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Abstract

This book is the second of a two-volume series, and focuses on Cross-Border Spillovers in Labor, Financial (e.g. stocks, bonds, derivatives), Finished-Commodity-Products and Commodities (e.g. electricity, agricultural products, basic necessities) markets and the Preferences of market-participants (primarily Cross-Border Spillovers from developed countries to Emerging markets countries, and, to a lesser extent, across industries, in the same country).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See: Kovarsky, P. (2019). Fabozzi: Finance Must Modernize or Face Irrelevancy. https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2019/06/03/fabozzi-finance-must-modernize-or-face-irrelevancy/#__prclt=C4ADXq9m. This article stated in part: “………Frank J. Fabozzi, CFA: My criticism of academic economics is that the models built by economists basically treat market agents as robots. They make decisions according to defined rules, and the constructed models are labeled “rational models.” Since finance is a field within economics, the same criticism applies to the models built by financial economists. …….The “rational models” in finance have been attacked by the behavioral finance camp, which has demonstrated the disconnect between model behavior and real-world investor behavior. The concern with academic economics also comes from practitioners.……..The problem with relying on rational models and treating them as the foundation of finance is that new findings that are inconsistent with the bedrock theories are dismissed. This is the major point that Sergio M. Focardi and I made when we argued that economics in its current form does not describe empirical reality but an idealized rational economic world. It is revealing that in financial economics, deviations in empirical prices or returns from theoretical models are referred to as “anomalies.” A true empirical science would revise its models so that they fit empirical data. Financial economics, however, takes the opposite approach and considers deviations from an idealized economic rationality to be anomalies of the true empirical price processes………In the 1970s and 1980s, an academic couldn’t get published in a peer-reviewed finance journal if their research conflicted with prevailing theory, such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). For example, in the late 1970s, a prestigious financial journal sought papers written jointly by academics and practitioners. Thinking that the journal’s editorial board was sincere, I co-authored a paper with then-chairman of Merrill Lynch White Weld, Tom Chrystie. Our thesis was that securities can be structured/customized for investors using the asset side of the balance sheet. Basically, it provided the general blueprint for structured finance. The review we received in response was short and went something like—the ideas in the paper did not make any sense because they were inconsistent with CAPM!……... The over-reliance on calculus is symptomatic of the subject’s stagnation and a disservice to the students who aspire to work in asset management. Economists should combine sophisticated mathematical tools and empirical techniques while recognizing the limitations of a field where experiments are rarely possible…..Ultimately, calculus has not been effective in describing economic and financial phenomena…… Econometric models are utterly inappropriate to model the sheer complexity of economic systems……The paradox in economics is that researchers either use non-empirical tools—calculus and sophisticated math—or paleo-statistical tools that were designed before the advent of computers. ……. Other fields have embraced machine learning and other computational methods. But these methods are rejected in economic journals as “black boxes”…..…In the idealized pseudo-rational world of current economic theory, there is no real place for major crises. Financial economics, in particular, is based on the assumption that economic quantities might deviate from their theoretical value, but that market forces will quickly realign them with theoretical values. This assumption has proved to be inadequate…..…..”.

  2. 2.

    See: Brunnermeier, Farhi, et al. (2021) which states in part: “…….In terms of asset pricing theory, an important avenue for future research is to develop models that explain which agency, behavioral, or regulatory frictions may give rise to sparse portfolios, low elasticities of demand, and volatile latent demand. ………Interestingly, the recent work on demand systems suggests that investors do not behave as our models suggest,……. Indeed, many of the salient policy and regulatory questions involve quantities: What is the impact of large-scale asset purchases by central banks? ……What is the impact of growing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) mandates on asset prices? What is the impact of changing the risk regulation of banks or insurance companies? The recent COVID-19 crisis has highlighted once more the importance of being able to answer these questions quantitatively.……….By combining models of the asset demand system with models of corporate decision making, we obtain an integrated model of asset pricing and corporate finance.……..Indeed, and despite decades of international financial integration, there are many more frictions in financial markets across countries than within countries. Third, currencies are more central to international finance than they are to finance….….. Fourth, the role of governments is more central to international finance than it is to finance……..Common long-standing problems include the identification of the economic determinants of beliefs Et, the economic determinants of risk premia or equivalently of stochastic discount factors Xt,t+1 and X*t,t+1, the economic determinants of portfolios. They also include what I will call the “disconnect” problem: the fact that it seems difficult to connect the stochastic discount factor Xt,t+1 to an actual preference-based marginal rate of substitution MRSt,t+1 of a well-identified marginal investor ……… Other common long-standing problems include the identification of the key market failures and externalities ……..as well as the role and transmission of policy (monetary, fiscal, prudential, etc.).……..International finance also faces specific challenges with no counterparts in finance. First, there is the Mussa puzzle,…… Second, there is covered-interest-parity (CIP) arbitrage violation, ………Third, there is the large degree of home bias in portfolios across countries. Fourth, there are the destabilizing effects of volatile capital flows in emerging markets. Fifth, there are the economic determinants of government behavior in these countries. Sixth, there are the economic determinants and implications of exchange rate regimes …… Seventh and finally, there are the importance of the international monetary system and the special role of the United States……… as the world banker and the exorbitant privilege that comes with it, and the resulting pattern of global imbalances.…......”.

  3. 3.

    See: Go (2003). Law and Versteeg (2012) noted that the US Constitution is similar to those of many countries including the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United kingdom; Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei, Cyprus, Dominica, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, American Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

  4. 4.

    See: “Covid Crisis Shows Once Again Why US Dollar Is World’s Dominant Currency – A Lack of Global Alternatives Helps Explain Some of The Dollar’s Role. The Euro’s Status As A Reserve Currency Remains Limited & China’s Currency Is Still Subject To Capital Controls”. By Enda Curran and Finbarr Flynn; 23 October, 2020. https://theprint.in/economy/covid-crisis-shows-once-again-why-us-dollar-is-worlds-dominant-currency/529331/”.

    See: Gifford, C. (September 8, 2020). “The dominance of the US dollar is called into question”. World Finance. https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/the-dominance-of-the-us-dollar-is-called-into-question.

    See: Amadeo, K. (July 2020), “Why the US Dollar Is the Global Currency”. The Bottom Line. July 23, 2020. https://www.thebalance.com/world-currency-3305931.

    See: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “Is the International Role of the Dollar Changing?” Page 6. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci16-1.pdf.

  5. 5.

    See: XE. “ISO 4217 Currency Codes”. http://www.xe.com/iso4217.php.

  6. 6.

    See: International Money Fund. “Table 1: World Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves.” https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=41175.

  7. 7.

    See: International Monetary Fund (2019). “Global Financial Stability Report”. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2019/10/01/global-financial-stability-report-october-2019.

  8. 8.

    See: Bank for International Settlements, “The Geography of Dollar Funding of Non-US Banks”. https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1812b.htm.

  9. 9.

    See: Goldberg, L. (2010). Is the International Role of the Dollar Changing? Federal Reserve Bank of New York – Current Issues in Economics & Finance. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci16-1.pdf.

  10. 10.

    See: U.S. Currency Education Program. “U.S. Currency in Circulation.” https://www.uscurrency.gov/life-cycle/data/circulation.

  11. 11.

    See: World Integrated Trade Solutions. “Japan Exports By Country 2020”.

    See: World Integrated Trade Solutions. “US Exports By Country 2020”. https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/USA.

  12. 12.

    See: World Integrated Trade Solutions. “China Exports By Country 2020.” https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/CHN.

    See: World Integrated Trade Solutions. “US Exports By Country 2020”. https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/USA.

  13. 13.

    Baccini (2019) stated in part: “………According to the Desta dataset (Dür et al. 2014), there were a little more than one hundred PTAs in the 1990s, whereas there are more than seven hundred PTAs in force to date. Both developed and developing countries are heavily involved in preferential liberalization, and the number of North–South PTAs (i.e., PTAs between developed and developing countries) has boomed since the formation of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In summary, much of the trade liberalization that we have seen in the past twenty years is preferential rather than unilateral or multilateral. While impressive, the growing number of PTAs is not the most defining transformation in the global governance of trade. Rather, the most important change is that modern PTAs not only reduce tariffs but also regulate investment, intellectual property rights, competition policy, government procurement, and many other matters. In other words, PTAs remove barriers not only at the border but also behind the border, producing what has been referred to as deep integration between countries (Lawrence 1996). An illustration of this change is the contrast between the PTA that the European Union signed with Egypt in 1972, which is 92 pages long, and the 2016 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union, which is 1598 pages long. Since many of the provisions and regulations included in PTAs go beyond World Trade Organization commitments (Horn et al. 2010), it is fair to say that preferential liberalization shapes the global governance of trade in the twenty-first century…”.

  14. 14.

    See: “Emefiele: Nigeria Spends 40% of FX on Importation of Petrol, Others”. This Day (Nigerian newspaper) October 15, 2021. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/10/15/emefiele-nigeria-spends-40-of-fx-on-importation-of-petrol-others/.

  15. 15.

    See:What the Chinese Bank Crackdown Means for Crypto Investors”. By Emma Newbery. May 20, 2021. https://www.fool.com/the-ascent/buying-stocks/articles/what-the-chinese-bank-crackdown-means-for-crypto-investors/?source=eptyholnk0000202&utm_source=yahoo-host&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=article.

    See:China vows to crack down on bitcoin mining, trading activities”. May 21, 2021. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-says-crack-down-bitcoin-145443522.html.

    See: Chaudhary, A. & Singh, S. (Sept. 17, 2020). “India Plans To Introduce Law To Ban Cryptocurrency Trading”. Economic Times Of India. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/government-plans-to-introduce-law-to-ban-cryptocurrency-trading/articleshow/78132596.cms.

    See: India To Propose Cryptocurrency Ban, Penalising Miners, Traders—Source. By Aftab Ahmed and Nupur Anand. March 15, 2021.

    See: Putin Says Russia Must Stop Illegal Cross-Border Crypto Transfers. By Anna Baydakova. Wed, March 17, 2021. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/putin-says-russia-must-stop-170337080.html.

    See: “Over 13% of all Proceeds of Crime in Bitcoin are Now Laundered Through Privacy Wallets”. 09 December, 2020. https://www.elliptic.co/blog/13-bitcoin-crime-laundered-through-privacy-wallet.

    See: “Ex-Microsoft Engineer Gets Prison Sentence For Bitcoin Tax Fraud”. By Shehan Chandrasekera. Nov 9, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/shehanchandrasekera/2020/11/09/ex-microsoft-engineer-gets-prison-sentenced-for-bitcoin-tax-fraud/?sh=656419c062cd.

    See: “Top cryptocurrency scams of 2019—and how most hackers got away with it”. By Sophia Ankel and Prabhjote Gill. Business Insider India. Dec 27, 2019. https://www.businessinsider.com/the-biggest-cryptocurrency-scams-and-arrests-of-2019-so-far-2019-8?IR=T.

    See: “Romance fraud, cryptocurrency risks and money laundering in Asia Pacific”. July/August 2019. https://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4295006266.

    See: “Chinese cryptocurrency scam ringleaders jailed in US$2.25 billion Ponzi scheme involving PlusToken platform”. By Sidney Leng. December 1, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3112115/chinese-cryptocurrency-scam-ringleaders-jailed-us225-billion.

    See: “How Terrorists Use Cryptocurrency in Southeast Asia—The first transactions involving cryptocurrencies have been made recently by Islamic State-linked terrorist networks in the Philippines”. By V. Arianti and Kenneth Yeo Yaoren. June 30, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/how-terrorists-use-cryptocurrency-in-southeast-asia/.

    See: “Two Chinese Nationals Charged with Laundering Over $100 Million in Cryptocurrency from Exchange Hack—Forfeiture Complaint Details Over $250 Million Stolen by North Korean Actors”. US Dept. Of Justice. March 2, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-nationals-charged-laundering-over-100-million-cryptocurrency-exchange-hack.

    See: “Lawsuits Filed Against Binance, Bitmex and Other Crypto Companies”. April 07, 2020. By M.D. Rockybul Hasan. https://atozmarkets.com/news/lawsuits-filed-against-binance-bitmex-other-crypto-companies/. (“US law firm, Roche Cyrulnik Freedman and Selendy & Gay PLLC, recently filed eleven class-action lawsuits. The firm has targeted many members of the crypto industry. The company, which represents crypto investors, has targeted a total of 42 defendants. Lawsuits filed against some of the biggest crypto exchanges, including Binance and BitMEX, as well as their founders and other officials…. Targeted companies operate in many countries around the world. This includes the United States itself, as well as Canada, China, Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Israel and many others. The lawsuits also alleged that the defendants violated federal securities laws and misled investors by inducing them to buy unregistered assets…. Defendants include crypto issuers and exchanges, including KuCoin, BitMEX, Bprotocol, Status, Block.one, Civic and Binance. The class action names executives such as Block.one CTO Dan Larimer and Binance CEO Changpeng Zhao”).

    See: “GemCoin Founder Sentenced to ten Years for $147M Crypto Scheme”. Danny Nelson. January 12, 2021. https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/gemcoin-founder-sentenced-10-years-231228865.html.

    See: “Bitcoin exchange owner who helped scam eBay buyers sentenced to ten years in prison”. By Mariella Moon. January 13, 2021. https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/bitcoin-exchange-owner-ebay-car-scam-sentenced-093009069.html.

    See: “Owner of Crypto Exchange RG Coins Gets 10 Years in Prison for Laundering $5Million”. By Sebastian Sinclair. January 13, 2021. https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/bitcoin-exchange-owner-ebay-car-scam-sentenced-093009069.html.

    See: “Centra Tech Co-Founder Handed Prison Term for $25 Million Crypto Fraud”. By Tanzeel Akhtar. Dec 16, 2020. https://www.coindesk.com/centra-tech-co-founder-handed-prison-term-for-25m-crypto-fraud.

    See: “Criminals hide ‘billions’ in crypto-cash—Europol”. By Shiroma Silva. February 12, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43025787.

    See: “Terrorist Use of Cryptocurrencies: Technical and Organizational Barriers and Future Threats”. By Cynthia Dion-Schwarz, David Manheim and Patrick B. Johnston. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3026.html.

    See: “Cryptoqueen: How This Woman Scammed The World, Then Vanished”. 24 November 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-50435014.

    See:Illegal Online Gambling Proliferates In China’s Digital Economy”. By Kapronasia. December 1, 2020. https://www.kapronasia.com/china-payments-research-category/illegal-online-gambling-proliferates-in-china-s-digital-economy.html. This article stated in part, “One key takeaway from the crackdown is that China’s digital economy lacks sufficiently robust anti-fraud and anti-money laundering controls. Despite the widely touted technological capabilities of firms like Alipay and WeChat Pay, criminals appear to have moved massive amounts of illicit funds through the e-wallets with relative ease. Many of the suspicious transactions were somehow overlooked”.

    See: “EU will make Bitcoin traceable and ban anonymous crypto wallets in anti-money laundering drive”. By Tom Bateman with Reuters. Updated: 26/08/2021. https://www.euronews.com/next/2021/07/21/eu-will-make-bitcoin-traceable-and-ban-anonymous-crypto-wallets-in-anti-money-laundering-d.

    See: “Cryptocurrency: rise of decentralised finance sparks ‘dirty money’ fears—‘Know your customer’ rules for banks and brokers underpin anti-money laundering efforts but are at risk due to DeFi”. Financial Times. By Gary Silverman, September 14, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/beeb2f8c-99ec-494b-aa76-a7be0bf9dae6.

    See: “Crypto crimes surge in Asia; Bitcoin cause for divorce in South Korea”. The Daily Forkast. May 28, 2021. https://forkast.news/video-audio/crypto-crimes-surge-in-asia-bitcoins-reason-for-divorce-in-s-korea-the-daily-forkast/. This article stated in part, “As crypto grows in size and magnitude, we look deeper into scams right now that are landing some more victims. Police in South Korea have arrested 14 individuals in a cryptocurrency fraud case estimated to have cost 69,000 investors, a total of US$3.85 billion. That brings the country’s losses due to crypto fraud to—get this—US$5 billion over the past five years. This accounts for an increase from 41 cases in 2017 to 333 last year. And that is a huge jump. This trend is not unique to Korea. In Singapore, police recorded 393 cases of crypto crimes last year. That’s 60 more than South Korea”.

    See: “China says all cryptocurrency-related transactions are illegal and must be banned”. By Manish Singh, September 24, 2021. https://techcrunch.com/2021/09/24/china-says-all-cryptocurrency-related-transactions-are-illegal/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAICiG6PkR%2D%2D_7KkrIf_HX7v5jHUeN0RxVcNkvGn4t1a62QuOxeIDVJsQoM6EIPcRPBeKj_Payi_dv9K-spISOiacV6Kd4UJjxKJaK5ZRd3LcfnsAghV-mldbEza0xkpSxhtsSDhQnrcuWkqGufy4A5ASWrSArjGVKQ2DyViyYwQ8.

    See:China arrests 1,100 over cryptocurrency money laundering…China’s bitcoin mines power nearly eighty percent of the global trade in cryptocurrencies”. June 10, 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-arrests-1100-over-cryptocurrency-money-laundering.

  16. 16.

    See: “China-Bangladesh Bilateral Currency Cooperation Enjoys Broad Prospects”. By Agencies. December 28, 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202012/1211181.shtml. This article stated in part: “…In 2019, the cross-border RMB settlement between China and the neighboring countries registered RMB 3.6 trillion yuan, among which the trade in goods amounted to RMB 994.5 billion yuan, and the direct investment amounted to RMB 351.2 billion yuan. Furthermore, the total cross-border RMB payments and receipts between China and the countries along the B&R (Belt-And-road) reached over RMB 2.73 trillion yuan, among which the trade in goods amounted to RMB 732.5 billion yuan, and the direct investment to RMB 252.4 billion yuan…. Since 2008, China has signed the bilateral local currency settlement agreements with nine neighboring countries and the countries along the B&R such as Vietnam, Laos, Russia and Kazakhstan, and has signed the bilateral local currency swap agreements with the central banks or monetary authorities of twenty-three neighboring countries and the countries along the B&R such as Russia, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates (the UAE), Egypt and Turkey. By the end of 2019, China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), had signed bilateral currency swap agreements with the central banks or monetary authorities of thirty-nine countries and regions, covering major developed and emerging economies in the world, as well as the major offshore RMB markets, totaling more than RMB 3.7 trillion yuan. In 2019, the PBC renewed the bilateral local currency swap agreements with the Centrale Bank van Suriname, Singapore Monetary Authority, Turkey Central Bank, European Central Bank and Hungary Central Bank, totaling RMB 683 billion yuan. In October, the Republic of Korea and China signed a deal to extend the bilateral currency swap agreement and expand the size to USD 59 billion. Though a late comer in the global reserve currency family, the RMB proved to be remarkably stable and resilient amid adverse and uncertain economic conditions in recent years, including during the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2008. Especially during the year of 2019 and 2020, despite headwinds from the ongoing trade tensions and unprecedented disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, businesses globally are still increasing their use of RMB in international transactions…”.

  17. 17.

    Kim and Milner (2019) noted that “………Multinational corporations (MNCs) play significant roles in shaping the global economy. For example, MNCs in the U.S., which has the world’s largest economy, make disproportionate contributions to the national economy: they represent a very small number of total American firms (less than 1%), but a large fraction of GDP, exports, imports, research and development, and private-sector employee compensation; Specifically, U.S. MNC parent companies in 2016 constituted more than 24% of private sector GDP (value-added) and 26% of private-sector employee compensation (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2018a); U.S. MNCs are engaged in more than half of all U.S. exports and more than 40% of U.S. imports (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2018). Likewise, MNCs throughout the world dominate the global economy as well as their national economies. The OECD (2018) estimates that MNCs account for half of global exports, nearly a third of world GDP (28%), and about fourth of global employment. These firms all generate a significant share of their revenue from abroad as well. Importantly, their transnational activities have transformed the nature of international trade, investments, and technology transfers in the era of globalization. The extensive global value chains (GVCs) prevalent in today’s world economy have been driven by how MNCs structure their global operations through outsourcing and offshoring activities. In fact, their decisions have enormous implications for a wide range of policy issues—such as taxation, investment protection, immigration—across many countries with different political and economic institutions. MNCs also may have strong political influence domestically. Indeed, their global economic dominance may go hand-in-hand with their powerful domestic political position……….”.

  18. 18.

    The abstract in Autor et al. (2017) states as follows: “………The fall of labor’s share of GDP in the United States and many other countries in recent decades is well documented but its causes remain uncertain. Existing empirical assessments of trends in labor’s share typically have relied on industry or macro data, obscuring heterogeneity among firms. In this paper, we analyze micro panel data from the U.S. Economic Census since 1982 and international sources and document empirical patterns to assess a new interpretation of the fall in the labor share based on the rise of “superstar firms.” If globalization or technological changes advantage the most productive firms in each industry, product market concentration will rise as industries become increasingly dominated by superstar firms with high profits and a low share of labor in firm value-added and sales. As the importance of superstar firms increases, the aggregate labor share will tend to fall. Our hypothesis offers several testable predictions: industry sales will increasingly concentrate in a small number of firms; industries where concentration rises most will have the largest declines in the labor share; the fall in the labor share will be driven largely by between-firm reallocation rather than (primarily) a fall in the unweighted mean labor share within firms; the between-firm reallocation component of the fall in the labor share will be greatest in the sectors with the largest increases in market concentration; and finally, such patterns will be observed not only in U.S. firms, but also internationally. We find support for all of these predictions……”. The decline in labor’s share of GDP in many developed countries during 2000–2018 is significant evidence of Globalization, Cross-Border Spillovers and global Market-Integration (of international labor markets).

  19. 19.

    See: European Union (2021). Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/green-taxation-0/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en.

  20. 20.

    See: Shearman & Sterling, Dodd-Frank, UK, EU & Other Regulatory Reforms (2013) at http://www.shearman.com/dodd-frank/ [Accessed July 1, 2013].

  21. 21.

    See: Regulation 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L201/1.

  22. 22.

    See: FSA (UK) (2012), Review of The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II. Available at: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/international/mifid.

    See: DIRECTIVE 2008/10/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 March 2008. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:076:0033:0036:EN:PDF.

  23. 23.

    Directive 2006/48 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions [2006] OJ L177/1.

  24. 24.

    See: Chwieroth and Walter (2020), Copelovitch et al. (2016), Carruthers (2013), and Banerji et al. (2018).

  25. 25.

    See: Barta and Johnston (2017), Iyengar (2012), Mennillo and Sinclair (2019), Abdelal and Blyth (2015), Brummer and Loko (2014), Kiff et al. (2012), and Kruck (2016).

  26. 26.

    See: Coffee (2011), Darbellay (2013), Amtenbrink and Heine (2013), European Commission (2015), Gaillard and Harrington (2016), Copelovitch et al. (2016), Nwogugu (2021) and Kruck (2016).

  27. 27.

    See: “Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission – Final Report-Conclusions-January 2011”. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.

    See: Casey, K. (February 6, 2009). “In Search of Transparency, Accountability, and Competition: The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies”. Remarks at “The SEC Speaks in 2009”. US SEC. http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609klc.htm.

    See: “Ratings agencies suffer ‘conflict of interest’, says former Moody’s boss”. Rupert Neate. The Guardian; 22 August 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/22/ratings-agencies-conflict-of-interest.

    See: Kerwer (2004), Gaillard (2014), Frost (2007), Bartels and Weder di Mauro (2013), Blodget (2011), European Commission (2016), and Gärtner et al. (2011).

  28. 28.

    See: “SEC Sues Morningstar’s Former Credit Ratings Agency”. By Bernice Napach. February 17, 2021. https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2021/02/17/sec-sues-morningstars-former-credit-ratings-agency/.

    See: US SEC vs. Morningstar Credit Ratings LLC (US District Court for the Southern District Of New York, USA; Case #: 21-CV-1359). https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2021/comp-pr2021-29.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.

    See: Jindal Power Limited vs. ICRA Limited (Delhi High Court, India) (court stated the permitted basis for issuers to file lawsuits against CRAs; court stated that CRA regulations cannot be contracted away by CRAs and their clients). https://indiankanoon.org/doc/54995907/.

    See: SERI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. vs. Fitch Rating India Pvt. Ltd. (Calcutta High Court; India). http://164.100.79.153/judis/kolkata/index.php/casestatus/viewpdf/APOT_380_2012_17092012_J_21_220.pdf.

    See: First Leasing Company of India vs. ICRA (Madras High Court, India). https://www.lawyerservices.in/First-Leasing-Company-of-India-Limited-Versus-ICRA-Limited-2000-06-23.

    See: Credit Rating Agencies Dodge Investors’ Lawsuits. September 12th, 2016. By: Brad Fleming. http://ipjournal.law.wfu.edu/2016/09/credit-rating-agencies-dodge-investors-lawsuits/.

    See: “Litigation against Credit Rating Agencies: Delhi High Court Delineates the Scope”. September 8, 2020. https://indiacorplaw.in/2020/09/litigation-against-credit-rating-agencies-delhi-high-court-delineates-the-scope.html.

    See: “Credit-rating agencies are back under the spotlight - This time is different from the financial crisis—sort of”. The Economist. May 9, 2020. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/05/07/credit-rating-agencies-are-back-under-the-spotlight.

    See: It Is High Time to Implement a Major Reform of Credit-Rating Agencies. International Banker. By Yuefen Li. June 16, 2021. https://internationalbanker.com/finance/it-is-high-time-to-implement-a-major-reform-of-credit-rating-agencies/.

    See: “First German decision holding credit rating agency liable to …….”. Allen and Overy. 2021. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwj21omW7NvxAhUGV8AKHXH1Aqk4ChAWegQIBRAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.allenovery.com%2Fen-gb%2Fglobal%2Fnews-and-insights%2Fpublications%2Ffirst-german-decision-holding-credit-rating-agency-liable-to-investors&usg=AOvVaw2KgmdfHKgeT9ljIYWJGBKV.

    See: Why China Is Shaking Up Its Credit Ratings Industry: QuickTake. Bloomberg. July 23, 2020. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjapomH7dvxAhWhnVwKHfE8BGo4FBAWegQIDRAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bloomberg.com%2Fnews%2Farticles%2F2020-07-23%2Fwhy-china-sought-help-with-credit-ratings-for-bonds-quicktake&usg=AOvVaw0qjmxyRB-D2yAe_6DMfYDT.

    See: Rating agencies braced for Calpers lawsuit - Risk.net. 2021. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjapomH7dvxAhWhnVwKHfE8BGo4FBAWegQIDxAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.risk.net%2Frisk-management%2Fcredit-risk%2F1560780%2Frating-agencies-braced-calpers-lawsuit&usg=AOvVaw0XcaYVzgFSEJZwcSU4pj4V.

    See: Nwogugu (2021a).

    See: “Liquidators of failed Bear Stearns funds sue rating agencies”. July 10, 2013. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/10/us-ratings-agency-lawsuit-idUSBRE9690QV20130710.

    See: “Bond Insurer Sues Credit-Rating Agencies”. July 17, 2013. www.wsj.com. https://www.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323993804578612212273026342.html.

    See: Wayne, L. (15 July 2009). “Calpers Sues Over Ratings of Securities”. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/business/15calpers.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss.

    See: “S&P Lawsuit First Amendment Defense May Fare Poorly, Experts Say”. 4 February 2013. Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/sp-lawsuit-first-amendment_n_2618737.html.

    See: “Credit Rating Agencies Settle 2 Suits Brought by Investors”. Reuters. April 27, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/business/credit-rating-agencies-settle-lawsuits-over-debt-vehicles.html?_r=0.

    See: Reuters (September 3, 2013). “S.&P. Calls Federal Fraud Suit Payback for Credit Downgrade”. New York Times.

    See: “Corrupted credit ratings: Standard & Poor’s lawsuit and the evidence”. Matthias Efing & Harald Hau; 18 June 2013. http://www.voxeu.org/article/corrupted-credit-ratings-standard-poor-s-lawsuit-and-evidence.

    See: Standard & Poor’s Says Civil Lawsuit Threatened By DOJ Is Without Legal Merit And Unjustified”. https://Reuters.com. 2013/02/04. https://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/04/ny-sp-doj-lawsuit-idUSnPnNY53856+160+PRN20130204.

    See: “Analysis: Credit agencies remain unaccountable”. Kathleen Day. USA Today. May 19, 2014. https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/05/19/credit-rating-agencies-in-limbo/9290143/.

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Appendix 1 Worldwide US Dollar Exchange Rates (1999–2019; the Value of One US Dollar in Foreign Currencies)

Appendix 1 Worldwide US Dollar Exchange Rates (1999–2019; the Value of One US Dollar in Foreign Currencies)

Country

Currency

Code

2019[7]

2014[8]

2009

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

1989

United Arab Emirates

Emirati dirham

AED

3.6725

3.673

3.673

3.6725

3.6725

3.6725

3.6725

3.6725

3.6725

3.6725

Afghanistan

Afghan afghani

AFN[9]

75.14

50.42

50.05

42.785

43.13

42.785

4.7

4.75

4.75

4.836

Albania

Albanian lek

ALL

108.931

79.546

92.668

140.16

102.93

115.918

143.71

137.69

150.63

148.92

Algeria

Algerian dinar

DZD

118.4

63.25

69.9

77.215

77.889

78.67

75.26

66.574

58.739

57.707

Angola[10]

Angolan kwanza

AOA

310.16

75.023

76.6

22.058

32.8716

73.8297

10.041

2.791

0.393

0.229

Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines[11]

East Caribbean dollar

XCD

2.7

2.69

2.7

2.76

2.76

2.76

2.76

2.76

2.76

2.76

Argentina[12]

Argentine peso

ARS

59.9

8

3.1105

2.951

2.926

3.08

2.945

3.24

0.9994

0.9996

Armenia

Armenian dram

AMD

485.73

303.93

344.06

522.08

459.79

395.89

570.95

535.06

504.92

490.85

Aruba[13]

Aruban florin

AWG

1.79

 

1.8

1.79

1.79

1.8

1.79

1.79

1.79

1.79

Australia, Kiribati, Nauru, Norfolk Island, Tuvalu, Christmas Island, Cocos Island

Australian dollar

AUD

1.3994

1.2059

1.2137

1.932

1.9354

1.5361

1.7173

1.5497

1.5888

1.3439

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijani manat (old)

AZM

NA

NA

NA

4657

4804

4875.50

4474

4120

3869

3985

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijani manat

AZN

1.705

0.8219

0.8581

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

The Bahamas

Bahamian dollar

BSD

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Bahrain

Bahraini dinar

BHD

0.376

0.376

0.376

0.376

0.376

0.376

0.376

0.376

0.376

0.376

Bangladesh

Bangladeshi taka

BDT

83.891

68.554

69.893

55.807

57.756

58.15

52.142

49.085

46.906

43.892

Barbados

Barbadian dollar

BBD

2

 

2.02

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

Belarus[14]

Belarusian ruble

BYB/BYR

NA

2130

2145

1531

Unk

2032.79

876.75

248.8

46.127

26.02

Belarus

Belarusian third ruble

BYN

2.06

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Belize

Belizean dollar

BZD

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo[15]

CFA franc

XOF/XAF

574.59

438.77

493.51

733.04

742.79

560

711.98

615.7

589.95

583.67

Bermuda

Bermudian dollar

BMD

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Bhutan[16]

Bhutanese ngultrum/Indian rupee

BTN/INR

70.754

 

41.487

47.186

48.336

46.98

44.942

43.055

41.259

36.313

Bolivia

Bolivian boliviano

BOB

6.912

7.253

7.8616

6.6069

6.8613

7.5719

6.1835

5.8124

5.5101

5.2543

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible mark

BAM

1.7132

1.3083

1.4419

2.161

1.6237

1.5579

2.124

1.837

1.76

1.734

Botswana

Botswana pula

BWP

10.5219

6.7907

6.2035

5.8412

6.8353

5.15464

5.1018

4.6244

4.2259

3.6508

Brazil[17]

Brazilian real

BRL

3.7404

1.8644

1.9516

2.358

2.378

2.9675

1.83

1.815

1.161

1.078

Brunei[18]

Bruneian dollar

BND

1.3562

1.4322

1.526

1.8917

1.8388

1.7346

1.724

1.695

1.6736

1.4848

Bulgaria[19]

Bulgarian lev

BGN

1.7132

1.3171

1.4366

2.1847

2.2147

1.654

2.1233

1.8364

1.7604

1.6819

Burundi

Burundi franc

BIF

1814.64

1198

1065

830.35

865.14

1052.8

720.67

563.56

477.77

352.35

Cambodia

Cambodian riel

KHR

4016.45

4070.94

4006

3918.50

3895.00

3950.00

3840.80

3807.80

3744.40

2946.30

Canada

Canadian dollar

CAD

1.3311

1.0364

1.0724

1.4963

1.5979

1.3866

1.452

1.5263

1.425

1.3737

Cape Verde

Cape Verdean escudo

CVE

96.58

73.84

81.235

104.617

123.556

108.95

115.877

102.7

98.158

93.177

Cayman Islands

Caymanian dollar

KYD

0.8333

0.8333

0.8333

0.82

0.8333

0.83

0.8189

0.81528

0.802

0.802

Chile

Chilean peso

CLP

675.38

509.02

526.25

618.7

651.9

545.5

535.47

508.78

460.29

419.3

China, People’s Republic of

Renminbi

CNY

6.7888

6.9385

7.61

8.2771

8.2767

8.2768

8.2785

8.2783

8.279

8.2898

Colombia

Colombian peso

COP

3161.45

2302.90

2013.80

2299.63

2275.89

2856.80

2087.90

1756.23

1426.04

1140.96

Comoros[20]

Comorian franc

KOF

430.94

337.26

361.4

549.78

557.09

393.83

533.98

461.77

442.46

437.75

Congo, Democratic Republic of the[21]

Congolese franc

CDF

1628.74

459.175

437

305

420

437.962

21.82

4.02

1.61

1.31

Costa Rica

Costa Rican colon

CRC

603.78

529.62

519.53

328.87

343.08

395.29

308.19

285.68

257.23

232.6

Croatia

Croatian kuna

HRK

6.507

4.877

5.3735

8.34

8.452

6.4196

8.277

7.112

6.362

6.101

Cuba[22]

Cuban peso

CUP

1

0.9259

0.9259

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Cyprus (Greek Cypriot area)

Cypriot pound

CYP

0.5127

NA

0.4286

0.6427

0.6518

0.49996

0.6208

0.5423

0.517

0.5135

Cyprus (Turkish Cypriot area)

Turkish lira

TRY

See Turkey

  

1.42234

1.34079

1.43111

1.49307

1.50548

1.22541

0.6237

Czech Republic

Czech koruna

CZK

22.468

17.037

20.53

38.035

36.325

26.645

38.598

34.569

32.281

31.698

Denmark, Faroe Islands, Greenland

Danish krone

DKK

6.5396

5.0236

5.4797

5.9911

5.9969

5.9468

6.5877

7.8947

8.3228

8.0831

Djibouti

Djiboutian franc

DJF

177.72

179.14

177.71

177.721

177.721

177.721

177.721

177.721

177.721

177.721

Dominican Republic

Dominican peso

DOP

50.501

34.775

33.113

16.952

17.31

27.1

16.415

16.033

15.267

14.265

East Timor

U.S. dollar

USD

1

1

1

Irr

1

1

Irr

Irr

Irr

Irr

Ecuador

U.S. dollar, Ecuadorian sucre

USD/ECS

NA

NA

NA

25,000.00

25,000.00

25,000

24,988

11,787

5447

3988

Egypt

Egyptian pound

EGP

17.87

5.4

5.67

4.49

4.5

5.975

3.69

3.405

3.388

3.388

El Salvador

Salvadoran colon, U.S. dollar

SVC, USD

NA

NA

NA

8.755

8.75

8.75

8.755

8.755

8.755

8.755

Eritrea

Eritrean nakfa

ERN

15

15.38

15.5

Unk

15

9.65

9.5

7.6

7.2

Unk

Estonia

Estonian kroon

EEK

13.706

10.537

11.535

17.538

17.518

13.2625

16.969

14.678

14.075

13.882

Ethiopia

Ethiopian birr

ETB

28.39

9.57

8.96

8.314

8.455

8.4

8.314

8.134

7.503

6.864

Eurozone Countries

Euro

EUR

0.8934

0.6734

0.7345

0.8039

0.8038

0.7964

0.884

1.0575

1.1166

1.0827

Fiji

Fijian dollar

FJD

2.125

1.5986

1.6138

2.2766

2.2934

1.8653

2.1286

1.9696

1.9868

1.4437

French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna

Change Franc Pacifique

XPF

104.53

83.12

87.59

133.26

135.04

116.49

129.44

107.25

106.11

126.39

The Gambia

Gambian dalasi

GMD

49.51

22.75

27.79

15

29.24

25

12.788

11.395

10.643

10.2

Georgia

Georgian lari

GEL

2.65

1.47

1.7

2.073

2.1888

2.1352

1.9762

2.0245

1.3898

1.2975

Ghana

Ghanaian cedi (old)

GHC

NA

NA

NA

7170.76

7195

8675

5455.06

2669.30

2050.17

5526.60

Ghana

Ghanaian cedi

GHS

4.91342

3.02469

1.54586

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

 

Guatemala

Guatemalan quetzal

GTQ

7.729

7.5895

7.6833

7.8586

8.0165

7.925

7.7632

7.3856

6.3947

6.0653

Guinea

Guinean franc

GNF

9185.32

5500

4122.80

1950.60

1974.40

1963.14

1746.90

1387.40

1236.80

1095.30

Guyana

Guyanese dollar

GYD

209.01

203.86

201.89

187.3

189.5

179

182.4

178

150.5

142.4

Haiti

Haitian gourde

HTG

78.143

39.216

37.138

26.339

26.674

37.25

22.524

17.965

16.505

17.311

Honduras

Honduran lempira

HNL

24.271

18.983

18.9

15.9197

16.0256

17.26

15.1407

14.5039

13.8076

13.0942

Hong Kong

Hong Kong dollar

HKD

7.84

7.8

7.802

7.7994

7.798

7.7987

7.7918

7.7589

7.7462

7.7425

Hungary

Hungarian forint

HUF

280.13

165.89

186.16

286.49

275.92

209

282.179

237.146

214.402

186.789

Iceland

Icelandic króna

ISK

119.7

85.619

63.391

97.425

102.43

70.1

78.616

72.335

70.958

70.904

India

Indian rupee

INR

70.775

43.815

41.357

45.34

44.115

45.319

46.66

48.679

47.227

44.942

Indonesia

Indonesian rupiah

IDR

14,159.50

9558.10

9056

10,260.90

10,377.30

9183.77

7855.20

10,013.60

8374.50

Iran

Iranian rial

IRR

42,107.80

9142.80

9407.50

1750

7900

7900

1750

1750

1750

1750

Iraq

Iraqi dinar

IQD

1191

1202

1255

2000

1500.59

1516.50

1910

1815

1530

910

Israel, West Bank

new Israeli shekel

ILS

3.69

3.56

4.14

4.2057

4.2757

4.46685

4.1397

4.0773

3.8001

3.4494

Jamaica

Jamaican dollar

JMD

130.418

72.236

69.034

45.996

47.277

58.75

42.701

39.044

36.55

35.404

Japan

Japanese yen

JPY

108.92

103.58

117.99

121.529

125.388

115.933

107.765

113.907

130.905

120.991

Jordan

Jordanian dinar

JOD

0.709

0.709

0.709

0.709

0.709

0.709

0.709

0.709

0.709

0.709

Kazakhstan

Kazakh tenge

KZT

378.61

120.25

122.55

146.74

151.14

149.757

142.13

119.52

78.3

75.44

Kenya

Kenyan shilling

KES

101.54

68.358

68.309

78.563

78.597

73.5

76.176

70.326

60.367

58.732

North Korea

North Korean won

KPW

900.11

3400 (Oct)[34]

140

2.15

2.15

2.15

2.15

2.15

2.15

2.15

South Korea

South Korean won

KRW

1122.48

1101.70

929.2

1290.99

1317.01

1205.45

1130.96

1188.82

1401.44

951.29

Kuwait

Kuwaiti dinar

KWD

0.3032

0.2679

0.2844

0.3066

0.3075

0.299105

0.3067

0.3044

0.3047

0.3033

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstani som

KGS

69.835

36.108

37.746

48.378

47.972

44.0542

47.704

39.008

20.838

17.362

Laos

Lao kip

LAK

8549.18

8760.69

9658

8954.58

9467.00

7562

7887.64

7102.03

3298.33

1259.98

Lebanon

Lebanese pound

LBP

1507.50

1507.50

1507.50

1507.50

1507.50

1507.5

1507.50

1507.80

1516.10

1539.50

Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland

South African rand (also, Lesotho loti, Swazi lilangeni)

ZAR, LSL, SZL

13.85

7.75

7.25

8.60918

11.58786

8.0154

6.93983

6.10948

5.52828

4.60796

Liberia

Liberian dollar

LRD

158.62

63.31

59.715

48.5833

46.04

57.149

40.9525

41.9025

41.5075

40

Libya

Libyan dinar

LYD

1.3898

1.2112

1.2604

0.6501

1.36495

1.2059

0.5403

0.5403

0.3785

0.3891

Lithuania

Lithuanian litas

LTL

3.0245

2.3251

2.5362

4

3.4946

2.93995

4

4

4

4

Macau

Macau pataca

MOP

8.07726

8.16567

8.011

8.034

8.033

8.0325

8.026

7.992

7.979

7.975

Madagascar

Malagasy franc

MGF

NA

NA

NA

6588.50

6531.40

5820.75

6767.50

6283.80

5441.40

5090.90

Madagascar

Malagasy ariary

MGA

3566.02

1654.78

1880

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Malawi

Malawian kwacha

MWK

730.99

419.6

155.5

72.1973

67.3111

91.8

59.5438

44.0881

31.0727

16.4442

Malaysia

Malaysian ringgit

MYR

4.117

3.33

3.46

3.8

3.8

3.8

3.8

3.8

3.9244

2.8133

Maldives

Maldivian rufiyaa

MVR

15.512

12.954

12.942

11.77

11.77

11.77

11.77

11.77

11.77

11.77

Malta

Maltese lira

MTL

NA

NA

0.3106

0.4499

0.4542

0.3632

0.4376

0.3994

0.3885

0.3857

Mauritania

Mauritanian ouguiya

MRO

  

267.66

254.35

273.72

261.2

238.923

209.514

188.476

151.853

Mexico

Mexican peso

MXN

19.182

11.016

10.8

9.3423

9.1614

10.247

9.4556

9.5604

9.136

7.9185

Moldova

Moldovan leu

MDL

17.134

10.326

12.177

12.8579

Unk

14.1565

12.4342

10.5158

5.3707

4.6236

Mongolia

Mongolian tugrug

MNT

2650.51

1165.92

1170

1097.70

1101.29

1120.37

1076.67

1072.37

840.83

789.99

Morocco, Western Sahara

Moroccan dirham

MAD

9.535

7.526

8.3563

11.303

11.584

9.3135

10.626

9.804

9.604

9.527

Mozambique

Mozambique metical (old)

MZM

NA

NA

NA

20,703.60

23,314.20

23,180

15,447.10

13,028.60

12,110.20

11,772.60

Mozambique

Mozambique metical

MZN

61.72

24.125

26.264

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Myanmar

Myanma kyat

MMF

1531.78

1205

1296

6.7489

6.8581

Unk

6.5167

6.2858

6.3432

6.2418

Namibia

Namibian dollar, South African rand

NAD, ZAR

13.87

7.75

7.18

8.60918

11.58786

8.0154

6.93983

6.10948

5.52828

4.60796

Nepal

Nepalese rupee

NPR

113.14

 

118.14

74.961

76.675

74.83

71.094

68.239

65.976

58.01

Netherlands Antilles

Netherlands Antillean guilder

ANG

1.79

1.79

1.79

1.79

1.79

1.79

1.79

1.79

1.79

1.79

New Zealand, Niue, Cook Islands, Pitcairn Islands, Tokelau

New Zealand dollar

NZD

1.476

1.4151

1.3811

2.3776

2.3535

1.724

2.1863

1.8886

1.8632

1.5083

Nicaragua

Nicaraguan córdoba

NIO

32.533

19.374

18.457

13.37

13.88

14.9

12.69

11.81

10.58

9.45

Nigeria

Nigerian naira

NGN

360.9

117.8

127.46

133.56

115

136

101.697

92.338

21.886

21.886

North Macedonia

Macedonian denar

MKD

53.75

41.414

44.732

64.757

52.11

51.2467

65.904

56.902

54.462

50.004

Norway, Svalbard

Norwegian krone

NOK

8.5521

5.2338

5.8396

8.9917

8.9684

6.7156

8.8018

7.7992

7.5451

7.0734

Oman

Omani rial

OMR

0.3845

0.3845

0.3845

0.3845

0.3845

0.3849

0.3845

0.3845

0.3845

0.3845

Pakistan

Pakistani rupee

PKR

138.94

70.64

60.6295

61.927

60.719

57.8

53.648

49.118

44.943

40.918

Panama

U.S. Dollar, Panamanian balboa

USD, PAB

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinean kina

PGK

3.3653

2.6956

3.03

3.374

3.706

3.6036

2.765

2.539

2.058

1.434

Paraguay

Paraguayan guarani

PYG

6034.30

4337.70

5031

4107.70

4783.00

6265

3486.40

3119.10

2726.50

2177.90

Peru

Peruvian nuevo sol

PEN

3.3457

2.9322

3.1731

3.509

3.44

3.49185

3.49

3.3833

2.93

2.6642

Philippines

Philippine peso

PHP

52.454

44.439

46.148

50.993

51.201

53.255

44.192

39.089

40.893

29.471

Poland

Polish zloty

PLN

3.759

3.155

2.966

4.0939

4.0144

3.8045

4.3461

3.9671

3.4754

3.2793

Qatar

Qatari rial

QAR

3.64

3.64

3.64

3.64

3.64

3.64

3.64

3.64

3.64

3.64

Romania

Romanian leu

RON

4.122

2.5

2.43

3.26

2.91

2.81

3.32

3.3

2.91

2.16

Russia

Russian ruble

RUR/RUB

66.84

24.3

25.659

29.0053

28.2885

27.0474

30.709

30.1372

28.16

27

Rwanda

Rwandan franc

RWF

884.73

550

585

442.99

456.81

520.385

389.7

333.94

312.31

301.53

Samoa

Samoan tala

WST

2.6

 

NA

3.4722

3.5236

3.0021

3.2712

3.012

2.9429

2.5562

São Tomé and Príncipe

São Tomé and Príncipe dobra

STD

21,461

14,900

13,700

8842.10

9009.10

9019.7

7978.20

7119.00

6883.20

4552.50

Saudi Arabia

Saudi riyal

SAR

3.75

3.75

3.745

3.745

3.745

3.7503

3.745

3.745

3.745

3.745

Serbia and Montenegro

Serbian dinar

RSD

103.67

56.14

54.5

58.96

65

57.6065

57.68

63.53

10

5.85

Seychelles

Seychellois rupee

SCR

13.65

8

6.5

5.8575

5.7458

5.618

5.7138

5.3426

5.2622

5.0263

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leonean leone

SLL

8584.71

3007.90

2800.86

1985.89

2212.47

2275

2092.13

1804.20

1563.62

981.48

Singapore

Singapore dollar

SGD

1.356

1.415

1.507

1.6902

1.6644

1.5819

1.7422

1.7906

1.7917

1.4848?

Slovakia

Slovak koruna

SKK

26.39

21.05

NA

47.792

31.087

35.173

46.035

41.363

35.233

33.616

Slovenia

Slovenian tolar

SIT

NA

NA

NA

242.75

251.4

194.94

222.66

181.77

166.13

159.69

Solomon Islands

Solomon Islands dollar

SBD

8.1195

7.6336

7.6336

5.3728

7.629

7.3432

5.0889

4.8381

4.8156

3.7169

Somalia

Somali shilling

SOS

NA

1436

1423.73

Unk

Unk

2620

11,000

2620

Unk

7500

South Africa

South African rand

ZAR

13.87

7.9576

7.05

8.60918

11.58786

8.0154

6.93983

6.10948

5.52828

4.60796

Sri Lanka

Sri Lankan rupee

LKR

181.82

108.14

110.78

89.383

93.383

97.245

77.005

70.635

64.45

58.995

Sudan

Sudanese dinar

SDD

NA

NA

NA

258.7

261.44

257.41

257.12

252.55

200.8

157.57

Sudan

Sudanese pound

SDG

47.62

5.582

2.665

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Suriname

Surinamese dollar

SRD

7.458

3.271

3.225

2.1785

2.549

2.5024

2.1785

0.9875

0.401

0.401

Sweden

Swedish krona

SEK

8.9948

6.4074

6.7629

7.3489

7.4731

7.3783

8.0863

9.7371

10.3291

9.1622

Switzerland, Liechtenstein

Swiss franc

CHF

0.9906

1.0774

1.1973

1.6876

1.6668

1.3003

1.6888

1.5022

1.4498

1.4513

Syria

Syrian pound

SYP

515.03

46.5281

50.0085

51

52.98

41.79

46

52.29

46

41.9

Taiwan, Republic of China

New Taiwan dollar

TWD

30.83

31.47

32.84

34.49

34.6

34.699

33.08

31.4

32.22

32.05

Tajikistan

Tajik somoni

TJS

9.433

3.4563

3.4418

2.2

2.55

3.081

1550

998

Unk

350

Tanzania

Tanzanian shilling

TZS

2306.23

1178.10

1255

876.41

924.7

1038

800.41

744.76

664.67

612.12

Thailand

Thai baht

THB

31.81

33.37

33.599

43.432

43.982

41.695

40.112

37.814

41.359

31.364

Tonga

Tongan pa’anga

TOP

2.266

2.0747

2.0747

2.1236

2.192

2.151

1.7585

1.5991

1.492

1.2635

Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago dollar

TTD

6.7833

6.3228

6.3275

6.2332

6.2466

6.135

6.2998

6.2989

6.2983

6.2517

Tunisia

Tunisian dinar

TND

2.9607

1.211

1.2776

1.3753

1.44

1.26445

1.3707

1.1862

1.1387

1.1059

Turkey

Turkish lira (old)

TRL

NA

NA

NA

1,422,340

1,340,790

1,431,110

1,493,070

1,505,840

1,225,410

623,700

Turkey

New Turkish lira

TRY

5.375

2.1895

1.319

1.422

1.34

1.431

1.493

1.505

1.225

0.623

Turkmenistan

Turkmen manat

TMM

17,016

14,250

6250[45]

5200

5200

5200

5200

5350

Unk

4070

Uganda

Ugandan shilling

UGX

3703.09

1658.10

1685.80

1755.70

1738.70

2002.50

1644.50

1454.80

1240.20

1083.00

Ukraine

Ukrainian hryvnia

UAH

27.89

4.9523

5.05

5.3722

5.3126

5.3093

5.4402

4.1304

2.4495

1.8617

United Kingdom

Pound sterling

GBP

0.776

0.5302

0.4993

0.5462

0.55

0.5435

0.6125

0.6672

0.6947

0.6609

Falkland Islands

Falkland Islands pound

FKP

          

Guernsey

Guernsey Pound

GGP

          

Jersey

Jersey pound

JEP

          

Saint Helena

Saint Helena pound

SHP

          

Gibraltar

Gibraltar pound

GIP

          

Uruguay

Uruguayan peso

UYU

32.6059

20.438

23.947

13.3191

14.3325

20.025

12.0996

11.3393

10.4719

9.4418

Uzbekistan

Uzbek som

UZS

8357.39

1317

1263.80

325

687

966.24

141.4

111.9

110.95

75.8

Vanuatu

Vanuatuan vatu

VUV

113.79

100.87

104.956

145.31

146.02

121.41

137.64

129.08

127.52

115.87

Venezuela

Venezuelan bolívar fuerte

VEF

#######

2.147

2.147

0.723.666

0.761225

2.15

0.679.96

0.605.717

0.547556

0.488635

Vietnam

Vietnamese đồng

VND

23,201.10

21,189

16,119

15,746

15,746

15,983

15,510

15,280

14,725

14,167.70

Yemen

Yemeni rial

YER

250.36

199.76

199.14

168.678

171.86

178.01

161.718

155.718

135.882

129.281

Zambia

Zambian kwacha

ZMK

11,937.15

3512.90

3990.20

4778.90

4463.50

3601.50

4733.30

4398.60

1862.07

1314.50

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwean dollar

ZWN[49]

322.33

361.9

30,000

5.729

77.965

162.07

0.824

0.055

0.055

0.038

  1. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tables_of_historical_exchange_rates_to_the_United_States_dollar
  2. Notes (Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tables_of_historical_exchange_rates_to_the_United_States_dollar):
  3.  (1) Financial Guide FX Fundamentals Retrieved on July 6, 2007 (http://www.financial-guide.net/markets-foreign_exchange-fx_fundamentals-page2.html).
  4.  (2) From November 1967 until June 1972, £1 was worth $2.40, making $1 = £0.41666, ±1%. see Linda Arch, The Regulation of the London Clearing Banks, 1946–1971: Stability and Compliance, pp. 72–73 (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hQJ2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73&dq=%22Bretton+woods%22+%22par+value%22+sterling+1946&source=bl&ots=tI0cDPri7N&sig=ACfU3U3qL6P8G5wy-1UWdRLOXoybe9Dkig&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjRy5u_3croAhWFZMAKHehtDfAQ6AEwDHoECAwQKQ#v=onepage&q=%22Bretton%20woods%22%20%22par%20value%22%20sterling%201946&f=false).
  5.  (3) From September 1949 until November 1967, £1 was worth $2.80, making $1 worth £0.35714286, ±1%. see Linda Arch, The Regulation of the London Clearing Banks, 1946–1971: Stability and Compliance, pp. 72–73 (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hQJ2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73&dq=%22Bretton+woods%22+%22par+value%22+sterling+1946&source=bl&ots=tI0cDPri7N&sig=ACfU3U3qL6P8G5wy-1UWdRLOXoybe9Dkig&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjRy5u_3croAhWFZMAKHehtDfAQ6AEwDHoECAwQKQ#v=onepage&q=%22Bretton%20woods%22%20%22par%20value%22%20sterling%201946&f=false).
  6.  (4) Exchange rates for the U.S. dollar vs 41 other currencies.
  7.  (5) Foreign Exchange Rates: Demand Draft (1893–1926).
  8.  (6) Antweiler, Werner (2016). “Foreign Currency Units per 1 U.S. Dollar, 1948–2015” (PDF). Canada: University of British Columbia. Retrieved June 25, 2016.
  9.  (7) “Currency converter—fxtop.com”. fxtop.com. Retrieved January 4, 2020.
  10.  (8) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2076.html.
  11.  (9) On January 1, 2003, the Afghan afghani was rebased. 1 new afghani equals 1000 AFA. In this table the AFN is used throughout.
  12.  (10) In December 1999 the Angolan kwanza was rebased. 1 new kwanza equals 1 million old kwanza. In this table the new kwanza is used throughout.
  13.  (11) The East Caribbean dollar has been pegged at a fixed rate of 2.76 to the dollar since 1976.
  14.  (12) The Argentine peso was pegged at equal parity to the U.S. dollar from January 1992 to January 2002. Since then it has been allowed to float freely.
  15.  (13) The Aruban florin has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1986.
  16.  (14) On January 1, 2000 the Belarusian ruble was rebased. One new ruble is worth 2000 old rubles. The new ruble is used throughout in this table.
  17.  (15) The Communaute Financiere Africaine franc is pegged to the euro. Before 1999, it was pegged to the French Franc.
  18.  (16) The Bhutan ngultrum is at par with the Indian rupee which is also legal tender.
  19.  (17) From October 1994 through 14 January 1999, the official Brazilian rate was determined by a managed float; since 15 January 1999, the official rate floats independently with respect to the U.S. dollar.
  20.  (18) The Bruneian dollar is at par with the Singaporean dollar.
  21.  (19) The Bulgarian lev was rebased on July 5, 1999. 1000 old levs are worth 1 new lev. New levs are used throughout this table.
  22.  (20) Prior to January 1999, the official rate was pegged to the French franc at 75 Comorian francs per French franc; since 1 January 1999, the Comorian franc is pegged to the euro at a rate of 491.9677 Comorian francs per euro

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Nwogugu, M.I.C. (2021). Introduction. In: Geopolitical Risk, Sustainability and “Cross-Border Spillovers” in Emerging Markets, Volume II. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71419-2_1

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