Abstract
In this chapter, I introduce the general framework for conducting a meta-semanticTERM analysis, which is always a kind of reflexive analysis. I also explain how a semanticREF-r analysis can be combined with a meta-semanticTERM analysis in order to yield a meta-semanticREF analysis (refer to Fig. 2.1, “Semantic and Meta-Semantic Analysis Map”). Furthermore, I illustrate this relationship through the introduction of the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion (refer to Fig. 3.1, “Meta-SemanticREF Taxonomy of Theories of Emotion”). I conclude with a discussion of the benefits of this taxonomy for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion, including how it can help unify various theories of emotion under one interdisciplinary taxonomic scheme. I also focus on the following theories of emotion which were discussed in the previous chapter: Jesse J. Prinz’s perceptual, embodied appraisal theory, Klaus R. Scherer’s component process model, Paul Ekman’s basic emotion theory, Martha C. Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory, James A. Russell’s psychological constructionist theory, Lisa F. Barrett’s conceptual act theory, James R. Averill’s social constructivist theory, and Paul E. Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino’s biologically basic theory of emotion.
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Notes
- 1.
Throughout this monograph, I use superscripts (e.g., meta-semanticTERM) to indicate the context in which a particular term should be understood (e.g., the terminological context for a meta-semantic analysis).
- 2.
This discussion is about how one should understand words within a meta-semantic perspective rather than the primary semantic perspective. So we are concerned here with the way in which words in one language can be said to be related (or not) to words in another language rather than with what words mean given the context and perspective of a particular theory.
- 3.
As is typically the case with philosophical writing, the mutually inclusive disjunction (“or”) is used throughout, unless stated otherwise or indicated by the use of the phrase “either, or.”
- 4.
Frege (1948) was the first to introduce the distinction between the intension and extension of a word, along with the terms “sense” and “reference.”
- 5.
What is unclear to me is whether Putnam required a subject to be aware of the approximate correctness of an approximately correct definite description in order to regard it to be an “approximately correct definite description.” I would think not.
- 6.
Although these values can be understood in terms of matters of degree (e.g., Russell 2010), for simplicity’s sake, my analysis draws a clear distinction between theorists who believe that the aim of the science of emotion is to further elucidate and correct ordinary language emotion words and those who deny this to be the case.
- 7.
Read Scarantino 2012, for a similar distinction between researchers who accept and those who reject the legitimacy of ordinary language words or concepts for emotion research.
- 8.
Note that “optimism” and “pessimism” is used here not to refer to one’s position regarding the natural kind status of emotion, as used by Charland (2005).
- 9.
In an earlier paper (Mun 2016), I classified Prinz’s (2004) theory as an eliminative-realist theory, but I later realized that it is actually a realist theory. The ambiguous aspect about Prinz’s account for me at the time was whether or not his theory held an optimistic or a pessimistic position about ordinary language. Yet there is clear evidence that his theory holds an optimistic position about ordinary language. For example, consider what Prinz says about attitudinal emotions in contrast with state emotions: “I will use the word ‘state emotions’ to label emotions that can persist as self-contained states. Those that are parts of larger wholes can be called ‘attitudinal emotions.’ Attitudinal emotions are ways of construing objects or states of affairs emotionally. This distinction, marked by ordinary language, corresponds to a real division in our affective lives” (Prinz 2004, 180).
- 10.
Read Needham 2002, for a very interesting discussion of the history of and the theoretical developments surrounding water and the concept of WATER.
- 11.
For examples of such arguments read Griffiths 1997 and Russell 2009. Some pessimists, however, have high hopes for ordinary language emotion words, although they ultimately deny their usefulness in their research (e.g., Panksepp 2008). Furthermore, arguments like Griffiths’ (1997) and Russell’s (2009) are not unique to pessimism (e.g., Barrett et al. 2009; Wierzbicka 1999), although it is typical of pessimists to put forth such arguments.
- 12.
Earlier (Mun 2016), I used the word “meanings” rather than the word “referents.” The use of the word “referents” would be more precise.
- 13.
- 14.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Semantic and meta-semantic analyses map. This is a non-exhaustive conceptual map relating various semantic analyses and meta-semantic analyses. A semanticREF analysis is covered in Chap. 2 and a meta-semanticREF analysis is covered in Chap. 3. A social-practical analysis is briefly discussed in Chap. 10, and a more detailed discussion of a social-practical, a social-conceptual, and a practical theoretical analysis provided in Mun 2019
Appendix B
Meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion. The above are the four categories of the meta-semanticREF taxonomy of theories of emotion, along with representative theories of emotion presented as perspectival functions for the meaning of the word “emotion”
Appendix C
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Mun, C. (2021). From an Eagle’s Eye Point of View. In: Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71194-8_3
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