Abstract
This paper examines Elisabeth of Bohemia’s critique of Descartes’ internalist conception of happiness. According to this conception, we can all become happy because we can all make full use of our rational faculties and constantly follow our best judgments. Happiness is nothing but an “internal satisfaction” that arises when we act in accordance with these judgments. Elisabeth challenges this conception by pointing out that it is far too optimistic and that it neglects what is external to our own mind. Quite often, we cannot make full use of our rational faculties (i) because we are in the grip of passions and diseases or (ii) because we are under time pressure and can neither make the best decisions nor foresee their consequences. The paper focuses on these two objections, arguing that Elisabeth replaces Descartes’ internalist conception of happiness with a more complex conception that takes both internal and external factors into account. On her view, not only the right use of our rational faculties but also the right conditions for using them are required for obtaining happiness. In defending this view, Elisabeth presents an alternative to Descartes’ position and should therefore be seen as an original thinker engaging in a philosophical debate.
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Notes
- 1.
All the references to Descartes’ works apply to the edition established by Adam and Tannery (= AT). All the translations from the correspondence between Descartes and Elisabeth stem from Shapiro’s edition (= S). All other translations from Descartes’ works are taken from the three-volume collection edited by Cottingham et al. (= CSMK).
- 2.
- 3.
Given this close connection between virtue and happiness, Descartes cannot simply be labeled a Neo-Stoic. In fact, he openly criticizes Zeno, the founder of Stoic ethics, for taking virtue to “be so severe and so opposed to pleasure, in making all the vices equal, that it seems to me that only melancholic people or minds entirely detached from bodies were able to be among his followers” (AT IV, 276; S 104). For a nuanced comparison of Descartes’ program in ethics to that of the Stoics, see Rutherford (2004, 2014).
- 4.
I confine myself to presenting the key elements that are relevant for his theory of virtue. For a more comprehensive account, see Perler (2004).
- 5.
To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to note that Cartesian second-order volitions are not just about first-order volitions or desires, but about judgments that include a volition as one (but not the only) element. They should therefore not be confused with Frankfurt-style second order volitions that are often discussed in the contemporary debate.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
For a concise analysis of this distinction, see Curley (1993).
- 9.
It is not purely fictional because it is based on a historical event, namely the marriage of her brother which took place on 24 April 1645. But it only became known to Elisabeth in November 1645. So, in real life she had no opportunity to think about whether or not she should attend the wedding ceremony.
- 10.
For a more extensive discussion of this reason, see Shapiro (2014, 157–160).
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
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Perler, D. (2021). Is Our Happiness up to Us? Elisabeth of Bohemia on the Limits of Internalism. In: Ebbersmeyer, S., Hutton, S. (eds) Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680): A Philosopher in her Historical Context. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71527-4_10
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