Abstract
In his 1997 paper “Technology and Complexity” Dasgupta draws a distinction between systematic and epistemic complexity. Entities are called systematically complex when they are composed of a large number of parts that interact in complicated ways. This means that even if one knows the properties of the parts one may not be able to infer the behaviour of the system as a whole. In contrast, epistemic complexity refers to the knowledge that is used in, or generated by the making of an artefact and is embodied in it. Interestingly, a high level of systematic complexity does not entail a high level of epistematic complexity and vice versa. Prehistoric stone tools, for example, display a unique combination of systematic simplicity with epistemic complexity. In order to attract the attention of philosophers of technology and engineering to the domain of prehistoric technology or what is called “First Technology”, the present chapter aims to examine the epistemic complexity of, (that is to say the amount, variety and kind of knowledge embodied in) ancient Oldowan stone tools. The aim is addressed by critically reviewing and extending Karl Popper’s unconventional objective approach to epistemology and by drawing upon recent experimental-archaeological research on Oldowan stone tool production.
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Notes
- 1.
The terms ‘artificial things,’ ‘artefacts’ and ‘technical artefacts’ used interchangeably in this chapter refer to any product of human (or hominin) activities, conceived, manufactured or modified in response to some need, want or desire to produce an intended result.
- 2.
- 3.
We do not assume here that technological knowledge is simple know-how or non-propositional, practical knowledge. For more details on the heterogenous nature of technological knowledge see Dasgupta (1996).
- 4.
How technical ideas or thoughts can be expressed and conveyed through visual or pictorial forms has been brilliantly illustrated by Ferguson (1977). We will take up the issue in the next section.
- 5.
But the converse is not true because our thought contents or products are largely autonomous and not entirely reducible to our thought processes.
- 6.
Things which are ‘based on’ certain processes but cannot be ‘explained by’ the theories of the underlying processes are to be understood as ‘emergent’ (Niemann 2014: 68).
- 7.
Italian engineer Ramelli’s 1588 Le Diverse et Artificiose Machine or the German instrument maker Leupold’s series of machine books entitled Theatrum Machinarum are examples of works that transmitted a huge amount of new technical ideas and information through mere illustrations of artefacts.
- 8.
- 9.
Despite its unmatched significance Ferguson’s (1977) study of how non-verbal thought recorded in technical drawings and images is not useful in a direct way for our investigation into the epistemic complexity of stone tools.
- 10.
Nordmann (2006), for example, argues that the knowledge of making, building, repairing artefacts or that of design cannot be properly examined by considering knowledge as a species of belief.
- 11.
For a discussion of how to understand the partially autonomous nature of World 3 products see Chakrabarty (2014).
- 12.
Such embodied objects do not exhaust World 3. Popper accepted the possibility of the existence of unembodied World 3 objects which are neither materially embodied nor do they exist as World 2 memories nor has been discovered by anyone yet (Popper and Eccles 1977/1995: 41).
- 13.
Baird has been criticised (e.g., Kletzl 2014) for not providing a more plausible explanation of the problem of justification of instruments. Had he interpreted ‘knowledge’ in the strict Popperian sense he could have easily explained to his critics why the issue of justification whether of theories or of instruments in the traditional way is a relatively unimportant problem for Popper’s objective epistemology and his ‘thing knowledge.’ For a review of this problem of justification see Musgrave (1974).
- 14.
By stating that science is just one component of technological knowledge Dasgupta (1996) challenges the popular perception that technology emerges from science and entails the mere application of scientific knowledge.
- 15.
Operational-principles-as-knowledge may generate in different ways. The most explicit means possibly are the processes of design but experiments and experience also produce operational principles. For details see Dasgupta (1996).
- 16.
Leakey’s view has been questioned by contemporary scholars like Jeffares (2010a) who thinks Homo habilis definitely had tool using ancestors.
- 17.
The distinction between the tool-assisted foraging of some primates or birds and the tool-dependent foraging of the human genus that indicates a new level of integration between brain, hand and tool is worth noting here (Bruner and Iriki 2016: 4).
- 18.
Such scrutiny generally consists of replication of artefact- forms, followed by experimental assessment of the feasibility of performing a series of tasks with each artefact form, microscopic study of use-wear polishes, and the examination of marks made by stone tools on other materials, notably bones (Isaac 1989: 129).
- 19.
The controlled fracture of stone by hand is called knapping.
- 20.
The experiments of Stout and colleagues (Stout et al. 2005) at the early (2.6–2.5 Mya) sites at Gona, Ethiopia also suggest that the early toolmakers were able to identify and preferentially select higher quality materials (finer-grained volcanic materials with fewer phenocrysts that could produce hard, sharp edges when flaked).
- 21.
Many World 3 objects, though not all, are embodied or physically realized in World 1 physical objects (Popper 1978: 145).
- 22.
Toth (1987) has, in fact, replicated the entire range of Oldowan core forms along with a variety of flakes.
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Chakrabarty, M. (2021). Prehistoric Stone Tools and their Epistemic Complexity. In: Pirtle, Z., Tomblin, D., Madhavan, G. (eds) Engineering and Philosophy. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 37. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70099-7_5
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