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Procedural Fairness and CETA: Ghosts of Decades Past

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CETA's Investment Chapter

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 13))

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Abstract

To ensure the application of the law and avoid potential abuses, the Rule of Law sets out certain procedural conditions that should be met by tribunals. The observance of procedural constraints by investment tribunals enables the law to be correctly ascertained and applied, revent arbitrators from taking extra-legal considerations into account and ensure that arbitral awards are issued without bias. For this purpose, the drafters of the CETA have introduced a permanent investment tribunal with a roster of adjudicators, a code of conduct and ethics provisions for the members of a tribunal, a mechanism for the appointment and compensation of adjudicators, and a series of other provisions to ensure procedural fairness. These provisions are supposed to deal with concerns about the arbitrators’ impartiality at an individual level and a pro-investor institutional bias that is associated with the system’s ad hoc nature. This chapter seeks to evaluate whether the institutional safeguards in CETA have the potential to ensure procedural fairness during the arbitration proceedings. Although that the contracting parties to CETA have put in place concrete provisions to ensure procedural fairness, the chapter argues that investors run the risk of being subjected to bias in favor of States in the context of investment disputes. The view of this chapter is that the method of appointment and compensation in CETA could jeopardise procedural fairness since it creates incentives for arbitrators to lean towards the state parties. Lastly, the lack of detailed criteria requiring greater diversity in the CETA tribunal is regrettable.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See generally European Commission (2017).

  2. 2.

    CETA, Art. 8. 30.

  3. 3.

    ibid.

  4. 4.

    Van Harten (2016).

  5. 5.

    See generally Sand (2011).

  6. 6.

    Van Harten (2007), pp. 122–124.

  7. 7.

    Simoes (2018), p. 109. The clear prohibition is of paramount importance due to that certain tribunals went to dismiss the claim that ‘double-hatting’ is problematic for fair proceedings. ‘It is at the core of the job description of legal counsel—whether acting in private practice, in-house for a company, or in government—that they present the views which are favorable to their instructor and highlight the advantageous facts of their instructor's case. The fact that a lawyer has taken a certain stance in the past does not necessarily mean that he will take the same stance in a future case.’ See Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/13, Decision on Claimant's Proposal to Disqualify Mr. Bottini from the Tribunal under Article 57 of the ICSID Convention, para.80.

  8. 8.

    CETA, Art. 8. 30 (1).

  9. 9.

    ibid.

  10. 10.

    ibid.

  11. 11.

    Horodyski (2010), p. 15.

  12. 12.

    General standard 2 (d) of the rules state further that ‘doubts are justifiable if a reasonable and informed third party would reach the conclusion that there was a likelihood that the arbitrator may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case as presented by the parties in reaching his or her decision.’

  13. 13.

    IBA Guidelines, General Standards 2 (c). The IBA threshold stands in contrast with the much higher threshold in the ICSID convention that imposes an excessive burden of proof on the challenging party. The ICSID Convention states that a party seeking to challenge an arbitrator may request its disqualification on the basis of any fact indicating a manifest lack of independence and/or impartiality.

  14. 14.

    Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Decision on Annulment.

  15. 15.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Professor Campbell McLachlan, Arbitrator, para. 45.

  16. 16.

    Further on this point See Giorgetti (2013a, b).

  17. 17.

    Sobota (2015), p. 316.

  18. 18.

    Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator.

  19. 19.

    ibid, para.41.

  20. 20.

    ibid. Relevant to this test, practical standard 2 (d) in the IBA Guidelines states that if an arbitrator had a strong opinion or interest in an issue relevant to the particular dispute will trigger the ‘justifiable doubt’ test.

  21. 21.

    Vito G. Gallo v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 55798, Decision on the Challenge to Mr. J. Christopher Thomas, QC, para. 36.

  22. 22.

    ibid, Resignation letter of Arbitrator J. Christopher Thomas.

  23. 23.

    Nicole Cleis (2017), p. 212. In the same vein, despite that ICSID tribunals have begun to equate ‘manifest’ with ‘easily recognizable’ authors still support that a general lowering of the standard required for ICSID arbitrator challenges is necessary. See Vasani and Palmer (2015) and Sheppard (2009).

  24. 24.

    IBA Guidelines, Explanation of General Standard 2 (d).

  25. 25.

    ibid. 1.2.

  26. 26.

    ibid. 2.1.

  27. 27.

    ibid, Practical Application 2.

  28. 28.

    ibid.

  29. 29.

    IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Part II: Practical Application of the General Standards, para. 3.

  30. 30.

    In UPS case, the applicants challenged the appointment of an arbitrator because the arbitrator was a partner and chairman of a law firm with a longstanding and significant ongoing relationship with a company that was not a disputing party but, nevertheless, had a significant interest in the outcome of the particular dispute. Relying on the ICSID standard, the tribunal rejected the challenge. See United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1.

  31. 31.

    Nicole Cleis (2017), p. 238.

  32. 32.

    ibid, p. 175.

  33. 33.

    Fach Gomez (2018), p. 26.

  34. 34.

    Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the Committee, para. 28.

  35. 35.

    IBA Guidelines, General Standards 3 (a).

  36. 36.

    ICSID Convention, Chapter 1, Rule 6 (2).

  37. 37.

    CETA, Annex 29-B, Code of Conduct for Arbitrators and Mediators, Art. 3.

  38. 38.

    IBA Guidelines, General Standards 3 (b) (a).

  39. 39.

    Fach Gomez (2018), p. 39.

  40. 40.

    Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the Committee.

  41. 41.

    ibid, para. 229.

  42. 42.

    ibid, para. 229. General Standards 3 (b). This obligation is critical given that the duty to disclose is complicated by a presumed static character. See Fernandez Perez (2018), p. 113.

  43. 43.

    Malintoppi (2008), p. 825.

  44. 44.

    ibid p. 825. General Standards 3 (d). This provision is also critical given that arbitrators might underestimate their connection with a party.

  45. 45.

    ibid. General Standards 7 (a).

  46. 46.

    Anderson (2018), p. 1162.

  47. 47.

    Tidewater Inc., Tidewater Investment SRL, Tidewater Caribe, C.A., et al. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on Claimants' Proposal to Disqualify Professor Brigitte Stern, Arbitrator, para. 43.

  48. 48.

    Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Decision on Respondent’s Proposal to Disqualify Arbitrator Dr. Yoram Turbowicz, paras. 62–66.

  49. 49.

    Niedermeyer (2014), p. 5.

  50. 50.

    Menon (2010), para. 43.

  51. 51.

    For a brief overview of the various enforcement mechanisms that guide and control the behavior of adjudicators in both public and private international law See Fisher (1996).

  52. 52.

    UN General Assembly (2018, p. 12. Furthermore, out of 75 disqualifications proposals brought at ICSID by 2019, only 5 were upheld. See ICSID Database, Decisions on Disqualifications. icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/Process/Decisions-on-Disqualification.aspx.

  53. 53.

    ICSID Convention, Art. 58.

  54. 54.

    Clein (2017), p. 231.

  55. 55.

    ibid.

  56. 56.

    ibid.

  57. 57.

    CETA, Art. 8. 30 (2).

  58. 58.

    ibid. Art, 8. 30 (3).

  59. 59.

    ibid, Art. 8. 30 (4).

  60. 60.

    ibid, Art. 8. 30 (3).

  61. 61.

    Niedermeyer (2014), p. 8.

  62. 62.

    Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, para. 26.

  63. 63.

    Empirical studies indicate that voluntary restraints have been insufficient to deal with the concerns arising from ‘double-hatting’ and other concerns relating to conflicts of interest. Nicole Cleis (2017).

  64. 64.

    Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Robert (2014), p. 13. This view is also supported by another study suggesting structural and procedural safeguards to decrease the risk of errors and systemic bias. See Franck et al. (2017).

  65. 65.

    Van Harten (2012), p. 252.

  66. 66.

    For a general overview See Gaukrodger (2018).

  67. 67.

    CETA, Art. 8. 27 (6).

  68. 68.

    ibid, Art. 8. 27 (7).

  69. 69.

    ibid, Art. 8.28 (3).

  70. 70.

    ibid, Art. 8.28 (3). Randomization in case assignment is expected to better guarantee institutional independence because it eliminates risks of outside and internal interference. By contrast, placing case assignment powers within the discretionary powers of the President of the tribunal or another body poses various risks, such as pressures and/or interferences from outsiders. See Kaufmann-Kohler and Potesta (2017), pp. 104–105.

  71. 71.

    CETA, Art. 8. 27. Puig suggests that the party appointed method characterises the dynamics of the field of investment arbitration. Since the appointment of an arbitrator may be translated into direct and indirect economic gains, it is suggested that the current method should be investigated further to limit the negative consequences. See Puig (2014).

  72. 72.

    ibid.

  73. 73.

    Sardinha (2017), p. 633.

  74. 74.

    ibid.. See generally Kaufmann and Potesta (2016), pp. 34–41.

  75. 75.

    Koskenniemi (2017), p. 352.

  76. 76.

    Waibel (2016), p. 355.

  77. 77.

    Sardinha (2018), p. 129. Along the same lines, Schwebel asks if it is to be presumed that a member of the panel appointed by a foreign investor is biased in favour of him, is there a reason to presume that adudicators appointed only by States will not be biased in favour of them ? See Stephen Schwebel as cited in Lowenfeld (2009), p. 24. According to Article 8.27 (5), fifteen members of the CETA tribunal shall be appointed for a 5-year term, renewable once.

  78. 78.

    ibid, p. 126.

  79. 79.

    Fontanelli et al. (2016), p. 205.

  80. 80.

    Horodyski (2010), p. 16.

  81. 81.

    EFILA Paper (2015), p. 15; Also See Schacherer (2016).

  82. 82.

    Rogers (2013), p. 245.

  83. 83.

    CETA, Annexes to CETA note 12.

  84. 84.

    This section’s argument stands in sharp contrast with the assurances given by the EU regarding the remote event that the parties to CETA will ‘pack’ the roster of arbitrators with pro-state individuals. Sardinha (2018), p. 25.

  85. 85.

    Howse (2017), p. 225; For a similar proposal See Devaney (2019).

  86. 86.

    Donaubauer et al. (2018), p. 20.

  87. 87.

    ibid.

  88. 88.

    Investment Treaty Working Group: Task Force Report on the Investment Court System Proposal (2016), p. 14.

  89. 89.

    ibid. There is no suggestion in the investment chapter of CETA that the appointment of members to the tribunal will be conducted in a transparent manner or whether other stakeholders will be asked to provide their opinion on the suitability of candidates.

  90. 90.

    This is very similar to the method of appointment adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union. See generally Kuiper (2017).

  91. 91.

    A recent proposal by the EU Commision about the independence of arbitrators does not permit any optimistic expectations. No reference is made to transparent proceedings or consultations with other stakeholders. See ‘Proposal for a Council Decision as regards the adoption of a code of conduct for Members of the Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal and mediators (2019).

  92. 92.

    UNCTAD (2018a), p. 9.

  93. 93.

    Gaukrodger (2017).

  94. 94.

    UNCTAD (2018b), p. 5.

  95. 95.

    CETA, Art. 8. 27 (12).

  96. 96.

    ibid.

  97. 97.

    ibid.

  98. 98.

    ibid.

  99. 99.

    The EU Commision recently proposed security of tenure and a monthly retainer fee for the members of the appellate tribunal. Approval by Council, Member States and Canada is pending. See ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on matters regarding the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal (2019).

  100. 100.

    In domestic legal systems, disputing parties do not pay adjudicators directly. Furthermore, remuneration of adjudicators does not depend on the amount of the fees collected from the disputing parties.

  101. 101.

    European Statute on the Statute of Judges, Art. 6.

  102. 102.

    Opinion 1/17 of the CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 202.

  103. 103.

    ibid, para. 202.

  104. 104.

    ibid, para. 61.

  105. 105.

    See generally Schultz (2019).

  106. 106.

    Kidane (2017), p. 145.

  107. 107.

    Gomez (2018), p. 81. In the same paper it is highlighted that since different arbitrators are from different countries the bias of other judges can mitigate one arbitrator. It is also suggested that arbitrators with homogenous profiles tend to share the same attitudes. On this basis, diversity could serve as a de-biasing agent.

  108. 108.

    Waibel and Wu (2012), p. 4.

  109. 109.

    CETA, Art. 8. 27 (4).

  110. 110.

    ibid.

  111. 111.

    For the relevant statistics See Giorgetti (2013a, b), pp. 459–460.

  112. 112.

    Dimitropoulos (2018), p. 32.

  113. 113.

    Kaufmann-Kohler and Potesta (2017), pp. 64–65.

  114. 114.

    Article 8. 27 of CETA states that the members of a tribunal will be selected on the basis of their national and, in particular, one from the EU, one from Canada and the presiding member from a neutral state. However, a prominent study by Franck maps the contours of diversity to six factors: (1) gender (2) nationality (3) age (4) linguistic capacity (5) legal training and (6) professional experiences related to arbitration. See Franck et al. (2015), p. 440. See generally Polonskaya (2018). For example, others have taken a pledge for equal representation in arbitration. See Equal Representation in Arbitration. Another example of strong assurances to diversity by an international tribunal is the International Criminal Court. Article 36 (8) of the Rome Statute provides that the State parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into account the need, within the membership of the Court, for the representation of the principal legal systems of the world, equitable geographical representation and a fair representation of female and male judges.

  115. 115.

    CETA merely stipulates that five of the members of the tribunal must be EU nationals (appointed by the EU), five shall be Canadian nationals (appointed by Canada) and the remaining five must be third-country nationals (appointed by the CETA Joint Committee).

  116. 116.

    The absence of guidance on diversity in CETA was further noted by Sornarajah. See Sornarajah (2016).

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    Kriton Dionysiou

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Dionysiou, K. (2021). Procedural Fairness and CETA: Ghosts of Decades Past. In: CETA's Investment Chapter. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66992-8_6

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