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Legal Certainty and CETA: The Fallacy of a Single Treaty As a Solution

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CETA's Investment Chapter

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 13))

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Abstract

Investment arbitration must fulfil the expectations of a wider audience and its demands for legal certainty, which is a sub-element of the Rule of Law. In particular, the Rule of Law prescribes that the law must be predictable and clearly defined in order for those subject to the law to be able to rely on it. Without legal certainty, those subject to the law will only be able to be guided by their guesses as to what the tribunal is likely to do, but these guesses will not be based on the law but on other considerations. Hence, the Rule of Law is considered as a means to protect those subject to the law from arbitrary rule and unpredictability by enhancing legal certainty. Against this background, this chapter analyses whether the provisions introduced in CETA’s Investment Chapter further legal certainty in the context of investment arbitration. In particular, this chapters goes through the drafting of the investment standards in CETA, the binding interpretative rules, the joint interpretative declarations, the provisions aiming to address the phenomenon of conflicting awards and multiple proceedings, including the appellate mechanism attached to the ISDS mechanism in CETA. The chapter finally argues that CETA’s Investment Chapter largely provides legal certainty, but stresses possible shortcomings and open questions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    European Commision (2004).

  2. 2.

    Klager (2011) and Tudor (2008).

  3. 3.

    These measures include: (a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings (b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings (c) manifest arbitrariness (d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or religious belief (e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment.

  4. 4.

    OECD indicates that many governments attempted to circumscribe the scope of the FET standard by either linking it to customary international law or to an autonomous self-contained treaty standard. See OECD (2004a, b).

  5. 5.

    Unuvar (2016), p. 36.

  6. 6.

    This method reflects Ortino’s suggestion that standards of treatment should operate as ‘rules’ rather than ‘standards’ to ensure predictability. In this context, rules have a higher degree of predictability. See Ortino (2013).

  7. 7.

    De Brabandere (2016), p. 267.

  8. 8.

    L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (15th October 1926), p. 61.

  9. 9.

    In Cargill the tribunal, when discussing about the FET standard in NAFTA, held that ‘that these words are imprecise and thus leave a measure of discretion to tribunals. But this is not unusual.’See Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, para. 285. For the same observation See Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2.

  10. 10.

    ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, para. 179.

  11. 11.

    Merrill and Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, para. 213.

  12. 12.

    Klein Bronfman (2006), p. 672.

  13. 13.

    Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, para. 154.

  14. 14.

    ibid, para 154.

  15. 15.

    MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, para. 113.

  16. 16.

    See generally Paparinskis (2013), pp. 160–166.

  17. 17.

    Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, para. 98.

  18. 18.

    Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, paras. 288 & 303.

  19. 19.

    ibid, para. 291.

  20. 20.

    One could argue that tribunals maintain the ability to interpret the FET standard in a broad manner. However, CETA has an appellate mechanism, a roster of arbitrators, and a mechanism for States to issue joint interpretative declarations. These mechanisms will ensure continuity in decision-making, thereby ensuring consistency, as well as maintaing that States control on the scope and content of investment provisions.

  21. 21.

    CETA, Art. 8. 9 (2).

  22. 22.

    For an overview See Potesta (2013).

  23. 23.

    For this argument See Ngangjoh-Hodu and Ajibo (2018).

  24. 24.

    ibid. pp. 93–94.

  25. 25.

    CETA, Art. 8.10 (4).

  26. 26.

    Unuvar argues that when it comes to the FET standard, which includes the concept of legitimate expectations, the parties have successfully articulated its elements and delimited its scope. See Unuvar (2007), p. 17. For the same argument about CETA and legitimate expectations See Nyer (2015), p. 703.

  27. 27.

    Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. V 062/2012, para. 499. Also See EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, para. 217.

  28. 28.

    ibid, para. 493.

  29. 29.

    The dangers posed by the vague scope of the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ in CETA is highlighted by other commentators as well. See Dumberry (2018), p. 109.

  30. 30.

    EU-Singapore FTA, Chapter 2, Art. 2.4.

  31. 31.

    ibid, Art. 2.4.

  32. 32.

    For an overview of the debate See OECD (2004a, b) and Reinisch (2008).

  33. 33.

    Kriebaum (2015), p. 971. In a similar fashion, the tribunal in CME v Czech held that de facto or indirect expropriation are subject to expropriation claims, a proposition which is undisputed under international law. CME Czech Republic BVv The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Award 9/2001, para. 604.

  34. 34.

    CETA, Art. 8.12.

  35. 35.

    ibid, Art. 8. 12.

  36. 36.

    ibid.

  37. 37.

    CETA, Annex 8-A (1b).

  38. 38.

    Supra note 155, LG&E, para. 188. In Biloune, the tribunal held that: ‘Expropriation may occur in the absence of a single decisive act that implies a taking of property. it could result from a series of acts and/or omissions that, in sum, result in a deprivation of property rights’ Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana (UNCITRAL), para. 209.

  39. 39.

    De Naunteil (2018), p. 133.

  40. 40.

    Ortino (2016), p. 355.

  41. 41.

    CETA, Annex 8-A (2).

  42. 42.

    ibid,Annex 8-A (2).

  43. 43.

    ibid, Annex 8-A (2).

  44. 44.

    Shirlow (2014), p. 607.

  45. 45.

    CETA, Annex 8-A (3).

  46. 46.

    Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23.

  47. 47.

    ibid, para. 81.

  48. 48.

    ibid.

  49. 49.

    Perkams argues that a variety of jurisdictions recognise a certain margin of appreciation to public institutions when they adopt regulations in the public interest. In this way, it is possible to build a more reliable and balanced foundation for the interpretation of expropriation provisions in an effort to avoid contradicting interpretations. See Perkams (2010).

  50. 50.

    Kriebaum (2014), p. 467.

  51. 51.

    Stone Sweet (2010), p. 63.

  52. 52.

    See generally Bucheler (2015), ch. 9.

  53. 53.

    Hoffmann (2020), pp. 156–158.

  54. 54.

    Bonnitcha et al. (2017), p. 106. In Tecmed, the tribunal held that:‘The government’s intention is less important than the effects of the measures on the owner of the assets or on the benefits arising from such assets affected by the measures; and the form of the deprivation measure is less important than its actual effects.’ Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, para.116.

  55. 55.

    ibid. Also See Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (formerly Crompton Corporation v. Government of Canada), para. 266.

  56. 56.

    See generally The Energy Charter Treaty, Art. 13; NAFTA, Art. 1110; Chinese Model BIT (2003), Art. 4; German Model Treaty (2008), Art. 4; UK Model BIT (2005), Art. 5.

  57. 57.

    Schill (2009), p. 196.

  58. 58.

    Batifort and Benton Heath (2017), p. 875.

  59. 59.

    For a general overview See Ziegler (2008).

  60. 60.

    Renta 4 S.V.S.A, Ahorro Corporación Emergentes F.I., Ahorro Corporación Eurofondo F.I., Rovime Inversiones SICAV S.A., Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A., Orgor de Valores SICAV S.A., GBI 9000 SICAV S.A. v. The Russian Federation, SCC No. 24/2007 (Award on Preliminary Objections), para. 94.

  61. 61.

    Maupin (2011), p. 179. For an illustration See Reinisch (2015).

  62. 62.

    ibid.

  63. 63.

    CETA, Art. 8.7.

  64. 64.

    ibid.

  65. 65.

    ibid. Art, 8.7 (4).

  66. 66.

    ibid.

  67. 67.

    İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, para. 329.

  68. 68.

    CETA, Art. 28 (3) (2).

  69. 69.

    CETA, Art. 8.31.

  70. 70.

    VCLT, Art. 31.

  71. 71.

    Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries (1966), p. 220.

  72. 72.

    Renta 4 S.V.S.A, Ahorro Corporación Emergentes F.I., Ahorro Corporación Eurofondo F.I., Rovime Inversiones SICAV S.A., Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A., Orgor de Valores SICAV S.A., GBI 9000 SICAV S.A. v. The Russian Federation, SCC No. 24/2007, para. 93.

  73. 73.

    VCLT, Art. 31 (1).

  74. 74.

    Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, para. 389.

  75. 75.

    ibid.

  76. 76.

    Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 Apr 2004 para. 46.

  77. 77.

    See generally Gazzini (2016), pp. 105–108.

  78. 78.

    Hai Yen (2014), p. 116.

  79. 79.

    CETA, Preamble.

  80. 80.

    The formulation of the preamble of CETA avoids prioritising investment protection over the regulatory power of States. In the opposite case, the tribunal in Siemens v Argentina, following a teleological approach, held that it shall be guided by the purpose of the Treaty as expressed in its title and preamble. The treaty’s objective is “to protect” and “to promote” investments. Furthermore, according to the tribunal, the preamble provides that the parties have agreed to the provisions of the Treaty for the purpose of creating favorable conditions for the investments of nationals or companies of one of the two States in the territory of the other State. See Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 (Decision on Jurisdiction), para. 81.

  81. 81.

    VCLT, Art. 32.

  82. 82.

    ibid, Art. 32.

  83. 83.

    Methanex Corporation v United States of America, UNCITRAL 2005, para. 22.

  84. 84.

    The confirmation of meaning through supplementary means can take different forms. For example, the preparatory works could provide the arbitrators with arguments that directly support the interpretation at hand. Furthermore, the preparatory work might confirm an interpretation if it appears that its content does not contradict the meaning resulting from Article 31. See Mbengue (2016), pp. 405–406.

  85. 85.

    Camuzzi International S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2, para. 134.

  86. 86.

    ibid, para. 134.

  87. 87.

    Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 228 (Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility), para. 268.

  88. 88.

    Saldarriaga (2013), p. 204; Also See Kristian Fauchald (2008).

  89. 89.

    For a paper explaining how tribunals may use other techniques to reach a decision See Pauwelyn and Elsig (2012).

  90. 90.

    Bonnitcha (2014), pp. 357–360. To this point, it has been suggested that arbitrators are not generally activists but they are merely conferred with broad authority. See generally Bjorklund (2018).

  91. 91.

    Ascensio (2016), p. 366. For the same argument See Boisson de Chazournes (2015).

  92. 92.

    For an illustration See Ishikawa (2014).

  93. 93.

    See generally Gordon and Pohl (2015), pp. 25–28.

  94. 94.

    According to Article 31 (3) (a) of the VCLT, a tribunal should apply and interpret a treaty in accordance with any subsequent agreement or practice between the parties of a dispute. A ‘subsequent agreement’ is ‘an agreement between the parties, reached after the conclusion of a treaty, regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.’ This provision is a manifestation of the intention of sovereign States to keep the interpretation of international treaties anchored to their intentions.

  95. 95.

    CETA, Art. 8.31.

  96. 96.

    ibid, Art. 8.31.

  97. 97.

    Methanex Corporation v United States of America, UNCITRAL Award 8/2005, paras. 20–21.

  98. 98.

    A report indicates that 22% of NAFTA cases (decided between 2001 and 2010) had a positive outcome for investors on their FET claims. In non-NAFTA cases where an investor alleged an FET breach, tribunals found that the state violated the standard in 62% of the cases. See UNCTAD (2012), p. 61.

  99. 99.

    TEU Article 19 (3).

  100. 100.

    CETA, Art. 31.

  101. 101.

    Kaufmann-Kohler (2011). p. 188. See generally Polanco (2018), ch. 4.

  102. 102.

    Ecuador’s attempt to secure a joint interpretation of the ‘effective means’ provision was questioned by the US as an attempt to interfere with a pending dispute. See Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America (PCA Case No. 2012-5).

  103. 103.

    Castro de Figueiredo (2015), p. 529.

  104. 104.

    For a paper illustrating the dual role of States in the context of investment disputes See Roberts (2010). In support of interpretative declarations, the tribunal in the Methanex held that if a legislature, having enacted a statute, feels that the courts implementing it have misinterpreted the legislature’s intention, it is proper for the legislature to clarify its intention. In a democratic system in which legislation expresses the will of the nation, legislative clarification in this sort of case would appear to be mandatory. The Tribunal further stated that it sees no reason why the same analysis should not apply to international law. See Supra note 90, Methanex, para. 22.

  105. 105.

    Ewing-Chow and Losari (2014), p. 14.

  106. 106.

    Gaukrodger (2016), p. 14.

  107. 107.

    Roberts (2010), p. 212.

  108. 108.

    It is interesting to note that during the CETA negotiations, the European Commission rejected a proposal that would have prohibited the possibility of issuing retroactive interpretative declarations. See Lavranos, (2016), p. 314.

  109. 109.

    See Brower (2003), p. 75.

  110. 110.

    The difference between an interpretation and an amendment arose in Pope & Talbot. The tribunal considered an interpretative declaration to be an amendment to the treaty than an interpretation. Pope & Talbot v. Canada UNCITRAL.

  111. 111.

    Kasikili/Sedudu Island, Botswana v Namibia, Judgment, Merits, [1999] ICJ Rep 1045, para. 49.

  112. 112.

    Lavranos (2016).

  113. 113.

    Gaspar-Szilagyi (2017), p. 115.

  114. 114.

    ibid, p. 115.

  115. 115.

    See generally Methymaki and Tzanakopoulosa (2016), pp. 178–180.

  116. 116.

    For a discussion See Brower (2006). Bonnitcha goes one step further by arguing that since it’s not a simple task to distinguish an interpretation from an amendment, it’s preferable to present an interpretative declaration as a prospective ‘amendment’ clarifying the level of protection provided by investment treaties than as a retrospective ‘interpretation.’ See Bonnitcha (2014), p. 350.

  117. 117.

    ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, para. 177.

  118. 118.

    CETA, Art. 30.2.

  119. 119.

    Roberts (2010), pp. 220–221.

  120. 120.

    According to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, the dispute settlement mechanism should ‘clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.’

  121. 121.

    Jojo Sushama (2014). Gal-Or argues that an appeal mechanism serves one main purpose, namely countering the risk of legal uncertainty arising from conflicting awards and, thus, serving the Rule of Law. See Gal-Or (2008), p. 45.

  122. 122.

    CETA, Art. 8.28.

  123. 123.

    ibid, Art. 8.28 (2).

  124. 124.

    Sardinha (2017), p. 515.

  125. 125.

    ibid.

  126. 126.

    Mbengue and Schacherer (2018), p. 643.

  127. 127.

    CETA, Art, 8. 27.

  128. 128.

    See generally Laura Marceddu (2016), pp. 56–58.

  129. 129.

    This has been identified as the ‘challenge of decentralization’. Hansen (2010), p. 534. Butler and Subedi have proposed the establishment of a multilateral investment organization in order to address inconsistency in international investment law. See Butler and Subedi (2017).

  130. 130.

    CETA. Art. 8. 29.

  131. 131.

    For a discussion See Legum (2008).

  132. 132.

    CETA, Art. 8.43.

  133. 133.

    ibid, Art. 8. 43 (8).

  134. 134.

    ibid, Art. 8. 43 (8).

  135. 135.

    ibid, Art. 8. 43 (10).

  136. 136.

    Dugan et al. (2008), pp. 26–33, pp. 186–190.

  137. 137.

    Kaufmann Kohler et al. (2006), p. 89. Multinational enterprises are able to take advantage of the protection of several IIAs due to the fact that they hold several legal personalities across many jurisdictions. In this way, different subsidiaries or multiple shareholders of the same company may bring simultaneous claims in different proceedings against the same respondent. As Shookman argues, bilateralism, non-exclusivity and multiple investor claims are some of the reasons behind the phenomenon of multiple proceedings. See Shookman (2010), p. 365.

  138. 138.

    CETA, Art. 8 (18) (3).

  139. 139.

    For further discussion See Wehland (2016) and Watson and Brebner (2018).

  140. 140.

    Wehland (2013), p. 219.

  141. 141.

    ibid, p. 219.

  142. 142.

    CETA, Art. 8.1 (iii) (a-b).

  143. 143.

    ibid, Art. 8 (16).

  144. 144.

    As Baumgartner argues, IIAs which accord protection on purely formal basis, letting suffice incorporation, they can be considered as inherently treaty-shopping friendly. On the contrary, States that prescribe additional substantive criteria in BITs, the more difficult it will become for an investor to create and use a corporate vehicle for the sole purpose of bringing a claim as an eligible investor under a given investment treaty. See Baumgartner (2016), ch. 8.

  145. 145.

    CETA, Art. 8.24.

  146. 146.

    ibid, Art. 8.22 (f-g).

  147. 147.

    ibid, Art. 8. 24 (a-b).

  148. 148.

    ibid, Art. 8. 24 (a-b).

  149. 149.

    The total rejection of an umbrella clause by the drafters of CETA constitutes a decisive attempt to address multiple proceedings. Umbrella clauses usually permit an investor to include a contractual undertaking under the ‘umbrella’ of protection of an IIA. Consequently, an investor is able to hold a host state accountable for a contractual commitment in the same way as breaches of investment protection standards. As a result of this possibility, the distinction between a treaty claim and contractual claim is disturbed by the inclusion of an umbrella clause. Through an umbrella clause, therefore, an investor can initiate multiple procedings on the basis of different legal instruments. It is no surprise that the jurisdictional uncertainty caused by umbrella clauses has occasionally resulted in overlapping claims. Although that it has been attempted to limit the scope of the umbrella clause in an attempt to address multiple proceedings, such attempts have been unsuccesfull. See Pereira De Souza Fleury (2015), p. 688.

  150. 150.

    Dugan (2008), p. 377. The lack of hierarchical order between different courts and tribunals is the reason why Wehland argues that the role of both lis pendens and res judicata principle is more limited than frequently assumed. Wehland (2013), p. 228.

  151. 151.

    VCLT, Art. 27.

  152. 152.

    Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, Art. 3.

  153. 153.

    In support of this, the tribunal in GAMI held that each jurisdiction is responsible for the application of the law under which it exercises its mandate. According to the tribunal, it was for the Mexican judiciary to determine whether the expropriation was legitimate under domestic law. Lastly, it was held that it is for the present Tribunal to determine whether there have been breaches of international law by any agency of the Mexican government. Gami Investments, Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, para. 41.

  154. 154.

    McLachlan et al. (2017), p. 23. Also See Reinisch (2010), p. 121.

  155. 155.

    McLachlan et al. (2017) p. 125. Also See Lee (2015), pp. 365–368.

  156. 156.

    Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, para. 129.

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    Kriton Dionysiou

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Dionysiou, K. (2021). Legal Certainty and CETA: The Fallacy of a Single Treaty As a Solution. In: CETA's Investment Chapter. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66992-8_4

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