Abstract
The chapter underlines that the entire Baltic area and especially the Finland Bay offer a large terrain for the realisation of the warfighting doctrines of Air-Sea Battle, and for the US projections of military forces over long distances, in other words for rapid invasive operations in the direction of St. Petersburg waged with the aim to destroy the maximum amount of the Russian A2/AD systems. From the neorealist point of view, all of NATOʼs exercises organised as a response to the annexation of the Crimea resulted in a new shortening of the distances between the armed forces of NATO and Russia. They accelerated the process of the new imbalance of security threats as well as the substantial changes in their perceptions. As a result, they dangerously reinforced the military tension in this part of the Old Continent. The chapter introduces a new term, the Stoltenberg doctrine, and describes it as a very sophisticated verbal game with the referential objects of the NATO expansion and its growing military presence on the territories of new member states. The chapter concludes that the two waves of NATO expansion led to a dangerous military tension in Europe which is symbolised by the big military exercises of NATO (namely Saber Strike, Swift Response, and Defender-Europe) and of the RF (namely Zapad 2017).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Carpathian Russia was the extreme western part of the USSR, which had belonged to Czechoslovakia in the period between 1918 and 1939, which was the golden period of this region. But after the end of WW II it was rendered to the USSR following a request of J. Stalin. Within the framework of the philosophy of Václav Klaus, this fact could hypothetically be used as an argument for a military inclusion comparable with that made by Saakashvili 40 years later.
- 2.
An excellent Swiss diplomat who is internationally appreciated for her long-term outstanding engagement on the field of international aid and peacekeeping missions. She led the European Union investigation into the causes of the 2008 South Ossetia War, and represented the OSCE in the 2015 negotiations about the Minsk II agreement concerning the war in Donbass.
- 3.
Globalnaya Navigatsionayya Sputnikovaya Sistema [GLONASS], or, in English, Global Positioning System.
- 4.
He held the post of the President of the Russian Federation between 7 May 2008 and 7 May 2012.
- 5.
The DDR had 108,000 km2 with 20 million inhabitants, the Czech Republic 79,000 km2 with more than 10.6 million inhabitants, Poland 313,000 km2 with 39 million inhabitants, Hungary 93,000 km2 with 10 million inhabitants, Lithuania 65,000 km2 with 2.8 million inhabitants, Latvia 64,500 km2 with 2 million inhabitants, Estonia 45,300 km2 with 1.3 million inhabitants, Slovakia 49,000 km2 with 5.5 million inhabitants, Slovenia 20,200 km2 with 2 million inhabitants, Bulgaria 111,000 km2 with 7 million inhabitants, and Romania 240,000 km2 with 20 million inhabitants.
- 6.
Viktor Yanukovych was the Prime Minister of Ukraine between 4 August 2006 and 18 December 2007, and the President of Ukraine between 25 February 2010 and 22 February 2014.
- 7.
The political annexation of the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR was decided upon and imposed by Nikita Khrushchev during his reign as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
- 8.
The separatist movement includes a long range of self–proclaimed commanders of battalions, deputies and ministers.
- 9.
Volgograd is one of the 13 “Town–Heroes” from WW II; this fact that plays an enormously important role in the mentality of Russians.
- 10.
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard is a teacher and researcher at the University of Oslo, where she does work on Russia and nuclear strategy affairs.
Sources
Allison, R. (Ed.). (2006). Putinʼs Russia and the Enlarged Europe . London: Chatham House.
Allison, R. (2014, November). Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules. International Affairs, 90(6), 1255–1297.
ANAKONDA 14. (2014, September 10). ANAKONDA 14—The Largest Exercise of Polish Army. Available at: https://defence24.com/anakonda-14-the-largest-exercise-of-polish-army.
Bahr, E., & Neuneck, G. (2015, April–May). Against Renuclearising Europe. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy.
Baranets, V. (2009, August 6). Lessons from the Caucasus: One Year Later. Website of Komsomolskaya Pravda, quoted on BBC Mon FS1 FsuPol iu/osc.
BBC. (2009, September 30). Georgia ʻStarted Unjustified Warʼ. BBC.
Berzins, J. (2014, October 14). Russian New Generation Warfare: Implications for Europe. European Leadership Network.
Bialos, J. P., & Koehl, S. L. (2012, June 25). The NATO Response Force—Facilitating Coalition Warfare Through Technology Transfer and Information Sharing. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Biden, J. R. Jr., & Carpenter, M. (2018, May 10). How to Stand Up to the Kremlin. Foreign Affairs.
Biggest Ever National Exercises. Biggest Ever National Exercises UK and US Biggest Outside Participants. http://www.icds.ee/blog/article/hedgehog-estonias-biggest-military-exercise-of-all-time-does-everyquill-really-count/; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/raf-typhoons-intercept-russian-aircraftnear-estonia.
Blechman, M. M., & Moore, M. R. (1983, April). A Nuclear-weapon-free Zone in Europe. Scientific American, 248(4), 37–43.
Bowen, A. (2017). Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy in Eastern Ukraine. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(3–4), 312–343.
Brenner, M. J. (Ed.). (1998). NATO and Collective Security. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Brenner, M. (2016). Washingtonʼs Putin Obsession. Défense et Stratégie, 40 (Autumn), 5.
British Army. (2016, April 21). 16 Air Assault Brigade and 11e Brigade Parachutiste—British Army. Available at: www.army.mod.uk›NewsandFeatures.
Brooke-Holand, L. (2016). NATOʼs Military Response to Russia. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7276.
Burns, N. (2014, March 26). Three Myths About Putin’s Russia by Nicholas Burns. Globe Columnist.
Bush, G. W. (2004). Remarks Following Discussions with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and an Exchange with Reporters. Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62702.
Carter, A. (2016–2017). A Strong and Balanced Approach to Russia. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. December 2016–January 2017.
Charbonneau, L. (2007, February). Putin Says U.S. Wants to Dominate World. Reuters.
Chauprade, A., & Thual, F. (1999). Dictionnaire de géopolitique (Dictionary of geopolitics) (2nd ed.). Paris: Ellipses.
Clark, N. (2012, February 10). 10 Years on, Putin’s Munich Speech Continues to Resonate. www.rt.com›Op-ed.
Clem, R. (2018, November). Military Exercises as Geopolitical Messaging in the NATO-Russia Dynamic: Reassurance, Deterrence, and (In)stability. The Strategist, 2(1), 133–136. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/865.
Clinton, H. (2014a, March 6). Hillary Clinton Says Vladimir Putinʼs Crimea Occupation… Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/06/hillary-clinton-says-vladimir-putins-crimea-occupation-echoes-hitler.
Clinton, H. (2014b, March 5). Hillary Clinton Says Putinʼs Actions Are Like ʻWhat Hitler Did… Available at: www.washingtonpost.com›news.
Cockburn, H. (2017, September 15). Zapad 2017: Russia Kicks off Huge Military Exercises on Europe’s Border. The Independent. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/zapad-2017-russia-milita….
Conradi, P. (2018). Who Lost Russia? How the World Entered a New Cold War. Oneworld.
Cornell, S. E. (2017). The Raucous Caucasus. Available at: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/05/02/the-raucous-caucasus/.
Deudney D., & Ikenberry, G. J. (2009–2010). The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, December 2009–January 2010.
Eichler, J., & Tichý, L. (2013). Lukáš Tichý: USA a Ruská federace: komparace z pohledu bezpečnostni ́ a strategické kultury. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů.
Emmott, R. (2017, September 7). Germany Disputes Size of Russian Wargames, Predicts 100,000 Troops. Reuters.
Fedorov, Y. E. (2008). The Sleep of Reason: The War on Georgia and Russia’s Foreign Policy. Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky, Research Paper, 5/2008, 19–21.
Felgenhauer, P. (2008, July 31). Russian Rail Road Troops Complete Mission in Abkhazia. The Jamestown Foundation.
Ferdinando, L. (2016, February 25). Breedlove: Russia, Instability Threaten U.S., European Security Interests. Available at: https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/673338/breedlove….
Ferris, E. (2017, October 4). The True Purpose of Russiaʼs Zapad Military Exercises. Why Moscow Wanted to Send a Message to Minsk.
Fidler, S., & Sevastopulo, D. (2007, February 10). Putin Rails Against US Foreign Policy. Financial Times.
Finn, P. (2008, August 9). Russian Air, Ground Forces Strike Georgia. The Washington Post.
Fleming, B. P. (2011, May 5). Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art (pdf). United States Army Command and General Staff College.
Frear, T. (2015, August 12). Anatomy of a NATO Exercise. Available at: www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org›commentary.
Frear, T., Kulesa, L., & Kearns, I. (2014, November). Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014. European Leadership Network.
Friedman, G. (2008, September 2). The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy. Stratfor Global Intelligence.
Friedman, G. (2015). Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe. New York: Doubleday.
Friedman, G. (2020). The Storm Before the Calm: America’s Discord, the Coming Crisis of the 2020s, and the Triumph Beyond. New York: Doubleday.
Freedman, L. (2014, June–July). Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management. Survival. Global Politics and Strategy, 56(3), 7–42.
Galeotti, M. (2019). Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid. London: Routledge.
Gehring, T., Urbanski, K., & Oberthür, S. (2017). The European Union as an Inadvertent Great Power: EU Actorness and the Ukraine Crisis. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(4), 727–743.
Girard, R. (2015, May 12). Pourquoi donc humilier la Russie? Le Figaro.
Girard, R. (2017). Quelle diplomatie pour la france: prendre les réalités telles qu’elles sont. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2017, 22–24.
Giuliani, E. (2015, March 11). NATO and Russia Simultaneously Stepping Up Military Presence in the Black Sea Region. Politics.
Gorbatchev, M. (2015, January). De la chute du mur de Berlin au risque d´une nouvelle guerre Froide. La Revue internationale et stratégique, 17–22.
Gordon, M. R., & Schmitt, E. (2017). Russia’s Military Drills Near NATO Border Raise Fears of Aggression. Available at: www.nytimes.com›2017/07/31world›europe.
gov.pl. (2015). Available at: http://mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/2015-10-02-dragon-15-najwieksze-tegoroczne-cwiczeniewp/.
Grossman, E. (2006, April 8). Air Force Proposes New Strike Missile. Military.com.
Hooker, R. D. (2015, June). Operation Baltic Fortress, 2016: NATO Defends the Baltic States. The RUSI Journal, 160(3), 26–36.
Hybrid Warfare. (2015). Challenge and Response. In The Military Balance 2015.
Ikenberry, G. J. (2014, May/June). The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order. Foreign Affairs.
Kent, N. (2017, October 3). Book Review: Sevastopol’s Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin. The RUSI Journal, 75–77.
Keohane, R. O. (Ed.). (1986). Neorealism and Its Critics (p. 378). New York: Columbia University Press.
Keohane, R. O. (1988, Summer). Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism: The Origins of Alliances. International Security, 13(1), 169–176.
Kissinger, H. (2014, March 5). To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/…/.
Klein, M. (2016). Russiaʼs Military: On the Rise? (Transatlantic Academy Paper Series, no. 2), 11–12.
Кoncepcija vnešnej politiky. (2008). Ministerstvo inostrannych del Rossijskoj federacii 2008. Кoncepcija vnešnej politiky Rossijskoj federaci. Utverdena prezidentom Rossijskoj federacii D. A. Medvedevym, 12 июля 2008 г. http://www.mid.ru.
Kroenig, M. (2015, February–March). Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57(1), 49–70.
Kucera, J. (2015, March 13). NATO Picks Site for Military Training Center in Georgia. EurasiaNet. Available at: www.eurasianet.org/node/72526,‎.
Kuchins, A. C., & Mankoff, J. (2016). The South Caucasus in a Reconnecting Eurasia: U.S. Policy Interests and Recommendations. Available at: https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161007_Kuchins_SouthCaucasusReconnectingEurasia_Web.pdf.
Lavey, A. M. (2015, May 14). US, Georgian Soldiers Train Together on Close Quarters Techniques. Available at: www.army.mil/…/U_S___Georgian_Soldiers_train_together_on_close_quarters_techniques/.
Lavrov, S. (2007, September 3). 2007 Speech at MGIMO University on the Occasion of the Start of a New Academic Year. http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070.
Lidovky.cz. (2008, August 18). https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/za-valku-muze-gruzie-mysli-si-klaus.A080818_104236_ln_domov_bat.
Lindley-French, J. (2014). Ukraine: Understanding Russia. The RUSI Journal, 159(3), 36–39.
Maco, J. (2016). Beyond Positive Attraction: Russia’s Soft Power Projection in Georgia. St Andrews: University of St Andrews. Available at: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jakubmaco/detail/treasury/education:365550826/?entityUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_treasuryMedia%3A(ACoAAB9d9NIB98kTT03Z2X6E_BX84H1XT5TdxII%2C1502806622647.
MacFarlane, N., & Menon, A. (2014). The EU and Ukraine. Survival. Global Politics and Strategy, 56(3), 95–101.
Manchanda, S. (2009, September 30). Report Blames Georgia for Starting War with Russia: Newspapers. EarthTimes. Archived from the original on 2 October 2009.
Mankoff, J. (2009). Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Marchis, S. (2014, June 18). Lithuanian President, Dignitaries Visit Saber Strike 2014. Available at: http://www.army.mil/article/128187/.htm.
Matthews, O. (2008, November 21). Dmitry Medvedevʼs Grand Strategic Ambitions. Newsweek.
McFaul, M. (2018). Russia as It Is. A Grand Strategy for Confronting Putin. Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018 Issue, 81–92.
McFaul, M., Sestanovich, S., & Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Faulty Powers. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2014 Issue.
Mead, W. R. (2014). The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers. Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014 Issue.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014 Issue.
Medveděv, D. A. (2008, November 5). Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow.
Melvin, M. (2014). Sevastopol: Crimean Citadel from Potemkin to Putin. RUSI Journal, 159(3), 70–76.
Melvin, M. (2017). Sevastopol’s Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
Military Balance. (2009–2016).
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. (2015). English Translation. Available at: https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029.
Muchin, V. (2008, August 4). V armii: Voenno-ekonomicheskie manevry. Nezavisimaia Gazeta.
Mukhin, V. (2010, January 18). Catastrophic Look of the Russian Army. Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 2.
NATO. Available at: www.nato.int.
NATO. (2002). NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality. Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19572.htm.
NATO. (2008). Bucharest Summit Declaration. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.
NATO. (2014a, September 5). Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
NATO. (2014b, May 16). Nato’s Steadfast Javelin 1 Exercise Underway in Estonia. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109929.htm.
NATO. (2014c, September 8). NATO Exercise Steadfast Javelin II Tests Allied Interoperability. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/eu/natohq/news_112999.htm.
NATO. (2015a, March 9). NATO Response Force/Very High Readiness Joint Task Force: Fact sheet.
NATO. (2015b, February 6). Defence Ministers Agree to Strengthen NATOʼs Defences, Establish Spearhead force. nato.int (Press release). Brussels, BE: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NATO. (2015c, September 6). ‘Spearhead’ Force Deploys for First Time, Exercise Noble Jump Underway. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_120512.htm. June 2015–19 June 2015.
NATO. (2015d, October 20). Available at: News: Alliance Kicks off Live Military Exercise Trident … NATO.https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_123995.htm.
NATO. (2015e, October 20). News: Alliance Kicks off Live Military Exercise Trident …—NATO. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_123995.htm.
NATO. (2019). NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. nato.int, May 2017. Available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_04/20190402_1904-factsheet_efp_en.pdf.
NATO SHAPE. shape.nato.int›nato-response-force… Available at: https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-force--very-high-readiness-joint-task-force.
Nedelin, A.V., Levshin, V. I., & Sosnovsky, M. E. (1999). O primenenii iadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalastii voennikh dyestvii [On the Use of Nuclear Weapons for the de-Escalation of a Military Conflict]. Voyennaya Mysl, 3(May–June), 34–37.
Neumann, I. B. (2006). Russia as a Great Power. In Hedenskog, Jakob et al. (Eds.), Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security Under Putin (pp. 13–28). London and New York: Routledge.
Neumann, I. B. (2016). Russiaʼs Europe, 1991–1996: Inferiority to Superiority. International Affairs, 92(6), 1381–1399.
Nichol, J. (2009, March 3). Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. Interest (pdf). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf, 4.
Obama, B. (2014, March 17). Statement by the President on Ukraine—Obama White House… obamawhitehouse.archives.gov.
OʼHanlon, M. E. (2017). Beyond NATO: A New Security Architecture for Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Operation Atlantic Resolve. United States Department of Defense. Available at: www.defense.gov/…atlanticresolve/FactSheet_Operat….
Parry, R. (2019, December 10). Cheering a ʻDemocraticʼ coup in Ukraine. consortiumnews.com.. Available at: https://consortiumnews.com/2019/12/10/cheering-a-democratic-coup-in-ukraine/.
Persson, G. (Ed.). (2016). Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective—2016, FOI.
Pifer, S. (2015, April–May). Nato’s Response Must be Conventional, Not Nuclear. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57(2), 120–124.
Pleshakov, C. (2017). The Crimean Nexus: Putin’s War and the Clash of Civilizations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Pomerantsev, P. (2014, May 6). How Putin Is Reinventing Warfare. Foreign Policy.
Pomerantsev, P., & Weiss, M. (2014). The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money. The Interpreter. Available at: http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Menace_of_Unreality_Final.pdf.
Putin, V. (2007, February 10). Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. kremlin.ru.
Putin, V. (2014, March 18). Address by President of the Russian Federation. President of… Available at: kremlin.ru›events›president›news.
Putin, V. (2017a, November 20). Bлaдимиp Пyтин пpoвoдит cepию coвeщaний c pyкoвoдcтвoм Mинoбopoны и BПК. Regnum.Ru.
Putin, V. (2017b, November 22). Coвeщaниe c pyкoвoдcтвoм Mинoбopoны, oбopoннo-пpoмышлeннoгo кoмплeкca, глaвaми миниcтepcтв и peгиoнoв. Kremlin.ru.
Putin, V. (2017c, November 22). Пyтин пpикaзaл пpeдпpиятиям гoтoвитьcя к вoйнe. Nezavisimaya gazeta.
Reuters. (2017, October 12). Russia Accuses U.S. of Illegally Building Up Eastern Europe Forces. Reuters.
Rynning, S. (2015, May). The False Promise of Continental Concert: Russia, the West and the Necessary Balance of Power. International Affairs, 91(3), 539–552.
Saakashvili, M. (2008a, August 11). The War in Georgia Is a War for the West. The Wall Street Journal.
Saakashvili, M. (2008b, December 2). Georgia Acted in Self-defense. The Wall Street Journal.
Sakwa, R. (2015, February 4). Dangerous Plan to Arm Ukraine. Letters: Professor Richard Sakwa and… The Guardian.
Schadlow, N. (2014, August 18). Peace and War: The Space Between. War on the Rocks.
Shakarian, P. (2014, November 14). Gorbachevʼs Landmark Berlin Speech. Russia Direct. https://russia-direct.org/opinion/gorbachevs-landmark-berlin-speech.
Shalal, A. (2017, July 20). U.S. General Says Allies Worry Russian War Game May Be ʻTrojan Horseʼ.
Shanker, T. (2008, August 16). Russians Melded Old-school Blitz with Modern Military Tactics. The New York Times.
Simonian, Y. (2009a, January 27). Chernomorskii flot dreifuet v Ochamchiru [The Black Sea Fleet Is Drifting Towards Ochamchire]. Nezavisimaia Gazeta.
Simonian, Y. (2009b, January 30). Moskva prikroet Abkhaziiu s vozdukha. [Moscow Covers Abkhazia from the Air]. Nezavisimaia Gazeta. http://www.ng.ru/politics/2009-01-27/1_flot.html.
Stewart, P. (2016, August 12). U.S. General Calls on Russia to Allow Observers at Military Drills. Reuters.
Stoltenberg, J. (2017, June 20). Joint Press Point with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė. NATO.
Strategija nacionalnoj bezopsansoti. (2009). Sovet bezopsansoti Rossijskoj federacii 2009. Strategija nacionalnoj bezopsansoti Rossijskoj federacii do 2020 g., 12 maja 2009 g., no 537. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html.
Tagliavini, H. (2014, November 20). Address by the Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini to the OSCE Permanent Council. Vienna.
The Economist. (2017, August 10). Russia’s Biggest War Game in Europe Since the Cold War Alarms NATO. The Economist.
The Guardian. (2003, March 10). Iraq: Russia and France Threaten to Use Veto.
Thornton, R. (2011, June). Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1071.pdf, 16–20.
Thornton, R. (2015, August). The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare: Responding to Russian Information Warfare. The RUSI Journal, 160(4), 40–48.
Traynor, I. (2009, September 30). Russia and Georgia Set to Share Blame for South Ossetia Conflict. The Guardian.
Tsygankov, A. P. (2010). Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (2nd ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Týden.cz. (2008a, August 18). Available at: https://tyden.cz/knize-se-pustil-do-klause-kvuli-gruzii-76181.html.
Týden.cz. (2008b, August 18). Available at: https://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/domaci/postoje-ceskych-politiku-k-valce-na-kavkaze-se-ruzni_76195.html.
Ukraine Freedom Support. (2014). S.2828—Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 113th. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2828.
Ukraine Support. (2014, March 27). H.R.4278, Ukraine Support Act 113th Congress (2013–2014). Available at: www.congress.gov›bill›house-bill›4278.
UN. (2014, March 27). General Assembly Adopts Resolution… United Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm.
U.S. Army. (2014, October 20). U.S. Army Europe Conducts Exercise Saber Junction. Available at: http://www.army.mil/article/132332/U_S__Army_Europe_conducts_exercise_Saber_Junctio/.
Ven Bruusgaard, K. (2016). Russian Strategic Deterrence. Survival. Global Politics and Strategy, 58(4), 7–26.
Vendil Pallin, C., & Westerlund F. (2009). Russiaʼs War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20(2), 400–424.
Vláda, Č. R. (2008, August 26). Premiér M. Topolánek: Rusko nemůže omezovat svobodu svých sousedů. Available at: https://vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php.
Walt, S. M. (2015, February 9). Why Arming Kiev Is a Really, Really Bad Idea. Foreign Policy.
Waltz, K. N. (2000). NATO Expansion: A RealistʼS View. Contemporary Security Policy, 21(2): Explaining Nato Enlargement, 35.
Worley, W. (2017, August 21). Russia Causes Alarm with ʻLargest Everʼ Military Drills in Belarus. The Independent.
www.aco.nato.int. (a). Available at: http://www.aco.nato.int/-nato-warships-participate-in-exercise-breeze-2014-.aspx.
www.aco.nato.int. (b). Available at: http://www.aco.nato.int/nato-allies-begin-naval-exercise-baltops-in-the-baltic-sea.aspx.
www.agerpres.ro. (2015). Available at: http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2015/04/20/mircea-dusa-and-general-bradshaw-to-participatein-wind-spring-15-multinational-exercise-18-27-15.
www.jfcnaples. (2015). Available at: www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page11122031/2015/jfc-naples-commander-announces-exercise-increased-nato-capability-in-romania-.aspx.
www. worldbulletin. (2015). Available at: http://www.worldbulletin.net/balkans/161780/bulgaria-hosts-breeze-2015-naval-exercise.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Eichler, J. (2021). From the War Against Georgia to the Annexation of the Crimea and the Following Increase of Military Tension. In: NATO’s Expansion After the Cold War. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66641-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66641-5_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-66640-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-66641-5
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)