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Environmentalism and Interdisciplinarity

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Demography and the Anthropocene

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Environment, Security, Development and Peace ((BRIEFSSECUR,volume 35))

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Abstract

Although among Americans sensitivity to the environment is a predictor of sensitivity to human population growth, it is an imperfect predictor, a commitment to the environment does not automatically produce are cognition that population growth has negative environmental effects. Indeed, in the two G.S.S. samples that provided the data for the study in Chap. 2, only six out of ten White men, White women, Black men who were concerned with the environment were also concerned with population growth. Given the absence of a close connection between the two concerns, ecosystem deterioration will often not be traced to, will often not be seen as a function of, the mounting number of human beings. Among Americans, the situation should perhaps not be surprising because environmental concepts, movements in the United States have historically been insular, had an arrow focus.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Greg Mitman, In Search of Health: Landscape and Disease in American Environmental History, 10 envtl. hist. 184, 185 (2005).

  2. 2.

    Dean Spears, Making People Happy or Making Happy People? Questionnaire-Experimental Studies of Population Ethics and Policy, 49 soc. choice & welfare 145, 168 (2017). Accord, Noah Scovronick et al., Impact of Population Growth and Population Ethics on Climate Change Mitigation Policy, 114 proc. nat’l acad. sci. 12,338, 12,342 (2017) (contrasting average utilitarianism and total utilitarianism); Veit Bader, The Ethics of Immigration, 12 constellations 331 (2005).

  3. 3.

    Note 28 in supra Chap. 1.

  4. 4.

    In the relationship, attitudes are generally the cause rather than the effect of behavior. Michael Riketta, The Causal Relation Between Job Attitudes and Performance: A Meta-Analysis of Panel Studies, 93 J. applied psychol. 472, 476 (2008).

  5. 5.

    Laura R. Glasman & Dolores Albarracin, Forming Attitudes That Predict Future Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of the Attitude-Behavior Relation, 132 psychol. bull. 778, 814 (2006) (reporting a weighted mean correlation coefficient of .52). Since (0.52)2 = .27 × 100 = 27%, variance in attitudes explains 27% of the variance in behavior.

  6. 6.

    In a nation that is structurally complex and democratically governed, macro-level conditions and forces shape the content of law on key social matters. larry d. barnett, explaining law: macrosociological theory and empirical evidence 8–11, 47–48 (2015) [hereinafter explaining law]; larry d. barnett, societal agents in law: a macrosociological approach ch. 2 pt. 2.3 (2019) [hereinafter sail vol. 1]. Macro-level conditions and forces mold the content of law probably by generating, inter alia, attitudes that favor particular law content. See Adam J. Zolotor & Megan E. Puzia, Bans against Corporal Punishment: A Systematic Review of the Laws, Changes in Attitudes and Behaviours, 19 child abuse rev. 229, 242 (2010) (finding that the enactment of legislation prohibiting corporal punishment was preceded by a decline in attitudes favorable to corporal punishment).

  7. 7.

    Ian M. Johnson et al., Expanding the Reach of Vested Interest in Predicting Attitude-Consistent Behavior, 9 soc. influence 20, 21–22, 33 (2014).

  8. 8.

    Jie Zhou et al., How Affectively-Based and Cognitively-Based Attitudes Drive Intergroup Behaviours: The Moderating Role of Affective-Cognitive Consistency, 8(11) plos one, Nov. 14, 2013, at 1, 10, https://journals.plos.org/plosone.

  9. 9.

    A study using a nonprobability sample of 300 individuals residing in the United Kingdom found that negative affect regarding population growth, but not exposure to information about population growth, raised the likelihood that respondents saw risk in world population growth; the study also found, however, that negative affect and exposure to information were unrelated to the likelihood of favoring measures to limit population growth. Ian G. J. Dawson & Johnnie E. V. Johnson, Does Size Matter? A Study of Risk Perceptions of Global Population Growth, 37 risk analysis 65, 67–68, 71, 75 tbl. IV, 77 tbl. V (2017).

  10. 10.

    John Holmwood, Functionalism and Its Critics, in 2 historical developments and theoretical approaches in sociology 110, 110–12 (Charles Crothers ed., 2010), available at https://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C04/E6-99A-26.pdf.

  11. 11.

    Jonathan H. Turner, The Disintegration of American Sociology, 32 sociol. persp. 419, 429 (1989). See also Reba Rowe Lewis, Forging New Syntheses: Theories and Theorists, 22 am. sociologist 221 (1991) (contending that, in order for sociology to improve the quality of its research and its standing as an academic discipline, the advocates of different theories in sociology must curtail their internecine fights and work toward a unification of their theories).

  12. 12.

    E.g., Benjamin Cornwell & Edward O. Laumann, If Parsons Had Pajek: The Relevance of Midcentury Structural-Functionalism to Dynamic Network Analysis, 17 J. soc. structure 1, 2 (2016), https://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volindex.html; Stacie E. Goddard & Daniel H. Nexon, Paradigm Lost? Reassessing theory of international politics, 11 eur. j. int’l rel. 9, 10 (2005); larry d. barnett, the place of law: the role and limits of law in society 302–310 (2011) [hereinafter the place of law]. See also Ruth Lane, Structural-Functionalism Reconsidered: A Proposed Research Model, 26 comp. pol. 461 (1994) (contending that structural-functionalism and its insights are relevant to and useful in studies of comparative politics). Cf. Donald W. Harper, Structural-Functionalism: Grand Theory or Methodology?, at 1 (2011) (arguing that structural-functionalism theory has had, and continues to have, a major influence on scholarly work in the fields of sociology, organizations, and management), https://www.scribd.com/document/261889937/Structural-Functionalism-Harper.

  13. 13.

    the place of law, supra note 12, at 394.

  14. 14.

    Goddard & Nexon, supra note 12, at 18.

  15. 15.

    the place of law, supra note 12, at 394.

  16. 16.

    Gösta Carlsson, Reflections on Functionalism, 5 acta sociologica 201, 201 (1962) (observing that structural-functionalism theory posits the existence of societal needs, including the need for agents that foster cohesiveness in social life).

  17. 17.

    robert k. merton, social theory and social structure 176 (1968 enlarged ed.) (contending that strains within a society “exert pressure for change. When social mechanisms for controlling them are operating effectively, these strains are kept within such bounds as to limit change of the social structure.”).

  18. 18.

    S. N. Eisenstadt, Functional Analysis in Anthropology and Sociology: An Interpretative Essay, 19 ann. rev. anthropology 243, 244 (1990).

  19. 19.

    David Lockwood, Social Integration and System Integration, in explorations in social change 244, 245 (George K. Zollschan & Walter Hirsch eds., 1964). Within a given society, the degree of social integration and the degree of system integration may vary over time. This fluctuation can result in a difference between the former and the latter at a specific point in time, i.e., at any one time in a society, the degree of social integration may be higher or lower than the degree of system integration. Margaret Archer, Social Integration and System Integration: Developing the Distinction, 30 sociol. 679, 693–94 (1996).

  20. 20.

    Nancy Kingsbury & John Scanzoni, Structural-Functionalism, in sourcebook of family theories and methods: a contextual approach 195, 196 (P. G. Boss et al. eds., 1993); larry d. barnett, societal agents in law: quantitative research 20 (2019) [hereinafter sail vol. 2].

  21. 21.

    The full framework is presented in explaining law, supra note 6, at 7–17.

  22. 22.

    sail vol. 1, supra note 6, at 21, 64 n.126, 85. Immigration and emigration are likely to be society-important activities, too, since they can alter the culture and structure of a society. sail vol. 2, supra note 20, at 240–42.

  23. 23.

    sail vol. 1, supra note 6, at 23–26.

  24. 24.

    kim parker et al., pew res. ctr., record share of americans have never married 12 (2014) (forecasting the incidence of marriage among U.S. residents born during the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s when, in 2030, this cohort will be in the age range 45–54), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/09/24/record-share-of-americans-have-never-married.

  25. 25.

    Donald T. Rowland, Historical Trends in Childlessness, 28 J. fam. issues 1311, 1314–15 tbl. 1, 1323, 1325 Fig. 2 (2007) (using data on the eleven five-year cohorts of females who were born in the twentieth century and reached age 45–49 during the twentieth century, i.e., the 1900–1904 birth cohort through the 1950–1954 birth cohort).

  26. 26.

    carmen solomon-fears, cong. res. serv., nonmarital births: an overview 24–26 tbl. A-1 (2014); Joyce A. Martin et al., Nat’l Ctr. Health Stat., Births: Final Data for 2018, nat’l vital stat. rep., Nov. 27, 2019, at 25 tbl. 9, 26 tbl. 10.

  27. 27.

    Lawrence L. Wu, Cohort Estimates of Nonmarital Fertility for U.S. Women, 45 demography 193, 194, 199, 201 tbl. 6 (2008) (studying a set of birth cohorts of U.S. women; finding that, from the first (pre-1925) birth cohort to the last (1965–69) birth cohort that had reached age 30 by June 1995, the percentage of women having had a non-marital birth prior to their thirty-first birthday rose among all women, among White women, and among Black women but that, in the 1965–1969 cohort, the percentage was 26.9 for all women and 19.6 for White women, although it was 61.2% for Black women). In following women through just age 30, Professor Wu notes that the percentage of women bearing a child outside of marriage rises “only modestly” after age 30. Id. at 199.

    In the United States, the percentage of all births in the 1960–1992 period that were non-marital steadily increased among both Blacks and Whites but was higher among Blacks than Whites. Over the course of 1960–1992, the demographic reasons for the increases in the percentage among Blacks were not identical to the demographic reasons for the increases in the percentage among Whites. Herbert L. Smith et al., A Decomposition of Trends in the Nonmarital Fertility Ratios of Blacks and Whites in the United States, 1960–1992, 33 demography 141, 142 Fig. 1, 146–47, 148 figs. 2 & 3 (1996).

  28. 28.

    See Sharon Sassler & Daniel T. Lichter, Cohabitation and Marriage: Complexity and Diversity in Union-Formation Patterns, 82 J. marriage & fam. 35, 41–42, 46 (2020) (concluding that cohabitation has not become a substitute for marriage among Americans).

  29. 29.

    See Martin Landau, On the Use of Functional Analysis in American Political Science, 35 soc. res. 48, 56–57, 64 (1968) (applying structural-functionalism theory to political phenomena; positing that a society, as a “living system,” is “self-regulating” and hence stable; contending that a society changes in only its “form and process,” not its “material substance”; and postulating that the functions in a system — what the components of a system do to sustain the system — change much more quickly than the structure of the system).

  30. 30.

    See solomon-fears, supra note 26, at 24–26 tbl. A-1; Martin, supra note 26, at 26 tbl. 10.

  31. 31.

    Kelly Musick, Planned and Unplanned Childbearing Among Unmarried Women, 64 J. marriage & fam. 915, 919, 923 tbl. 4, 925 (2002); Marcia J. Carlson et al., Examining the Antecedents of U.S. Nonmarital Fatherhood, 50 demography 1421, 1426, 1438 tbl. 4 (2013). Accord, Dawn M. Upchurch et al., Nonmarital Childbearing: Influences of Education, Marriage, and Fertility, 39 demography 311, 321 tbl. 3 (2002).

  32. 32.

    sail vol. 2, supra note 20, at 46, 119; the place of law, supra note 12, at 308.

  33. 33.

    Cf. sail vol. 1, supra note 6, at 81–86 (listing criteria that determine whether a particular social activity is societally important/significant, and suggesting sources that may supply information pertinent to whether a particular social activity satisfies the criteria).

  34. 34.

    The U.S. Constitution provides that “The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” u.s. const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The foregoing provision, which is known as the Intellectual Property Clause, has provided the authority for federal legislation on copyrights and on patents. Both copyrights and patents are popularly thought to enhance the welfare of society. Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., An Unconstitutional Patent in Disguise: Did Congress Overstep Its Constitutional Authority in Adopting the Circumvention Prevention Provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act?, 41 brandeis l.j. 33, 37–43 (2002).

  35. 35.

    pew res. ctr., as marriage and parenthood drift apart, public is concerned about social impact 49, 50, 51, 73 (2007) (reporting the results of a survey conducted in 2007 of a national sample of adults in the United States; finding that (i) two out of three respondents thought that increased childbearing by “single women... without a male partner to help raise” the children was harmful to society, (ii) three out of five respondents believed that increased childbearing by unmarried couples was hurting society, and (iii) just six percent of the respondents viewed these trends as socially beneficial). See Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 am. u.j. gender soc. pol'y & l. 387, 393, 399, 405, 408–09, 412 (2012) (summarizing, in parts I and II of her article, U.S. Supreme Court decisions relevant to non-marital childbearing; concluding that the Supreme Court, through its decisions on the rights of parents of non-marital children, did not favor out-of-wedlock childbearing but, instead, preferred childbearing within marriage).

  36. 36.

    See george gao, pew res. ctr., americans’ ideal family size is smaller than it used to be (2015) (reporting that since the mid-1930s, when ideal family size was first measured in U.S. public opinion surveys, at least 90% of American adults in most years have favored a minimum of two children, and sizeable percentages have favored a minimum of three children), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/08/ideal-size-of-the-american-family.

  37. 37.

    explaining law, supra note 6, at 8–11, 47–52.

  38. 38.

    The period has been labelled a “major chapter in American history.” Mark Lawrence Schrad, Constitutional Blemishes: American Alcohol Prohibition and Repeal as Policy Punctuation, 35 pol’y stud. j. 437, 438 (2007). It has also been characterized as “one of the most colorful and controversial” eras in the history of the United States and as involving what was perhaps “the most widely and flagrantly disobeyed” law ever adopted by the U.S. federal government. louise chipley slavicek, the prohibition era 1 (2009).

  39. 39.

    sarah w. tracy, alcoholism in america: from reconstruction to prohibition 8–12, 14–16 (2005).

  40. 40.

    u.s. const. amend. XVIII . The Eighteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution in January 1919 and, by its terms, was effective one year later. the constitution of the united states of america as amended, H.R. Doc. No. 110–50, at 19–20 (2007) [hereinafter u.s. constitution as amended] (providing the text and ratification record of the Eighteenth Amendment). Federal legislation implementing the Eighteenth Amendment was adopted in October 1919, but was not fully in force until the Amendment took effect in January 1920. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66–66, ch. 85, tit. III, § 21, 41 Stat. 305, 322–23 (1919). The Eighteenth Amendment was repealed in December 1933 by the Twenty-First Amendment. u.s. constitution as amended, supra, at 22.

  41. 41.

    Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 yale l. j. 1290 (1937); sail vol. 1, supra note 6, at 14–15.

  42. 42.

    the place of law, supra note 12, at 213–14.

  43. 43.

    Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). Accord, Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The crafting and safeguarding of public morality has long been an established part of the States’ plenary police power to legislate...”). See 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So.3d 319, 337 (Ala. 2010) (observing that “public morality” is “a rational basis for legislation”); State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501, 509 (La. 2000) (“commission of what the legislature determines as an immoral act, even if consensual and private, is an injury against society itself”).

    In Bowers, supra, the Court had concluded that the liberty guarantee contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was not violated by a state statute that criminalized same-sex sexual activity even when this activity occurred in a private setting. 478 U.S. at 189, 196. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), the Court overruled its holding in Bowers. Both cases stemmed from state statutes that allowed criminal penalties to be imposed on persons who engage in homosexual activity inside a residence. 478 U.S. at 187–88; 539 U.S. at 562–63, 566.

    Although Bowers and Lawrence resulted in contrary holdings, the rationales of the Court that underlie these holdings are similar in one respect: They employ, albeit implicitly, the dichotomy between public and private. To be precise, the majority opinion in Bowers, by calling attention to the long-standing and widespread statutory bans in the United States on same-sex sexual activity, recognizes that such activity is of concern to the public, regardless of where this activity happens. 478 U.S. at 192–94. The Court in Bowers thus assigned homosexual activity to the public sphere. By contrast, the majority opinion in Lawrence points out that the statute being challenged “does not involve public conduct,” but instead “touch[es] upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.” 539 U.S. at 567, 578. The Court in Lawrence accordingly treated homosexual activity that occurs within a setting not visible to the public as being in the private sphere. Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 minn. l. rev. 915, 921 (2006).

  44. 44.

    Angela K. Dills et al., The Effect of Alcohol Prohibition on Alcohol Consumption: Evidence from Drunkenness Arrests, 86 econ. letters 279, 280, 283 (2005). The time-limited impact of the change in law was probably attributable to the social benefits that accrue from the consumption of intoxicating beverages in group settings. Derek A. Kreager et al., Delinquency and the Structure of Adolescent Peer Groups, 49 criminology 95, 103–05, 109, 119–22 (2011); E. C. Moore, The Social Value of the Saloon, 3 am. j. sociol. 1 (1897). See also Bethany L. Peters & Edward Stringham, No Booze? You May Lose: Why Drinkers Earn More Money than Nondrinkers, 27 J. lab. res. 411, 414, 417–19 & tbl. 3, 420 n.7 (2006) (studying a national sample of men and women in the United States who were employed thirty or more hours weekly; finding that men (but not women) who drank at “a bar or tavern” one or more times a month had statistically significant higher earnings than those who did not; and hypothesizing that the increment in earnings was due to the social advantages that men obtained from drinking in groups).

  45. 45.

    explaining law, supra note 6, at 14–15, 55–58; larry d. barnett, legal construct, social concept 26–36 (1993); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 oxford j. legal stud. 173, 174–75, 197–204 (2004); Helmut Hirtenlehner & Per-Olof H. Wikström, Experience or Deterrence? Revising an Old but Neglected Issue, 14 eur. j. criminology 485, 486–89, 496–98 (2017).

    For a recent study that finds law is ineffective in curbing crime that involves sexuality, see Jeff A. Bouffard & LaQuana N. Askew, Time-Series Analyses of the Impact of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law Implementation and Subsequent Modifications on Rates of Sexual Offenses, 65 crime & delinq. 1483, 1503–04 (2019) (analyzing monthly data from January 1977 to April 2012 for Harris County, Texas, which includes the city of Houston). The conclusion reached by the Bouffard-Askew study is consistent with the conclusion reached by Jeffrey C. Sandler et al., Does A Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of New York State’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 psychol. pub. pol’y & l. 284 (2008) (analyzing monthly data covering the state of New York from 1986 through 2006). See also Kristin Zgoba et al., Megan’s Law 20 Years Later: An Empirical Analysis and Policy Review, 45 crim. just. & behav. 1028, 1029–30, 1033–34, 1044 (2018) (analyzing yearly data covering the state of New Jersey; studying the impact of a state statute that (i) required a convicted sexual offender, after being released from prison and taking up residence in New Jersey, to register with the local police department and (ii) required specified segments of the public to be notified of the presence of the offender; finding that the statute did “not have a demonstrable effect on future offending” in either the short-run or the long run).

    A recent study looked at law that requires minors to be in school until a designated age and concluded that this law did not have a uniform impact on school attendance. Erica Raimondi & Loris Vergolini, Everyone in School: The Effects of Compulsory Schooling Age on Drop-out and Completion Rates, 54 eur. j. educ. 471, 475, 479–80 tbl. 2, 482–83 (2019) (using time-series data from recurring quarterly sample surveys of households in Italy; analyzing the data to estimate change in the odds of secondary-school attendance and graduation after the law-mandated ending age for compulsory schooling was raised from age 14 to age 15; finding that, net of other independent variables, the higher law-mandated age was responsible for (i) a 38% increase in the odds of school attendance by 16 year-olds, (ii) a 42% increase in the odds of school attendance by 17 year-olds, which effect diminished over time and was no longer detectable at the end of the four years (1999–2003) that the new law was in force, and (iii) a 20% decrease in the odds of graduating from secondary school). Earlier research, too, concluded that compulsory-schooling law brought about little overall change in rates of school attendance. the place of law, supra note 12, at 118, 142 n.162 (citing three studies).

  46. 46.

    The proclivities for social integration and system integration may operate through, inter alia, the feedback loops that exist in a society. See Sylvia Walby, Complexity Theory, Systems Theory, and Multiple Intersecting Social Inequalities, 37 phil. soc. sci. 449, 454–55, 463–64 (2007) (conceptualizing societies as systems; pointing out that feedback loops are implicit in the concept of a system; contending that feedback loops can cause the stability of a system to increase or decrease exponentially in response to a stimulus; and citing instances of exponential reductions in economic-system stability but not in social-system stability).

    Although feedback loops may produce side effects, the side effects can in turn give rise to reactions that counter or suppress the side effects. E.g., Navid Ghaffarzadegan et al., Research Workforce Diversity: The Case of Balancing National versus International Postdocs in US Biomedical Research, 31 sys. res. & behav. sci. 301 (2014). The reactions by a society to side effects can, of course, be expected to generate other side effects that are then followed by societal reactions that neutralize these side effects. Such chains of events would maintain or build society-level inertia, which would curtail the ability of law and government policy to achieve their social goals. Notably, the chains are compatible with and explicable by structural-functionalism theory. See Roger I. Roots, When Laws Backfire: Unintended Consequences of Public Policy, 47 am. behav. sci. 1376, 1380, 1385–88, 1390 (2004) (concluding that law and government policy have rarely cured social ills and have often had side effects; reasoning that this conclusion supports the utility of structural-functionalism theory).

  47. 47.

    Alessandra Cepparulo et al., Can Constitutions Bring About Revolutions? How to Enhance Decarbonization, 93 envtl. sci. & pol’y 200, 204–05 & tbl. 3 (2019).

  48. 48.

    Chris Jeffords & Lanse Minkler, Do Constitutions Matter? The Effects of Constitutional Environmental Rights Provisions on Environmental Outcomes, 69 kyklos 294, 301, 303, 308, 313 n.25, 317 tbl. 6 (2016) (using an index measuring seventeen aspects of “ecosystem vitality”).

  49. 49.

    Both studies have several limitations that should be mentioned because the findings of the studies may have been affected by one or more of the limitations.

    First, neither of the studies specifically controlled between-nation differences in culture. Thus, neither of the studies removed the sizeable influence that culture normally exercises over the content and operation of law. For quantitative research on this influence, see Amir N. Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, 35 J. comp. econ. 659, 667 (2007); Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002, at 2–4 (World Bank Pol’y Res. Working Paper No. 3106, 2003) (describing the indexes comprising the dependent variables in the study by Licht et al.). Cf. Fikresus Fikrejesus Amahazion, Human Rights and World Culture: The Diffusion of Legislation Against the Organ Trade, 36 sociol. spectrum 158 (2016) (positing a geographic spread of cultural beliefs that individuals have intrinsic worth and finding that empirical indicators of these beliefs predicted the adoption by nations, during the 1965–2012 period, of law prohibiting commercial transactions in human organs). For qualitative research on the influence that culture has on law, see, for example, Peter Just, Let the Evidence Fit the Crime: Evidence, Law, and “Sociological Truth” among the Dou Donggo, 13 am. ethnologist 43, 58–59 (1986).

    The second limitation of the studies is that they each employed data that were in essence cross-sectional, not longitudinal. Cepparulo et al., supra note 47, at 204; Jeffords & Minkler, supra note 48, at 308–10. Since a cause-effect relationship involves a sequence of events, such a relationship must be proven using longitudinal data. A relationship between variables that appears in cross-sectional data may be, and often is, absent in longitudinal data. frans l. leeuw & hans schmeets, empirical legal research 122–25 (2016).

    The third limitation of the studies is that they did not attempt to ascertain whether one or more nations in their data were influential outliers. As a result, neither study in its statistical analysis took into account nations that may have disproportionately shaped the relationships found between the independent variables and dependent variable. Although the procedures for identifying and treating influential outliers are not uniform due to a lack of generally accepted guidelines, outliers require attention because they can distort the results of regression analyses. Herman Aguinis et al., Best-Practice Recommendations for Defining, Identifying, and Handling Outliers, 16 org. res. methods 270, 271, 273, 297 (2013).

  50. 50.

    Text accompanying supra note 25; supra note 36; supra Chap. 1, at 14–18. The U.S. Constitution, in authorizing Congress “[t]o establish an [sic] uniform Rule of Naturalization,” implicitly recognizes immigration by noncitizens because naturalization presupposes such immigration. u.s. const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.

  51. 51.

    See the following summaries of empirical research: Anne H. Gauthier, The Impact of Family Policies on Fertility in Industrialized Countries: A Review of the Literature, 26 population res. & pol’y rev. 323, 342 (2007) (concluding that, in developed nations, fertility-relevant policies have only a “small” effect on the frequency of childbearing); Olivier Thévenon & Anne H. Gauthier, Family Policies in Developed Countries: A “Fertility-Booster” with Side-Effects, 14 community, work & fam. 197, 211 (2011) (concluding that “family-friendly policies” in developed nations have just a “limited” effect on the fertility rates in these nations). Accord, Ann-Zofie Duvander et al., Impact of a Reform Towards Shared Parental Leave on Continued Fertility in Norway and Sweden, population res. & pol’y rev. (2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-020-09574-y; Suzanne Ryan et al., State-level Welfare Policies and Nonmarital Subsequent Childbearing, 25 population res. & pol’y rev. 103 (2006). See also Abdoulaye Quedraogo et al., Fertility and Population Policy, 42 pub. sector econ. 21, 22, 36–37 (2018) (using panel data on 133 nations for the years 1976–2013; finding that the governments of these nations did not affect the level of childbearing through policies that were adopted to increase fertility, e.g., policies that provided tax inducements for childbearing and monetary assistance to defray childrearing and housing costs; also finding that the governments decreased childbearing through policies that were not intended to reduce fertility, e.g., policies that improved education, health care, and family-planning services); Yeon Jeong Son, Do Childbirth Grants Increase the Fertility Rate? Policy Impacts in South Korea, 16 rev. econ. households 713, 716, 733 (2018) (using panel data on 230 municipalities in South Korea for the years 2001–2014; finding that municipalities that adopted a policy of providing monetary grants to parents for the birth and care of children experienced an increase in childbearing; but concluding that, to raise the level of childbearing substantially, the amount of the grants would have to be very large and that such an amount would not be “cost-effective”).

    One research summary maintains that a set of family-supportive policies can increase fertility when the policies embody “a spirit” that favors childbearing and exist within “a family-friendly culture.” Jan M. Hoem, Overview Chapter 8: The Impact of Public Policies on European Fertility, 19 demographic res. 249, 253–56 (2008). The degree to which these policies are effective, in other words, is determined by their societal context. Id. at 253–55. That context, however, is what gives rise to the content of law and government policy on society-significant social behaviors in developed nations. The assertion by Dr. Hoem, therefore, is not inconsistent with the thesis that societal culture and structure, not law and government policy, are the chief determinants of the level of childbearing in developed countries. explaining law, supra note 6, at 8–9, 17, 50–52.

  52. 52.

    Wayne A. Cornelius, Impacts of the 1986 US Immigration Law on Emigration from Rural Mexican Sending Communities, 15 population & dev. rev. 689, 701–02 (1989); Douglas S. Massey et al., Why Border Enforcement Backfired, 121 am. j. sociol. 1557, 1558 (2016) (summary of research); Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA, 40 demography 437, 448 (2003); Emily Ryo, Deciding to Cross: Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration, 78 am. sociol. rev. 574, 580–81, 588–89 tbl. 2, 593 (2013). Intensified actions by the U.S. government to control Mexico-to-U.S. migration between 1970 and 2010 evidently enlarged the number of U.S. residents from Mexico who were illegally present in the United States. Massey et al., supra, at 1590–91.

  53. 53.

    Short-term effects that law has on the frequency of society-important social behavior must be juxtaposed with the absence of long-term effects of the same law. Macrosociology needs to go beyond simply noting the difference in impact between the former and the latter; it should be able to explain the disappearance of an effect over time.

  54. 54.

    explaining law, supra note 6, at 47–52.

  55. 55.

    Infectious diseases have not only killed large numbers of humans in the past but have the potential to do so in the future. R. M. Anderson & R. M. May, The Invasion, Persistence and Spread of Infectious Diseases Within Animal and Plant Communities, 314 phil. transactions of the royal soc’y of london series b 533, 533–34 (1986); Alexander Koch et al., Earth System Impacts of the European Arrival and Great Dying in the Americas after 1492, 207 quaternary sci. rev. 13, 22 tbl. 4, 30 (2019); Michael T. Osterholm, Univ. of Minnesota Ctr. for Infectious Disease Research & Pol’y, Commentary: Pandemic Preparedness and Missed Opportunities (2017) (contending that “pandemic clocks are ticking; we just don’t know what time it is”), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2017/10/commentary-pandemic-preparedness-and-missed-opportunities (last visited March 18, 2020). See also notes 59 & 91 and accompanying text in supra Chap. 1; Katherine F. Smith et al., Global Rise in Human Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 11(101) j. of the royal soc’y interface, Dec. 2014, at 1, 5 (finding that among humans the worldwide number of outbreaks of infectious disease, and the number of new infectious diseases, increased between the period 1980–1984 and the period 2005–2010), https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsif.2014.0950.

  56. 56.

    Patrick Gerland et al., World Population Stabilization Unlikely This Century, 346 sci. 234, 234 (2014) (modeling world population growth; forecasting that a large numerical increase will occur in the size of the human population during the twenty-first century unless childbearing decreases significantly in sub-Saharan Africa, and stating that such decreases would be “unprecedented”).

  57. 57.

    According to the widely discussed study The Limits to Growth, which was published in the early 1970s and used computer simulation to estimate the long-term consequences for the human species of trends in resource consumption and environmental contamination, Malthusian solutions will occur during the twenty-first century unless there is substantial change in prevailing forms of human activity. Jorgen Randers, The Real Message of the limits to growth, 21 gaia 102 (2012) (summarizing The Limits to Growth study and noting its ramifications). This conclusion is buttressed by recent evidence. Graham M. Turner, On the Cusp of Global Collapse? Updated Comparison of the limits to growth with Historical Data, 21 gaia 116, 123 (2012) (adding forty years of data to three simulations in The Limits to Growth study, which employed data covering the 1900–1970 period; finding that inclusion of the added data provided support to the simulation in which patterns of social and economic behavior persist; and pointing out that this simulation predicts a “collapse of the global economy and population in the near future”).

    For computer-simulation evidence that national policies that avert Malthusian solutions are feasible, see Surya Raj Acharya & Khalid Saeed, An Attempt to Operationalize the Recommendations of the “Limits to Growth” Study to Sustain the Future of Mankind, 12 systems dynamics rev. 281 (1996).

  58. 58.

    E.g., Quedraogo et al., supra note 51.

  59. 59.

    Hill Kulu & Andres Vikat, Fertility Differences by Housing Type: The Effect of Housing Conditions or of Selective Moves?, 17 demographic res. 775, 779–80, 790 (2007); Hill Kulu et al., Settlement Size and Fertility in the Nordic Countries, 61 population stud. 265, 270–71, 278 (2007); Nathanael Lauster, A Room to Grow: The Residential Density-Dependence of Childbearing in Europe and the United States, 37 canadian stud. in population 475, 481, 485, 487, 488 tbl. 3, 491 (2010). See also George Martine et al., Urbanization and Fertility Decline: Cashing in on Structural Change 19, 25, 28–30 & tbl. 5 panel B (Internat’l Inst. for Env’t & Dev., IIED Working Paper, 2013) (analyzing cross-sectional data for 131 countries around the year 2010; finding that, all else being equal, the percentage of the population of a country that resided in an urban area was inversely related to the total fertility rate in the country).

  60. 60.

    In the United States, urban-containment policies of local governments and growth-management policies of state governments have been found to (i) reduce the number of square miles of land necessary to accommodate the resident population of an urbanized area — a reduction that raises population density — as well as (ii) curtail the mean number of individuals in a household. Robert W. Wassmer, The Influence of Local Urban Containment Policies and Statewide Growth Management on the Size of United States Urban Areas, 46 J. regional sci. 25, 34, 41–42 tbl. 3 (2006) (studying 452 places in the United States that in the year 2000 were designated urbanized areas by the U.S. Census Bureau).

  61. 61.

    If policies that increase population density in housing lower the birth rate slowly, they may not substantially alter the course of world population growth during the twenty-first century and yield large environmental benefits. Compare Corey J. A. Bradshaw & Barry W. Brook, Human Population Reduction is not A Quick Fix for Environmental Problems, 111 proc. nat’l acad. sci. 16,610, 16,613–15 (2014) (estimating that growth in world population during the twenty-first century will be material and arguing that this growth is “virtually locked-in”), with Brian C. O’Neill et al., Global Demographic Trends and Future Carbon Emissions, 107 proc. nat’l acad. sci. 17,521, 17,525 (2010), and Brian C. O’Neill et al., Plausible Reductions in Future Population Growth and Implications for the Environment, 112 proc. nat’l acad. sci. E506 (2015) (critiquing the Bradshaw-Brook estimates and contending that world birth rates can decline sufficiently during the twenty-first century to bring about “significant” reductions in the production of greenhouse gases).

  62. 62.

    These impacts are summarized in Part 1.4 of supra Chapter 1. See also Ahmet Atıl Aşıcı & Sevil Acar, Does Income Growth Relocate Ecological Footprint?, 61 ecological indicators 707, 712 tbl. 2 (2016) (studying 116 nations at different income levels during the years 2004–2008; finding that increases in population density reduce human-induced environmental impacts stemming from domestic production activities but have no effect on environmental impacts stemming from imports; reporting that the overall R2 for the relationship between population density and production-generated environmental impacts is just .07 (model (2)).

  63. 63.

    Brian E. Green, Explaining Cross-National Variation in Energy Consumption: The Effects of Development, Ecology, Politics, Technology, and Region, 34 int’l j. sociol. 9, 20–21 tbl. 2, 24–27, tbl. 4 (models 3, 4, and 5) (2004). See Burak Güneralp et al., Global Scenarios of Urban Density and Its Impacts on Building Energy Use Through 2050, 114 proc. nat’l acad. sci. early ed. 8945, 8947–48 (2017) (estimating the impact of urban-population density in regions of the world on energy use in each of these regions during the period 2010–2050).

  64. 64.

    org. for econ. co-operation and dev. & china dev. res. found., trends in urbanisation and urban policies in oecd countries: what lessons for china? 78, 145, 148 (2010), available at www.oecd.org/urban/roundtable/45159707.pdf. See generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning for Density: Promises, Perils and a Paradox, 33 J. land use & envtl. l.1 (2017) (analyzing the policy push for urban redevelopment, and hence for higher housing density, in the United States).

  65. 65.

    Among individuals, parenthood has been hypothesized to create concern with the environment, because parents are assumed to care about the legacy they leave their children. The hypothesis, however, lacks firm empirical support. Gregory O. Thomas et al., The Impact of Parenthood on Environmental Attitudes and Behaviour: A Longitudinal Investigation of the Legacy Hypothesis, 39 population & env’t 261, 262–63, 265–68, 272 (2018) (finding that the birth of a child did not have a general, material influence on the environment-pertinent views and actions of the parents of the child). A collective reduction in childbearing, therefore, is unlikely to alter the prevalence of views and actions bearing on the environment.

  66. 66.

    nat’l ctr. for health stat., technical appendix to the cohort fertility tables for all, white, and black women: united states, 1960-2005, at 11 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/cohort_fertility_tables.htm.

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    u.s. dept. of health & human serv., trends in the well-being of america’s children and youth, 2002, at 28 (2002), https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/trends-well-being-americas-children-and-youth-2002.

  68. 68.

    Among women who are 50 years of age or older, childbearing is rare but not nonexistent. In 2018, to give an example, U.S. women who were 50–54 years of age (the oldest age group for which birth data are reported) had fewer than 1,000 births; the total number of births in 2018 to all U.S. women was nearly 3.8 million. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2018, nat’l vital stat. rep., vol. 68, no. 13 (Nov. 27, 2019), at 4, 14 tbl. 3.

  69. 69.

    The data for the CBR were obtained from: nat’l ctr. for health stat., fertility tables for birth cohorts by color: united states, 1917–73, at 125 tbl. 5-A (1976) (data for 1940 to 1960) [hereinafter fertility tables]; Nat’l Ctr. for Health Stat., Cohort Fertility Tables – Table 2. Cumulative Birth Rates, by Live-Birth Order, Exact Age, and Race of Women in Each Cohort from 1911 through 1991: United States, 1961–2006 (data for 1961 to 2006); Nat’l Ctr. for Health Stat., Cohort Fertility Tables – Table 2. Cumulative Birth Rates, by Live-Birth Order, Exact Age, and Race of Women in Each Cohort from 1957 through 1995: United States, 2007–2010 (data for 2007 to 2010). For the CBR, the age of women in a given year is their age on January 1 of that year. The documents cited in this footnote are available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/cohort_fertility_tables.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2020).

    The data for the TFR were obtained from: fertility tables, supra, at 4 tbl. 1A (data for 1920 through 1939); Nat’l Ctr. for Health Stat., Table 1–7: Total Fertility Rates and Birth Rates, by Age of Mother and Race: United States, 1940–2003, vital statistics of the united states, 2003, vol. i, natality (data for 1940 to 1969), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus/vsus_1980_2003.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2020); Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2015, nat’l vital stat. rep., vol. 66, no. 1 (Jan. 5, 2017), at 20 tbl. 4 (data for 1970 to 2010).

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    Thomas J. Espenshade et al., The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility, 22 population res. & pol’y rev. 575, 577, 580–81 & tbl. 1 (2003).

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    walt kelly, pogo: we have met the enemy and he is us (1972).

  72. 72.

    intergovernmental science-policy platform on biodiversity and ecosystem services, the global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services: summary for policymakers 12, 13, 15, 29, 37 (2019) [hereinafter ipbes report]; Paul R. Ehrlich & Anne H. Ehrlich, Can A Collapse of Global Civilization Be Avoided?, 280 proc. royal soc’y b: biological sci. 1, 6 (no. 1754, 2013) (summarizing estimates of the capacity of Earth to sustain the current size of the human population given (i) existing technology and (ii) present types of resource use and present levels of resource consumption; observing that the estimates indicate that this capacity has been exceeded; and concluding that the probability of averting an uncontrollable breakdown in world civilization during the twenty-first century is evidently “small”). In addition, see Part 1.4 in supra Chap. 1.

  73. 73.

    Figure 3.2 is based on the data that were used to construct Fig. 1.1. See note 27 in supra Chap. 1 for the sources of the data. My calculations for Fig. 3.2 assumed that each year had 8,766 hours, a number obtained by spreading the extra day in a leap year over four years, i.e., by imputing 365.25 days to every calendar year.

  74. 74.

    Nicole L. Boivin et al., Ecological Consequences of Human Niche Construction: Examining Long-term Anthropogenic Shaping of Global Species Distributions, 113 proc. nat’l acad. sci. 6388 (2016). In addition, see note 69 in supra Chap. 1.

  75. 75.

    Scholars have not yet agreed on a single definition of the word “Anthropocene.” Valentí Rull, The “Anthropocene”: Neglects, Misconceptions, and Possible Futures, 18 sci. & soc’y 1056 (2017). Nonetheless, the contention that the Earth has entered another geological epoch is accepted by many scholars. E.g., Jan Zalasiewicz et al., When Did the Anthropocene Begin? A Mid-Twentieth Century Boundary Level is Stratigraphically Optimal, 383 quaternary int’l 196, 201 (2015) (contending that Earth entered the Anthropocene epoch in the middle of the twentieth century when industrialization accelerated and started to have global, synchronized effects).

  76. 76.

    The aphorism was evidently first put into writing in 1937 and is credited to three literary figures, viz., Laura Riding, Robert Graves, and Paul Valéry. Quote Investigator, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/12/06/future-not-used (last visited July 14, 2020).

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    Jane Lubchenco, Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for Science, 279 sci. 491, 492 (1998).

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    Jane Lubchenco et al., The Sustainable Biosphere Initiative: An Ecological Research Agenda: A Report from the Ecological Society of America, 72 ecology 371, 377 (1991); laurie laybourn-langton et al., inst. pub. pol’y res., this is a crisis: facing up to the age of environmental breakdown 4–5, 14–15, 20, 31 (2019), https://www.ippr.org/research/publications/age-of-environmental-breakdown; Digby J. McLaren, Population Growth — Should We Be Worried?, 17 population & env’t 243, 255, 257–58 (1996); Randers, supra note 57; Turner, supra note 57. See also ipbes report, supra note 72, at 12, 15, 37 (observing that “[t]he rate of global change in nature during the past 50 years is unprecedented in human history” and naming, inter alia, population growth as a cause of this change).

    If the ecosystem of the Earth has thresholds that when passed trigger severe global environmental effects, the consequences of exceeding the thresholds would be world-wide and potentially cataclysmic. The natural sciences, however, are unsure that a broad range of such thresholds exist. Compare Barry W. Brook et al., Does the Terrestrial Biosphere Have Planetary Tipping Points?, 28 trends in ecology & evolution 396 (2013) (concluding that presently available empirical evidence indicates that there are few major ecological thresholds), with José A. Rial et al., Nonlinearities, Feedbacks and Critical Thresholds within the Earth’s Climate System, 65 climatic change 11 (2004) (describing the sources of tipping points in the climate of the planet). See also Yiqi Luo et al., Coordinated Approaches to Quantify Long-Term Ecosystem Dynamics in Response to Global Change, 17 global change biology 843, 846 tbl. 1, 852 (2011) (pointing out and discussing the obstacles encountered in empirical research on ecosystem thresholds).

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    ctr. for res. on the epidemiology of disasters, u.n. office for disaster risk reduction, human cost of disasters: an overview of the last 20 years, 2000–2019, at 6 ([2020]). For more information on this report, see note 96 in supra Chapter 1.

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    pew res. ctr., public and scientists’ views on science and society 51,102 (2015).

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    E.g., Marlieke E. A. de Kraker et al., Mortality and Hospital Stay Associated with Resistant staphylococcus aureus and escherichia coli Bacteremia: Estimating the Burden of Antibiotic Resistance in Europe, 8(10) plos med., Oct. 2011, at 1, 5–6; the review on antimicrobial resistance, tackling drug-resistant infections globally: final report and recommendations 4, 11–12 (2016).

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    Derek MacFadden et al., Antibiotic Resistance Increases with Local Temperature, 8 nature climate change 510, 511, 513 tbl. 1 (2018); Kate E. Jones et al., Global Trends in Emerging Infectious Diseases, 451 nature 990, 991 Fig. 1, 992 tbl. 1, [994] (2008). Accord, N. Bruinsma et al., Influence of Population Density on Antibiotic Resistance, 51 J. antimicrobial chemotherapy 385, 387–89 & tbls. 2 & 3 (2003) (using data from samples of residents of three cities in different Western nations; comparing rates of antibiotic resistance across the cities; finding, without a multivariate analysis, that the rates were generally highest in the most densely populated city and were generally lowest in the least densely populated city).

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    MacFadden et al., supra note 82, at 511, 513 tbl. 1; Sarah F. McGough et al., Rates of Increase of Antibiotic Resistance and Ambient Temperature in Europe: A Cross-National Analysis of 28 Countries Between 2000–2016, biorxiv, Sept. 12, 2018, at [1], [10], [16] tbl. 1, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/early/2018/09/12/414920.full.pdf.

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    Note 59 and accompanying text in supra Chap. 1.

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    reid a. bryson & thomas j. murray, climates of hunger (1977); Jun Yin et al., Climate Change and Social Vicissitudes in China over the Past Two Millennia, 86 quaternary res. 133, 142 (2016).

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    Robert McLeman, Thresholds in Climate Migration, 39 population & env’t 319, 333 (2018).

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    Michael Berlemann & Max Friedrich Steinhardt, Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Migration — A Survey of the Empirical Evidence, 63 cesifo econ. stud. 353, 377 (2017) (review of research). See also Raphael J. Nawrotzki et al., Do Rainfall Deficits Predict U.S.-Bound Migration from Rural Mexico? Evidence from the Mexican Census, 32 population res. & pol’y rev. 129, 135, 139, 150 (2013) (finding that deficits in rainfall in already dry areas of Mexico promoted migration from Mexico to the United States). Weather-caused environmental problems, however, more often generate long-distance migration within a country than migration between countries. David J. Kaczan & Jennifer Orgill-Meyer, The Impact of Climate Change on Migration: A Synthesis of Recent Empirical Insights, 158 climatic change 281, 284, 288, 294, 296 (2020). See also Fernando Riosmena et al., Climate Migration at the Height and End of the Great Mexican Emigration Era, 44 population & dev. rev. 455, 463–64, 478, 480 (2018) (analyzing data on Mexico from the 2000 and 2010 censuses of that country; limiting the data analysis to local areas having a population below 15,000; pointing out that emigrants from these areas to another nation usually go to the United States; finding that climate changes reduced emigration to another nation from “most” of these areas but increased emigration to another nation from (i) low and high socioeconomic areas and (ii) areas having a history of migration; concluding that climate problems tend to produce domestic migration and migration over short distances); Raphael J. Nawrotzki et al., Domestic and International Climate Migration from Rural Mexico, 44 hum. ecology 687, 689, 695 tbl. 5, 696 (2016) (analyzing data on members of households in rural areas of Mexico during the period 1986–1999; finding that two out of three measures of high temperatures were associated with emigration from these areas to the U.S.; finding, too, that increases in the number of “very wet” and “extremely wet” days reduced the odds of emigration from these areas to the U.S. but did not affect the odds of migration within Mexico).

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    Michel Beine & Lionel Jeusette, A Meta-Analysis of the Literature on Climate Change and Migration 18–19 (Munich Soc’y for the Promotion of Econ. Research, CESifo Working Paper No. 7417, 2018).

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    Guy Abel & Nikola Sander, Quantifying Global International Migration Flows, 343 sci. 1520, 1521 Fig. 3 (2014) (reporting that the number of international migrants in 196 nations was 39.9 million during 2000–2005 and 41.5 million during 2005–2010).

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    Mathilde Maurel & Michele Tuccio, Climate Instability, Urbanisation and International Migration, 52 J. dev. stud. 735, 749 (2016) (analyzing data on more than 200 nations for 1960 to 2000).

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    Note 44 and accompanying text in supra Chapter 1.

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    Thomas Faist, Cross-Border Migration and Social Inequalities, 42 ann. rev. sociol. 323, 337–38, 340–41 (2016).

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    Notes 88 to 91 and their accompanying text in supra Chap. 1.

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    See generally sail vol. 2, supra note 20, at 240–42 (positing three ways in which large-scale migration may alter social life). The sociological impact of migration presumably involves at least some of the factors that determine the incidence of migration. For example, the extent and nature of social networks affects the probability of migration by individuals. Miriam Manchin & Sultan Orazbayev, Social Networks and the Intention to Migrate 9–11, 30–31 (Harvard Ctr. for Int’l Dev., Working Paper No. 90, 2018) (studying the impact of social networks on the intentions of residents in more than 150 nations to migrate to another country). If cultures are not the same in the degree to which they promote and support the existence of such networks, the members of some cultures will have higher rates of emigration than the members of other cultures. A high-emigration culture will generate social conflict in a destination area if this culture is dissimilar to the dominant culture of the destination area.

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    Graeme S. Cumming & Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Linking Economic Growth Pathways and Environmental Sustainability by Understanding Development as Alternate Social-Ecological Regimes, 115 proc. nat’l acad. sci. 9533, 9536–37 (2018).

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    40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2020).

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    Notes 8 to 10, and their accompanying text, in supra Chap. 1.

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    Supra note 2 and its accompanying text.

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    See, e.g., john mckeown, god’s babies (2014); abdel rahim omran, family planning in the legacy of islam (1992).

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    Douglas W. Vick, Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law, 31 J. l. & soc’y 163, 189–90 (2004).

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    leeuw & schmeets, supra note 49, at 237. Cf. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 u. chi. l. rev. 1, 6–10, 15–16 (2002) (concluding that the empirical research published in U.S. law journals is of poor quality).

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Barnett, L.D. (2021). Environmentalism and Interdisciplinarity. In: Demography and the Anthropocene. SpringerBriefs in Environment, Security, Development and Peace, vol 35. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69428-9_3

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