Abstract
The effect of fundamental rights in private relationships is a controversial question not only within Member States, but also with regard to rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Recent ECJ Judgments have been read as adopting a stance in favour of recognizing horizontal direct effect to certain rights. This paper addresses the issue based on the understanding of fundamental rights as principles that impose upon public authorities an optimization command. This comprehension of fundamental rights is crucial to explain the need of a legislative intervention in order to ensure their enforceability in private relationships and, therefore, to conclude that the rights enshrined in the Charter do not have horizontal direct effect. Only exceptionally certain fundamental rights do not require this intervention because they are defined as such in the private sphere, and thus within the scope of private relationships. The same applies for human dignity, which is directly enforceable in private relationships since it is inextricable tied to the essence of human beings. As we will show, this view is consistent with the EU legislative action and ECJ case law.
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Notes
- 1.
Jarass (2016a), pp. 33–34, confirming that this matter has barely been discussed in the United Kingdom and the United States.
- 2.
Lohsse and Schulze (2016), pp. 16–21.
- 3.
- 4.
This rule resembles other Member State constitutional provisions. See, for instance, Article 1(3) GG of the German Constitution (“Die nachfolgenden Grundrechte binden Gesetzgebung, vollziehende Gewalt und Rechtsprechung als unmittelbar geltendes Recht”), or Article 53(1) of the Spanish Constitution, which provides that “[t]he rights and freedoms recognised in Chapter 2 of the present Part are binding on all public authorities. Only by an act which in any case must respect their essential [core] content, could the exercise of such rights and freedoms be regulated, which shall be protected in accordance with the provisions of section 161(1)(a).”
- 5.
Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, Judgment of 26 February 2013, EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 45 and 46.
- 6.
Case C-684/16, Shimizu, Judgment of 6 November 2018, EU:C:2018:874, paragraph 76. Advocate General Cruz Villalón had already taken this stance in his opinion delivered on 18 July 2013, Case C-176/12, Association de Médiation Sociale, EU:C:2013:491, paragraphs 28–35.
- 7.
Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Bauer, Judgment of 6 November 2018, EU:C:2018:871, paragraph 89, and Case C-684/16, cit. in note 6, paragraph 78.
- 8.
Case C-193/17, Cresco, Judgment of 22 January 2019, EU:C:2019:43, paragraph 76.
- 9.
See Alexy (1993), pp. 81–82.
- 10.
Ibid, pp. 140–141.
- 11.
Menéndez (2004), pp. 161–166. Consequently, out of the list of rights and principles laid down in the Charter, only those providing for optimization commands giving rise to individual rights vis-à-vis public authorities qualify as fundamental rights. Any rights and principles whose content depends on a specific legislative expression, whether by the EU or national legislatures, will not be considered as fundamental rights. Ibid, pp. 179 and 182–183. See also Case C-176/12, Association de Médiation Sociale, Judgment of 15 January 2014, EU:C:2014:2, paragraphs 44–48.
- 12.
Ibid, pp. 182–183 and Lohsse and Schulze (2016), p. 23. Regarding workers’ right to information and consultation (Article 27 CFREU), see the Opinion by AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-176/12, cit. in note 6, points 51–53, and Judgment of 15 January 2014, Association de Médiation Sociale, EU:C:2014:2, paragraphs 45–48. As for the right to paid annual leave (Article 31(2) CFREU), which had been listed as a principle by several scholars, see Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, cit. in note 7, paragraph 58, where the Court defines it as a fundamental right only requiring that lawmakers determine its exact duration. In this vein, see also Case C-684/16, cit. in note 6, paragraph 74.
- 13.
Opinion delivered by AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-176/12, cit. in note 6, point 62.
- 14.
Case C-176/12, cit. in note 11, paragraph 47.
- 15.
For further detail, see the Opinion delivered by AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-176/12, cit. in note 6, points 61-71. In these terms, this principle may be relied on in disputes between individuals (see, points 38–42). Also, see the scholarly work by Mangas (2008a), p. 819.
- 16.
Alexy (1993), pp. 86–87. Díez-Picazo Giménez (2013) specifies that certain Spanish Constitution fundamental rights (Constitución Española, CE) are structured as rules, such as those set out in Article 17 CE– “[…] the person arrested must be set free or handed over to the judicial authorities within a maximum period of seventy two hours” or in Article 18 CE–“no entry or search may be made without the consent of the householder or a legal warrant, except in cases of flagrante delicto.” (pp. 11–12). Regarding EU law, Menéndez (2004) acknowledges that a fundamental right can contain a principle and a rule at the same time (p. 184).
- 17.
Alexy (1993), pp. 99–103. Although principles are sometimes reinforced by arguing in their favour, they do not quite become rules.
- 18.
Ibid, pp. 102–103.
- 19.
Ibid, pp. 89–90. See Díez-Picazo Giménez (2013), pp. 11–12.
- 20.
Starck (2002), pp. 70 and 72.
- 21.
On the twofold dimension of fundamental rights as “prohibitions to intervene” (Abwehrssverbot) and “duties of protection” (Schutzgebot), see Canaris (1984), pp. 212–213 and 225–226, and Alfaro (1993), pp. 66, 69–70. On the individual right to protection, see Alexy (1993), pp. 435 and 437. In fact, Canaris notes that one of public authorities’ (or the state’s) primary duties is to protect individuals from other individuals (ibid, 225–226). See also, von Münch (1997) who points out as purpose for fundamental rights imposing on public authorities a “public duty of protection.” (pp. 46–48). Concerning the Charter, in this connection, see Mangas (2008a), p. 819.
- 22.
Alexy (1993), pp. 439–440.
- 23.
Alexy (1993), pp. 435 and 446. Along these lines, see the Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-176/12, cit. in note 6, point 36.
- 24.
Ibid, p. 448.
- 25.
Ibid, pp. 446–448. This is why Fornasier (2015) considers that this way of applying fundamental rights to private relations broadens the regulatory options for lawmakers than merely imposing them directly (p. 34).
- 26.
- 27.
In the scholarly literature, regarding gender equality in marriage, see Starck (2002), pp. 71–72. He considers also included in this category trade union freedom. See also Alfaro (2015a) on equal pay (pp. 1 and 4). The right to paid annual leave is considered effective in private relationships within firms (see Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, cit. in note 7, paragraph 90; see also Case C-684/16, cit. in note 6, paragraph 79). In this regard, the Court of Justice states that it entails “[…] by its very nature, a corresponding obligation on the employer, which is to grant such periods of paid leave.”
- 28.
This notion is taken from Cruz Villalón (1988), pp. 106–107. Let us recall that “two-way rights” is a broader category, encompassing freedom of expression, freedom of association (including its negative dimension, the right to decline membership) or freedom of assembly; these rights and freedoms may not be addressed to private parties after all.
- 29.
Lohsse and Schulze (2016), p. 19. According to them, there is no need to resort to the Drittwirkung in these cases.
- 30.
Ibid, p. 16.
- 31.
However, Beladíez (2017) considers that the key is the protected legal interest, and it subsequently specifies that their scope depends on the type of legal relationship where they are exercised (pp. 92–93).
- 32.
- 33.
Alfaro (2017), p. 5.
- 34.
- 35.
Alfaro (1993), p. 73.
- 36.
- 37.
As repeatedly noted by the General Court, the grounds for refusal of registration of trademarks contrary to public policy provided in Article 7(1)(f) of the EU Trademark Regulation are intended to preserve social and democratic values preventing signs contrary to core EU values, such as human dignity, integrity and individual freedom (Arts. 2, 3 and 6 CFREU), from being registered as EU trademarks. This was the case with “La mafia se sienta a la mesa”, referring to a criminal organization originating in Italy, or “Paki”, which in English is considered a racial slur. In this regard, Cases T-526/09, PAKI, Judgment of 5 October 2011, EU:T:2011:564, paragraph 15, and T-1/17, La Mafia SE SIENTA A LA MESA, Judgment of 15 March 2018, EU:T:2018:146, paragraph 36.
- 38.
Menéndez (2004), pp. 179–180.
- 39.
- 40.
Menéndez (2004), pp. 177–179.
- 41.
- 42.
In this connection, see Díez-Picazo Giménez (2012), p. 148. His interpretation being that, in this case, private law is directly affected by fundamental rights, which impact any provision, Alfaro (1993), pp. 71 and 76. Among German scholarly work, see Lohsse and Schulze (2016), pp. 24–25. Nevertheless, this should not be regarded as a “constitutionalization” of private law or as the subordination thereof to constitutional law. However, see Cherednychenko (2007), p. 142.
- 43.
In this vein, see Starke (2016), p. 219.
- 44.
Case C-275/06, Promusicae, Judgment of 29 January 2008, EU:C:2008:54, paragraphs 66 and 68. This line of reasoning can be found in other rulings. See Case C-314/12, Constantin Film Verleih, Judgment of 27 March 2014, EU:C:2014:192, paragraph 46, within the framework of Directive 2001/29, on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. The case involved a conflict between the right to property–namely intellectual property–and the freedom to conduct a business. See also Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended, Judgment of 24 November 2011, EU:C:2011:771, paragraphs 44–46, within the framework of a number of Directives, related, essentially, with the protection of copyright and privacy, as well as with the processing of personal data. The Court stresses the need to balance the right to property against other fundamental rights at stake, such as the freedom to conduct a business, the right to privacy and freedom of information. In Case C-580/13, Coty German, Judgment of 16 June 2015, EU:C:2015:485, paragraphs 34–43, the Court assessed the compatibility with Directive 2004/48, on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, of a domestic provision on banking secrecy allowing to deny access to banking information of a private party that was selling counterfeit perfumes online. The Court found that this provision disregarded the balance achieved by the EU legislator in the abovementioned Directive between property rights–tied to intellectual property rights in particular–and effective legal protection, on the one hand, and the processing of personal data, on the other.
- 45.
Jarass (2016b) considers that this is the Court of Justice’s approach (§ 51 RdN 32).
- 46.
Hesse speaks about “balancing or weighing.” See note 41 above.
- 47.
Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist, EU:C:2003:596, Judgment of 6 November 2003, paragraph 82.
- 48.
- 49.
Council Directive 2000/78/EC, of 27 November 2000, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000, L 303, p. 16).
- 50.
“The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief […] with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment” (Article 1).
- 51.
Case C-414/16, cit. in note 48, paragraph 52.
- 52.
In this connection, see Case C-414/16, cit. in note 48, paragraphs 48, 49, 54 and 59. The same line of reasoning can be found in Case C-68/17, IR, Judgment of 11 September 2018, EU:C:2018:696, paragraphs 43-45.
- 53.
With regard to this “palliative role,” see the Opinion of AG Y. Bot delivered on 25 November 2015, Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri, EU:C:2015:776, paragraph 47. Consequently, the Court of Justice found that the application of a national provision which was contrary to principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, “as given concrete expression” in Directive 2000/78, must be precluded in disputes among private persons (see Judgment of 19 April 2016, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 27).
- 54.
In contrast, see Azpitarte (2019), p. 1572.
- 55.
Case C-414/16, cit. in note 48, paragraphs 76–78 and Case C-68/17, cit. in note 52, paragraph 69. Regarding the non-discrimination principle, this line of reasoning can also be found in Case C-193/17, cit. in note 8, paragraph 76.
- 56.
Case C-176/12, cit. in note 11, paragraphs 38–39, preventing an interpretation of national law contra legem. Likewise, Case C-193/17, cit. in note 8, paragraph 74.
- 57.
Case C-414/16, cit. in note 48, paragraph 79.
- 58.
Case C-414/16, cit. in note 48, paragraphs 72-73 and 81-82. See also, Case C-68/17, cit. in note 52, paragraphs 64-65 and 70-71, along with Case C-684/16, cit. in note 6, p. 60.
- 59.
Case C-144/04, Mangold, Judgment of 22 November 2005, EU:C:2005:709, paragraphs 74-78, and Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, Judgment of 19 January 2010, EU:C:2010:21, paragraphs 53-56. In line with the body, see Fornasier (2015), p. 44.
- 60.
In this connection, see Case C-282/10, Maribel Domínguez, Judgment of 24 January 2012, EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 27. On this aspect, among the scholars, see Alfaro (2015a), p. 6.
- 61.
Case C-555/07, cit. in note 59, paragraph 46 and Case C-282/10, cit. in note 60, paragraph 37.
- 62.
“Therefore, if it proved to be the case that national provisions could not be interpreted in a manner which was consistent with Directive 2000/78, the referring court would nevertheless be obliged to guarantee individuals the legal protection afforded to employees under Article 21 of the Charter and to guarantee the full effect of that article.”
- 63.
Case C-193/17, cit. in note 8, paragraphs 60–61 and 67–68.
- 64.
Case C-193/17, cit. in note 8, paragraph 80.
- 65.
Case C-406/15, Milkova, Judgment of 9 March 2017, EU:C:2017:198, paragraphs 66–69 and cited case law.
- 66.
Case C-569/16 and C-570/16, cit. in note 7, paragraph 92. See also, Case C-684/16, cit. in note 6, paragraph 81.
- 67.
Case C-43/75, Defrenne, Judgment of 8 April 1976, EU:C:1976:56, paragraph 39. In this regard, see Sarmiento (2017), p. 4.
- 68.
Ibid refers to this case as the first one where the horizontal direct effect of a Treaty provision, addressed to Member States, is acknowledged for private relationships (p. 4).
- 69.
Case C-43/75, cit. in note 67, paragraph 40.
- 70.
In this regard, see Alfaro (2015a), p. 4.
- 71.
On this case law, see Sarmiento (2017), pp. 3–6.
- 72.
Cherednychenko (2007), p. 202, note 10.
- 73.
Sarmiento (2017), p. 3.
- 74.
Ibid, p. 3.
- 75.
Ibid, p. 6. He examines Case C-281/98, Angonese, Judgment of 6 June 2000, EU:C:2000:296.
- 76.
Ibid, p. 6.
- 77.
Alexy (1993) points out that this fundamental right sometimes operates as a rule and some others as a principle. He adds that a distinct feature of human dignity is that there is a high degree of certainty regarding its precedence over conflicting principles within the fully protected sphere of human worth (pp. 106–107).
- 78.
Concerning this connection with the inherent worth of individuals, see the Opinions of AG C. Stix-Hackl, in Case C-36/02, Omega, EU:C:2004:162, paragraph 75 and AG Poiares Maduro, in Case C-303/06, Coleman, EU:C:2008:61, point 9. Amongst other scholarly works, see Escarejo (2019), p. 65, including additional references. See also, Sobrino (2008), who underlines that human dignity is absolute, non-derogable and not subject to any limitation under any other fundamental rights provided in the Charter (p. 108).
- 79.
Alexy (1993), p. 37.
- 80.
- 81.
Case C-36/02, Omega, Judgment of 14 October 2004, EU:C:2004:614.
- 82.
Case C-36/02, cit. in note 81, paragraphs 34–35.
- 83.
Alfaro (1993) explaining that the process of interpretation leads to the “concretization” or realization of the rules for them to be applied to a specific case (pp. 73 and 75).
- 84.
Hesse (1995), p. 65.
- 85.
Case C-414/16, cit. in note 48, paragraph 79.
- 86.
Case C-101/01, cit. in note 47, paragraph 87; C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, Judgment of 26 June 2007, EU:C:2007:38, paragraph 28, and Case C-275/06, cit. in note 44, paragraph 68.
- 87.
See the insights of Díez-Hochleitner (2013), pp. 5 and 8.
- 88.
Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats, Judgment of 1 March 2011, EU:C:2011:100.
- 89.
For example, see Case C-377/98, The Netherlands v European Parliament and Council, Judgment of 9 October 2001, EU:C:2001:523, deciding on the application for annulment against Directive 98/44/EC, of 6 July 1998, on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, for being contrary to human dignity (among other grounds). As for the scholarly works, Mangas (2008a) points out this possibility (p. 820).
- 90.
Mangas (2008b), p. 842.
- 91.
As acknowledged, on a general basis, Mangas (2008a), p. 817.
- 92.
Case C-555/07, cit. in note 59, paragraph 56. Along the same lines, see also Case C-144/04, cit. in note 59, paragraph 78.
- 93.
Case C-275/06, cit. in note 44, paragraph 68.
- 94.
Case C-414/16, cit. in note 48, paragraphs 72 and 73 and Case C-68/17, cit. in note 52, paragraphs 64 and 65.
- 95.
On this approach to personal autonomy, see Hesse (1995), pp. 75–77.
- 96.
Alfaro (2015b), p. 1.
- 97.
Hesse (1995), p. 75. See Alfaro (1993), p. 94; von Münch (1997), p. 50. More recently, Lohsse and Schulze (2016) recall that personal autonomy is a constitutionally protected principle (p. 29). In contrast, Ramos (2016) argues that personal autonomy is inextricably linked to the core or essence of fundamental rights (pp. 247–249). Based on this claim, he suggests that the potential conflicts between personal autonomy and fundamental rights should be solved by striking a fair balance and weighing the interests at stake. Ibid, pp. 250–264.
- 98.
Case C-303/06, cit. in note 78, points 9 and 11.
- 99.
Hesse (2011): “An unlimited connection of individuals with fundamental rights would entail a restriction of their personal autonomy, which could lead to a significant limitation of personal freedom, thereby reshaping private law’s meaning and distinct nature.” (p. 172). See also, von Münch (1997), pointing out that both fundamental rights and private autonomy “are an integral part of a democratic, liberal and social legal order subject to the rule of law.” (pp. 49–50).
- 100.
Alfaro (1993), pp. 99–100.
- 101.
Ibid, p. 94.
- 102.
Article 1255 of Spanish Civil Code is worded as follows: “The contracting parties may establish any covenants, clauses and conditions deemed convenient, provided that they are not contrary to the laws, to morals or to public policy.”
- 103.
Alfaro (1993), pp. 96–99, as well as the further elaboration on this idea in those pages.
- 104.
Ibid, pp. 103–104.
- 105.
Ibid, pp. 104-105.
- 106.
Ibid, pp. 106-107.
- 107.
Alfaro (2015a), pp. 1–2.
- 108.
- 109.
Case C-84/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, Judgment of 16 July 2015, EU:C:2015:480, paragraph 87.
- 110.
Case C-84/14, cit. in note 109, operative paragraph 4: “such a measure would be capable of being objectively justified by the intention to ensure the security of the electricity transmission network and the due recording of electricity consumption only if that measure did not go beyond what is appropriate and necessary to achieve those legitimate aims and the disadvantages caused were not disproportionate to the objectives thereby pursued.”
- 111.
1BvR3080/09. This ruling is available at: https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2018/04/rs20180411_1bvr308009.html. See the English translation of this ruling at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2018/04/rs20180411_1bvr308009en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1.
- 112.
On these matters, see Alfaro (2018), p. 1.
- 113.
Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, Judgment of 14 July 1994, EU:C:1994:292, paragraph 29, and Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, Judgment of 5 March 1996. See also Fornasier (2015), p. 36.
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Bermejo, N. (2021). Fundamental Rights and Horizontal Direct Effect Under the Charter. In: Izquierdo-Sans, C., Martínez-Capdevila, C., Nogueira-Guastavino, M. (eds) Fundamental Rights Challenges. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72798-7_5
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