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Economic Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: A Simulation Feedback Model

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Feedback Economics

Part of the book series: Contemporary Systems Thinking ((CST))

Abstract

Organized crime satisfies the demand for protection and enforcement of property rights in the absence of effective government institutions. However, weak law enforcement alone cannot explain the cross-regional differences in mafia activity. This chapter develops a feedback model of economic causes for the rise of the Sicilian mafia. Grounded in earlier economic research, the model incorporates causal relationships between the mafia’s activities, predation, law enforcement, and the profitability of the local businesses. The model explains important historical observations such as the emergence of the mafia in wealthier regions and its absence in the poorer districts despite the greater levels of banditry. Using computational experiments with the model, we explore how different factors and feedback effects impact the mafia’s activities.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://www.iseesystems.com/. Last accessed on June 24, 2020.

  2. 2.

    An electronic version of the model is available as an online supplementary file with this chapter.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA

    Oleg V. Pavlov

  2. The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

    Jason M. Sardell

Authors
  1. Oleg V. Pavlov
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  2. Jason M. Sardell
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Oleg V. Pavlov .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wellington School of Business and Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

    Robert Y. Cavana

  2. School of Management, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

    Brian C. Dangerfield

  3. Department of Social Science & Policy Studies, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA

    Oleg V. Pavlov

  4. Department of Social Science & Policy Studies, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA

    Michael J. Radzicki

  5. University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway

    I. David Wheat

1 Electronic supplementary material

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Supplementary material 1 (ITMX 56 kb)

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Pavlov, O.V., Sardell, J.M. (2021). Economic Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: A Simulation Feedback Model. In: Cavana, R.Y., Dangerfield, B.C., Pavlov, O.V., Radzicki, M.J., Wheat, I.D. (eds) Feedback Economics. Contemporary Systems Thinking. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67190-7_6

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