Epilogue

Abstract

As we write these lines, we are looking back at 10 months of the Covid-19 pandemic, which is now going to stretch well into 2021. While it remains uncertain when and how the world will overcome this nasty virus, the pandemic will clearly leave a long-lasting impact on the political, economic and social fabric of liberal democracies in the Western hemisphere. In the past months, we were able to observe the—quite literal—human cost of the slowness of liberal democracies when faced with an external shock. Apparently, states with autocratic leadership were generally able to better protect public health by tackling such a major crisis with decisiveness and speed. However, it would be wrong to conclude that liberal democracies are per se less capable of dealing with external shocks than less democratic regimes such as those of China, Laos, or Saudi Arabia. For example, Finland, New Zealand or Canada, all model-states of liberal democracy, have so far been able to keep infection rates low, therewith protecting both the economy and public health, with relatively soft measures and the support of a majority of their constituency. A conclusion we can draw from this observation is that the existing institutional framework of western liberal democracies leaves considerable room for tailored policies—even in the case of a global emergency. Hence, as long as the fundamental principles of liberal democracy are protected, the institutional (or constitutional) framework arguably matters less for the economic and social prospects of liberal democracy than the policies implemented by those in power.