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Zeroing in on Port 0 Traffic in the Wild

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Passive and Active Measurement (PAM 2021)

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Abstract

Internet services leverage transport protocol port numbers to specify the source and destination application layer protocols. While using port 0 is not allowed in most transport protocols, we see a non-negligible share of traffic using port 0 in the Internet.

In this study, we dissect port 0 traffic to infer its possible origins and causes using five complementing flow-level and packet-level datasets. We observe 73 GB of port 0 traffic in one week of IXP traffic, most of which we identify as an artifact of packet fragmentation. In our packet-level datasets, most traffic is originated from a small number of hosts and while most of the packets have no payload, a major fraction of packets containing payload belong to the BitTorrent protocol. Moreover, we find unique traffic patterns commonly seen in scanning. In addition to analyzing passive traces, we also conduct an active measurement campaign to study how different networks react to port 0 traffic. We find an unexpectedly high response rate for TCP port 0 probes in IPv4, with very low response rates with other protocol types. Finally, we will be running continuous port 0 measurements and providing the results to the measurement community.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that due to the nature of traceroute measurements, missing traceroute responses could stem either from filtered packets on the forward path, rate-limiting of ICMP packets at the routers, as well as dropping of ICMP responses on the return path.

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Acknowledgments

We are thankful to the anonymous reviewers as well as our shepherd Ramakrishna Padmanabhan for their constructive feedback. We also thank the large European IXP, MAWI, the University of Waikato, and CAIDA for providing the data used in our analysis.

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Correspondence to Aniss Maghsoudlou .

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Appendices

A Additional Traceroute Analyses

We perform additional analyses for the active traceroute measurements, which we provide in the following.

1.1 A.1 Last Responsive Hops

We analyze the last responsive hop of each trace specifically. More concretely, we are interested in the distance, i.e., the largest TTL value of traceroutes, where we get an ICMP response to. This allows us to determine whether TCP/0 traceroutes are e.g., dropped earlier in the network and therefore are terminated earlier in the Internet.

Therefore, we compare the distribution of the last responsive hop. The left part of Fig. 8 shows the distribution of the last responsive hop for IPv4 and IPv6, respectively. The only visible difference we see for IPv4 are the lower whiskers for TCP/0, stemming from the fact that TCP/80 and TCP/443 has slightly more outliers with high TTLs when it comes to the last responsive hops. For IPv6 we see that TCP/0 has a median of 13 and TCP/80 as well as TCP/443 have a median last responsive hop TTL of 14. Since the median is almost identical, this is due to the median only being able to represent integer values if all elements (namely path lengths) are integers. TCP/0’s median is therefore “just below” 14 and the others’ median is “just above” 14. All in all, the box plots show that there is no significant difference when analyzing last responsive hops depending on the transport port.

Fig. 8.
figure 8

Box plot of last responsive hop (left) and the number of responsive hops (right) aggregated by transport port protocol for IPv4 and IPv6 showing the median, first and third quantiles, mean (\(\blacktriangle \)), and 1.5 times IQR as whiskers.

1.2 A.2 Number of Responsive Hops

Next, we try to answer the question whether fewer routers on the path send ICMP messages for port 0 traceroute traffic or not.

In the right part of Fig. 8 we show the box plot of the number of responsive hops. Again, we see no evidence of router sending fewer ICMP responses for port 0 traffic. We see a slight reduction of TCP/443 ICMP responses per trace in IPv4.

1.3 A.3 ICMP Types and Codes

Finally, we evaluate the different ICMP types and codes sent by routers.

Fig. 9.
figure 9

Distribution of ICMP(v6) type and code combinations for all responses split by transport protocol for IPv4 (left) and IPv6 (right).

Figure 9 shows the distribution of type and code combinations for ICMP and ICMPv6, respectively. As expected, the vast majority are of type “Time to Live exceeded in Transit” for IPv4 and ‘hop limit exceeded in transit” for IPv6. We see almost identical distributions for the port 0 and other ports.

B Additional Passive Analysis

We analyze hourly patterns of port 0 traffic grouped by source AS, compared with the total port 80 traffic as a reference for regular traffic. Due to space limitations we publish the figure on our website:

inet-port0.mpi-inf.mpg.de

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Maghsoudlou, A., Gasser, O., Feldmann, A. (2021). Zeroing in on Port 0 Traffic in the Wild. In: Hohlfeld, O., Lutu, A., Levin, D. (eds) Passive and Active Measurement. PAM 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12671. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72582-2_32

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