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Westphalian Sovereignty and the 4th Industrial Revolution: In Search of Legitimate Governmental Control Over Online Content

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Democracy and Globalization

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 10))

Abstract

This contribution deals with state sovereignty over Internet content regulation at the eve of the 4th industrial revolution. The author argues that the territorial state has taken a central role in regulating Internet content spread on international Internet platforms. The increasing body of state regulation has led to conflicting norms, authorities, and interest. Some state regulation has extraterritorial effects limiting the sovereignty of other states to regulate internet content to their liking. This raises questions about what ‘sovereignty over the Internet’ means. This contribution explores what the role of the state should be in regulating Internet content. Departing from what is often referred to as Westphalian sovereignty, the author argues that this conception of sovereignty offers clarity of what regulation is authoritative. Westphalian sovereignty offers a territorial delineation of rules and authority. Westphalian sovereignty also enables political communities to establish their own rules appropriate to their situation without external interference. Westphalian sovereignty, in other words, offers a pluralistic account of Internet content regulation. On the Internet, a clear delineation in different jurisdictions is, however, not easy to be made. Therefore, the author discusses seven different models of Internet content regulation that take the global nature of the Internet into account. The models discussed vary from no state intervention at all to far-reaching state control over the Internet resulting in fragmentation of the Internet in local networks to ensure the effectivity of state regulation. In discussing these models, the relationship between different states is discussed but also the relationship between state- and private actors require attention. The author reviews propositions to bring Internet content regulation under the control of international organisations such as the United Nations. As this contribution shows, human rights law offer only so-far direction in regulating Internet content. The legal and cultural norms on what is perceived acceptable on the Internet differs between jurisdictions. Fragmentation of the Internet in national networks is the ‘most Westphalian’ solution to conflicts arising between regulation of different states. Requiring Internet platforms to ‘align’ their policies to the jurisdiction where they offer their services to users offers the best trade-off between the unique tenets of Westphalian sovereignty and the specific features of the Internet. There is, however, a downside. Different states may enact different—and even conflicting—norms which may lead to a patchwork of legislation. Because Internet platforms often issue their community guidelines internationally, it is almost impossible for Internet platforms to abide by all national laws. In regulating Internet platforms, the author suggests that cooperation between states—harmonising the law that regulates Internet content—may offer a solution. This contribution also emphasises that state laws should not be enacted lightly and that it must be questioned how state regulation impact the sovereignty of other states.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Internet content can be best defined as ‘Information made available by a website or other electronic medium.’, see Lexico (2019).

  2. 2.

    Schmidt and Cohen (2014), p. 4.

  3. 3.

    Berman (2012), p. 284.

  4. 4.

    Schwab (2017), p. 8.

  5. 5.

    Schwab (2017), p. 67.

  6. 6.

    Schwab (2017), p. 9.

  7. 7.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 26–33.

  8. 8.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 150.

  9. 9.

    Morozov (2012), p. xiii.

  10. 10.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. xi.

  11. 11.

    Internet content can be best defined as ‘Information made available by a website or other electronic medium.’, see Lexico (2019).

  12. 12.

    Perset (2010), p. 4.

  13. 13.

    Balkin (2018), pp. 2021–2025.

  14. 14.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 158.

  15. 15.

    As was the case in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l’antisémitisme (LICRA), 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).

  16. 16.

    Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1 [BGBL I] at 3352 (Ger.).

  17. 17.

    Citron (2018), p. 1045; See also Bradford (2020), pp. 164–166.

  18. 18.

    For example, Case C-131/12 Google/Spain [2014] OJ C 212, 7.7.2014.

  19. 19.

    Case C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek [2019] OJ C 413, 9.12.2019, paras. 48–53.

  20. 20.

    United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), “General Comment no. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (CCPR/C/GC/34) (Geneva: United Nations, 2011), para. 12. digitallibrary.un.org/record/715606.

  21. 21.

    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

  22. 22.

    United Nations Treaty Collection, “Declarations and Reservations - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” United Nations, accessed May 18, 2020. treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec.

  23. 23.

    Securing the Protection off Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), 124 Stat. 2380 (2010).

  24. 24.

    Goldman (2020), p. 170; 28 USCA § 4102 (West 2010, Westlaw Next through PL 116–150).

  25. 25.

    Allawi (2018), pp. 30–35.

  26. 26.

    In the EU context, the principle of subsidiarity should be mentioned, see Article 5 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union 2012 O.J. (C 326), 18 (EU); In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights the margin of appreciation must be mentioned, see Gerards (2019), pp. 160–197.

  27. 27.

    Cliteur and Ellian (2019), p. 18.

  28. 28.

    Fuller (1969), p. 39; Cliteur and Ellian (2019), pp. 17–18. Similar and other criteria are found in, for example, Bingham (2011); Raz (2011).

  29. 29.

    Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1 [BGBL I] at 3352 (Ger.).

  30. 30.

    Tworek and Leerssen (2019), p. 2.

  31. 31.

    Tworek and Leerssen (2019), pp. 5–6.

  32. 32.

    Klos (2020), pp. 48–51.

  33. 33.

    Armitage (2013), pp. 27–28.

  34. 34.

    Walzer (2004), p. 172.

  35. 35.

    Kissinger (2015), p. 26.

  36. 36.

    Armitage (2013), p. 191.

  37. 37.

    Kissinger (2015), p. 27.

  38. 38.

    Kissinger (2015), p. 363.

  39. 39.

    Walzer (2004), p. 174.

  40. 40.

    Besson (2011).

  41. 41.

    Loughlin (2012), p. 185.

  42. 42.

    Loughlin (2016), p. 60.

  43. 43.

    Loughlin (2012), p. 186.

  44. 44.

    Goldsmith and Posner (2005), pp. 193–197.

  45. 45.

    Loughlin (2016), p. 60.

  46. 46.

    Hart (2012), pp. 94–95.

  47. 47.

    Walzer (2004), p. 173.

  48. 48.

    This is also reflected in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ Of course, this provision is a limitation on the sovereignty of states (prohibition of violence) and a recognition of this sovereignty.

  49. 49.

    Cliteur and Ellian (2019), p. 158.

  50. 50.

    Cliteur and Ellian (2019), p. 122.

  51. 51.

    Ziegler (2013).

  52. 52.

    Schmitt et al. (2017), p. 26.

  53. 53.

    Schmitt et al. (2017), p. 315.

  54. 54.

    Schmitt et al. (2017), p. 26.

  55. 55.

    For example, Paragraph 1 of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 reads ‘Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law’.

  56. 56.

    Philpott (2001), p. 92.

  57. 57.

    See, for example, Cohen (2012), pp. 320–323.

  58. 58.

    Goldsmith and Posner (2005), pp. 193–197.

  59. 59.

    Goldsmith and Posner (2005), p. 212.

  60. 60.

    Berman (2012), p. 250.

  61. 61.

    A map of differences among Internet intermediary regulation regimes can be found in The Center for Internet and Society, “About the World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap),” Stanford Law School, accessed December 11, 2019. wilmap.law.stanford.edu/about.

  62. 62.

    Article 19, “Internet Intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability,” article19.org, August 20, 2013, accessed December 11, 2019. article19.org/resources/internet-intermediaries-dilemma-liability.

  63. 63.

    O’Sullivan (2019).

  64. 64.

    Balkin (2018), p. 2019.

  65. 65.

    Balkin (2018), p. 2055.

  66. 66.

    Klonick (2018), p. 1665.

  67. 67.

    ‘Privatised censorship’ has two dimensions. Firstly, ‘privatised censorship’ refers to censorship carried out by private actors under pressure of governmental actors that would be not allowed themselves to impose these content restrictions. Secondly, ‘private censorship’ may occur when all Internet intermediaries are concentrated in the hand of just a few private actors.

  68. 68.

    Nunziato (2009), pp. 1–3.

  69. 69.

    Lessig (2006), pp. 39, 173–175.

  70. 70.

    Barlow (1996).

  71. 71.

    Lessig (2006), p. 254.

  72. 72.

    Schmidt and Cohen (2014), p. 75.

  73. 73.

    Section 230 (2) (a) reads: ‘No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of--

    (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;’, see 47 USCA § 230 (West 2018, Westlaw Next through PL 116-91).

  74. 74.

    Goldman (2020), p. 162.

  75. 75.

    Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, no. 33014/05, § 63, ECHR 2011-II (extracts), 5 May 2011.

  76. 76.

    Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850, 3 (1997).

  77. 77.

    United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment no. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34), para. 39.

  78. 78.

    United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment no. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34), paras. 21–34.

  79. 79.

    Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, “Declaration on Freedom of Communication on the Internet,” coe.int, May 28, 2003, accessed December 28, 2019. rm.coe.int/16805dfbd5.

  80. 80.

    United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment no. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34), para. 43.

  81. 81.

    This was for example the case in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l’antisémitisme (LICRA), 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).

  82. 82.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 158.

  83. 83.

    Klos (2020), pp. 42–43 and 48–51.

  84. 84.

    See Bradford (2020), Chapter 5.

  85. 85.

    Goldman (2020), p. 167.

  86. 86.

    Harvey, in his turn, bases his models on models set out by Lawrence Solum, see Solum (2008).

  87. 87.

    Harvey (2019), pp. 107–108.

  88. 88.

    Harvey (2019), pp. 108–109.

  89. 89.

    Harvey (2019), pp. 109–110.

  90. 90.

    Harvey (2019), pp. 110–112.

  91. 91.

    Harvey (2019), pp. 112–113.

  92. 92.

    Harvey (2019), p. 113.

  93. 93.

    Harvey (2019), pp. 113–116.

  94. 94.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 26–27, 73.

  95. 95.

    Harvey (2019), p. 101.

  96. 96.

    Harvey (2019), pp. 115–116.

  97. 97.

    ‘Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different.’ See Barlow (1996).

  98. 98.

    Barlow (1996).

  99. 99.

    Barlow (1996).

  100. 100.

    Shahbaz (2018).

  101. 101.

    Shahbaz and Funk (2019), p. 2.

  102. 102.

    Barlow mentions property as a legal concept that does not apply to cyberspace, see Barlow (1996).

  103. 103.

    Schmidt and Cohen (2014), p. 6.

  104. 104.

    Schmidt and Cohen (2014), p. 7.

  105. 105.

    Berman (2012), p. 80.

  106. 106.

    Berman (2012), p. 44.

  107. 107.

    Berman (2012), p. 15.

  108. 108.

    Mueller (2017), p. 10.

  109. 109.

    Harvey (2019), p. 118; Kissinger (2015), p. 344.

  110. 110.

    Kissinger (2015), p. 347.

  111. 111.

    Morozov (2012), pp. 261–266.

  112. 112.

    Mueller (2017), p. 16.

  113. 113.

    European means here both the European Union and the Council of Europe.

  114. 114.

    Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 446 U.S. 74 (1980).

  115. 115.

    Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 44306/98, § 41–50, ECHR 2003-VI, 6 May 2003.

  116. 116.

    The Council of the European Union, “EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline,” consilium.europa.eu, May 12, 2014, accessed December 30, 2019. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142549.pdf.

  117. 117.

    United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment no. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34), para. 40.

  118. 118.

    Godwin (2003), p. 71.

  119. 119.

    Godwin (2003), p. 68.

  120. 120.

    Godwin (2003), p. 109.

  121. 121.

    Gillespie (2018), p. 52.

  122. 122.

    An interesting biography of the birth of a social media platform and its relations with its moderators is provided by Lagorio-Chafkin (2018).

  123. 123.

    Gillespie (2018), pp. 111–140.

  124. 124.

    Cicilline (2019).

  125. 125.

    European Commission, “Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online,” ec.europa.eu, June 30, 2016, accessed October 1, 2019. ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en#theeucodeofconduct.

  126. 126.

    European Commission, “Code of Practice on Disinformation,” ec.europa.eu, September 28, 2018, accessed October 11, 2019. ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation.

  127. 127.

    European Commission, “Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online.”.

  128. 128.

    European Commission, “Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online.”.

  129. 129.

    Balkin (2018), p. 2020.

  130. 130.

    European Commission, “Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online.”.

  131. 131.

    Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1 [BGBL I] at 3352 (Ger.).

  132. 132.

    Tworek and Leerssen (2019), p. 2.

  133. 133.

    Citron and Wittes (2017), pp. 408–409.

  134. 134.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 166.

  135. 135.

    United Nations Treaty Collection, “Depositary - Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography,” United Nations, accessed December 30, 2019. treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-c&chapter=4&lang=en.

  136. 136.

    Kalathil (2017), pp. 15–17, 9–20.

  137. 137.

    Price (2017), p. 45.

  138. 138.

    Price (2017), pp. 43–46.

  139. 139.

    The White House, “The National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America,” whitehouse.gov, September, 2018, accessed December 30, 2019, 24. whitehouse.gov/articles/president-trump-unveils-americas-first-cybersecurity-strategy-15-years.

  140. 140.

    The White House, “The National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America,” 24.

  141. 141.

    U.S. Department of State, “Global Internet Freedom Task Force,” state.gov, 2006, accessed October 4, 2019. 2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/lbr/c26696.htm.

  142. 142.

    U.S. Department of State, “Global Internet Freedom Task Force (GIFT) Strategy: A Blueprint for Action,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, December 28, 2006, accessed October 4, 2019. 2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/78340.htm.

  143. 143.

    Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “The Internet in China,” china.org.cn, June 8, 2010, accessed December 11, 2019. china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm.

  144. 144.

    Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “The Internet in China: V. Protecting Internet Security,” china.org.cn, June 8, 2010, accessed December 11, 2019. china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2010-06/08/content_20207978.htm.

  145. 145.

    Kalathil (2017), pp. 19–20.

  146. 146.

    Lessig (2006), p. 79.

  147. 147.

    BBC Monitoring, “China Web Users Debate New Rules on Online Identity,” BBC, August 29, 2017, accessed May 18, 2020. bbc.com/news/technology-41081676.

  148. 148.

    Price (2017), p. 50.

  149. 149.

    Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “The Internet in China: VI. Active International Exchanges and Cooperation,” china.org.cn, June 8, 2010, accessed December 11, 2019. china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2010-06/08/content_20207975.htm.

  150. 150.

    Vincent (2016).

  151. 151.

    Accessnow, “#KeepItOn,” accessnow.org, accessed October 4, 2019. accessnow.org/keepiton.

  152. 152.

    Price (2017), p. 49.

  153. 153.

    Morozov (2012), p. 228.

  154. 154.

    Morozov (2012), pp. 228–229.

  155. 155.

    Price (2017), p. 42.

  156. 156.

    Lee (2016).

  157. 157.

    Ackerman (2012).

  158. 158.

    Lee (2016).

  159. 159.

    Mueller (2017), p. 48.

  160. 160.

    Schmidt and Cohen (2014), pp. 82–83.

  161. 161.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 26–27, 73.

  162. 162.

    Mueller (2017), p. 49.

  163. 163.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 21–22.

  164. 164.

    Morozov (2012), p. 102.

  165. 165.

    Mueller (2017), p. 73.

  166. 166.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 74–77.

  167. 167.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 77–82.

  168. 168.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 82–84.

  169. 169.

    Mueller (2017), p. 104.

  170. 170.

    Schmidt and Cohen (2014), p. 85.

  171. 171.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 43–44.

  172. 172.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 150.

  173. 173.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 152.

  174. 174.

    Morozov (2012), p. 218.

  175. 175.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 49.

  176. 176.

    Lessig (2006), p. 39.

  177. 177.

    Lessig (2006), p. 308.

  178. 178.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 67.

  179. 179.

    Lessig (2006), p. 39.

  180. 180.

    Of course, Internet content regulation is not unique in this respect. There are also other challenges (such as environmental issues) raising cross-border legal questions.

  181. 181.

    Harvey (2019), p. 116.

  182. 182.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 152.

  183. 183.

    Klos (2020), pp. 48–51.

  184. 184.

    Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Charter states that personal data ‘must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.’ On the other hand, the more ‘traditional’ privacy rights laid down in Article 7 of the Charter states that ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’

  185. 185.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 159.

  186. 186.

    See Bradford (2020), Chapter 5.

  187. 187.

    Goldsmith and Wu (2008), p. 159.

  188. 188.

    Harvey (2019), pp. 117–118.

  189. 189.

    Klos (2020).

  190. 190.

    Bradford (2020), pp. 160–169.

  191. 191.

    Case C-131/12 Google/Spain [2014] OJ C 212, 7.7.2014.

  192. 192.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 77–78.

  193. 193.

    Mueller (2017), pp. 79–80.

  194. 194.

    For example, Paragraph 1 of Article 10 ECHR only permits ‘licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.’ Cleary, Internet intermediaries do not fall within these categories.

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Klos, M. (2021). Westphalian Sovereignty and the 4th Industrial Revolution: In Search of Legitimate Governmental Control Over Online Content. In: Sieber-Gasser, C., Ghibellini, A. (eds) Democracy and Globalization. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69154-7_5

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