Abstract
This chapter examines procurement auctions, such as those that utility companies use to deliver water or garbage collection services, under different settings. In these auctions, firms compete to be awarded the service delivery contract, privately observe their costs, and bid to a social planner who seeks to award the contract to the most efficient firm (lowest cost).
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Choi, P-S, Espnola-Arredondo A., & Muoz-Garca, F. (2018). Conservation Procurement Auctions with Bidirectional Externalities. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 92, 559–579.
Myerson, R. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operation Research, 6(1), 58–73.
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Choi, PS., Munoz-Garcia, F. (2021). Procurement Auctions. In: Auction Theory. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69575-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69575-0_10
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