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Efficient Mixing of Arbitrary Ballots with Everlasting Privacy: How to Verifiably Mix the PPATC Scheme

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Secure IT Systems (NordSec 2020)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12556))

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Abstract

The long term privacy of voting systems is of increasing concern as quantum computers come closer to reality. Everlasting privacy schemes offer the best way to manage these risks at present. While homomorphic tallying schemes with everlasting privacy are well developed, most national elections, using electronic voting, use mixnets. Currently the best candidate encryption scheme for making these kinds of elections everlastingly private is PPATC, but it has not been shown to work with any mixnet of comparable efficiency to the current ElGamal mixnets. In this work we give a paper proof, and a machine checked proof, that the variant of Wikström’s mixnet commonly in use is safe for use with the PPATC encryption scheme.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) and the Research Council of Norway for the joint project SURCVS.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

    Kristian Gjøsteen, Thomas Haines & Morten Rotvold Solberg

Authors
  1. Kristian Gjøsteen
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  2. Thomas Haines
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  3. Morten Rotvold Solberg
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Morten Rotvold Solberg .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden

    Mikael Asplund

  2. Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden

    Simin Nadjm-Tehrani

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Gjøsteen, K., Haines, T., Solberg, M.R. (2021). Efficient Mixing of Arbitrary Ballots with Everlasting Privacy: How to Verifiably Mix the PPATC Scheme. In: Asplund, M., Nadjm-Tehrani, S. (eds) Secure IT Systems. NordSec 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12556. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70852-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70852-8_6

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-70852-8

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