Abstract
The traditional legislative process is dead in the U.S. Statutes are increasingly long and complex omnibus efforts rushed through at the end of congressional sessions. Yet American statutory interpretation remains largely unchanged, with judges generally uninterested in the realities of the legislative process, despite claiming our dominant interpretive approach reflects Congress or is in conversation with it. Omnibus statutes pose challenges for judges who read statutes with assumptions of linguistic perfection and consistency—as American judges do—and the truncated legislative process results in more gaps and mistakes, problems that lack coherent doctrinal approaches in our courts. And American judges have never been willing to strike down federal statutes for lack of deliberation or process, preferring instead indirect nudges toward more “due process in lawmaking.” This chapter documents the rise of unorthodox modern lawmaking in the U.S., including omnibus lawmaking, and details its causes, costs and benefits. These developments are not unmitigated negatives; they are adaptations to the changing complexities of the American political system. It has been 50 years since the last congressional reorganization and another revolution may be coming. There is a burgeoning legal movement among scholars and some American jurists, including several Supreme Court justices, to bring understanding of the legislative process, and how it has changed, into our theories and doctrines of statutory interpretation.
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Notes
- 1.
Linde (1976).
- 2.
Sinclair (2017).
- 3.
Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 113–18 (2013); Rules of the One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, H. Res. 6 (2019); Cong. Research Serv., Reorganization of the House of Representatives: Modern Reform Efforts (2003); Cong. Research Serv., R30862, The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate’s “Byrd Rule” (2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20161122_RL30862_ce42dbc9f4a53acdf63bcb8097c7392495568965.pdf.
- 4.
Cloture Rule, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Cloture_Rule.htm.
- 5.
Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 113–18, R. XXII (2013).
- 6.
2 U.S.C. § 644.
- 7.
See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J., concurring).
- 8.
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
- 9.
See Bar-Siman-Tov (2021).
- 10.
Scalia (1997).
- 11.
Gluck (2015).
- 12.
Sinclair (2017).
- 13.
- 14.
Ibid., p. 1802.
- 15.
Ibid., p. 1803.
- 16.
Ibid.
- 17.
Gluck and Bressman (2013), p. 979.
- 18.
Gluck et al. (2015), p. 1804.
- 19.
Ibid.
- 20.
Ibid., p. 1805.
- 21.
Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1319 (2020).
- 22.
Ibid., p. 1806.
- 23.
Ibid., pp. 1807–1808.
- 24.
Wolfensberger (2020).
- 25.
Gluck et al. (2015), pp. 1808–1809.
- 26.
Ibid., p. 1809.
- 27.
Ibid.
- 28.
O’Connell et al. (2020).
- 29.
Gluck et al. (2015).
- 30.
Ibid., p. 1813.
- 31.
Ibid., pp. 1817–1818.The Affordable Care Act offer an important exception, with novel process requirements for Medicaid waivers.
- 32.
Ibid., p. 1820.
- 33.
Binder (2015).
- 34.
Sinclair (2017).
- 35.
Gluck and Bressman (2013).
- 36.
Ibid., p. 750.
- 37.
Elis (2020).
- 38.
Stack (2010).
- 39.
Reynolds (2019).
- 40.
Ibid.
- 41.
Ibid.
- 42.
Ibid.
- 43.
Ibid.
- 44.
Fisk and Chemerinsky (1997).
- 45.
Koger (2010).
- 46.
Smith and Flathman (1989).
- 47.
H. Comm’n on Immigration and Facilities, Staff Requirements of the House Legislative Counsel, H. Doc. 94-327 at 4.
- 48.
Ibid.
- 49.
Ibid. at 5.
- 50.
Gluck and Cross (2020).
- 51.
Gluck and Bressman (2013).
- 52.
Ibid.
- 53.
Ibid., p. 748.
- 54.
Ibid., p. 739.
- 55.
Gluck and Bressman (2013), p. 757.
- 56.
Gluck and Bressman (2013), p. 761.
- 57.
Gluck and Bressman (2013), p. 980.
- 58.
Gluck and Bressman (2013), p. 763.
- 59.
Ibid., p. 936.
- 60.
Ibid.
- 61.
Ibid.
- 62.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5.
- 63.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
- 64.
Ibid. at 2492.
- 65.
Gluck and Cross (2020).
- 66.
Maine Community Health Options, supra.
- 67.
See Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782–83 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
- 68.
See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 562 (2015) (Kagan, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
- 69.
See Loving v. I.R.S., 742 F.3d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
- 70.
See Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1453 (2020) (“[R]edundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication.”).
- 71.
See United States Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 855 F.3d 381, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
- 72.
See, e.g., Council for Urological Interests v. Burwell, 790 F.3d 212, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (“The Congress often uses legislative history, rather than the text, to restrain agencies in the exercise of their delegated authority”); see also United States v. Torres, 910 F.3d 1245, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting that even the Gluck/Bressman study, the leading empirical work challenging the presumption that Congress imports prior judicial interpretations when it borrows a phrase from an earlier statute, recognizes the accuracy of that presumption where the relevant statutes are closely related).
- 73.
United States v. Koutsostamatis, 956 F.3d 301, 307 (5th Cir. 2020); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 130 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted sub nom. Altitude Exp., Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 378 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
- 74.
Ibid.
- 75.
Ibid.
- 76.
Gluck and Bressman (2013), p. 781.
- 77.
Gluck and Cross (2020).
- 78.
Gluck and Bressman (2013), p. 981.
- 79.
Gluck and Cross (2020).
- 80.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 705 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
- 81.
Id. at 706 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
- 82.
See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (“The more relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress.”).
- 83.
Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 616–17 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
- 84.
Manning (2015).
- 85.
Gluck and Bressman (2013), pp. 926–947.
- 86.
Gluck (2015).
- 87.
Easterbrook (2017).
- 88.
Ibid.
- 89.
- 90.
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892).
- 91.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008).
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Gluck, A.R. (2021). Unorthodox Lawmaking and Legislative Complexity in American Statutory Interpretation. In: Bar-Siman-Tov, I. (eds) Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation. Legisprudence Library, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72748-2_9
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