Abstract
The “Arrangements Law” has become one of the most powerful policy tools used by the Israeli government since 1985. Under this omnibus legislation, the Budgets Department at the Ministry of Finance (MOF) introduces various bills and amendments in various policy areas almost on an annual basis. While previous studies presented how the MOF reached a powerful position in the policymaking process through this institutional architecture, this chapter examines how the MOF has also sought control in the everyday regulatory processes. More specifically, the chapter examines the extent to which the Arrangements Law authorized ministers to issue regulations (e.g., secondary legislation), based on a content analysis of 38 Arrangements laws legislated between 1985 and 2018. This chapter shows that against the conventional wisdom, the process of delegation of authority from parliament to the executive is a process that centralizes, rather than decentralizes, regulatory powers. In particular, the MOF was involved in nearly 60 percent of all delegations through four mechanisms of centralization: (1) vesting itself with an authority to create regulation; (2) vesting itself and another ministry with a joint authority to create regulation; and holding veto power over the regulations of other ministries either by requiring (3) its consent or (4) consultation prior to publication. Altogether, these mechanisms extended the MOF’s power in everyday regulatory processes.
I would like to express my special thank David Levi-Faur, Adi Ayal, and Ittai-Bar-Siman-Tov for the helpful comments on this paper. I also thank the participants of the International Conference on “Rearranging the Arrangements Law: Comparative, Multidisciplinary, Empirical and Normative Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation” at Bar-Ilan University (January 1–3, 2019).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Maor and Bar Nir (2008).
- 3.
Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2006).
- 4.
Nahmias and Klein (1999).
- 5.
- 6.
Page (2001), p. 5.
- 7.
Kosti et al. (2019a).
- 8.
- 9.
Page (2001).
- 10.
Ibid.; Page (2012).
- 11.
Kosti and Levi-Faur (2019).
- 12.
Rose-Ackerman (2019).
- 13.
Huber and Shipan (2002).
- 14.
For more information on the historical grounds of the arrangements laws, see Hetis-Rolf in this book.
- 15.
Nahmias and Klein (1999).
- 16.
Kosti et al. (2019b).
- 17.
- 18.
Nahmias and Klein (1999).
- 19.
Gilad and Cohen (2018).
- 20.
Thatcher and Sweet (2002), p. 3.
- 21.
- 22.
Huber (2000).
- 23.
Page (2001).
- 24.
(2003) Attorney General Guidelines on Secondary Legislation.
- 25.
Page (2001).
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
Frickey and Farber (1991), pp. 80–83.
- 30.
Tsebelis (1999, p. 593).
- 31.
Nahmias and Klein (1999).
- 32.
Gilad and Cohen (2018).
- 33.
- 34.
Knesset’s Website (2014) The Government Violated the Obligation to Implement Regulations in 50 Laws.
- 35.
Government Decision No. 2588, 2017.
- 36.
This research focuses mainly on the consent and approvals mechanisms as longs as they were given by governmental actors, such as cabinet ministers, and not by legislative actors, such as parliamentary committees.
- 37.
Zarhia Z (2018) ‘Third Apartment Tax Case Restored Our Deterrence’ (Hebrew). In: Calcalist. https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3739857,00.html. Accessed 27 December 2018.
- 38.
Note that for the data analysis, the allocation of laws to years was not clear-cut. While most of the arrangements laws are legislated in the beginning or an end of a calendar year, referring either to the same budgetary year or the subsequent budgetary year correspondingly, there are two caveats. The first are laws that were legislated in the middle of a calendar year with a fragile connection to specific budgetary year. In such cases, if the law was legislated before June 30, I assigned it to its year of legislation, and otherwise, to the subsequent year of legislation. Additionally, as some laws were enacted along a biennial budget, I decided again to allocate them to one of or two years based on the same rule (for the match between years and laws, see Appendix 1).
- 39.
Anastasopoulos and Bertelli (Forthcoming).
- 40.
The legal language distinguishes approval (Eyishur) and agreement (Haskama), but we treat them similarly here.
- 41.
Anastasopoulos and Bertelli (Forthcoming), Franchino (2007) and Huber and Shipan (2002).
- 42.
Kosti et al. (2019b).
- 43.
The “General” category refers potentially to all ministers.
- 44.
The overall number of delegations included in the Arrangements laws between 1986 and 2019 was 893. Since some delegations provided authority to more than one minister, and due to the counting scheme, the overall number of authorities given to ministries was 1104.
- 45.
As mentioned in the introduction, while Ministers are formally authorized to make regulations, the process of such everyday policymaking is dominated by the ministries.
- 46.
Overall, it seems that the larger the law, the more likelihood it contains more delegations. Yet, the amount of delegation sharply differs.
- 47.
- 48.
Horev T, Kedar N, Light and Shadow in the Development and Implementation of the National Health Insurance Law: Reflection of the Reform from Fifteen Years of Legislation, 2010.
- 49.
Amsterdamski S (2012) ‘We, the Ministry of Finance Officials, have Taken over the Country’ (Hebrew). In: Calcalist. https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3575841,00.html. Accessed 27 December 2018.
- 50.
Kosti and Levi-Faur (2019).
- 51.
- 52.
Yackee and Yackee (2016).
- 53.
(2003) Attorney General Guidelines on Secondary Legislation; Annual Report 65c for the Year 2014 and for Fiscal Year, 2015.
References
Anastasopoulos J, Bertelli AM (forthcoming) Understanding delegation through machine learning: a method and application to the European Union. Am Polit Sci Rev
Asiskovich S (2011) Life has a price: the political economy of the national health insurance reform in Israel (Hebrew). Jerusalem
Baldwin R (1995) Rules and government. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Bar-Siman-Tov I (2015) The role of courts in improving the legislative process. Theory Pract Legis 3:295–313
Ben-Bassat A, Dahan M (2006) The balance of power in the budgeting process (Hebrew). The Israeli Democracy Institute, Jerusalem
Cohen N (2013) The power of expertise? Politician–bureaucrat interactions, national budget transparency and the Israeli health care policy. Policy Stud 34:638–654. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2013.804174
Croley SP (1998) Theories of regulation: incorporating the administrative process. Columbia Law Rev 98:1–168. https://doi.org/10.2307/1123396
Epstein D, O’Halloran S (1999) Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Franchino F (2007) The powers of the union: delegation in the EU. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Frickey PP, Farber D (1991) Law and public choice. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Gilad S, Cohen N (2018) Bureaucratic politics in Israel. In: The Oxford handbook of Israeli politics and society. Oxford University Press
Golan E (2008) The democratic deficit of the arrangements law and the erosion of the Israeli Welfare State (Hebrew). Law Gov 11:243–331
Horev T, Babad YM (2005) Healthcare reform implementation: stakeholders and their roles: the Israeli experience. Health Policy 71:1–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2004.05.001
Huber JD (2000) Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies. Eur J Polit Res 37:397–413. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007033306962
Huber JD, Shipan CR (2002) Deliberate discretion? The institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Huber JD, Shipan CR, Pfahler M (2001) Legislatures and statutory control of bureaucracy. Am J Polit Sci 45:330–345. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669344
Kerwin CM (2010) Rulemaking: how government agencies write law and make policy, 4th edn. CQ Press, Washington, DC
Kop Y (2010) A sting in its tail: 1985 Israel economic stabilization plan and the arrangements law method that accompanied it. In: Lissak M, Hacohen D (eds) Critical decisions in Israel. Ben-Gurion University Publisher, Beer-Sheva, pp 238–261
Kosti N, Levi-Faur D (2019) The co-production of primary and secondary legislation: Israel as a case study. Law Policy 41:432–457
Kosti N, Levi-Faur D, Mor G (2019a) Legislation and regulation: three analytical distinctions. Theory Pract Legis 7:169–178
Kosti N, Shpizman I, Levi-Faur D (2019b) The Israeli Agendas Project. In: Baumgartner FR, Grossman E, Breuning C (eds) Comparative Agendas Project. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 114–119
Maor A, Bar Nir D (2008) Implications of the sweeping use of the economic arrangements law on social gaps in 2002–2005 (Hebrew). Soc Secur 77:95–124
Miers D, Page AC (1982) Legislation. Sweet & Maxwell, London
Nahmias D, Klein E (1999) The arrangements law: between economics and politics [Hebrew]. The Israel Democracy Institute, Jerusalem
Page EC (2001) Governing by numbers: delegated legislation and everyday policy-making. Hart Publishing, Portland
Page EC (2012) Policy without politicians: bureaucratic influence in comparative perspective. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Rose-Ackerman S (2019) Executive rulemaking and democratic legitimacy: ‘Reform’ in the United States and the United Kingdom’s Route to Brexit. Chic-Kent Law Rev 94:267
Slapper G, Kelly D (2012) The English legal system: 2012–2013. Routledge, London
Sperling D, Cohen N (2012) The influence of the Israeli state economy arrangement law and Supreme Court decisions on health policy and the right to health in Israel – neo-institutional analysis. Hukim- Isr J Legis 4:153–236
Taggart M (2005) From ‘parliamentary powers’ to privatization: the chequered history of delegated legislation in the twentieth century. Univ Tor Law J 55:575–627. https://doi.org/10.1353/tlj.2005.0030
Thatcher M, Sweet AS (2002) Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions. West Eur Polit 25:1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/713601583
Tsebelis G (1995) Decision making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism. Br J Polit Sci 25:289–325. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400007225
Tsebelis G (1999) Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies: an empirical analysis. Am Polit Sci Rev 93:591–608. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585576
Yackee J, Yackee S (2016) From legislation to regulation: an empirical examination of agency responsiveness to congressional delegations of regulatory authority. Adm Law Rev 68:395–443
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendices
Appendix 1: Laws Included in the Dataset
Title of law | Date | Year of implementationa | |
|---|---|---|---|
1 | Emergency Arrangements in the State Economy Law, 5746-1985 | 1.10.1985 | 1986 |
2 | Economic Stability Law (Various Provisions), 5747-1987 | 9.4.1987 | 1987 |
3 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals), 5748-1988 | 17.4.1988 | 1988 |
4 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments), 5749-1989 | 7.4.1989 | 1989 |
5 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments), 5750-1990 | 6.4.1990 | 1990 |
6 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Levies and Property Taxes), 5751-1991 | 31.1.1991 | 1991 |
7 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments), 5751-1991 | 27.3.1991 | 1991 |
8 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Creating Conditions for Growth and Aliyah and Integration), 5751-1991 | 27.3.1991 | 1991 |
9 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals), 5752-1992 | 2.1.1992 | 1992 |
10 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals), 5753-1993 | 7.1.1993 | 1993 |
11 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals), 5754-1994 | 9.1.1994 | 1994 |
12 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments), 5755-1995 | 27.1.1995 | 1995 |
13 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals), 5756-1996 | 8.1.1996 | 1996 |
14 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals), 5757-1996 | 7.1.1997 | 1997 |
15 | The Law for Enhancing the Growth and Employment for the Attainment of the Budget Goals for the Fiscal Year 1998 (Legislative Amendments), 5758-1998 | 15.1.1998 | 1998 |
16 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 1999), 5759-1999 | 15.2.1999 | 1999 |
17 | Arrangements Law in the Israeli State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2000), 5760-2000 | 10.1.2000 | 2000 |
18 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2001), 5761-2001 | 4.4.2001 | 2001 |
19 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2001), (Amendment, Repeal, and Postponent of Private Member’s Bills) 5761-2001 | 4.4.2001 | 2001 |
20 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Income Tax Discounts), (Temporary Order) 5761-2001 | 4.4.2001 | 2001 |
21 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2002), 5762-2002 | 17.2.2002 | 2002 |
22 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003), 5762-2002 | 16.6.2002 | 2002 |
23 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2003), 5763-2002 | 29.12.2002 | 2003 |
24 | Recovery Program for the Israeli Economy 2003 (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of Budget Goals and Economic Policy for Fiscal 2003–2004), 5763-2003 | 1.6.2003 | 2003 |
25 | Economic Policy Law for the Fiscal Year 2004 (Legislative Amendments), 5764-2004 | 18.1.2004 | 2004 |
26 | Economic Policy Law for the Fiscal Year 2005 (Legislative Amendments), 5765-2005 | 11.4.2005 | 2005 |
27 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2006), 5766-2006 | 15.6.2006 | 2006 |
28 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2007), 5767-2007 | 11.1.2007 | 2007 |
29 | Arrangements Law in the State Economy (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals and Economic Policy for the Fiscal Year 2008), 5768-2008 | 1.1.2008 | 2008 |
30 | Economic Efficiency Law (Legislative Amendments to for Implementing the Economic Plan for 2009–2010), 5769-2009 | 23.7.2009 | 2010 |
31 | Economic Policy Law for the Years 2011 and 2012 (Legislative Amendments), 5771-2011 | 6.1.2011 | 2011 |
32 | The Law for Changing National Priorities (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals for 2013–2014), 5773-2013 | 5.8.2013 | 2014 |
33 | Economic Efficiency Law (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals for the Budget Years 2015–2016), 5775-2015 | 30.11.2015 | 2016 |
34 | Economic Efficiency Law (Legislative Amendments for Implementing the Budget Goals for the Budget Years 2015–2016), 5775-2015 | 30.11.2015 | 2016 |
35 | Economic Efficiency Law (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals for the Budget Years 2017–2018), 5777-2016 | 29.12.2016 | 2017 |
36 | Economic Efficiency Law (Legislative Amendments for Implementing the Budget Goals for the Budget Years 2017–2018), 5777-2016 | 29.12.2016 | 2017 |
37 | conomic Efficiency Law (Legislative Amendments for Implementing the Economic Policy for the Budget Year 2019), 5778-2018 | 22.03.2018 | 2019 |
38 | Economic Efficiency Law (Legislative Amendments for the Attainment of the Budget Goals for the Budget Year 2019), 5778-2018 | 22.03.2018 | 2019 |
Appendix 2: Number of Words in the Arrangements Laws, 1986–2019
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kosti, N. (2021). Centralization via Delegation: The Long-Term Implications of the Israeli Arrangements Laws. In: Bar-Siman-Tov, I. (eds) Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation. Legisprudence Library, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72748-2_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72748-2_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-72747-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-72748-2
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)