Abstract
Elisabeth is widely known as a critic of René Descartes’ account of mind–body interaction and scholarly interpretations of her view on the will most often pose the question about the freedom of the will in relation to bodily impulses such as the passions. This chapter takes a different perspective and focuses on the problem of the compatibility of free will and providence, as it is discussed in a sequence of six letters that Elisabeth and Descartes wrote between September 1645 and January 1646. The chapter focuses on this specific metaphysical problem in order to ask what Elisabeth’s remarks on the topic can tell about her general philosophical method as well as about her particular philosophical worries. The chapter divides into three parts. The first part discusses Elisabeth’s initial philosophical interest in the question of free will and providence, and recounts the arguments presented by her and Descartes. The second part discusses the philosophical foundation for Descartes’ position and Elisabeth’s criticism of this position. The final part compares Elisabeth’s criticism of Descartes’ account of the compatibility of free will and providence with her criticism of his account of mind–body interaction, which she develops in her three first letters to him, written in 1643. It is argued that at the core of both criticisms we find Elisabeth’s search for answers based on reason and a dissatisfaction with Descartes’ reliance on the incomprehensible nature of God as a basis for some of his philosophical arguments.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For interpretations of Elisabeth’s philosophical arguments see Nye (1996), Shapiro (1999, 2007), Tollefsen (1999), Wartenberg (1999), Broad (2002, 13–34), Alanen (2004), Brown (2006), Reuter (2013, 2019), Kolesnik-Antonie and Pellegrin (Eds.) (2014), and Janssen-Lauret (2018). Most interpretations read the letters on moral philosophy in the light of Elisabeth’s early metaphysical inquiries. Elisabeth’s and Descartes’ letters on moral philosophy constitute an essential source also for scholars who focus on Descartes’ part of the correspondence; see Normore (2019) and Svensson (2019) for recent accounts. Svensson’s bibliography provides a comprehensive list of previous scholarship.
- 3.
In a previous letter Elisabeth writes that she does “not know how to consider the injurious accidents that befall [her house] under any other notion than that of evil” (AT 4, 209; S 89).
- 4.
In this and future references I use CSM followed by volume number as an abbreviation for Cottingham et al. (eds.) (1985).
- 5.
- 6.
In the letters discussing the relations between reason and passion Elisabeth emphasizes that bodily conditions may affect reasoning, see in particular the passages cited above (AT 4, 233–234; S 93; and AT 4, 269; S 100). It seems plausible to think that in these cases the freedom of the will is also impaired, but I do not think we should draw the conclusion that Elisabeth would claim that there are circumstances under which we can doubt the freedom of will. The will may lose its capacity to control the body and to cause voluntary action, but it does not lose its intrinsic freedom; see also Tollefsen (1999, 66) and Reuter (2019, 49–50).
- 7.
On Calvin’s view on providence see e.g. Schneewind (1998, 32–36).
- 8.
Surrounded by the 30-years war, the Calvinist Elisabeth and the Catholic Descartes seem to agree to disagree about religious matters. See especially Descartes letter of January 1646, where he comments on Elisabeth’s complaints about her brothers conversion to Catholicism (AT 4, 351; S 129).
- 9.
According to Janssen-Lauret, if “one substance can genuinely possess two natures [instead of only one principal attribute], neither reducible to or equivalent to the other, Elisabeth can consistently hold that the soul is both conscious and extended, without endorsing materialism. Not only is she under no theoretical pressure to reduce thought to extension, she need not prioritise one of these attributes as the real, underlying principal attribute. In her case, raising the question of multiple natures is therefore compatible with a kind of dualism” (2018, 178). When characterizing what she means by “a kind of dualism,” Janssen-Lauret argues that “Elisabeth was not a Cartesian dualist in the strict sense,” but rather, as suggested by Jacqueline Broad (2002, 27), held a position akin to the one later developed by the English Platonist Henry More (2018, 185). Janssen-Lauret is rather fiercely arguing against what she characterizes as a materialist interpretation of Elisabeth’s position, and which she attributes to Tollefsen (1999) and especially Shapiro (2007). Unfortunately, her criticism is mostly attacking a straw man. Tollefsen too compares Elisabeth’s and Henry More’s positions, and does so prior to and in more detail than Broad and Janssen-Lauret (Tollefsen, 1999, 72–73). Shapiro, on the other hand, is, quite like Janssen-Lauret, interpreting Elisabeth as searching for a middle road between Cartesian dualism and reductionist materialism à la Thomas Hobbes (Shapiro, 1999, 507–508; 2007, 41–42). In her chapter in this volume, Lilli Alanen suggests that Elisabeth’s position on the relation between mind and body bears some similarity with the position later developed by Baruch Spinoza, and Janssen-Lauret’s discussion of one substance with several attributes does interestingly strengthen this line of interpretation, even if Janssen-Lauret does not mention Spinoza (and would perhaps consider his combination of attribute dualism and substance monism as too materialist).
- 10.
Janssen-Lauret is quite right when emphasizing that Elisabeth had a keen interest in science (see also Sabrina Ebbersmeyer’s chapter in this volume), but we must keep in mind that for Elisabeth as for Descartes science was firmly anchored in mathematics, and I am not sure that Elisabeth would have preferred empirical a posteriori knowledge of the soul over a priori knowledge based on reason.
- 11.
There are many significant differences between mind–body causation (i.e. voluntary action) and body–mind causation (i.e. sensation), which is Nadler’s main focus, but I overlook these differences since I think that Descartes believed that the role of God’s ordination was more or less the same in both directions. On the differences see Nadler (1994, 44). He is discussing interpretations defended by Daniel Garber, in particular Garber (1992).
- 12.
Many scholars have pointed out that Elisabeth poses the how question in her early letters and also moves beyond this question in order to develop her own position, see in particular Shapiro (1999, 506) and Tollefsen (1999, 61). Here I want to stick to the how question in order to illuminate similarities between Elisabeth’s philosophical attitude in her early letters and the letters on free will and providence.
- 13.
For an account of Elisabeth’s time as abbess at Herford, see Pal (2012, 254–265) and Miriam de Baar’s chapter in this volume.
- 14.
For an interpretation of Elisabeth’s letters to Barclay see also Sarah Hutton’s chapter in this volume. My account is indebted to hers.
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Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Sabrina Ebbersmeyer, Sarah Hutton and Ruth Hagengruber, who invited me to present the first version of this paper at the conference Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680)—Life and Legacy (18–20 May 2018, Paderborn University), and Marguerite Deslauriers, who invited me to present a later version at the panel discussion Women in Early Modern Philosophy (15 October 2018, McGill University). I am deeply indebted to my fellow participants at these events for their excellent comments. Additional thanks to the editors of this volume and to Frans Svensson for insightful comments on earlier written drafts.
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Reuter, M. (2021). Elisabeth on Free Will, Preordination, and Philosophical Doubt. In: Ebbersmeyer, S., Hutton, S. (eds) Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680): A Philosopher in her Historical Context. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71527-4_9
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