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The Backlash Against Investment Treaty Arbitration: Treat the Cause and Not the Symptom

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CETA's Investment Chapter

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 13))

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Abstract

This chapter explores the cause behind the backlash against investment arbitration, and subsequently, identifies the method through which the contracting parties to CETA have responded. For this purpose, the chapter provides a brief historical account of investment arbitration and then turns to its normative foundations. The inquiry in the first two parts lays the groundwork for better explaining the root cause behind the backlash against this dispute settlement mechanism. The chapter then outlines the concerns driving the legitimacy crisis and, subsequently, looks at the public law framework that was used by the contracting parties to CETA in an effort to respond to the criticism against investment arbitration. It is subsequently argued that the legitimacy crisis in investment arbitration can be explained only if it is acknowledged that investment disputes go beyond the mere interest of States. Because of this function, the main issue with investment arbitration is its nonconformity with public law rules and principles that aim to protect a number of interests that go beyond States’ interests. On this basis, it is finally argued that the backlash against investment arbitration reflects fundamentally a Rule of Law crisis within investment law’s dispute settlement mechanism. Since the legitimacy crisis is rooted in a deeper Rule of Law crisis, it appears that the latter constitutes the principal normative assumption on which existing arguments against investment arbitration are based. In other words, this chapter argues that the legitimacy crisis in investment arbitration is a priori a Rule of Law crisis.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Newcombe and Paradell (2008), p. 2.

  2. 2.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 3.

  3. 3.

    Vattel (2008), p. 315.

  4. 4.

    Miles (2013), p. 33.

  5. 5.

    ibid.

  6. 6.

    Newcombe and Paradell (2008), pp. 1–10. A famous example of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ is the dispatch of a European armada to Venezuela as a response to the unwillingness of Venezuela’s government to repay its debt. See Hood (1977).

  7. 7.

    A usual method of redress was diplomatic espousal, where an investor’s home government was espousing the investor’s cause of action. See generally Dugan et al. (2008), pp. 26–33.

  8. 8.

    Sornarajah (2011), p. 20.

  9. 9.

    Newcombe and Paradell (2008), p. 10.

  10. 10.

    Bray (2018), pp. 111–118.

  11. 11.

    Lauterpacht (1991), p. 15.

  12. 12.

    Schefer (2016), p. 7.

  13. 13.

    Preziosi (1989), p. 656.

  14. 14.

    Garcia-Mora (1950), pp. 205–208.

  15. 15.

    ibid.

  16. 16.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 45.

  17. 17.

    ibid, p. 45.

  18. 18.

    Montt (2009), p. 57.

  19. 19.

    Thomas and Gimblett (2011), pp. 661–662.

  20. 20.

    ‘Mexico – United States: Expropriation by Mexico of Agrarian properties owned by American citizens’ (1938), p. 181.

  21. 21.

    Lipson (1985), pp. 16–19.

  22. 22.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 49.

  23. 23.

    ibid.

  24. 24.

    Braun (2010), pp. 491–492.

  25. 25.

    Root (1910).

  26. 26.

    Halsbury’s Laws (2010), paras. 462–463.

  27. 27.

    For a study on decolonization and international investment law See Pahuja (2013), Ch. 4.

  28. 28.

    See generally Dolzer (1986).

  29. 29.

    See UNGA Resolution 1803, promoted by developing countries and communist regimes, which sets forth that FDIs remain subject to the domestic law of the host state and the compensation for expropriation should be ‘appropriate’ rather than ‘prompt, adequate and effective’.

  30. 30.

    Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Art. 12.

  31. 31.

    For the efforts of developing countries to perpetuate the dominance of Western nations through International Law See generally Linarelly et al. (2018), Ch. 3.

  32. 32.

    ibid.

  33. 33.

    UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (1974). www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm. Accessed 1/5/2020.

  34. 34.

    For the history of the ‘Washington Consensus’ See Williamson (2004).

  35. 35.

    ibid.

  36. 36.

    ibid.

  37. 37.

    Muchlinski (2011), p. 4.

  38. 38.

    See generally Salacuse (1999).

  39. 39.

    The first BIT was concluded between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. For a brief history of BITs See Vandevelde (2009).

  40. 40.

    See generally UNCTAD (2000), pp. 1–6; Salacuse (2007).

  41. 41.

    History of the ICSID Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Publications, 2009), p. 484.

  42. 42.

    ICSID Website, Index. icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx. Accessed 15/3/2020.

  43. 43.

    Parlett argues that foreign investment protection challenged the doctrine of diplomatic protection as individuals were given the right to initiate claims directly against sovereign States. See generally Parlett (2011), pp. 103–119.

  44. 44.

    See generally Shihata (2009).

  45. 45.

    ICSID Convention, Art. 35.

  46. 46.

    ICSID Convention, Section 6, para. 54.

  47. 47.

    For a relatively recent example of these difficulties See Sürmeli v. Germany, no. 75529/01, §§ 62–74, ECHR 2006-VII.

  48. 48.

    Yang (2016).

  49. 49.

    Reisman (2017), p. 12.

  50. 50.

    For example, the International Court of Justice has played a minor role in investment dispute settlement. Very limited cases involving investment disputes have been brought to the court for which several of them the court rejected jurisdiction. The Barcelona Traction and ELSI cases demonstrate the inadequacy of the ICJ to settle investment disputes. See generally Desierto (2012).

  51. 51.

    It is interesting to note that the drafters of ICSID did not have in mind that investment arbitration would be used for treaty dispute settlement, but to resolve disputes arising from contracts between foreign investors and States. See Lowenfeld (2009), p. 55.

  52. 52.

    For an overall view on the ‘minimum standard of protection’ See Dumberry (2016), Ch. 2.

  53. 53.

    Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd (1970) ICJ 1, para. 89.

  54. 54.

    ibid, para. 89.

  55. 55.

    Calamita (2015), p. 111.

  56. 56.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 54.

  57. 57.

    See generally Poulsen (2015), Ch. 2.

  58. 58.

    See generally St John (2018), Ch. 1.

  59. 59.

    See generally Subedi (2016), Ch. 3.

  60. 60.

    ibid.

  61. 61.

    Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), p. 78.

  62. 62.

    Fatouros further added that most of the attempts to conclude a multilateral treaty failed because the draft codes of investment protection were unbalanced and one-sided. See Argyrios (1961), p. 99.

  63. 63.

    Jagdish Bhagwati once described this complex network of international agreements as a ‘spaghetti bowl.’ See Bhagwati (1995).

  64. 64.

    Despite that international investment law consists of thousand of IIAs, their substantial and procedural similarities (standards of treatment and dispute settlement mechanism) allows us to draw certain general conclusions. These similarities have led scholars to characterise this body of IIAs as an international investment regime. See generally Salacuse (2010) and Schill (2009).

  65. 65.

    For a discussion See Echandi (2011).

  66. 66.

    Schneiderman (2016a), p. 23.

  67. 67.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 14.

  68. 68.

    Bolivar (2005), p. 751.

  69. 69.

    Kenneth (1998), p. 4.

  70. 70.

    Vaughan (2007), p. 37.

  71. 71.

    Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), p. 77.

  72. 72.

    SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, para. 116.

  73. 73.

    Bianchi (2016), p. 21.

  74. 74.

    See generally Rosado de Sa Ribeiro and Jose Guterres Costa Junior (2015), pp. 421–426; Cassese (2005), p. 692.

  75. 75.

    For a comprehensive outline of the conceptual and methodological approaches on International investment law See Schill (2011b).

  76. 76.

    For example D’Aspremont explains that although is necessary to draw a bright line between law and non-law, legal formalism is unable to describe the entire phenomenon of law. See generally D’Aspremont (2011), Ch. 2.

  77. 77.

    See generally Coleman (2002).

  78. 78.

    See generally Hutchinson (2017).

  79. 79.

    This is discussed in detail in the following sections. For indicative reading See Schill (2010).

  80. 80.

    For a thorough analysis See Douglas (2003) and Roberts (2015).

  81. 81.

    For a case that involves environmental laws and investment protection See Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1. In para. 72 the tribunal held that expropriatory environmental measures—no matter how beneficial to society as a whole—are similar to any other expropriatory measures that a government may take in order to implement its policies. Furthermore, according to the tribunal, where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains. Also See Martinez-Fraca and Ryan Reetz (2014) and Titi (2014).

  82. 82.

    Blackaby and Partasides (2015), Ch. 1.

  83. 83.

    ibid.

  84. 84.

    Lando (1985), p. 747.

  85. 85.

    ibid, pp. 747–748.

  86. 86.

    Walde (2010), p. 177.

  87. 87.

    Romak S.A (Switzerland) v The Republic of Uzbekistan PCA Case No. AA280, Award (26 November 2009). The reasoning in para. 171 represents this view. According to the tribunal, the panel has not been entrusted, by the Parties with a mission to ensure the coherence or development of jurisprudence. Furthermore, in the panel’s view, its mission is to resolve the present dispute between the parties in a reasoned and persuasive manner, irrespective of the unintended consequences that the tribunal’s analysis might have on future disputes in general.

  88. 88.

    Paulsson (2013), p. 13. For a detailed survey on the world of commercial arbitrators See Dezalay and Garth (1996), Ch. 1.

  89. 89.

    See generally Christopher Thomas and Kaur Dhillon (2017), pp. 476–480.

  90. 90.

    Mills (2011), p. 469. Also See UN General Assembly – International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’.

  91. 91.

    Perrone (2016), p. 621.

  92. 92.

    Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004.

  93. 93.

    Walde (2009), p. 727.

  94. 94.

    See generally Miller and Hicks (2005), pp. 8–10.

  95. 95.

    ibid.

  96. 96.

    See generally Bockstiegel (2012).

  97. 97.

    Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL. In para. 3 the tribunal held that the investment chapter of NAFTA which contains an ISDS mechanism is ‘a significant public system of private investment protection’.

  98. 98.

    For the sociological dimension of the investment arbitration community and how its commercial law foundations influence decisions See Hirsch (2014). On page 154, the author argues that panels that give weight to their law-making role are more likely to take into account public policy objectives and seek a balance between the competing interests. On the other hand, panels that emphasize their role in settling a dispute between the disputing parties are less prone to give weight to broader policy issues involved in the dispute.

  99. 99.

    Van Harten (2007), p. 152.

  100. 100.

    International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, Separate Opinion, UNCITRAL, para. 12.

  101. 101.

    United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2015), p. 128. Kahale, a well-established practitioner in the field, characterised the ISDS as the ‘wild west’ of international law and arbitration. See Kahale (2018).

  102. 102.

    ibid.

  103. 103.

    ibid.

  104. 104.

    See generally Dupuy and Vinuales (2013).

  105. 105.

    Gaukrodger and Gordon (2012), pp. 17–23.

  106. 106.

    See generally Brower and Blanchard (2014), Franck (2015) and Nelson (2010).

  107. 107.

    Emilio Agustin Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, para 54.

  108. 108.

    Salini Costruttori S.p.a and Italstrade S.p.A v Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, para 119.

  109. 109.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8.

  110. 110.

    LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1.

  111. 111.

    Hansen (2010), p. 524.

  112. 112.

    Ronald S. Lauder v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Award 9/2001.

  113. 113.

    CME Czech Republic BVv The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Award 9/2001.

  114. 114.

    Kreindler (2010), p. 127.

  115. 115.

    Paulsson (1995), p. 257.

  116. 116.

    McLachlan et al. (2017), p. 23.

  117. 117.

    See generally Schneiderman (2016b), Karl (2008), Caron and Shirlow (2018) and Fowles (2015).

  118. 118.

    Miller and Hicks (2005).

  119. 119.

    ILC Articles, Art. 25.

  120. 120.

    Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, para 307.

  121. 121.

    ibid, para 300.

  122. 122.

    For a detailed analysis of the awards dealing with Argentina’s financial collapse See Kurtz (2010).

  123. 123.

    See generally Korzun (2017), pp. 373–380.

  124. 124.

    Salacuse (2010), p. 453.

  125. 125.

    Appleton (2013), p. 25.

  126. 126.

    Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.

  127. 127.

    See generally Munro (2005).

  128. 128.

    Pope & Talbot v. Canada UNCITRAL, Award in Respect of Damages of 31 May 2002, para. 110.

  129. 129.

    Interpretation of NAFTA Chapter 11 – Provisions adopted by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission.

  130. 130.

    Kyla (2011), p. 609. See generally Cote (2014).

  131. 131.

    Peterson (2013).

  132. 132.

    O’Sullivan (1979), p. 112.

  133. 133.

    For a seminal paper See Langford et al. (2017).

  134. 134.

    Van Harten (2007).

  135. 135.

    ibid.

  136. 136.

    Holiday Inns SA/Occidental Petroleum v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1.

  137. 137.

    Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19.

  138. 138.

    Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a member of the Tribunal. Para. 30. Also See ICSID Convention, Article 57.

  139. 139.

    Art. 57 of the ICSID Convention stipulates that for a disqualification application to succeed, the applicant must establish manifest lack of independent judgment.

  140. 140.

    Nicole Cleis (2017), p. 4.

  141. 141.

    Adeleke (2015), p. 7.

  142. 142.

    Bonnitcha et al. (2017), p. 246.

  143. 143.

    Telefónica S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/4, Dissent to Procedural Order No. 1 (Unofficial English Translation) para. 27.

  144. 144.

    For further discussion See Sarkinovic (2016).

  145. 145.

    Gaukrodger and Gordon (2012), p. 19.

  146. 146.

    ibid, p. 19.

  147. 147.

    ibid.

  148. 148.

    ibid, p. 23.

  149. 149.

    Kreindler (2010), p. 526.

  150. 150.

    Supra note 105.

  151. 151.

    For an English case discussing this principle See R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256.

  152. 152.

    For this argument See Yackee (2008).

  153. 153.

    In defence of investment arbitration See Brower and Schill (2009). For a critical discussion See Van Harten (2010).

  154. 154.

    The G20 is a forum for the governments from 19 States and the EU. G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking (July 2016).

  155. 155.

    Hoffmeister and Alexandru (2014), pp. 380–381. For a study on EU Foreign Investment Law See Dimopoulos (2012).

  156. 156.

    ibid, pp. 380–381.

  157. 157.

    Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore) (2011). See generally Council of the European Union, Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, (2018); Schreuer (2016), pp. 737–738.

  158. 158.

    The EU accepts that investment arbitration resembles a public law system as it deals with the relationship between individuals and States. See generally European Commission (2017).

  159. 159.

    See generally Vadi (2015), pp. 41–43; Von Bogdandy and Venzke (2014), Ch. 3. On analogies and investment arbitration See Paparinskis (2014) and Roberts (2006).

  160. 160.

    Ortino (2012), p. 6; Schill (2011a).

  161. 161.

    See generally Franck (2007), pp. 365–366; Ginsburg (2006).

  162. 162.

    Council of the European Union, Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, (2018).

  163. 163.

    Kingsbury and Schill (2009), p. 1.

  164. 164.

    Van Harten and Loughlin (2006), p. 122.

  165. 165.

    See generally Lowe (2010), Ch. 1.

  166. 166.

    Kingsbury et al. (2005), p. 17. For another seminal paper on Supranational Governance and Global Administrative Law See Esty (2006).

  167. 167.

    Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL. The tribunal held that a case-specific mandate is not license to ignore systemic implications. To the contrary, it arguably makes it all the more important that each panel renders its specific decision with sensitivity to the position of future panels and an awareness of other systemic implications.

  168. 168.

    Van Harten (2007), p. 64.

  169. 169.

    ibid.

  170. 170.

    Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, para. 90.

  171. 171.

    ibid, para. 90.

  172. 172.

    Indicatively, Ulfstein argues that the international judiciary, including investment tribunals, may interfere in most subjects of constitutional concern, thus making the distinction between international and domestic issues blurred. Additionally, the combination of the vague standards with the ‘evolutive’ interpretation of international tribunals speak to the fact that these tribunals are conferred with sovereign powers that could hardly be foreseen at the treaty’s adoption and ratification. Eventually, the constitutional functions of international tribunals raise concerns regarding accountability. See generally Ulfstein (2009).

  173. 173.

    See generally Stone Sweet and Grisel (2017).

  174. 174.

    Chen attempts to provide a ‘superior’ solution to the legitimacy crisis through a traditional approach, yet his arguments are limited to the regulatory power of States. In particular, he argues that by focusing on states’ intentions when interpreting the standards of treatment it will be possible for states to take back control and protect their regulatory powers. Nevertheless, he fails to mention other aspects of the legitimacy crisis i.e. impartiality, transparency and multiple proceedings. See generally Chen (2015).

  175. 175.

    Von Bogdandy et al. (2009), pp. 4–5. For the purposes of the study, legitimacy is understood very broadly as the desirability or the appropriateness of legal rules and institutions. See generally Franck (1990), Ch. 1; Grossman et al. (2018).

  176. 176.

    European Commission (2015), p. 1.

  177. 177.

    ibid, p. 1.

  178. 178.

    Council of the European Union (2016) Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States.

  179. 179.

    TEU, Article 21.

  180. 180.

    CETA. Art. 8. 29.

  181. 181.

    Crawford (2010), p. 13.

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Dionysiou, K. (2021). The Backlash Against Investment Treaty Arbitration: Treat the Cause and Not the Symptom. In: CETA's Investment Chapter. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66992-8_2

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