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Omnibus Legislation in Germany: A Widespread Yet Understudied Lawmaking Practice

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Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation

Part of the book series: Legisprudence Library ((LEGIS,volume 8))

Abstract

Omnibus legislation (aka ‘Artikelgesetz’) is widespread in Germany and encounters only a few constitutional and other legal constraints. Efficiency of law-making, in particular by avoiding separate legislative procedures, the implementation of European directives and the growing sophistication of the statutory systems are strong reasons for legislative packaging. Moreover, by linking different regulations, omnibus legislation may serve as a tool to achieve consensus, though the U.S. debate on riders does not translate into the German legal context. Opaque omnibus bills, however, are a challenge to democratic decision-making. The worst example so far of non-transparent law-making by an omnibus bill was the de facto amnesty of tens of thousands Nazi criminals by the Regulatory Offences Act of 1968, which apparently only concerned traffic violations. This conspiracy-like aberration, however, did not fuel the small-scale German debate on omnibus legislation, which revolves around follow-up problems only comprehensible in the particular context of German constitutional law (relating to the issue of federalism on the one hand and the relationship of parliamentary bills and executive regulations on the other hand). Consequently, this doctrinal debate hardly contributes to the general analysis of omnibus legislation while the constitutional constraint on omnibus legislation in the field of budgetary legislation (Article 110.4 GBL) may attract attention abroad. Moreover, some provisions with no special focus on omnibus legislation, such as Federal Council participation in the legislative process depending on the subject matter, may create a deterrent effect in that they suggest avoiding provisions that trigger a high level of involvement of the Second Chamber. Irrespective of the identified problems, omnibus legislation is not intrinsically wrong. Codes of conduct, however, may be necessary to avoid abuses. The alternative to omnibus legislation is not myriads of miniscule statutes but codification and the answer to the lack of accountability is reason-giving requirements. Imposing the obligation to rationality on the legislator can tackle the excesses of the omnibus method at the root.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Some operational definitions are suitable for the performance of empirical analyses, while giving from the legal point of view the impression of arbitrariness. See, e.g., Krutz (2000), p. 539: ‘Omnibus Bill: any piece of major legislation that: (1) spans three or more major topic policy areas OR ten or more subtopic policy areas, AND (2) is greater than the mean plus standard deviation of major bills in size.’ On the controversial U.S. practice of combining disparate measures in one massive bill, see in more detail Krutz (2001a).

  2. 2.

    The use of the term by some authors and courts (references at Lachner 2007, pp. 25–26) does not prove its full inclusion into legal terminology. According to Lachner (2007), pp. 25–26, the term has a negative connotation and evokes the impression of boarding passengers at a bus stop (‘Zusteigen von Reisegästen in einen Omnibus’). Others see it as a joke, cf. Lachner, id., with further references, whereas the Federal Finance Court (Bundesfinanzhof) applies the term ‘Omnisbusgesetz’ in a neutral manner, see BFH, Deutsches Steuerrecht (DStR) 1997, 486 (487) and BFHE 198, 493 (495) {III R 22/01}.

  3. 3.

    Cf. Nightingale (2016)

  4. 4.

    House of Commons Committee on political and constitutional reform (2013), p. 7. ‘Portmanteau’ (id.) is also unknown.

  5. 5.

    Kluth (2014), p. 32; Schulze-Fielitz (1988a), pp. 49–50. See for further references, Lachner (2007), p. 27, and for a short definition in German, Creifelds (2017), p. 91. In the adjudication of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) the term appears in several judgments, cf. BVerfGE 38, 348 (348); 72, 175 (191); 101, 297 (302, 307, 308). The German abbreviation ‘BVerfGE’ used here and below stands for ‘Entscheidungen (Decisions) des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’ which are the official Reports of Judgments and Decisions.

  6. 6.

    Lachner (2007), p. 27.

  7. 7.

    Romain et al. (2002), p. 75.

  8. 8.

    See Xanthaki (2014), pp. 45 and 223–241; Brandner (2004).

  9. 9.

    The handbook on legislative drafting issued by the German Ministry of Justice emphasises the proximity of omnibus bills and amendments (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008, p. 147).

  10. 10.

    E.g. Gesetz zur Auflösung der Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein und zur Änderung weiterer Gesetze (Branntweinmonopolverwaltungs-Auflösungsgesetz – BfBAG) vom 10. März 2017 (BGBl. I S. 420).

  11. 11.

    This may be the fact in some Canadian provinces, see Massicotte (2013), p. 13.

  12. 12.

    The lowest threshold of three Articles results from the existence of bills consisting of two Articles: the first one contains the bill and the second lays out its entry into force. It obviously would be misleading to call such a bill ‘omnibus legislation’. The second Article may also contain an enabling act for a recast regulation while the third Article determines its entry into force.

  13. 13.

    Zeh (1982), p. 963. However, much longer article acts exist. See Einführungsgesetz zum Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (EGOWiG) vom 24. Mai 1968 (BGBl. I S. 503), consisting of 167 Articles and extending over 44 pages of the Official Journal.

  14. 14.

    On consequential amendments, Xanthaki (2014), pp. 239–240. See, as a recent example, Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der haushaltsnahen Getrennterfassung von wertstoffhaltigen Abfällen vom 5. Juli 2017 (BGBl. I S. 2234) containing the new packaging law (Verpackungsgesetz) and approximately 25 consequential amendments in Article 2.

  15. 15.

    Federal Ministry of Justice (2008), p. 226.

  16. 16.

    Perhaps this is why Schulze-Fielitz (1988a), p. 50, warns against equating this type of ‘Artikelgesetzgebung’ with genuine omnibus legislation (‘Artikelgesetz’).

  17. 17.

    Bundesministerium der Justiz (2008), p. 191.

  18. 18.

    Cf. Karpen (2017), p. 14.

  19. 19.

    See, however, Smeddinck (2014), p. 84; preceding Müller (1963), pp. 277–279; Hugger (1983), p. 298.

  20. 20.

    Müller (1963), p. 277.

  21. 21.

    House of Commons Committee on political and constitutional reform (2013), p. 7.

  22. 22.

    Krutz (2000), p. 539. In the same vein, Gluck et al. (2015), p. 1804. On complexity and length as features of omnibus bills Sinclair (2011), pp. 112–113.

  23. 23.

    Xanthaki (2014), p. 236.

  24. 24.

    Schulze-Fielitz (1988a), p. 49.

  25. 25.

    As Hebeler and Schröder (2018), p. 641, have correctly noted, German constitutional law and legal theory textbooks as a rule do not even mention ‘article acts’.

  26. 26.

    On this centuries-old rule in most U.S. State Constitutions and the litigation amounting to up to 8,000 cases, see Huefner (2017), pp. 212–213; Lowenstein (2002); Gilbert (2006); Kaminski and Hart (2012). Further information at https://ballotpedia.org/Single-subject_rule (accessed 5 November 2018). The idea that different negotiating matters should not be treated as a single entity is, incidentally, also the basis for the revision of Swiss Law Governing Corporations. Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 November 2018, p. 12.

  27. 27.

    In this I am in good company with the Federal Ministry of Justice Manual for Drafting Legislation (2008), pp. 226–232: ‘omnibus acts‘, while the original German text refers to ‘Artikelgesetze’.

  28. 28.

    Bundesministerium der Justiz (2008), pp. 226–232.

  29. 29.

    Lachner (2007), pp. 79–80, provides some data which support the conclusion that the share of legislation of omnibus acts rose from 13.1% in the 1950s to almost 50% by the end of the 14th parliamentary term (1998–2002). On the U.S. Gluck et al. (2015), pp. 1800–1803.

  30. 30.

    Due to lack of space, no references can be provided.

  31. 31.

    Zehnte Zuständigkeitsanpassungsverordnung vom 31. August 2015 (BGBl. I S. 1474). This regulation, however, was no challenge to the legal system because its sole objective was to adapt references to changes in departmental responsibilities or to adopt new department names.

  32. 32.

    Schneider (2002), p. 144.

  33. 33.

    For references, see Meßerschmidt (2000), pp. 71 and 137.

  34. 34.

    See BVerfGE 72, 175 (191).

  35. 35.

    Cf. Lachner (2007), pp. 64–65, referring to the example of anti-discrimination law (Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften: Lebenspartnerschaften vom 16. Februar 2001 [BGBl. I S. 266]) which addresses both civil and public law.

  36. 36.

    See on amendments in general, Duprat and Xanthaki (2017), pp. 122–123.

  37. 37.

    Cf. Irresberger and Jasiak (2017), pp. 174–175.

  38. 38.

    See for details and examples, Lachner (2007), pp. 66–73.

  39. 39.

    Cf. Lachner (2007), pp. 45–46.

  40. 40.

    Id. with further details.

  41. 41.

    See Lachner (2007), pp. 82–83.

  42. 42.

    Cf. Hebeler and Schröder (2018), p. 642.

  43. 43.

    Cf. Goertz (2011).

  44. 44.

    Krutz (2000), p. 533.

  45. 45.

    On the importance of compromise in politics and law, Schulze-Fielitz (1988b); Lachner (2007), p. 110, referring especially to omnibus legislation. The capacity of the omnibus method to facilitate the finding of compromises was also noticed by the Federal Constitutional Court. See BVerfGE 70, 69 (88–89). For a more sophisticated analysis in light of public choice theory, see Gilbert (2006), pp. 831–849 with a focus on the single subject rule and the advantages and disadvantages of logrolling.

  46. 46.

    Gilbert (2006), p. 831, referring, in particular, to Buchanan and Tullock.

  47. 47.

    Müller (1963), p. 277.

  48. 48.

    Schneider (2002), p. 144. In the same vein from the overseas point of view, Gluck et al. (2015), p. 1805: ‘mask transparency for certain objectives’.

  49. 49.

    See, generally, Bryde (1998). In this vein, newspapers have addressed a recent omnibus draft as a ‘secret agency style operation‘ (‘Geheimdienstoperation’), cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung of November 27, 2018, p. 5.

  50. 50.

    Kirchhoff and Tsuji (2014).

  51. 51.

    Schneider (2002), p. 144. In the same vein, Hebeler and Schröder (2018), p. 642.

  52. 52.

    Krutz (2000), p. 533.

  53. 53.

    Art. 24 Steuerreformgesetz 1990 vom 25. Juli 1988 (BGBl. I S. 1093).

  54. 54.

    Einführungsgesetz zum Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (EGOWiG) vom 24. Mai 1968 (BGBl. I S. 503).

  55. 55.

    Unauthorized translation of the following provision: ‘Fehlen besondere persönliche Eigenschaften, Verhältnisse oder Umstände (besondere persönliche Merkmale), welche die Strafbarkeit des Täters begründen, beim Teilnehmer, so ist dessen Strafe nach den Vorschriften über die Bestrafung des Versuchs zu mildern.’ Recently the German Federal Ministry of Justice issued a slightly different translation, available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0156 (accessed 5 November 2018).

  56. 56.

    The German Supreme Criminal Court has applied this law without reservation. See BGH 22 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1969: 1181 {5 StR 658/68}. This conforms with the general attitude of German courts. See for a short summary, Sambale (2002), pp. 212–217.

  57. 57.

    See Arndt (1965); Baumann (1969); Asholt (2016), pp. 51–56; Sambale (2002). Section 78 (2) (Period of Limitation) reads: ‘Serious criminal offences under Section 220a (genocide) and Section 211 (murder) are not subject to a statute of limitations.’ Asholt’s Ph.D. thesis (2016) of 785 pages dedicates only one line to the ‘mishap’ (‘Panne’) of 1969.

  58. 58.

    See Frommel (2001), Gehrling (1969), Glienke (2011), Greve (2000), Görtemaker and Safferling (2016, 2017), Rottleuthner (2001) and Samson (1969). Representative for the counter opinion Schröder (1969), p. 132.

  59. 59.

    Statement on June 11, 1969 to the German Parliament (Bundestag, 5th legislative term, session 236, Protokoll vom 11. Juni 1969, p. 13055). Ehmke emphasised that the draft was elaborated under his predecessors, but admitted that the impact escaped his notice when he was State Secretary.

  60. 60.

    Note the caustic comment of a former (Conservative) Federal Minister of Justice, Richard Jaeger (Bundestag, 5th legislative term, session 236, Protokoll vom 11. Juni 1969, p. 13062).

  61. 61.

    Braunbuch (1965) and Görtemaker (2018).

  62. 62.

    Kramer (2004) and Braunbuch (1965), pp. 147–148. Last edition of 1968 accessible in the internet https://archive.org/stream/braunbuchBRD/braunbuch_djvu.txt.

  63. 63.

    See, in general, Gilbert (2006), pp. 858–859.

  64. 64.

    Kluth (2014), p. 32: ‘Der Vorteil der Artikelgesetze besteht darin, dass der Gesamtzusammenhang des Gesetzgebungsvorhabens deutlicher wird, als dies bei parallelen Gesetzgebungsakten der Fall ist.’

  65. 65.

    Gilbert (2006), p. 846.

  66. 66.

    Cf. Hebeler and Schröder (2018), p. 641.

  67. 67.

    See Schulze-Fielitz (1988a), p. 39 and, for further references, Lachner (2007), p. 97.

  68. 68.

    Cf. Lachner (2007), p. 81.

  69. 69.

    See Lachner (2007), p. 81.

  70. 70.

    BVerfGE 68, 193 (225); 70, 69 (88–89).

  71. 71.

    Hebeler and Schröder (2018), p. 643.

  72. 72.

    BVerfGE 37, 363 (379–383) and 39, 1 (33–35). See for a short explanation, Hebeler and Schröder (2018), p. 643.

  73. 73.

    BVerfGE 114, 196 (234–240) {2 BvF 2/03}. Consequently, the oft-practiced insertion of the so-called Entsteinerungsklausel is redundant. See for a short explanation, Hebeler and Schröder (2018), p. 644; Lachner (2007), pp. 38–39. The term ‘Entsteinerung’ is difficult to understand even for Germans; it means the opposite of ‘petrification’. Cf. Sendler (2001) and Uhle (2001).

  74. 74.

    See, among many others, Schuppert (2003) with further references.

  75. 75.

    On the impact on omnibus legislation, see Krutz (2001b), p. 211.

  76. 76.

    This statement is not to deny the dignified status of German MPs, as enshrined in Article 38 para 1 GBL, nor is it downplaying the individual activities of Members—an aspect which von Bogdandy (2000), pp. 96–100, has emphasised.

  77. 77.

    Krutz (2000), p. 537.

  78. 78.

    Krutz (2001b), p. 212.

  79. 79.

    On the influence of a tough budgetary situation and divided government on the likelihood of omnibus usage, Krutz (2001b), p. 221.

  80. 80.

    There is almost no open academic debate on the influence of special interests on the law-making process. See, however, Meßerschmidt (2019).

  81. 81.

    Lobbyism often addresses the law-making bureaucracy. Outsourcing of drafting and placing external staff are gateways for lobbyist influence. Cf. Maisch (2015) and Meßerschmidt (2012).

  82. 82.

    See Meßerschmidt (2000), pp. 443–543.

  83. 83.

    See Gluck (2015).

  84. 84.

    Bundesministerium der Justiz (2008), pp. 191–195. English translation available, cf. Federal Ministry of Justice (2008), pp. 226–231. According to § 42.4 GGO the official draft manual is binding on the drafters (‘Für die rechtsförmliche Gestaltung von Gesetzentwürfen gelten das vom Bundesministerium der Justiz herausgegebene Handbuch der Rechtsförmlichkeit und die vom Bundesministerium der Justiz im Einzelfall gegebenen Empfehlungen’).

  85. 85.

    ‘Gesetzentwürfe sollen die notwendigen Folgeänderungen in anderen Gesetzen und, zum Zweck der Rechtsbereinigung, die Aufhebung überholter Vorschriften vorsehen.’

  86. 86.

    Schneider (2002), p. 154.

  87. 87.

    References can be found in Lachner (2007), pp. 99–103.

  88. 88.

    Gluck et al. (2015), p. 1804; Tollestrup (2010). On ‘omnibudget bills’ in Canada Dodek (2017), pp. 11–14 and 19–21.

  89. 89.

    Cf. Lachner (2007), p. 102. Due to restricted space availability, I waive further specific references.

  90. 90.

    Cf. Sachs (2018), Art. 110 n. 87–88 and Kube (2013), Art. 110 n. 182.

  91. 91.

    See Funke (2010), p. 17.

  92. 92.

    Schneider (2002), p. 157.

  93. 93.

    For an overview, see Denning and Smith (1999), p. 957.

  94. 94.

    As Hernandez Ramos and Heydt correctly remark (Hernandez Ramos and Heydt 2017), p. 137.

  95. 95.

    Kirchhof (2002), p. 2760 and Klein (2004) pp. 16–17, 26.

  96. 96.

    Wherry (2014), referring to 2000 pages of legislation passed by the House (Canada) without a change.

  97. 97.

    See on indirect amendments, in general, Xanthaki (2014), pp. 235–239. However, the selected example may exceed the definition. On a similar indirect amendment BVerfGE 37, 363 (383).

  98. 98.

    See, generally, Müller (1963), pp. 251–252.

  99. 99.

    The following example is revealing: under Article 6 of the Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act (Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz) of 20 October 2015 (BGBl. I S. 2015), which amended several laws (thus meeting the definition of an omnibus bill), Paragraph 16 was added to Article 246 of the Building Code (Baugesetzbuch) making it clear that the assumption of approval in cases where the Nature Conservation Authority had not delivered an opinion within the 1 month time limit, applies to the construction of hostels for asylum seekers in protected areas. See for details, Meßerschmidt (2017), § 18 no. 64a.

  100. 100.

    Reimer (2012), § 9 no. 111.

  101. 101.

    On the legal certainty of omnibus bills (Rechtsstaatsprinzip, Gesetzesbestimmtheit and Gesetzesklarheit) Lachner (2007), pp. 119–136 with further references.

  102. 102.

    Schneider (2002), p. 145.

  103. 103.

    BVerfGE 34, 9 (21); 37, 363 (382); 39, 1 (35). Undecided BVerfGE 24, 184 (199–200).

  104. 104.

    Relevant discussion can be found in Schulze-Fielitz (1983), p. 715.

  105. 105.

    BVerfGE 72, 175 (191–192) and 101, 297 (308). See for details and further references, Lachner (2007), pp. 106–110.

  106. 106.

    See Massicotte (2013), pp. 14–15 with further references.

  107. 107.

    Quoted in Massicotte (2013), p. 15.

  108. 108.

    See for references, Massicotte (2013), p. 17.

  109. 109.

    See on the management of legislation in general, Popelier (2017).

  110. 110.

    The UNECE Aarhus Convention and the UN International Migration Pact provide good examples.

  111. 111.

    Merten (1984).

  112. 112.

    See Robinson (2017), p. 247.

  113. 113.

    See Voermans (2017), pp. 30–32; Robinson (2017), pp. 250–255; Xanthaki (2017).

  114. 114.

    The extremely detailed provisions of some German energy laws serve primarily to perfect a subsidy system and only secondarily, indirectly the environmental protection and climate protection goal. See Meßerschmidt (2020), pp. 541–570.

  115. 115.

    For an overview, see Rose-Ackerman et al. (2015), who do not however mention the problem of omnibus legislation.

  116. 116.

    Schulze-Fielitz (1988a), p. 51, contrasts omnibus legislation with codification. Codification is based on the compilation of diverse single-issue laws and provisions, which are reorganized according to a uniform systemic structure, resulting from preparatory works and taking into account case law and often associated with ideas of legal reform. The German and continental concept is more demanding than the definition of codification as part of the EU Better Regulation Agenda. See on codification in general, Duprat and Xanthaki (2017), pp. 113–116; on consolidation and codification in the EU, European Commission (2015), pp. 35–37; Irresberger and Jasiak (2017), pp. 183–184; on consolidation in particular De Benedetto (2017), p. 224.

  117. 117.

    Cf. Schmidt (1985).

  118. 118.

    Oliver-Lalana (2005, 2013) and Shapiro (1992). On the German debate Lücke (1987) and Waldhoff (2016). Although German Constitutional Law privileges justifiability over justification and I therefore hesitate to place on the legislator the obligation to state reasons from the unspecific provisions of German Constitutional law (cf. Meßerschmidt 2000, pp. 920–924), I have developed a conciliatory procedural model of obligations related to the allocation of the burden of proof, and thus serving the self-interest of the legislator. This approach comes close to the ‘onus model’ as proposed by Gilbert (2006), p. 863.

  119. 119.

    House of Commons Committee on political and constitutional reform (2013), p. 50.

  120. 120.

    See Meßerschmidt and Oliver-Lalana (2016).

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  1. Department of Tax Law and Public Law, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Nürnberg, Germany

    Klaus Meßerschmidt

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    Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

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Meßerschmidt, K. (2021). Omnibus Legislation in Germany: A Widespread Yet Understudied Lawmaking Practice. In: Bar-Siman-Tov, I. (eds) Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation. Legisprudence Library, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72748-2_6

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