Abstract
In On the Magnitude of the Soul, written around AD 388, Augustine and his interlocutor Evodius discuss the nature of the soul. At a certain point they try to come up with a definition of sensory perception (sensus). However, they realise that in order to arrive at a consistent definition a number of qualifications need to be made. One of these qualifications concerns the relation between sensory perception and knowledge (scientia). On the one hand, various examples seem to show that animals have knowledge. On the other hand, knowledge seems to require reason (ratio), that is, a mental power usually reserved for rational beings such as humans or angels. Therefore, Augustine and Evodius engage in a lively discussion of human and animal cognition and finally agree on a number of points that were to remain influential throughout the entire medieval debate.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See O’Daly (1987).
- 3.
See Augustine, De trinitate, X.XI.18, ed. Mountain (1968), 330.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
This is the classical definition of ‘human being’ as found in Porphyry, Isagoge 4.29–34, ed. Minio-Paluello (1966), 10.
- 7.
What Augustine has in mind here is a person who is linguistic (grammaticum) in the sense that this person is a trained linguist or grammarian (grammaticus).
- 8.
This does not refer to the definition of human being but to the definition of sensory perception as ‘that which changes the body and does not remain hidden from the soul’ (non latere animam quod patitur corpus) in ch. XXIII (41) of the treatise.
- 9.
This refers to Argos, the dog of Odysseus, in Homer, Odysseae, book 17, ed. Allen (1908), ll. 292–294. Its capacity to recognise its master after many years of absence became a famous example of nonhuman animal cognition.
- 10.
This might refer to Plato’s theory of knowledge, according to which knowledge is innate but forgotten, and hence has to be restored by recollection (anamnesis).
- 11.
Augustine coined the term ‘aspectus mentis’ as an analogy to physical vision. The idea is that just as we perceive things through the eyes our mind sees things through what Augustine calls the ‘eye of the mind’ (oculus mentis), that is, reason (ratio); see Van Fleteren (1999).
- 12.
See note 9.
- 13.
- 14.
Augustine does not have an elaborate theory of habituation or conditioning. But what he has in mind here is basically the kind of learning that today is explained by a stimulus-response model.
- 15.
In most cases, the term ‘belua’ was employed for larger wild animals such as lions. On this terminology see note 5.
- 16.
The term ‘pecus’ was usually applied for cattle.
- 17.
Once more Augustine employs a term for ‘animal’ (fera) that was usually applied for wild animals.
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Oelze, A. (2021). Perception, Knowledge, Reason, and Mind (Augustine, De quantitate animae, Chapters 25–28). In: Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67012-2_2
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