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(Absence of) Omnibus Legislation in Sweden: When Legislative Drafting Affects the Political Discourse

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Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation

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Abstract

Unlike many other Western European countries, Sweden has had an astoundingly low rate of omnibus legislation in its legislative history, in particular if looking at the “deep” omnibus legislation, i.e. the model of legislation which regulates different topics, but where their regulation lacks a unifying underlying function, at least from a legal perspective. The purpose of this chapter is not only to present this peculiarity and investigate the specific reasons behind it (reasons that relate to the particular Swedish legal and political environment). The goal is also to attempt to draw some general conclusions (i.e. ones possibly valid outside the borders of the Scandinavian country), in particular as to the role of legal actors and legislative drafters on structuring the agenda for the discourses taking place in the political arena.

I would like to thank Jane Reichel, Peter Melz, Pernilla Leviner, Peter Wahlgren, and Jori Munukka for their extremely valuable inputs. I would also like to thank the Law Faculty’s Trust Fund for Publications, Stockholm University, Cassel Foundation, Stockholm University, and the Foundation for Jurisprudential Research for financial support during this study. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Krutz (2001a), p. 1 (“Omnibus legislating is the practice of combining numerous measures from disparate policy areas in one massive bill”); and Gluck et al. (2015), p. 1804. See also Kardasheva (2009), p. 55 (where omnibus legislation is defined as the case where “two issues y and w can be joined in a single proposal and be voted on as a package”).

  2. 2.

    See Sinclair (2000), p. 71 (“Legislation that addresses numerous and not necessarily related subjects, issues, and programs, and therefore is usually highly complex and long”). See also Krutz (2001a), pp. 3–5.

  3. 3.

    See, e.g., Schwartz (2013), pp. 1973–1974 (as to the flourishing at the national level of omnibus legislations in the area of data protection law as a consequence of the European Commission’s 1995 Data Protection Directive); the Canadian House of Commons (2011), p. 38 (where an omnibus bill is defined as “[a] bill consisting of a number of related but separate parts that seeks to amend and/or repeal one or several existing Acts and/or to enact one or several new Acts.”); or the same House of Commons (1988), p. 15880 (where Herb Gray, then Opposition House Leader, stated that an omnibus bill has “one basic principle or purpose which ties together all the proposed enactments and thereby renders the Bill intelligible for parliamentary purposes”). It is worth mentioning that sometimes, in the English-speaking parliamentary discussion, a distinction is made between a “proper omnibus bill” (mirroring the superficial omnibus legislation used in this work) and a “not proper omnibus bill” (similar to the deep omnibus legislation). See, e.g., the Canadian House of Commons (2012), p. 1205. This terminology is avoided in this work, due to the qualitative evaluation embedded in it.

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., Schick (1987), p. 48. See also, as another and more recent example of superficial omnibus legislation, the Irish Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (2019), where the legislative bodies prepared the country in case of a disorderly Brexit.

  5. 5.

    See van Beek (1995), p. 6; and Gluck (2015), p. 97 (“omnibus bills… tend to bundle together bills drafted by different committees at different times, or by multiple drafters (often not even internal to Congress) that are not in communication with one another”). See also Gluck et al. (2015), p. 1805 (“Omnibus vehicles also sometimes mask transparency for certain objectives. The 2008 [financial] bailout, for instance, had a variety of individual goodies attached to it, ranging from subsidies for wooden arrow makers to those for racetrack owners”). See, e.g., Galnoor (2011), p. 90 (as to the use of omnibus legislation, or “arrangements law” as it is termed in Israel, to encompass many unrelated legislative issues); or McKay and Johnson (2010), p. 445.

  6. 6.

    See Garrett (2002), p. 2; Ferejohn (1986), pp. 223–253; Krutz (2001b), p. 211; and Ruud (1958), p. 391. See also Krutz (2001a), pp. 30–43 (pointing out the various institutional political reasons, both of a micro and macro nature, behind the increasing use of omnibus legislation in a Western democracy like the U.S.A.); and Denning and Smith (1999), p. 974 (“omnibus bills often provide ideal political cover for members’ sops to influential constituencies”).

  7. 7.

    The terms “omnibus legislation (or bill)” used in its deep meaning (or its Swedish translation, sammanläggning lagstiftning or proposition), does not appear in any relevant legislative documents or work of legal scholarship in the last 70 years. But see Wahlgren (2014), p. 69 (pointing out the increasing “lack of identity” when it comes to the contemporary Swedish legislative production, in particular due to its internationalization).

  8. 8.

    Compare, e.g., Sinclair (2000), p. 72 (stating that “[o]mnibus measures have made up about 11 percent of major legislation in recent [USA] Congresses”).

  9. 9.

    See, e.g., Leviner (2011), pp. 28–31, where the idea of superficial omnibus legislation overlaps, to a certain extent, with the Swedish concept of “framework legislation,” in Swedish ramlagstiftning. Cf. deZafra (1978), p. 276 (“these [omnibus] laws say what to do rather than how to do it; i.e. they set forth general principles rather than prescriptive requirements”).

  10. 10.

    See Socialtjänstlag (2001), Chapter 1, art. 1. See, e.g., Alexandersson (2018), p. 115 (where the author points out the Swedish legislator’s goal of unifying the regulation of various social areas in order to implement certain fundamental ethical values).

  11. 11.

    See Hellner (1990), pp. 137–139 (stressing that the strive for internal coherence in each legislative act is the same for both drafters and legislative scholars). See, e.g., Wahlgren (2014), pp. 54–56 (pointing at the fact that the rules within the legislative document should be related in an unambiguous and systematic way, as a necessary criterion for the very legitimacy of the act); or Hellner (1990), pp. 199–216.

  12. 12.

    See Krutz (2001a), p. 2; and Frantzich and Berube (2010), p. 256 (“Omnibus legislation that covers a wide range of topics provides the opportunity to buy the support of a wide range of members, who, while not agreeing with all the components, judge that the overall package provides more benefits than detriments”). See also Krutz (2002), p. 213. See, e.g., Miller (2009), p. 23.

  13. 13.

    See Petersson (2015a), p. 98 (“Swedish political culture has been described as involving a pragmatic approach to decision-making and as stressing utilitarian considerations rather than rights- based principles… Among other things, this means that negotiations and compromise are preferred rather than overt conflicts and legal battles”).

  14. 14.

    See Nyman (1988), p. 57; Reichel (2011), p. 246; Wind et al. (2009), p. 63; and Nergelius (1996), p. 133.

  15. 15.

    See The Instrument of Government (1974); and Algotsson (2001), pp. 52–54.

  16. 16.

    See Strömberg and Lundell (2014), p. 95; and Nergelius (2015), p. 15.

  17. 17.

    See Esping-Andersen (1990), p. 27; Bergh (2004), pp. 749–754; and Forslund (1997), pp. 124–138 (as to the cardinal socio-economic points of the Swedish model of welfare state). See also Pierson and Leimgruber (2010), p. 40.

  18. 18.

    See Aubert (1986), pp. 32–39; Habermas (1998), pp. 405–407; and Dean (1997), pp. 3–27. See, e.g., Norrman and McLure Jr. (1997), p. 110.

  19. 19.

    See Peczenik (1995), pp. 46–47; Bjerstedt (2009), pp. 40–42; and Sundberg (1978), pp. 223–224.

  20. 20.

    See, e.g., Fast Lappalainen (2019), pp. 178–198; or Sundberg (2000).

  21. 21.

    See Hellner (1990), p. 192 (as to the Swedish general “minimalist” tradition when it comes to the formation of the bills and acts, i.e. “not to include more explicit rules in an act than it is required by the factual circumstances”).

  22. 22.

    See Sundberg (1978), pp. 232–237. See also Petersson (2015b), p. 650 (“Swedish system stands out because of its strong emphasis on the preparatory stages. Considerable time and effort is spent on investigations and discussions before a policy proposal becomes a government bill”); Tala (2005), p. 101 and pp. 112–113; and Wahlgren (2014), p. 88 (pointing out some of the negative effects of such system).

  23. 23.

    See Strömholm (1996), pp. 453–455; and Peczenik (1999), pp. 12–17.

  24. 24.

    See Petersson (2015b), p. 650 (“When adjudicating a case, a Swedish judge does not primarily refer to legal precedents set by the courts of law. More important are the ‘travaux préparatoires’ of the policy process, which consist of a chain of legal sources such as legislative acts, parliamentary committee proposals, government bills, and, importantly, reports from the commissions of inquiry and results from the referral process”). See, e.g., Lind (1993), pp. 301–318; or Nergelius (1997), pp. 432–434.

  25. 25.

    See Zamboni (2019), pp. 8–16.

  26. 26.

    See Petersson (2015b), p. 658. See, e.g., Lind (1996), pp. 359–360 (1996); or von Sydow (2007), pp. 49–50. See also Popelier and Verlinden (2009), pp. 31–33 (as to the central role of legal actors in the legislative processes of many Western-based legal systems).

  27. 27.

    See Strömholm (1988), p. 36; and Wahlgren (2014), pp. 47–48. See, e.g., Sterzel (2015), p. 79.

  28. 28.

    Nightingale (2016), p. 1686 (2016). See also Sinclair (1998), pp. 176–178; Krutz (2001a), pp. 3–4; and Odishaw (1988), p. 228 (“Omnibus legislation, termed by some a ‘Christmas tree,’ often passes at the end of a congressional session”).

  29. 29.

    See Petersson (2015b), p. 660 (“A frequent gesture used in political discourse by politicians from the government as well as the opposition is to stretch out a hand as invitation to the opponent to negotiate a broad agreement on a specific issue”); OECD (2007), p. 35; and OECD (2010), p. 109.

  30. 30.

    See Petersson (2015b), p. 654. See also Anton (1969), pp. 88–102. But see Svensson et al. (2012), pp. 64–85 (questioning the very idea of the Swedish welfare state as based on a consensus around common values). Cf. Petersson (2015b), p. 658.

  31. 31.

    See Bäck and Bergman (2015), pp. 210–211.

  32. 32.

    See Mattson (2015), p. 680 (though, as pointed out by the author, “[t]he committees are still grounds for working out compromises between the main political parties, but less so now than before,” 688). See also Sannerstedt (1996), pp. 17–58.

  33. 33.

    See Jensen (2000), pp. 210–236; and Mattson (2015), p. 679 (“Party discipline in voting is very strong which means that it is the parties and party leaderships that control the Members of Parliament”). See also Möller (2020), chapter 4. As pointed out by Christopher J. Kam, the Swedish legislative system is characterized by a rather strong autonomy of the members of the parliament when sitting in the drafting committees; however, at the same time, political parties maintain a strong hold on their fellows as soon as the work moves into the general assembly. See Kam (2009), p. 210.

  34. 34.

    See Petersson (2015b), p. 658 (“Today around 75 percent of the commissions consists of one single person and in most cases a judge or a senior civil servant”). See also Axberger (1995), pp. 140–142 (where the author strongly criticizes this overlapping of role within the legislative law-making, in particular when the judges are involved as drafters).

  35. 35.

    As pointed out previously, the drafter is usually picked from within the public apparatus (either from the public administration stricto sensu or among the judges with previous experience in the public administration). In Sweden, public servants are trained in an environment which tends to be strongly independent of the Government, from both an institutional perspective and a legal perspective. See Reichel (2007), pp. 104–105 (as to the Swedish dualist model, where there is a division in both organization and accountability between the government and the administration). See, e.g., Rosén (2011), pp. 796–798. See also Jones (1990), p. 153. But see Modéer (2011), pp. 745–747 and Öberg (2011), p. 770 (where both authors point out a recent shift towards a more political nature of the work made by the drafting committee).

  36. 36.

    See Håstad (2011), pp. 775–776. See, e.g., Rosén (2011), pp. 798–799. See also Wahlgren (2014), pp. 46–47; and Matz (2011), p. 726 (pointing out how, from a legal perspective, “social issues receive an objective and comprehensive treatment within the framework of the committee system”).

  37. 37.

    See Hellner (1990), p. 138 and pp. 194–198. See, e.g., Heckscher (2011), p. 845. As pointed out by Kaarlo Tuori, “efforts in this direction [of politicizing the legislative drafting] constitute a constant source of disappointment for politicians and bureaucrats, who often enough see their political goals sacrificed on the altar of the internal rationality of the law.” Tuori (2002), p. 138.

  38. 38.

    Among the institutional forces pushing the Swedish law-maker away from the omnibus legislation model, in theory one could also count the presence of the Council on Legislation (in Swedish, Lagrådet). This Council is a body composed of judges, who have previously served on one of the Supreme Courts, with the specific duty of evaluating bills sent to them by the competent departments and concerning central areas of law. According to Chapter 8, Article 22, section 2, of the Instrument of Government, among the other duties the Council has the one of controlling “the manner in which the various provisions of the draft law relate to one another.” See Hellner (1990), p. 137. However, the presence of such a legal institutional force should not be overestimated, at least when it comes to its capacity to block bills with an omnibus shape. First, the opinion expressed by this high evaluative body is a mere recommendation to the legislator, with no binding formal and (as praxis has shown) practical character. See Nergelius (2019), p. 336. See, e.g., Borg (2006), pp. 5–9. Second, since the qualitative evaluation by the Council on Legislation is taking place exclusively on the bill, this intermediary step could not stop hypothetical omnibus features to be attached to it later on, i.e. when the bill is transformed into an act after a discussion in front (and by decision) of the Parliament.

  39. 39.

    See, e.g., Weber (1991), p. 95; Bourdieu (1987), p. 830; or Tuori (2002), p. 162.

  40. 40.

    See Teubner (1989), p. 745 (1989); Cotterrell (1995), pp. 240–248; MacCormick (2008), pp. 11–12; and Zamboni (2007), pp. 130–131. See, e.g. Friedman (1986), pp. 27–28. “Radicalism” is the degree of change into legal language that the value expressed inside the political arena, i.e., in a political language, has to go through in order to be accepted into the legal order. This depends, among other things, on the national legal order under consideration, on the branch of law, and also on the dominant legal culture among the different legal actors. See Summers (2000b), p. 50; and Teubner (1996), p. 165. See also Luhmann (2004), pp. 366–367.

  41. 41.

    Poggi (1989), p. 132. See also Weber (1978), p. 34.

  42. 42.

    See Abbot (1988), pp. 52–57; and Cotterrell (1995), pp. 108–110. See, e.g., Xanthaki (2014), pp. 354–365; or Uhlmann and Höfler (2016).

  43. 43.

    See McLeod (2009), p. 1 (“In the simplest of terms, the drafter’s task is to convert policies into provisions which comply with the relevant formal conventions and are capable of being applied effectively in practice”); Xanthaki (2013), p. 142; and Tuori (2002), p. 161.

  44. 44.

    See Abbott et al. (2000), pp. 401–402 (2000) (as to the main components upon which the legalization of an institution, as the legislative law-making institutions in this case, may be measured). See Loughlin (2000), pp. 229–233 (as being this process a part of a more contemporary phenomenon of legalization of politics).

  45. 45.

    See Habermas (1998), p. 151; and van Hoecke (2002), p. 133. See also Kennedy (1998), p. 219; Zamboni (2007), pp. 156–157; Balbus (1977), p. 582; and Cotterrell (1995), pp. 151–152. See, e.g., Zander (2004), pp. 2–3; or Lund (1993), p. 452.

  46. 46.

    See Loughlin (2000), pp. 184–185.

  47. 47.

    See Cormacain (2017), chapter 5; and Bellamy (2003), pp. 127–129 (as to the central role the law-making process plays in the very idea of rule of law). See also Summers (2000a), pp. 167–168; Habermas (1998), pp. 134–135; Luhmann (2004), pp. 362–363; Raz (1994), pp. 359–361; and Waldron (2000), p. 1845.

  48. 48.

    See Kramer (2004), pp. 172–222; and Tamanaha (2012), pp. 236–246. See also Kelsen (1955), p. 77; Dworkin (1985), pp. 11–13; and Llewellyn (1971), pp. 130–135. But see Kairys (1998), p. 6. Cf. Taylor Hamara (2013), p. 22 (as to the difficulty in defining a political ideal, such as “the rule of law” is, where it is presupposed to have a clear idea of its essential legal component, i.e. what “law” is).

  49. 49.

    See Wahlgren (2014), pp. 139–146. See, e.g., Schultz (2012), pp. 211–214. See also Cotterrell (1992), pp. 180–204; and Sutton (2001), p. 223 (as to a possible connection between the professionalization of the legal arena and the establishment of the rule of law).

  50. 50.

    See Daintith and Page (1999), p. 254 (where the legislator’s main task consists in “translating the government’s intentions into legislative form”). See also Bourdieu (1987), pp. 834–839; and Summers (1997), p. 1204.

  51. 51.

    See Laws (2008), p. 20 (where the author points out how legislative drafters “are not just wordsmiths; they are also counsel, who advise the instructing department on a whole range of matters”); and Cormacain (2017), pp. 25–26. See also Howarth (2013), p. 41.

  52. 52.

    See Nzerem (2008), p. 132 (“In practice… a drafter often participates in defining the meaning of policy and in translating the broad terms of policy into the law’s details. Between policy and legislation, there are open spaces which the drafter may have to fill.”); Laws (2013), pp. 89–93; and Seidman et al. (2001), p. 6 and pp. 23–24. See, e.g., Laws (2011), pp. 1–16 (as to the central role in the legal system of the work of legislative drafters, in particular when misinterpreting the policies laid down by the political actors). But see Stefanou (2008), pp. 321–333 (with a more critical voice as to the actual influence of the drafting moment in a legislative process upon the policy-making).

  53. 53.

    Cotterrell (1992), pp. 203–204.

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Zamboni, M. (2021). (Absence of) Omnibus Legislation in Sweden: When Legislative Drafting Affects the Political Discourse. In: Bar-Siman-Tov, I. (eds) Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation. Legisprudence Library, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72748-2_13

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