principle-agent problem.

  69. 69.

    The use of the passive voice is not supposed to conceal that states have to agree to these rules; they are of course not imposed upon them.

  70. 70.

    Cf. Orakhelashvili (2019), p. 9.

  71. 71.

    Alter et al. (2019), pp. 450–454; van Damme (2010), pp. 614 et seqq.; Kucik (2019), pp. 1130–1131; see also the proposal cited in Blustein (2019), pp. 259–263; Art. 38 (1) (d) ICJ Statute.

  72. 72.

    Bown (2019a), pp. 26–27; Fukunaga (2019), pp. 797 et seqq.; Roberts et al. (2019), p. 672. Wolff (2018) stated: “At present the appellate function of the WTO is being threatened with extinction. […] The U.S. is blocking appointments to the WTO Appellate Body […]. It does this, it says, because it finds fault with the way in which the Appellate Body has acted. […] [T]here appears to be an unbridgeable gulf among WTO Members as to how the Appellate Body should interpret its mandate. […] The current threat to the future of the Appellate Body stems from these deeply divided views as to how the mandate of the Appellate Body has been and should be interpreted.”

  73. 73.

    David and Suissa (2009), p. 39 (Fr).

  74. 74.

    For this classical content of IIAs see, for instance, Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), pp. 130 et seqq. and Salacuse (2015), pp. 228 et seqq. International investment law can also place limitations on currency war, for instance transfer guarantees typical for IIAs can limit states’ prerogative to restrict capital outflows, see Viterbo (2012), pp. 243–271; Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 213.

  75. 75.

    Cf. Kroll (2015), p. 1483 (para. 2).

  76. 76.

    Cf. Chinkin (1989), pp. 856–859 on the problematic transformation process from soft to hard law.

  77. 77.

    For a list of potentially violated general international law see Kewenig (1982), pp. 17–18.

  78. 78.

    Cf. Beaucillon (2016), p. 103.

  79. 79.

    For a discussion of yet other strictures belonging to this group, namely the abus de droits doctrine, and how Art. 53 UN Charter could restrict the use of UN sanctions, see Neuss (1989), pp. 70–71, Lowenfeld (2008), pp. 881–883, 888 and Hakenberg (1988), pp. 143–146, respectively.

  80. 80.

    Cf. Popper (2005), pp. 8–9.

  81. 81.

    Cassese (2005), p. 399.

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    Teoman M. Hagemeyer-Witzleb

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Hagemeyer-Witzleb, T.M. (2021). Legality and Law of Economic Warfare. In: The International Law of Economic Warfare. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72846-5_7

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