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Omnibus Legislation and Maxi-Amendments in Italy: How to Circumvent the Constitutional Provision Requiring Approval of Bills ‘Article by Article’

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Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation

Part of the book series: Legisprudence Library ((LEGIS,volume 8))

Abstract

The chapter analyzes, with reference to the Italian legal order, the main forms of omnibus legislation (budget legislation and decree-laws) and the practice of maxi-amendments, namely long and heterogeneous amendments approved by a unique parliamentary vote tied to a question of confidence posed by the Government. It highlights the reasons for their success, due to the features of the political and institutional system, as well as their downsides, in terms of the quality of both the parliamentary process and the legislation so approved. It also addresses the latest developments in the parliamentary practices and in the case law of the Constitutional Court, which is seeking to establish some limits on the abuses of these instruments and to revamp the potential of the constitutional provision pursuant to which legislative bills need to be approved “article by article” (Art. 72 Const.).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the concentration of the various factors, endogenous and exogenous to the political system, that led to a complete renovation of the Italian political and institutional dynamics in 1993, see Manzella (2003), pp. 7 ff.

  2. 2.

    Sartori (1976).

  3. 3.

    On the so-called “complesso del tiranno”, see Pasquino (2015), pp. 23 ff.

  4. 4.

    Elia (1970).

  5. 5.

    Significantly, the signatures on the Italian Constitution are by a Christian Democrat (De Gasperi, President of the Council of Ministers), a Communist (Terracini, Speaker of the Constituent Assembly), a Liberal (Grassi, Minister of Justice), and a Monarchist (De Nicola, provisional Head of State).

  6. 6.

    According to Art. 72.3 Const., parliamentary rules of procedure may “establish when and how the consideration and approval of bills may be referred to Committees, including Standing Committees, composed so as to reflect the proportion of the Parliamentary Groups. Even in such cases, until the moment of its final approval, a bill may be referred back to the whole House, if the Government or one-tenth of the members of the House or one-fifth of the Committee request that it be debated and voted on by the House itself or that it be submitted to the House for final approval, following explanations of the vote. The Rules shall establish the ways in which the proceedings of Committees are made public”. According to Art. 72.4, however, “The ordinary procedure for consideration and direct approval by the House is always followed in the case of bills on constitutional and electoral matters, delegating legislation, ratification of international treaties and the approval of budgets and accounts”: see Fasone (2012).

  7. 7.

    Predieri (1963).

  8. 8.

    On the role of Berlusconi in determining both majority and opposition coalitions, see Colarizi and Gervasoni (2012). More generally on the impact of Berlusconi, his “premises” and his heritage in Italian politics, see Orsina (2014).

  9. 9.

    Predieri (1975).

  10. 10.

    See, for the translation of the judgment and for some further steps, Barsotti et al. (2016), pp. 166 ff.

  11. 11.

    Simoncini (2006).

  12. 12.

    The first example was the decree-law no. 1/1992, which was repeated twenty times and which, as is natural, was enriched with further extensions introduced on the initiative of the government or parliament). See, also for further references, Lupo (2006).

  13. 13.

    Law no. 400/1988 is the seminal piece of legislation that, for the first time in the Republic’s history, provided a statutory framework for the organisation of the Presidency of the Council and the normative powers of the executive.

  14. 14.

    See the allegedly “transitory” provision set forth by art. 154 of the rules of procedure of the Chamber.

  15. 15.

    Perna (2010).

  16. 16.

    Polimeni (2014).

  17. 17.

    See judgment no. 22/2012, §3.3 in Law. Contra, judgment no. 391/1995.

  18. 18.

    See Judgment no. 32/2014, quoting judgment no. 22/2012 and order no. 34/2013. See also judgment no. 247/2019.

  19. 19.

    Manetti (2012).

  20. 20.

    Lupo (2007), p. 82; Laze (2019), p. 141.

  21. 21.

    Article 11 of the original text of law no. 468/1978.

  22. 22.

    See Bergonzini (2014), pp. 58 ff; Bergonzini (2017), pp. 5 ff.

  23. 23.

    See, for instance, Corte dei conti, Relazione quadrimestrale sulla tipologia delle coperture adottate e sulle tecniche di quantificazione degli oneri, September-December 2017, Rome, 18 April 2018, pp. 43 ff.

  24. 24.

    Lupo (2013).

  25. 25.

    Lupo (2002), pp. 42 ff.

  26. 26.

    See art. 5, paragraph 2, third sentence, of law no. 243/2012 and art. 21, paragraph 1-quinquies, of law no. 196/2009.

  27. 27.

    Bartolucci (2019).

  28. 28.

    One fifth of the committee members or one tenth of the members of the plenary (Article 73.2 Const.).

  29. 29.

    Olivetti (1996) and Rossi (2001).

  30. 30.

    Art. 128 of the rules of procedure of the Chamber of Deputies (as in force since 27 April 1949).

  31. 31.

    Manzella (1969), Olivetti (1996), Gianniti and Lupo (2018).

  32. 32.

    Vassallo (2015), p. 114.

  33. 33.

    Pisaneschi (1988).

  34. 34.

    The precedent from 2004 is interesting. The Government was defeated on an amendment tabled by the opposition, which left out crucial parts of the basic elements for the budget decision. As a solution, on that occasion and in every single subsequent budget bill (when it was called either “legge finanziaria”, “di stabilità” or “di bilancio”), at least the final text was passed with maxi-amendments.

  35. 35.

    Even the Presidency of the Republic repeatedly denounced the problematic nature of this practice. Already in 2001 President Ciampi underlined the impossibility of reconstructing the ratio underlying laws approved via this procedure: see Lupo (2001) and Scagliarini (2005). Similarly, President Napolitano sent a letter in 2009 (and a second one in 2011) to the Speakers of the Chambers and the President of the Council, inviting them to end this practice: see Carnevale and Chinni (2011). In the literature, specifically on the unconstitutionality of the practice, see Piccirilli (2008), Pistorio (2018).

  36. 36.

    Macciotta (2020), p. 2.

  37. 37.

    The inadmissibility of questions of constitutionality related to parliamentary rules of procedure has more recently been re-affirmed by judgment no. 120/2014.

  38. 38.

    Piccirilli (2014).

  39. 39.

    All the expressions are taken from order no. 17/2019 in the official translation available on https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/O_17_2019_EN.pdf. A very broad academic debate has taken place on this order: see Lupo (2019) and, for further references, Morrone (2019), Fabrizzi (2019).

  40. 40.

    Order no. 60/2020, on which see Dickmann (2020).

  41. 41.

    In particular, the inclusion, in an amendment to the Senate (which examined the bill at first reading), of an additional article unrelated to the original content of the decree-law (a provision aimed at blocking hydrocarbon research activities in a decree-law dedicated to simplification and support for businesses): see Piccirilli (2020).

  42. 42.

    Longo (2017).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Parliamentary Studies at LUISS Guido Carli, University of Rome, Rome, Italy

    Nicola Lupo & Giovanni Piccirilli

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  1. Nicola Lupo
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Correspondence to Nicola Lupo .

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  1. Faculty of Law, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel

    Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

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Lupo, N., Piccirilli, G. (2021). Omnibus Legislation and Maxi-Amendments in Italy: How to Circumvent the Constitutional Provision Requiring Approval of Bills ‘Article by Article’. In: Bar-Siman-Tov, I. (eds) Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation. Legisprudence Library, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72748-2_3

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