Abstract
This book is the second of a two-volume series, and focuses on Cross-Border Spillovers in Labor, Financial (e.g. stocks, bonds, derivatives), Finished-Commodity-Products and Commodities (e.g. electricity, agricultural products, basic necessities) markets and the Preferences of market-participants (primarily Cross-Border Spillovers from developed countries to Emerging markets countries, and, to a lesser extent, across industries, in the same country).
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Notes
- 1.
See: Kovarsky, P. (2019). Fabozzi: Finance Must Modernize or Face Irrelevancy. https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2019/06/03/fabozzi-finance-must-modernize-or-face-irrelevancy/#__prclt=C4ADXq9m. This article stated in part: “………Frank J. Fabozzi, CFA: My criticism of academic economics is that the models built by economists basically treat market agents as robots. They make decisions according to defined rules, and the constructed models are labeled “rational models.” Since finance is a field within economics, the same criticism applies to the models built by financial economists. …….The “rational models” in finance have been attacked by the behavioral finance camp, which has demonstrated the disconnect between model behavior and real-world investor behavior. The concern with academic economics also comes from practitioners.……..The problem with relying on rational models and treating them as the foundation of finance is that new findings that are inconsistent with the bedrock theories are dismissed. This is the major point that Sergio M. Focardi and I made when we argued that economics in its current form does not describe empirical reality but an idealized rational economic world. It is revealing that in financial economics, deviations in empirical prices or returns from theoretical models are referred to as “anomalies.” A true empirical science would revise its models so that they fit empirical data. Financial economics, however, takes the opposite approach and considers deviations from an idealized economic rationality to be anomalies of the true empirical price processes………In the 1970s and 1980s, an academic couldn’t get published in a peer-reviewed finance journal if their research conflicted with prevailing theory, such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). For example, in the late 1970s, a prestigious financial journal sought papers written jointly by academics and practitioners. Thinking that the journal’s editorial board was sincere, I co-authored a paper with then-chairman of Merrill Lynch White Weld, Tom Chrystie. Our thesis was that securities can be structured/customized for investors using the asset side of the balance sheet. Basically, it provided the general blueprint for structured finance. The review we received in response was short and went something like—the ideas in the paper did not make any sense because they were inconsistent with CAPM!……... The over-reliance on calculus is symptomatic of the subject’s stagnation and a disservice to the students who aspire to work in asset management. Economists should combine sophisticated mathematical tools and empirical techniques while recognizing the limitations of a field where experiments are rarely possible…..Ultimately, calculus has not been effective in describing economic and financial phenomena…… Econometric models are utterly inappropriate to model the sheer complexity of economic systems……The paradox in economics is that researchers either use non-empirical tools—calculus and sophisticated math—or paleo-statistical tools that were designed before the advent of computers. ……. Other fields have embraced machine learning and other computational methods. But these methods are rejected in economic journals as “black boxes”…..…In the idealized pseudo-rational world of current economic theory, there is no real place for major crises. Financial economics, in particular, is based on the assumption that economic quantities might deviate from their theoretical value, but that market forces will quickly realign them with theoretical values. This assumption has proved to be inadequate…..…..”.
- 2.
See: Brunnermeier, Farhi, et al. (2021) which states in part: “…….In terms of asset pricing theory, an important avenue for future research is to develop models that explain which agency, behavioral, or regulatory frictions may give rise to sparse portfolios, low elasticities of demand, and volatile latent demand. ………Interestingly, the recent work on demand systems suggests that investors do not behave as our models suggest,……. Indeed, many of the salient policy and regulatory questions involve quantities: What is the impact of large-scale asset purchases by central banks? ……What is the impact of growing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) mandates on asset prices? What is the impact of changing the risk regulation of banks or insurance companies? The recent COVID-19 crisis has highlighted once more the importance of being able to answer these questions quantitatively.……….By combining models of the asset demand system with models of corporate decision making, we obtain an integrated model of asset pricing and corporate finance.……..Indeed, and despite decades of international financial integration, there are many more frictions in financial markets across countries than within countries. Third, currencies are more central to international finance than they are to finance….….. Fourth, the role of governments is more central to international finance than it is to finance……..Common long-standing problems include the identification of the economic determinants of beliefs Et, the economic determinants of risk premia or equivalently of stochastic discount factors Xt,t+1 and X*t,t+1, the economic determinants of portfolios. They also include what I will call the “disconnect” problem: the fact that it seems difficult to connect the stochastic discount factor Xt,t+1 to an actual preference-based marginal rate of substitution MRSt,t+1 of a well-identified marginal investor ……… Other common long-standing problems include the identification of the key market failures and externalities ……..as well as the role and transmission of policy (monetary, fiscal, prudential, etc.).……..International finance also faces specific challenges with no counterparts in finance. First, there is the Mussa puzzle,…… Second, there is covered-interest-parity (CIP) arbitrage violation, ………Third, there is the large degree of home bias in portfolios across countries. Fourth, there are the destabilizing effects of volatile capital flows in emerging markets. Fifth, there are the economic determinants of government behavior in these countries. Sixth, there are the economic determinants and implications of exchange rate regimes …… Seventh and finally, there are the importance of the international monetary system and the special role of the United States……… as the world banker and the exorbitant privilege that comes with it, and the resulting pattern of global imbalances.…......”.
- 3.
See: Go (2003). Law and Versteeg (2012) noted that the US Constitution is similar to those of many countries including the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United kingdom; Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei, Cyprus, Dominica, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, American Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- 4.
See: “Covid Crisis Shows Once Again Why US Dollar Is World’s Dominant Currency – A Lack of Global Alternatives Helps Explain Some of The Dollar’s Role. The Euro’s Status As A Reserve Currency Remains Limited & China’s Currency Is Still Subject To Capital Controls”. By Enda Curran and Finbarr Flynn; 23 October, 2020. https://theprint.in/economy/covid-crisis-shows-once-again-why-us-dollar-is-worlds-dominant-currency/529331/”.
See: Gifford, C. (September 8, 2020). “The dominance of the US dollar is called into question”. World Finance. https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/the-dominance-of-the-us-dollar-is-called-into-question.
See: Amadeo, K. (July 2020), “Why the US Dollar Is the Global Currency”. The Bottom Line. July 23, 2020. https://www.thebalance.com/world-currency-3305931.
See: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “Is the International Role of the Dollar Changing?” Page 6. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci16-1.pdf.
- 5.
See: XE. “ISO 4217 Currency Codes”. http://www.xe.com/iso4217.php.
- 6.
See: International Money Fund. “Table 1: World Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves.” https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=41175.
- 7.
See: International Monetary Fund (2019). “Global Financial Stability Report”. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2019/10/01/global-financial-stability-report-october-2019.
- 8.
See: Bank for International Settlements, “The Geography of Dollar Funding of Non-US Banks”. https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1812b.htm.
- 9.
See: Goldberg, L. (2010). Is the International Role of the Dollar Changing? Federal Reserve Bank of New York – Current Issues in Economics & Finance. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci16-1.pdf.
- 10.
See: U.S. Currency Education Program. “U.S. Currency in Circulation.” https://www.uscurrency.gov/life-cycle/data/circulation.
- 11.
See: World Integrated Trade Solutions. “Japan Exports By Country 2020”.
See: World Integrated Trade Solutions. “US Exports By Country 2020”. https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/USA.
- 12.
See: World Integrated Trade Solutions. “China Exports By Country 2020.” https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/CHN.
See: World Integrated Trade Solutions. “US Exports By Country 2020”. https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/USA.
- 13.
Baccini (2019) stated in part: “………According to the Desta dataset (Dür et al. 2014), there were a little more than one hundred PTAs in the 1990s, whereas there are more than seven hundred PTAs in force to date. Both developed and developing countries are heavily involved in preferential liberalization, and the number of North–South PTAs (i.e., PTAs between developed and developing countries) has boomed since the formation of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In summary, much of the trade liberalization that we have seen in the past twenty years is preferential rather than unilateral or multilateral. While impressive, the growing number of PTAs is not the most defining transformation in the global governance of trade. Rather, the most important change is that modern PTAs not only reduce tariffs but also regulate investment, intellectual property rights, competition policy, government procurement, and many other matters. In other words, PTAs remove barriers not only at the border but also behind the border, producing what has been referred to as deep integration between countries (Lawrence 1996). An illustration of this change is the contrast between the PTA that the European Union signed with Egypt in 1972, which is 92 pages long, and the 2016 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union, which is 1598 pages long. Since many of the provisions and regulations included in PTAs go beyond World Trade Organization commitments (Horn et al. 2010), it is fair to say that preferential liberalization shapes the global governance of trade in the twenty-first century…”.
- 14.
See: “Emefiele: Nigeria Spends 40% of FX on Importation of Petrol, Others”. This Day (Nigerian newspaper) October 15, 2021. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/10/15/emefiele-nigeria-spends-40-of-fx-on-importation-of-petrol-others/.
- 15.
See: “What the Chinese Bank Crackdown Means for Crypto Investors”. By Emma Newbery. May 20, 2021. https://www.fool.com/the-ascent/buying-stocks/articles/what-the-chinese-bank-crackdown-means-for-crypto-investors/?source=eptyholnk0000202&utm_source=yahoo-host&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=article.
See: “China vows to crack down on bitcoin mining, trading activities”. May 21, 2021. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-says-crack-down-bitcoin-145443522.html.
See: Chaudhary, A. & Singh, S. (Sept. 17, 2020). “India Plans To Introduce Law To Ban Cryptocurrency Trading”. Economic Times Of India. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/government-plans-to-introduce-law-to-ban-cryptocurrency-trading/articleshow/78132596.cms.
See: India To Propose Cryptocurrency Ban, Penalising Miners, Traders—Source. By Aftab Ahmed and Nupur Anand. March 15, 2021.
See: Putin Says Russia Must Stop Illegal Cross-Border Crypto Transfers. By Anna Baydakova. Wed, March 17, 2021. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/putin-says-russia-must-stop-170337080.html.
See: “Over 13% of all Proceeds of Crime in Bitcoin are Now Laundered Through Privacy Wallets”. 09 December, 2020. https://www.elliptic.co/blog/13-bitcoin-crime-laundered-through-privacy-wallet.
See: “Ex-Microsoft Engineer Gets Prison Sentence For Bitcoin Tax Fraud”. By Shehan Chandrasekera. Nov 9, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/shehanchandrasekera/2020/11/09/ex-microsoft-engineer-gets-prison-sentenced-for-bitcoin-tax-fraud/?sh=656419c062cd.
See: “Top cryptocurrency scams of 2019—and how most hackers got away with it”. By Sophia Ankel and Prabhjote Gill. Business Insider India. Dec 27, 2019. https://www.businessinsider.com/the-biggest-cryptocurrency-scams-and-arrests-of-2019-so-far-2019-8?IR=T.
See: “Romance fraud, cryptocurrency risks and money laundering in Asia Pacific”. July/August 2019. https://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4295006266.
See: “Chinese cryptocurrency scam ringleaders jailed in US$2.25 billion Ponzi scheme involving PlusToken platform”. By Sidney Leng. December 1, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3112115/chinese-cryptocurrency-scam-ringleaders-jailed-us225-billion.
See: “How Terrorists Use Cryptocurrency in Southeast Asia—The first transactions involving cryptocurrencies have been made recently by Islamic State-linked terrorist networks in the Philippines”. By V. Arianti and Kenneth Yeo Yaoren. June 30, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/how-terrorists-use-cryptocurrency-in-southeast-asia/.
See: “Two Chinese Nationals Charged with Laundering Over $100 Million in Cryptocurrency from Exchange Hack—Forfeiture Complaint Details Over $250 Million Stolen by North Korean Actors”. US Dept. Of Justice. March 2, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-nationals-charged-laundering-over-100-million-cryptocurrency-exchange-hack.
See: “Lawsuits Filed Against Binance, Bitmex and Other Crypto Companies”. April 07, 2020. By M.D. Rockybul Hasan. https://atozmarkets.com/news/lawsuits-filed-against-binance-bitmex-other-crypto-companies/. (“US law firm, Roche Cyrulnik Freedman and Selendy & Gay PLLC, recently filed eleven class-action lawsuits. The firm has targeted many members of the crypto industry. The company, which represents crypto investors, has targeted a total of 42 defendants. Lawsuits filed against some of the biggest crypto exchanges, including Binance and BitMEX, as well as their founders and other officials…. Targeted companies operate in many countries around the world. This includes the United States itself, as well as Canada, China, Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Israel and many others. The lawsuits also alleged that the defendants violated federal securities laws and misled investors by inducing them to buy unregistered assets…. Defendants include crypto issuers and exchanges, including KuCoin, BitMEX, Bprotocol, Status, Block.one, Civic and Binance. The class action names executives such as Block.one CTO Dan Larimer and Binance CEO Changpeng Zhao”).
See: “GemCoin Founder Sentenced to ten Years for $147M Crypto Scheme”. Danny Nelson. January 12, 2021. https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/gemcoin-founder-sentenced-10-years-231228865.html.
See: “Bitcoin exchange owner who helped scam eBay buyers sentenced to ten years in prison”. By Mariella Moon. January 13, 2021. https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/bitcoin-exchange-owner-ebay-car-scam-sentenced-093009069.html.
See: “Owner of Crypto Exchange RG Coins Gets 10 Years in Prison for Laundering $5Million”. By Sebastian Sinclair. January 13, 2021. https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/bitcoin-exchange-owner-ebay-car-scam-sentenced-093009069.html.
See: “Centra Tech Co-Founder Handed Prison Term for $25 Million Crypto Fraud”. By Tanzeel Akhtar. Dec 16, 2020. https://www.coindesk.com/centra-tech-co-founder-handed-prison-term-for-25m-crypto-fraud.
See: “Criminals hide ‘billions’ in crypto-cash—Europol”. By Shiroma Silva. February 12, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43025787.
See: “Terrorist Use of Cryptocurrencies: Technical and Organizational Barriers and Future Threats”. By Cynthia Dion-Schwarz, David Manheim and Patrick B. Johnston. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3026.html.
See: “Cryptoqueen: How This Woman Scammed The World, Then Vanished”. 24 November 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-50435014.
See: “Illegal Online Gambling Proliferates In China’s Digital Economy”. By Kapronasia. December 1, 2020. https://www.kapronasia.com/china-payments-research-category/illegal-online-gambling-proliferates-in-china-s-digital-economy.html. This article stated in part, “One key takeaway from the crackdown is that China’s digital economy lacks sufficiently robust anti-fraud and anti-money laundering controls. Despite the widely touted technological capabilities of firms like Alipay and WeChat Pay, criminals appear to have moved massive amounts of illicit funds through the e-wallets with relative ease. Many of the suspicious transactions were somehow overlooked”.
See: “EU will make Bitcoin traceable and ban anonymous crypto wallets in anti-money laundering drive”. By Tom Bateman with Reuters. Updated: 26/08/2021. https://www.euronews.com/next/2021/07/21/eu-will-make-bitcoin-traceable-and-ban-anonymous-crypto-wallets-in-anti-money-laundering-d.
See: “Cryptocurrency: rise of decentralised finance sparks ‘dirty money’ fears—‘Know your customer’ rules for banks and brokers underpin anti-money laundering efforts but are at risk due to DeFi”. Financial Times. By Gary Silverman, September 14, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/beeb2f8c-99ec-494b-aa76-a7be0bf9dae6.
See: “Crypto crimes surge in Asia; Bitcoin cause for divorce in South Korea”. The Daily Forkast. May 28, 2021. https://forkast.news/video-audio/crypto-crimes-surge-in-asia-bitcoins-reason-for-divorce-in-s-korea-the-daily-forkast/. This article stated in part, “As crypto grows in size and magnitude, we look deeper into scams right now that are landing some more victims. Police in South Korea have arrested 14 individuals in a cryptocurrency fraud case estimated to have cost 69,000 investors, a total of US$3.85 billion. That brings the country’s losses due to crypto fraud to—get this—US$5 billion over the past five years. This accounts for an increase from 41 cases in 2017 to 333 last year. And that is a huge jump. This trend is not unique to Korea. In Singapore, police recorded 393 cases of crypto crimes last year. That’s 60 more than South Korea”.
See: “China says all cryptocurrency-related transactions are illegal and must be banned”. By Manish Singh, September 24, 2021. https://techcrunch.com/2021/09/24/china-says-all-cryptocurrency-related-transactions-are-illegal/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAICiG6PkR%2D%2D_7KkrIf_HX7v5jHUeN0RxVcNkvGn4t1a62QuOxeIDVJsQoM6EIPcRPBeKj_Payi_dv9K-spISOiacV6Kd4UJjxKJaK5ZRd3LcfnsAghV-mldbEza0xkpSxhtsSDhQnrcuWkqGufy4A5ASWrSArjGVKQ2DyViyYwQ8.
See: “China arrests 1,100 over cryptocurrency money laundering…China’s bitcoin mines power nearly eighty percent of the global trade in cryptocurrencies”. June 10, 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-arrests-1100-over-cryptocurrency-money-laundering.
- 16.
See: “China-Bangladesh Bilateral Currency Cooperation Enjoys Broad Prospects”. By Agencies. December 28, 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202012/1211181.shtml. This article stated in part: “…In 2019, the cross-border RMB settlement between China and the neighboring countries registered RMB 3.6 trillion yuan, among which the trade in goods amounted to RMB 994.5 billion yuan, and the direct investment amounted to RMB 351.2 billion yuan. Furthermore, the total cross-border RMB payments and receipts between China and the countries along the B&R (Belt-And-road) reached over RMB 2.73 trillion yuan, among which the trade in goods amounted to RMB 732.5 billion yuan, and the direct investment to RMB 252.4 billion yuan…. Since 2008, China has signed the bilateral local currency settlement agreements with nine neighboring countries and the countries along the B&R such as Vietnam, Laos, Russia and Kazakhstan, and has signed the bilateral local currency swap agreements with the central banks or monetary authorities of twenty-three neighboring countries and the countries along the B&R such as Russia, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates (the UAE), Egypt and Turkey. By the end of 2019, China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), had signed bilateral currency swap agreements with the central banks or monetary authorities of thirty-nine countries and regions, covering major developed and emerging economies in the world, as well as the major offshore RMB markets, totaling more than RMB 3.7 trillion yuan. In 2019, the PBC renewed the bilateral local currency swap agreements with the Centrale Bank van Suriname, Singapore Monetary Authority, Turkey Central Bank, European Central Bank and Hungary Central Bank, totaling RMB 683 billion yuan. In October, the Republic of Korea and China signed a deal to extend the bilateral currency swap agreement and expand the size to USD 59 billion. Though a late comer in the global reserve currency family, the RMB proved to be remarkably stable and resilient amid adverse and uncertain economic conditions in recent years, including during the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2008. Especially during the year of 2019 and 2020, despite headwinds from the ongoing trade tensions and unprecedented disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, businesses globally are still increasing their use of RMB in international transactions…”.
- 17.
Kim and Milner (2019) noted that “………Multinational corporations (MNCs) play significant roles in shaping the global economy. For example, MNCs in the U.S., which has the world’s largest economy, make disproportionate contributions to the national economy: they represent a very small number of total American firms (less than 1%), but a large fraction of GDP, exports, imports, research and development, and private-sector employee compensation; Specifically, U.S. MNC parent companies in 2016 constituted more than 24% of private sector GDP (value-added) and 26% of private-sector employee compensation (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2018a); U.S. MNCs are engaged in more than half of all U.S. exports and more than 40% of U.S. imports (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2018). Likewise, MNCs throughout the world dominate the global economy as well as their national economies. The OECD (2018) estimates that MNCs account for half of global exports, nearly a third of world GDP (28%), and about fourth of global employment. These firms all generate a significant share of their revenue from abroad as well. Importantly, their transnational activities have transformed the nature of international trade, investments, and technology transfers in the era of globalization. The extensive global value chains (GVCs) prevalent in today’s world economy have been driven by how MNCs structure their global operations through outsourcing and offshoring activities. In fact, their decisions have enormous implications for a wide range of policy issues—such as taxation, investment protection, immigration—across many countries with different political and economic institutions. MNCs also may have strong political influence domestically. Indeed, their global economic dominance may go hand-in-hand with their powerful domestic political position……….”.
- 18.
The abstract in Autor et al. (2017) states as follows: “………The fall of labor’s share of GDP in the United States and many other countries in recent decades is well documented but its causes remain uncertain. Existing empirical assessments of trends in labor’s share typically have relied on industry or macro data, obscuring heterogeneity among firms. In this paper, we analyze micro panel data from the U.S. Economic Census since 1982 and international sources and document empirical patterns to assess a new interpretation of the fall in the labor share based on the rise of “superstar firms.” If globalization or technological changes advantage the most productive firms in each industry, product market concentration will rise as industries become increasingly dominated by superstar firms with high profits and a low share of labor in firm value-added and sales. As the importance of superstar firms increases, the aggregate labor share will tend to fall. Our hypothesis offers several testable predictions: industry sales will increasingly concentrate in a small number of firms; industries where concentration rises most will have the largest declines in the labor share; the fall in the labor share will be driven largely by between-firm reallocation rather than (primarily) a fall in the unweighted mean labor share within firms; the between-firm reallocation component of the fall in the labor share will be greatest in the sectors with the largest increases in market concentration; and finally, such patterns will be observed not only in U.S. firms, but also internationally. We find support for all of these predictions……”. The decline in labor’s share of GDP in many developed countries during 2000–2018 is significant evidence of Globalization, Cross-Border Spillovers and global Market-Integration (of international labor markets).
- 19.
See: European Union (2021). Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/green-taxation-0/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en.
- 20.
See: Shearman & Sterling, Dodd-Frank, UK, EU & Other Regulatory Reforms (2013) at http://www.shearman.com/dodd-frank/ [Accessed July 1, 2013].
- 21.
See: Regulation 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L201/1.
- 22.
See: FSA (UK) (2012), Review of The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II. Available at: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/international/mifid.
See: DIRECTIVE 2008/10/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 March 2008. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:076:0033:0036:EN:PDF.
- 23.
Directive 2006/48 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions [2006] OJ L177/1.
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
See: “Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission – Final Report-Conclusions-January 2011”. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
See: Casey, K. (February 6, 2009). “In Search of Transparency, Accountability, and Competition: The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies”. Remarks at “The SEC Speaks in 2009”. US SEC. http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609klc.htm.
See: “Ratings agencies suffer ‘conflict of interest’, says former Moody’s boss”. Rupert Neate. The Guardian; 22 August 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/22/ratings-agencies-conflict-of-interest.
See: Kerwer (2004), Gaillard (2014), Frost (2007), Bartels and Weder di Mauro (2013), Blodget (2011), European Commission (2016), and Gärtner et al. (2011).
- 28.
See: “SEC Sues Morningstar’s Former Credit Ratings Agency”. By Bernice Napach. February 17, 2021. https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2021/02/17/sec-sues-morningstars-former-credit-ratings-agency/.
See: US SEC vs. Morningstar Credit Ratings LLC (US District Court for the Southern District Of New York, USA; Case #: 21-CV-1359). https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2021/comp-pr2021-29.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.
See: Jindal Power Limited vs. ICRA Limited (Delhi High Court, India) (court stated the permitted basis for issuers to file lawsuits against CRAs; court stated that CRA regulations cannot be contracted away by CRAs and their clients). https://indiankanoon.org/doc/54995907/.
See: SERI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. vs. Fitch Rating India Pvt. Ltd. (Calcutta High Court; India). http://164.100.79.153/judis/kolkata/index.php/casestatus/viewpdf/APOT_380_2012_17092012_J_21_220.pdf.
See: First Leasing Company of India vs. ICRA (Madras High Court, India). https://www.lawyerservices.in/First-Leasing-Company-of-India-Limited-Versus-ICRA-Limited-2000-06-23.
See: Credit Rating Agencies Dodge Investors’ Lawsuits. September 12th, 2016. By: Brad Fleming. http://ipjournal.law.wfu.edu/2016/09/credit-rating-agencies-dodge-investors-lawsuits/.
See: “Litigation against Credit Rating Agencies: Delhi High Court Delineates the Scope”. September 8, 2020. https://indiacorplaw.in/2020/09/litigation-against-credit-rating-agencies-delhi-high-court-delineates-the-scope.html.
See: “Credit-rating agencies are back under the spotlight - This time is different from the financial crisis—sort of”. The Economist. May 9, 2020. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/05/07/credit-rating-agencies-are-back-under-the-spotlight.
See: It Is High Time to Implement a Major Reform of Credit-Rating Agencies. International Banker. By Yuefen Li. June 16, 2021. https://internationalbanker.com/finance/it-is-high-time-to-implement-a-major-reform-of-credit-rating-agencies/.
See: “First German decision holding credit rating agency liable to …….”. Allen and Overy. 2021. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwj21omW7NvxAhUGV8AKHXH1Aqk4ChAWegQIBRAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.allenovery.com%2Fen-gb%2Fglobal%2Fnews-and-insights%2Fpublications%2Ffirst-german-decision-holding-credit-rating-agency-liable-to-investors&usg=AOvVaw2KgmdfHKgeT9ljIYWJGBKV.
See: Why China Is Shaking Up Its Credit Ratings Industry: QuickTake. Bloomberg. July 23, 2020. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjapomH7dvxAhWhnVwKHfE8BGo4FBAWegQIDRAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bloomberg.com%2Fnews%2Farticles%2F2020-07-23%2Fwhy-china-sought-help-with-credit-ratings-for-bonds-quicktake&usg=AOvVaw0qjmxyRB-D2yAe_6DMfYDT.
See: Rating agencies braced for Calpers lawsuit - Risk.net. 2021. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjapomH7dvxAhWhnVwKHfE8BGo4FBAWegQIDxAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.risk.net%2Frisk-management%2Fcredit-risk%2F1560780%2Frating-agencies-braced-calpers-lawsuit&usg=AOvVaw0XcaYVzgFSEJZwcSU4pj4V.
See: Nwogugu (2021a).
See: “Liquidators of failed Bear Stearns funds sue rating agencies”. July 10, 2013. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/10/us-ratings-agency-lawsuit-idUSBRE9690QV20130710.
See: “Bond Insurer Sues Credit-Rating Agencies”. July 17, 2013. www.wsj.com. https://www.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323993804578612212273026342.html.
See: Wayne, L. (15 July 2009). “Calpers Sues Over Ratings of Securities”. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/business/15calpers.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss.
See: “S&P Lawsuit First Amendment Defense May Fare Poorly, Experts Say”. 4 February 2013. Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/sp-lawsuit-first-amendment_n_2618737.html.
See: “Credit Rating Agencies Settle 2 Suits Brought by Investors”. Reuters. April 27, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/business/credit-rating-agencies-settle-lawsuits-over-debt-vehicles.html?_r=0.
See: Reuters (September 3, 2013). “S.&P. Calls Federal Fraud Suit Payback for Credit Downgrade”. New York Times.
See: “Corrupted credit ratings: Standard & Poor’s lawsuit and the evidence”. Matthias Efing & Harald Hau; 18 June 2013. http://www.voxeu.org/article/corrupted-credit-ratings-standard-poor-s-lawsuit-and-evidence.
See: Standard & Poor’s Says Civil Lawsuit Threatened By DOJ Is Without Legal Merit And Unjustified”. https://Reuters.com. 2013/02/04. https://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/04/ny-sp-doj-lawsuit-idUSnPnNY53856+160+PRN20130204.
See: “Analysis: Credit agencies remain unaccountable”. Kathleen Day. USA Today. May 19, 2014. https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/05/19/credit-rating-agencies-in-limbo/9290143/.
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Appendix 1 Worldwide US Dollar Exchange Rates (1999–2019; the Value of One US Dollar in Foreign Currencies)
Appendix 1 Worldwide US Dollar Exchange Rates (1999–2019; the Value of One US Dollar in Foreign Currencies)
Country | Currency | Code | 2019[7] | 2014[8] | 2009 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 1989 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
United Arab Emirates | Emirati dirham | AED | 3.6725 | 3.673 | 3.673 | 3.6725 | 3.6725 | 3.6725 | 3.6725 | 3.6725 | 3.6725 | 3.6725 |
Afghanistan | Afghan afghani | AFN[9] | 75.14 | 50.42 | 50.05 | 42.785 | 43.13 | 42.785 | 4.7 | 4.75 | 4.75 | 4.836 |
Albania | Albanian lek | ALL | 108.931 | 79.546 | 92.668 | 140.16 | 102.93 | 115.918 | 143.71 | 137.69 | 150.63 | 148.92 |
Algeria | Algerian dinar | DZD | 118.4 | 63.25 | 69.9 | 77.215 | 77.889 | 78.67 | 75.26 | 66.574 | 58.739 | 57.707 |
Angola[10] | Angolan kwanza | AOA | 310.16 | 75.023 | 76.6 | 22.058 | 32.8716 | 73.8297 | 10.041 | 2.791 | 0.393 | 0.229 |
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines[11] | East Caribbean dollar | XCD | 2.7 | 2.69 | 2.7 | 2.76 | 2.76 | 2.76 | 2.76 | 2.76 | 2.76 | 2.76 |
Argentina[12] | Argentine peso | ARS | 59.9 | 8 | 3.1105 | 2.951 | 2.926 | 3.08 | 2.945 | 3.24 | 0.9994 | 0.9996 |
Armenia | Armenian dram | AMD | 485.73 | 303.93 | 344.06 | 522.08 | 459.79 | 395.89 | 570.95 | 535.06 | 504.92 | 490.85 |
Aruba[13] | Aruban florin | AWG | 1.79 | 1.8 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.8 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 | |
Australia, Kiribati, Nauru, Norfolk Island, Tuvalu, Christmas Island, Cocos Island | Australian dollar | AUD | 1.3994 | 1.2059 | 1.2137 | 1.932 | 1.9354 | 1.5361 | 1.7173 | 1.5497 | 1.5888 | 1.3439 |
Azerbaijan | Azerbaijani manat (old) | AZM | NA | NA | NA | 4657 | 4804 | 4875.50 | 4474 | 4120 | 3869 | 3985 |
Azerbaijan | Azerbaijani manat | AZN | 1.705 | 0.8219 | 0.8581 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
The Bahamas | Bahamian dollar | BSD | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Bahrain | Bahraini dinar | BHD | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376 | 0.376 |
Bangladesh | Bangladeshi taka | BDT | 83.891 | 68.554 | 69.893 | 55.807 | 57.756 | 58.15 | 52.142 | 49.085 | 46.906 | 43.892 |
Barbados | Barbadian dollar | BBD | 2 | 2.02 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
Belarus[14] | Belarusian ruble | BYB/BYR | NA | 2130 | 2145 | 1531 | Unk | 2032.79 | 876.75 | 248.8 | 46.127 | 26.02 |
Belarus | Belarusian third ruble | BYN | 2.06 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Belize | Belizean dollar | BZD | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo[15] | CFA franc | XOF/XAF | 574.59 | 438.77 | 493.51 | 733.04 | 742.79 | 560 | 711.98 | 615.7 | 589.95 | 583.67 |
Bermuda | Bermudian dollar | BMD | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Bhutan[16] | Bhutanese ngultrum/Indian rupee | BTN/INR | 70.754 | 41.487 | 47.186 | 48.336 | 46.98 | 44.942 | 43.055 | 41.259 | 36.313 | |
Bolivia | Bolivian boliviano | BOB | 6.912 | 7.253 | 7.8616 | 6.6069 | 6.8613 | 7.5719 | 6.1835 | 5.8124 | 5.5101 | 5.2543 |
Bosnia and Herzegovina | Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible mark | BAM | 1.7132 | 1.3083 | 1.4419 | 2.161 | 1.6237 | 1.5579 | 2.124 | 1.837 | 1.76 | 1.734 |
Botswana | Botswana pula | BWP | 10.5219 | 6.7907 | 6.2035 | 5.8412 | 6.8353 | 5.15464 | 5.1018 | 4.6244 | 4.2259 | 3.6508 |
Brazil[17] | Brazilian real | BRL | 3.7404 | 1.8644 | 1.9516 | 2.358 | 2.378 | 2.9675 | 1.83 | 1.815 | 1.161 | 1.078 |
Brunei[18] | Bruneian dollar | BND | 1.3562 | 1.4322 | 1.526 | 1.8917 | 1.8388 | 1.7346 | 1.724 | 1.695 | 1.6736 | 1.4848 |
Bulgaria[19] | Bulgarian lev | BGN | 1.7132 | 1.3171 | 1.4366 | 2.1847 | 2.2147 | 1.654 | 2.1233 | 1.8364 | 1.7604 | 1.6819 |
Burundi | Burundi franc | BIF | 1814.64 | 1198 | 1065 | 830.35 | 865.14 | 1052.8 | 720.67 | 563.56 | 477.77 | 352.35 |
Cambodia | Cambodian riel | KHR | 4016.45 | 4070.94 | 4006 | 3918.50 | 3895.00 | 3950.00 | 3840.80 | 3807.80 | 3744.40 | 2946.30 |
Canada | Canadian dollar | CAD | 1.3311 | 1.0364 | 1.0724 | 1.4963 | 1.5979 | 1.3866 | 1.452 | 1.5263 | 1.425 | 1.3737 |
Cape Verde | Cape Verdean escudo | CVE | 96.58 | 73.84 | 81.235 | 104.617 | 123.556 | 108.95 | 115.877 | 102.7 | 98.158 | 93.177 |
Cayman Islands | Caymanian dollar | KYD | 0.8333 | 0.8333 | 0.8333 | 0.82 | 0.8333 | 0.83 | 0.8189 | 0.81528 | 0.802 | 0.802 |
Chile | Chilean peso | CLP | 675.38 | 509.02 | 526.25 | 618.7 | 651.9 | 545.5 | 535.47 | 508.78 | 460.29 | 419.3 |
China, People’s Republic of | Renminbi | CNY | 6.7888 | 6.9385 | 7.61 | 8.2771 | 8.2767 | 8.2768 | 8.2785 | 8.2783 | 8.279 | 8.2898 |
Colombia | Colombian peso | COP | 3161.45 | 2302.90 | 2013.80 | 2299.63 | 2275.89 | 2856.80 | 2087.90 | 1756.23 | 1426.04 | 1140.96 |
Comoros[20] | Comorian franc | KOF | 430.94 | 337.26 | 361.4 | 549.78 | 557.09 | 393.83 | 533.98 | 461.77 | 442.46 | 437.75 |
Congo, Democratic Republic of the[21] | Congolese franc | CDF | 1628.74 | 459.175 | 437 | 305 | 420 | 437.962 | 21.82 | 4.02 | 1.61 | 1.31 |
Costa Rica | Costa Rican colon | CRC | 603.78 | 529.62 | 519.53 | 328.87 | 343.08 | 395.29 | 308.19 | 285.68 | 257.23 | 232.6 |
Croatia | Croatian kuna | HRK | 6.507 | 4.877 | 5.3735 | 8.34 | 8.452 | 6.4196 | 8.277 | 7.112 | 6.362 | 6.101 |
Cuba[22] | Cuban peso | CUP | 1 | 0.9259 | 0.9259 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Cyprus (Greek Cypriot area) | Cypriot pound | CYP | 0.5127 | NA | 0.4286 | 0.6427 | 0.6518 | 0.49996 | 0.6208 | 0.5423 | 0.517 | 0.5135 |
Cyprus (Turkish Cypriot area) | Turkish lira | TRY | See Turkey | 1.42234 | 1.34079 | 1.43111 | 1.49307 | 1.50548 | 1.22541 | 0.6237 | ||
Czech Republic | Czech koruna | CZK | 22.468 | 17.037 | 20.53 | 38.035 | 36.325 | 26.645 | 38.598 | 34.569 | 32.281 | 31.698 |
Denmark, Faroe Islands, Greenland | Danish krone | DKK | 6.5396 | 5.0236 | 5.4797 | 5.9911 | 5.9969 | 5.9468 | 6.5877 | 7.8947 | 8.3228 | 8.0831 |
Djibouti | Djiboutian franc | DJF | 177.72 | 179.14 | 177.71 | 177.721 | 177.721 | 177.721 | 177.721 | 177.721 | 177.721 | 177.721 |
Dominican Republic | Dominican peso | DOP | 50.501 | 34.775 | 33.113 | 16.952 | 17.31 | 27.1 | 16.415 | 16.033 | 15.267 | 14.265 |
East Timor | U.S. dollar | USD | 1 | 1 | 1 | Irr | 1 | 1 | Irr | Irr | Irr | Irr |
Ecuador | U.S. dollar, Ecuadorian sucre | USD/ECS | NA | NA | NA | 25,000.00 | 25,000.00 | 25,000 | 24,988 | 11,787 | 5447 | 3988 |
Egypt | Egyptian pound | EGP | 17.87 | 5.4 | 5.67 | 4.49 | 4.5 | 5.975 | 3.69 | 3.405 | 3.388 | 3.388 |
El Salvador | Salvadoran colon, U.S. dollar | SVC, USD | NA | NA | NA | 8.755 | 8.75 | 8.75 | 8.755 | 8.755 | 8.755 | 8.755 |
Eritrea | Eritrean nakfa | ERN | 15 | 15.38 | 15.5 | Unk | 15 | 9.65 | 9.5 | 7.6 | 7.2 | Unk |
Estonia | Estonian kroon | EEK | 13.706 | 10.537 | 11.535 | 17.538 | 17.518 | 13.2625 | 16.969 | 14.678 | 14.075 | 13.882 |
Ethiopia | Ethiopian birr | ETB | 28.39 | 9.57 | 8.96 | 8.314 | 8.455 | 8.4 | 8.314 | 8.134 | 7.503 | 6.864 |
Eurozone Countries | Euro | EUR | 0.8934 | 0.6734 | 0.7345 | 0.8039 | 0.8038 | 0.7964 | 0.884 | 1.0575 | 1.1166 | 1.0827 |
Fiji | Fijian dollar | FJD | 2.125 | 1.5986 | 1.6138 | 2.2766 | 2.2934 | 1.8653 | 2.1286 | 1.9696 | 1.9868 | 1.4437 |
French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna | Change Franc Pacifique | XPF | 104.53 | 83.12 | 87.59 | 133.26 | 135.04 | 116.49 | 129.44 | 107.25 | 106.11 | 126.39 |
The Gambia | Gambian dalasi | GMD | 49.51 | 22.75 | 27.79 | 15 | 29.24 | 25 | 12.788 | 11.395 | 10.643 | 10.2 |
Georgia | Georgian lari | GEL | 2.65 | 1.47 | 1.7 | 2.073 | 2.1888 | 2.1352 | 1.9762 | 2.0245 | 1.3898 | 1.2975 |
Ghana | Ghanaian cedi (old) | GHC | NA | NA | NA | 7170.76 | 7195 | 8675 | 5455.06 | 2669.30 | 2050.17 | 5526.60 |
Ghana | Ghanaian cedi | GHS | 4.91342 | 3.02469 | 1.54586 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | |
Guatemala | Guatemalan quetzal | GTQ | 7.729 | 7.5895 | 7.6833 | 7.8586 | 8.0165 | 7.925 | 7.7632 | 7.3856 | 6.3947 | 6.0653 |
Guinea | Guinean franc | GNF | 9185.32 | 5500 | 4122.80 | 1950.60 | 1974.40 | 1963.14 | 1746.90 | 1387.40 | 1236.80 | 1095.30 |
Guyana | Guyanese dollar | GYD | 209.01 | 203.86 | 201.89 | 187.3 | 189.5 | 179 | 182.4 | 178 | 150.5 | 142.4 |
Haiti | Haitian gourde | HTG | 78.143 | 39.216 | 37.138 | 26.339 | 26.674 | 37.25 | 22.524 | 17.965 | 16.505 | 17.311 |
Honduras | Honduran lempira | HNL | 24.271 | 18.983 | 18.9 | 15.9197 | 16.0256 | 17.26 | 15.1407 | 14.5039 | 13.8076 | 13.0942 |
Hong Kong | Hong Kong dollar | HKD | 7.84 | 7.8 | 7.802 | 7.7994 | 7.798 | 7.7987 | 7.7918 | 7.7589 | 7.7462 | 7.7425 |
Hungary | Hungarian forint | HUF | 280.13 | 165.89 | 186.16 | 286.49 | 275.92 | 209 | 282.179 | 237.146 | 214.402 | 186.789 |
Iceland | Icelandic króna | ISK | 119.7 | 85.619 | 63.391 | 97.425 | 102.43 | 70.1 | 78.616 | 72.335 | 70.958 | 70.904 |
India | Indian rupee | INR | 70.775 | 43.815 | 41.357 | 45.34 | 44.115 | 45.319 | 46.66 | 48.679 | 47.227 | 44.942 |
Indonesia | Indonesian rupiah | IDR | 14,159.50 | 9558.10 | 9056 | 10,260.90 | 10,377.30 | 9183.77 | – | 7855.20 | 10,013.60 | 8374.50 |
Iran | Iranian rial | IRR | 42,107.80 | 9142.80 | 9407.50 | 1750 | 7900 | 7900 | 1750 | 1750 | 1750 | 1750 |
Iraq | Iraqi dinar | IQD | 1191 | 1202 | 1255 | 2000 | 1500.59 | 1516.50 | 1910 | 1815 | 1530 | 910 |
Israel, West Bank | new Israeli shekel | ILS | 3.69 | 3.56 | 4.14 | 4.2057 | 4.2757 | 4.46685 | 4.1397 | 4.0773 | 3.8001 | 3.4494 |
Jamaica | Jamaican dollar | JMD | 130.418 | 72.236 | 69.034 | 45.996 | 47.277 | 58.75 | 42.701 | 39.044 | 36.55 | 35.404 |
Japan | Japanese yen | JPY | 108.92 | 103.58 | 117.99 | 121.529 | 125.388 | 115.933 | 107.765 | 113.907 | 130.905 | 120.991 |
Jordan | Jordanian dinar | JOD | 0.709 | 0.709 | 0.709 | 0.709 | 0.709 | 0.709 | 0.709 | 0.709 | 0.709 | 0.709 |
Kazakhstan | Kazakh tenge | KZT | 378.61 | 120.25 | 122.55 | 146.74 | 151.14 | 149.757 | 142.13 | 119.52 | 78.3 | 75.44 |
Kenya | Kenyan shilling | KES | 101.54 | 68.358 | 68.309 | 78.563 | 78.597 | 73.5 | 76.176 | 70.326 | 60.367 | 58.732 |
North Korea | North Korean won | KPW | 900.11 | 3400 (Oct)[34] | 140 | 2.15 | 2.15 | 2.15 | 2.15 | 2.15 | 2.15 | 2.15 |
South Korea | South Korean won | KRW | 1122.48 | 1101.70 | 929.2 | 1290.99 | 1317.01 | 1205.45 | 1130.96 | 1188.82 | 1401.44 | 951.29 |
Kuwait | Kuwaiti dinar | KWD | 0.3032 | 0.2679 | 0.2844 | 0.3066 | 0.3075 | 0.299105 | 0.3067 | 0.3044 | 0.3047 | 0.3033 |
Kyrgyzstan | Kyrgyzstani som | KGS | 69.835 | 36.108 | 37.746 | 48.378 | 47.972 | 44.0542 | 47.704 | 39.008 | 20.838 | 17.362 |
Laos | Lao kip | LAK | 8549.18 | 8760.69 | 9658 | 8954.58 | 9467.00 | 7562 | 7887.64 | 7102.03 | 3298.33 | 1259.98 |
Lebanon | Lebanese pound | LBP | 1507.50 | 1507.50 | 1507.50 | 1507.50 | 1507.50 | 1507.5 | 1507.50 | 1507.80 | 1516.10 | 1539.50 |
Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland | South African rand (also, Lesotho loti, Swazi lilangeni) | ZAR, LSL, SZL | 13.85 | 7.75 | 7.25 | 8.60918 | 11.58786 | 8.0154 | 6.93983 | 6.10948 | 5.52828 | 4.60796 |
Liberia | Liberian dollar | LRD | 158.62 | 63.31 | 59.715 | 48.5833 | 46.04 | 57.149 | 40.9525 | 41.9025 | 41.5075 | 40 |
Libya | Libyan dinar | LYD | 1.3898 | 1.2112 | 1.2604 | 0.6501 | 1.36495 | 1.2059 | 0.5403 | 0.5403 | 0.3785 | 0.3891 |
Lithuania | Lithuanian litas | LTL | 3.0245 | 2.3251 | 2.5362 | 4 | 3.4946 | 2.93995 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
Macau | Macau pataca | MOP | 8.07726 | 8.16567 | 8.011 | 8.034 | 8.033 | 8.0325 | 8.026 | 7.992 | 7.979 | 7.975 |
Madagascar | Malagasy franc | MGF | NA | NA | NA | 6588.50 | 6531.40 | 5820.75 | 6767.50 | 6283.80 | 5441.40 | 5090.90 |
Madagascar | Malagasy ariary | MGA | 3566.02 | 1654.78 | 1880 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Malawi | Malawian kwacha | MWK | 730.99 | 419.6 | 155.5 | 72.1973 | 67.3111 | 91.8 | 59.5438 | 44.0881 | 31.0727 | 16.4442 |
Malaysia | Malaysian ringgit | MYR | 4.117 | 3.33 | 3.46 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9244 | 2.8133 |
Maldives | Maldivian rufiyaa | MVR | 15.512 | 12.954 | 12.942 | 11.77 | 11.77 | 11.77 | 11.77 | 11.77 | 11.77 | 11.77 |
Malta | Maltese lira | MTL | NA | NA | 0.3106 | 0.4499 | 0.4542 | 0.3632 | 0.4376 | 0.3994 | 0.3885 | 0.3857 |
Mauritania | Mauritanian ouguiya | MRO | 267.66 | 254.35 | 273.72 | 261.2 | 238.923 | 209.514 | 188.476 | 151.853 | ||
Mexico | Mexican peso | MXN | 19.182 | 11.016 | 10.8 | 9.3423 | 9.1614 | 10.247 | 9.4556 | 9.5604 | 9.136 | 7.9185 |
Moldova | Moldovan leu | MDL | 17.134 | 10.326 | 12.177 | 12.8579 | Unk | 14.1565 | 12.4342 | 10.5158 | 5.3707 | 4.6236 |
Mongolia | Mongolian tugrug | MNT | 2650.51 | 1165.92 | 1170 | 1097.70 | 1101.29 | 1120.37 | 1076.67 | 1072.37 | 840.83 | 789.99 |
Morocco, Western Sahara | Moroccan dirham | MAD | 9.535 | 7.526 | 8.3563 | 11.303 | 11.584 | 9.3135 | 10.626 | 9.804 | 9.604 | 9.527 |
Mozambique | Mozambique metical (old) | MZM | NA | NA | NA | 20,703.60 | 23,314.20 | 23,180 | 15,447.10 | 13,028.60 | 12,110.20 | 11,772.60 |
Mozambique | Mozambique metical | MZN | 61.72 | 24.125 | 26.264 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Myanmar | Myanma kyat | MMF | 1531.78 | 1205 | 1296 | 6.7489 | 6.8581 | Unk | 6.5167 | 6.2858 | 6.3432 | 6.2418 |
Namibia | Namibian dollar, South African rand | NAD, ZAR | 13.87 | 7.75 | 7.18 | 8.60918 | 11.58786 | 8.0154 | 6.93983 | 6.10948 | 5.52828 | 4.60796 |
Nepal | Nepalese rupee | NPR | 113.14 | 118.14 | 74.961 | 76.675 | 74.83 | 71.094 | 68.239 | 65.976 | 58.01 | |
Netherlands Antilles | Netherlands Antillean guilder | ANG | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.79 |
New Zealand, Niue, Cook Islands, Pitcairn Islands, Tokelau | New Zealand dollar | NZD | 1.476 | 1.4151 | 1.3811 | 2.3776 | 2.3535 | 1.724 | 2.1863 | 1.8886 | 1.8632 | 1.5083 |
Nicaragua | Nicaraguan córdoba | NIO | 32.533 | 19.374 | 18.457 | 13.37 | 13.88 | 14.9 | 12.69 | 11.81 | 10.58 | 9.45 |
Nigeria | Nigerian naira | NGN | 360.9 | 117.8 | 127.46 | 133.56 | 115 | 136 | 101.697 | 92.338 | 21.886 | 21.886 |
North Macedonia | Macedonian denar | MKD | 53.75 | 41.414 | 44.732 | 64.757 | 52.11 | 51.2467 | 65.904 | 56.902 | 54.462 | 50.004 |
Norway, Svalbard | Norwegian krone | NOK | 8.5521 | 5.2338 | 5.8396 | 8.9917 | 8.9684 | 6.7156 | 8.8018 | 7.7992 | 7.5451 | 7.0734 |
Oman | Omani rial | OMR | 0.3845 | 0.3845 | 0.3845 | 0.3845 | 0.3845 | 0.3849 | 0.3845 | 0.3845 | 0.3845 | 0.3845 |
Pakistan | Pakistani rupee | PKR | 138.94 | 70.64 | 60.6295 | 61.927 | 60.719 | 57.8 | 53.648 | 49.118 | 44.943 | 40.918 |
Panama | U.S. Dollar, Panamanian balboa | USD, PAB | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Papua New Guinea | Papua New Guinean kina | PGK | 3.3653 | 2.6956 | 3.03 | 3.374 | 3.706 | 3.6036 | 2.765 | 2.539 | 2.058 | 1.434 |
Paraguay | Paraguayan guarani | PYG | 6034.30 | 4337.70 | 5031 | 4107.70 | 4783.00 | 6265 | 3486.40 | 3119.10 | 2726.50 | 2177.90 |
Peru | Peruvian nuevo sol | PEN | 3.3457 | 2.9322 | 3.1731 | 3.509 | 3.44 | 3.49185 | 3.49 | 3.3833 | 2.93 | 2.6642 |
Philippines | Philippine peso | PHP | 52.454 | 44.439 | 46.148 | 50.993 | 51.201 | 53.255 | 44.192 | 39.089 | 40.893 | 29.471 |
Poland | Polish zloty | PLN | 3.759 | 3.155 | 2.966 | 4.0939 | 4.0144 | 3.8045 | 4.3461 | 3.9671 | 3.4754 | 3.2793 |
Qatar | Qatari rial | QAR | 3.64 | 3.64 | 3.64 | 3.64 | 3.64 | 3.64 | 3.64 | 3.64 | 3.64 | 3.64 |
Romania | Romanian leu | RON | 4.122 | 2.5 | 2.43 | 3.26 | 2.91 | 2.81 | 3.32 | 3.3 | 2.91 | 2.16 |
Russia | Russian ruble | RUR/RUB | 66.84 | 24.3 | 25.659 | 29.0053 | 28.2885 | 27.0474 | 30.709 | 30.1372 | 28.16 | 27 |
Rwanda | Rwandan franc | RWF | 884.73 | 550 | 585 | 442.99 | 456.81 | 520.385 | 389.7 | 333.94 | 312.31 | 301.53 |
Samoa | Samoan tala | WST | 2.6 | NA | 3.4722 | 3.5236 | 3.0021 | 3.2712 | 3.012 | 2.9429 | 2.5562 | |
São Tomé and Príncipe | São Tomé and Príncipe dobra | STD | 21,461 | 14,900 | 13,700 | 8842.10 | 9009.10 | 9019.7 | 7978.20 | 7119.00 | 6883.20 | 4552.50 |
Saudi Arabia | Saudi riyal | SAR | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.745 | 3.745 | 3.745 | 3.7503 | 3.745 | 3.745 | 3.745 | 3.745 |
Serbia and Montenegro | Serbian dinar | RSD | 103.67 | 56.14 | 54.5 | 58.96 | 65 | 57.6065 | 57.68 | 63.53 | 10 | 5.85 |
Seychelles | Seychellois rupee | SCR | 13.65 | 8 | 6.5 | 5.8575 | 5.7458 | 5.618 | 5.7138 | 5.3426 | 5.2622 | 5.0263 |
Sierra Leone | Sierra Leonean leone | SLL | 8584.71 | 3007.90 | 2800.86 | 1985.89 | 2212.47 | 2275 | 2092.13 | 1804.20 | 1563.62 | 981.48 |
Singapore | Singapore dollar | SGD | 1.356 | 1.415 | 1.507 | 1.6902 | 1.6644 | 1.5819 | 1.7422 | 1.7906 | 1.7917 | 1.4848? |
Slovakia | Slovak koruna | SKK | 26.39 | 21.05 | NA | 47.792 | 31.087 | 35.173 | 46.035 | 41.363 | 35.233 | 33.616 |
Slovenia | Slovenian tolar | SIT | NA | NA | NA | 242.75 | 251.4 | 194.94 | 222.66 | 181.77 | 166.13 | 159.69 |
Solomon Islands | Solomon Islands dollar | SBD | 8.1195 | 7.6336 | 7.6336 | 5.3728 | 7.629 | 7.3432 | 5.0889 | 4.8381 | 4.8156 | 3.7169 |
Somalia | Somali shilling | SOS | NA | 1436 | 1423.73 | Unk | Unk | 2620 | 11,000 | 2620 | Unk | 7500 |
South Africa | South African rand | ZAR | 13.87 | 7.9576 | 7.05 | 8.60918 | 11.58786 | 8.0154 | 6.93983 | 6.10948 | 5.52828 | 4.60796 |
Sri Lanka | Sri Lankan rupee | LKR | 181.82 | 108.14 | 110.78 | 89.383 | 93.383 | 97.245 | 77.005 | 70.635 | 64.45 | 58.995 |
Sudan | Sudanese dinar | SDD | NA | NA | NA | 258.7 | 261.44 | 257.41 | 257.12 | 252.55 | 200.8 | 157.57 |
Sudan | Sudanese pound | SDG | 47.62 | 5.582 | 2.665 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Suriname | Surinamese dollar | SRD | 7.458 | 3.271 | 3.225 | 2.1785 | 2.549 | 2.5024 | 2.1785 | 0.9875 | 0.401 | 0.401 |
Sweden | Swedish krona | SEK | 8.9948 | 6.4074 | 6.7629 | 7.3489 | 7.4731 | 7.3783 | 8.0863 | 9.7371 | 10.3291 | 9.1622 |
Switzerland, Liechtenstein | Swiss franc | CHF | 0.9906 | 1.0774 | 1.1973 | 1.6876 | 1.6668 | 1.3003 | 1.6888 | 1.5022 | 1.4498 | 1.4513 |
Syria | Syrian pound | SYP | 515.03 | 46.5281 | 50.0085 | 51 | 52.98 | 41.79 | 46 | 52.29 | 46 | 41.9 |
Taiwan, Republic of China | New Taiwan dollar | TWD | 30.83 | 31.47 | 32.84 | 34.49 | 34.6 | 34.699 | 33.08 | 31.4 | 32.22 | 32.05 |
Tajikistan | Tajik somoni | TJS | 9.433 | 3.4563 | 3.4418 | 2.2 | 2.55 | 3.081 | 1550 | 998 | Unk | 350 |
Tanzania | Tanzanian shilling | TZS | 2306.23 | 1178.10 | 1255 | 876.41 | 924.7 | 1038 | 800.41 | 744.76 | 664.67 | 612.12 |
Thailand | Thai baht | THB | 31.81 | 33.37 | 33.599 | 43.432 | 43.982 | 41.695 | 40.112 | 37.814 | 41.359 | 31.364 |
Tonga | Tongan pa’anga | TOP | 2.266 | 2.0747 | 2.0747 | 2.1236 | 2.192 | 2.151 | 1.7585 | 1.5991 | 1.492 | 1.2635 |
Trinidad and Tobago | Trinidad and Tobago dollar | TTD | 6.7833 | 6.3228 | 6.3275 | 6.2332 | 6.2466 | 6.135 | 6.2998 | 6.2989 | 6.2983 | 6.2517 |
Tunisia | Tunisian dinar | TND | 2.9607 | 1.211 | 1.2776 | 1.3753 | 1.44 | 1.26445 | 1.3707 | 1.1862 | 1.1387 | 1.1059 |
Turkey | Turkish lira (old) | TRL | NA | NA | NA | 1,422,340 | 1,340,790 | 1,431,110 | 1,493,070 | 1,505,840 | 1,225,410 | 623,700 |
Turkey | New Turkish lira | TRY | 5.375 | 2.1895 | 1.319 | 1.422 | 1.34 | 1.431 | 1.493 | 1.505 | 1.225 | 0.623 |
Turkmenistan | Turkmen manat | TMM | 17,016 | 14,250 | 6250[45] | 5200 | 5200 | 5200 | 5200 | 5350 | Unk | 4070 |
Uganda | Ugandan shilling | UGX | 3703.09 | 1658.10 | 1685.80 | 1755.70 | 1738.70 | 2002.50 | 1644.50 | 1454.80 | 1240.20 | 1083.00 |
Ukraine | Ukrainian hryvnia | UAH | 27.89 | 4.9523 | 5.05 | 5.3722 | 5.3126 | 5.3093 | 5.4402 | 4.1304 | 2.4495 | 1.8617 |
United Kingdom | Pound sterling | GBP | 0.776 | 0.5302 | 0.4993 | 0.5462 | 0.55 | 0.5435 | 0.6125 | 0.6672 | 0.6947 | 0.6609 |
Falkland Islands | Falkland Islands pound | FKP | ||||||||||
Guernsey | Guernsey Pound | GGP | ||||||||||
Jersey | Jersey pound | JEP | ||||||||||
Saint Helena | Saint Helena pound | SHP | ||||||||||
Gibraltar | Gibraltar pound | GIP | ||||||||||
Uruguay | Uruguayan peso | UYU | 32.6059 | 20.438 | 23.947 | 13.3191 | 14.3325 | 20.025 | 12.0996 | 11.3393 | 10.4719 | 9.4418 |
Uzbekistan | Uzbek som | UZS | 8357.39 | 1317 | 1263.80 | 325 | 687 | 966.24 | 141.4 | 111.9 | 110.95 | 75.8 |
Vanuatu | Vanuatuan vatu | VUV | 113.79 | 100.87 | 104.956 | 145.31 | 146.02 | 121.41 | 137.64 | 129.08 | 127.52 | 115.87 |
Venezuela | Venezuelan bolívar fuerte | VEF | ####### | 2.147 | 2.147 | 0.723.666 | 0.761225 | 2.15 | 0.679.96 | 0.605.717 | 0.547556 | 0.488635 |
Vietnam | Vietnamese đồng | VND | 23,201.10 | 21,189 | 16,119 | 15,746 | 15,746 | 15,983 | 15,510 | 15,280 | 14,725 | 14,167.70 |
Yemen | Yemeni rial | YER | 250.36 | 199.76 | 199.14 | 168.678 | 171.86 | 178.01 | 161.718 | 155.718 | 135.882 | 129.281 |
Zambia | Zambian kwacha | ZMK | 11,937.15 | 3512.90 | 3990.20 | 4778.90 | 4463.50 | 3601.50 | 4733.30 | 4398.60 | 1862.07 | 1314.50 |
Zimbabwe | Zimbabwean dollar | ZWN[49] | 322.33 | 361.9 | 30,000 | 5.729 | 77.965 | 162.07 | 0.824 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 0.038 |
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Nwogugu, M.I.C. (2021). Introduction. In: Geopolitical Risk, Sustainability and “Cross-Border Spillovers” in Emerging Markets, Volume II. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71419-2_1
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