Skip to main content

Analysis–Defiances–Reflections in Germany

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
New Pathways to Civil Justice in Europe
  • 528 Accesses

Abstract

The German ADR landscape is and has always been diverse and provides ADR entities with a long history as well as new faces. The year 2016 marked a transformation point when the ADR directive was implemented into a functioning yet incomplete ADR system. Then and also along with the recent change in legislation mainly concerning residual ADR entities, the policy maker was faced with the task to convert reports, data and developments of a few years into a new foundation of the country’s residual ADR structure. We will take a close look on this landscape, its issues and changes. Along this way, we identify minor and major particularities in Germany and put them into relation to a broader, European context. In our conclusion and outlook, we discuss the rather paradox observation of (residual) ADR as a promising tool of conflict resolution yet not making the quick start the public expected.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Some sections of the VSBG are amended as we draft these lines, hence when citing the VSBG we are using the act’s amended version unless stated otherwise; an English translation (of the 2016 version) can be found here http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_vsbg/englisch_vsbg.html.

  2. 2.

    Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, henceforth called ADR Directive.

  3. 3.

    Roder et al. (2017), § 1, margin no. 1.

  4. 4.

    Cf. the metaphor used by Braun (2019), p. 131.

  5. 5.

    Cf. the 203 notified entities (Recommendation 98/257/EC): European Parliament (2011), p. 17; Hodges et al. (2012), p. 87 et seq.

  6. 6.

    Schlichtungsstelle bei der Deutschen Bundesbank (established 1999); Schlichtungsstelle Post der Bundesnetzagentur (established 2001); Schlichtungsstelle Telekommunikation der Bundesnetzagentur (established 1999); Schlichtungsstelle bei der BaFin (established 2011).

  7. 7.

    Hodges et al. (2012), p. 73; Berlin (2017), p. 28 et seq.

  8. 8.

    In this chapter, ‘Allgemeine Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle (Kehl)’ is referring to the residual ADR hosted by the Zentrum für Schlichtung e.V.; when mentioning one of the other German residual ADR entities, this will be indicated.

  9. 9.

    The list of notified ADR entities published by the Bundesamt für Justiz can be found here: https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/Themen/Buergerdienste/Verbraucherstreitbeilegung/Verbraucherschlichtungsstellen/Uebersicht_node.html.

  10. 10.

    Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz (2019).

  11. 11.

    Cf. Greger et al. (2016), VSBG § 1 margin no. 2.

  12. 12.

    https://www.kfz-schiedsstellen.de.

  13. 13.

    Cf. Deutsches Kraftfahrzeuggewerbe (2017); more details on non-certified ADR providers, Biard (2018), 171, paragraphs 32 and 33.

  14. 14.

    Cf. some ‘country reports’ on the ADR Directive’s implementation across the EU: Morais Carvalho and Nemeth (2018), p. 81 (EU); Cortés (2018), p. 82 (ES/UK); Pinto-Ferreira and Campos Carvalho (2018), p. 89 (PT); Fejős (2018), p. 116 (HU); Rott (2018), p. 121 (DE); Loizou (2018), p. 126 (CY); Biard (2019), p. 109 (FR/UK).

  15. 15.

    Regulation on Information and Reporting Obligations in accordance with the VSBG (Verordnung über Informations- und Berichtspflichten nach dem Verbraucherstreitbeilegungsgesetz) of 28 February 2016; the method of a separate governmental regulation was chosen to make amendments in those rather technical issues easier as it would be for a parliamentary law, cf. Deutscher Bundestag (2015), p. 77.

  16. 16.

    Regulation on ADR entities in the financial sector in accordance with § 14 UKlaG and their procedure (Verordnung über die Verbraucherschlichtungsstellen im Finanzbereich nach § 14 des Unterlassungsklagengesetzes und ihr Verfahren) of 5 September 2016.

  17. 17.

    E.g. VVG (insurance); EVO (rail transportation); LuftVG/LuftSchlichtV (air transportation); EU-FahrgRSchG (transportation by ship); EU-FahrgRBusG (transportation by bus); BRAO (solicitors/barristers); UKlaG (banking/finance); EnWG (electricity and gas); PostG (postal services); TKG (telecommunication).

  18. 18.

    Translation by Rott (2018), p. 121.

  19. 19.

    The ADR Directive respects the pre-existing procedures in the Member States and their legal traditions, recital 15.

  20. 20.

    In the sense of Directive 2008/52/EC.

  21. 21.

    Cf. Außergerichtliche Streitbeilegungsstelle für Verbraucher und Unternehmer e.V. in Leipzig.

  22. 22.

    Rätze (2016a, b).

  23. 23.

    Regulation (EU) 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes, henceforth called ODR Regulation.

  24. 24.

    European Commission (2017a), p. 66.

  25. 25.

    Bundesamt für Justiz (2018), p. 12.

  26. 26.

    https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/main/?event=main.statistics.show (live data).

  27. 27.

    Greger (2019d).

  28. 28.

    Cf. recital 6 ADR Directive.

  29. 29.

    Deutscher Bundestag (2015), p. 42.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., p. 43.

  31. 31.

    Bundesamt für Justiz (2018), pp. 60 and 61.

  32. 32.

    Greger (2019a), p. 43; Greger (2018a).

  33. 33.

    List (Article 20(2) ADR Directive) of the Bundesamt für Justiz as of 23 July 2019.

  34. 34.

    Cf. for instance the approach of Austria, § 4(1) AStG or—to some extent—of Liechtenstein, § 4(1) AStG.

  35. 35.

    Schlichtungsstelle für den öffentlichen Personenverkehr e.V. (2019), p. 9 et seq.

  36. 36.

    Greger (2018b).

  37. 37.

    Schlichtungsstelle für den öffentlichen Personenverkehr e.V. (2019), p. 9.

  38. 38.

    On 15 May 2014 the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) issued two rulings on the validity of loan fee clauses in banks’ general terms and conditions (BGH XI ZR 405/12 and XI ZR 170/13), followed by two other rulings on 28 October 2014 concerning the limitation of reimbursement-claims of said fees (BGH XI ZR 348/13 and XI ZR 17/14).

  39. 39.

    Allgemeine Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle am Zentrum für Schlichtung e.V. (2017–2019).

  40. 40.

    Anwaltliche Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle NRW e.V. (2019), p. 1; the in 2018 newly created residual ADR entity Außergerichtliche Streitbeilegungsstelle für Verbraucher und Unternehmer e.V. in Leipzig did not publish an annual report as of this chapter’s editorial deadline.

  41. 41.

    See Greger (2019c); Roder (2018), p. 202, who is exploring potential reasons.

  42. 42.

    Berlin (2017), p. 23 et seq., margins no. 5 and 11.

  43. 43.

    Cf. the comparison laid out by Braun (2019), p. 131.

  44. 44.

    Berlin (2017), pp. 23 and 25, margins no. 8 and 15.

  45. 45.

    https://arn.se/om-arn/statistik.

  46. 46.

    According to Braun (2019), p. 131.

  47. 47.

    End of 2018 the Netherlands had roughly 17,300,000 inhabitants, Sweden 10,200,000, Germany 83,000,000.

  48. 48.

    Based on the lower population figures of both Sweden and West-Germany in 1970.

  49. 49.

    Braun (2019), p. 131.

  50. 50.

    Stichting De Geschillencommissies (2018).

  51. 51.

    Stichting De Geschillencommissies (2019).

  52. 52.

    Cf. the information on ARN via https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/main/?event=main.adr.show2.

  53. 53.

    Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (2019), p. 5; ‘Traders’ participation is low in particularly because it is a voluntary procedure which is fee-based for traders.’ Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 68; cf. l.c. p. 90: interview with ECC Austria.

  54. 54.

    Wagner (2017), p. 124; Greger (2016).

  55. 55.

    Stadler (1998), p. 2481 with further explanations and references.

  56. 56.

    Braun (2019), p. 131.

  57. 57.

    Most German states abrogated this feature in the meantime which can be implemented in the cases laid out by § 15a(1) Gesetz, betreffend die Einführung der Zivilprozessordnung; nowadays, § 253(3) no. 1 Zivilprozessordnung only asks (‘shall specify’) whether an attempt of ADR has been made prior to the court action.

  58. 58.

    Stadler (1998), p. 2487 who is emphasizing that implementing conciliation by legal obligation is unlikely to work out when there is no objective reason that this type of dispute resolution would have emerged in the first place.

  59. 59.

    Schmidt-Kessel (2019), p. 2.

  60. 60.

    See the phenomena mentioned under Sect. 9.2.1.1 which rapidly lead to increased figures.

  61. 61.

    A general comparison of incentives per EU Member State is delivered by the European Commission (2019b), p. 32.

  62. 62.

    Deutscher Bundestag (2019), p. 32; Biard (2018), p. 171, paragraph 42.

  63. 63.

    Deutscher Bundestag (2015), p. 74; Greger et al. (2016), VSBG § 36 margin no. 1.

  64. 64.

    Greger (2019a), p. 44.

  65. 65.

    Greger suggests that traders could announce to participate in ADR procedures when the claim at stake exceeds a certain amount or only considering certain types of contracts, Greger et al. (2016), VSBG § 36 margin no. 7.

  66. 66.

    Statement of a trader (anonymous) in the intermediary report on the Allgemeine Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle (Kehl), Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 90.

  67. 67.

    Cf. supra Sect. 9.2.1; Braun (2019), p. 132 mentions the example of a large company which announced early on in 2016 to be willing to participate in ADR and did have as many as five cases lodged at the Allgemeine Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle (Kehl) within nearly three years.

  68. 68.

    Cf. the test arrangement by Braun (2019), p. 132.

  69. 69.

    To 15% of consumers who addressed the Allgemeine Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle (Kehl), the entity had been mentioned by the trader, Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 47.

  70. 70.

    The German Government is considering such an evaluation cf. Rita Hagl-Kehl (2019), p. 12789.

  71. 71.

    For package holidays, the German government identified such a need in 2017 and funded the söp_Schlichtungsstelle für den Öffentlichen Personenverkehr e.V. to deal with these requests as of 2019: Rott (2018), p. 125; Greger (2019b); Haushaltsgesetz 2019, BMJV, post 684 01-059.

  72. 72.

    The residual ADR entity is not competent for ‘disputes for the resolution of which ADR entities are recognised, commissioned or established by other legal provisions’.

  73. 73.

    Service de Médiation pour le Consommateur (2019), p. 40; SPF Economie (2018), p. 12 and p. 9.

  74. 74.

    European Commission (2019c), p. 7 and footnote 38.

  75. 75.

    Nota bene: the national competent authority has to notify their scope under the ADR Directive, Article 20(1) ADR Directive.

  76. 76.

    European Commission (2015), p. 10 with an illustrated example.

  77. 77.

    I.e. competence of the telecommunication ADR entity which does not cover ‘purely’ civil law disputes.

  78. 78.

    I.e. rules of procedure of the Ombudsmann Immobilien IVD/VPB (inter alia: construction of new buildings or substantial alterations to existing buildings): § 2(1) ‘Rejection of conciliation’: ‘The Ombudsman shall refuse to carry out dispute settlement procedures if (…) 7. the amount in dispute is less than EUR 3,000 (…); Contrary to § 2(1) no. 7, the ombudsman rejects conciliation proceedings for disputes within the meaning of § 1(2) sentence 2 if the amount in dispute is less than EUR 600.00 or exceeds EUR 5,000.00.’.

  79. 79.

    I.e. § 11 no. 3 of the rules of procedure of the Ombudsstelle für Sachwerte und Investmentvermögen e.V. (investment assets).

  80. 80.

    For instance, cases where consumers invested in the so-called ‘grey’ capital market (non-regulated yet legal capital market).

  81. 81.

    European Parliament (2017), p. 64: court costs are at 14.4% of a claim’s value; Hodges et al. (2012), p. 74.

  82. 82.

    Roland Rechtsreport (2014), p. 36.

  83. 83.

    Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 83 (consumers) and p. 62 (traders).

  84. 84.

    PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2016), p. 39 for the situation in Germany in 2015.

  85. 85.

    Rott (2018), p. 121 with reference to Engel (2015), p. 1633.

  86. 86.

    Wolf (2015), p. 1659 et seq.

  87. 87.

    The Amtsgericht (county court) has inter alia a competence for civil matters up to 5000 Euros, a barrister is not necessary; in Landgericht (district court) procedures (matters from 5000.01 € upward), representation by barrister is inevitable.

  88. 88.

    Statistisches Bundesamt (2019), p. 12/13 and p. 42/43; Wolf (2015), p. 1656 et seq.; with a comment on recent developments Rebehn (2019).

  89. 89.

    Nöhre (2018), p. 99/100; she also wonders at p. 88/89 whether high figures of lawsuits are even an indicator of the state of the rule of law.

  90. 90.

    Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 44.

  91. 91.

    Roland Rechtsreport (2014), p. 36.

  92. 92.

    Röthemeyer (2016), p. 16.

  93. 93.

    Berlin (2016), p. 40 with further references.

  94. 94.

    Cf. Biard (2018), p. 171, paragraph 7.

  95. 95.

    This formulation requires the dispute mediator to pass the Zweite juristische Staatsexamen; the certification as mediator was introduced on 1 September 2017 when the Zertifizierte-Mediatoren-Ausbildungsverordnung took effect.

  96. 96.

    Geier (2016), p. 1368/1369.

  97. 97.

    Deutscher Bundestag (2015), p. 61.

  98. 98.

    § 2.1 lit. h) no. 2 VerfO Allgemeine Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle (Kehl), § 2.1 lit. h) no. 2 VerfO Anwaltliche Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle NRW and § 2(1) lit. g) no. 2 VerfO Außergerichtliche Streitbeilegungsstelle für Verbraucher und Unternehmer.

  99. 99.

    Cf. Roder (2018), p. 204.

  100. 100.

    Bundesamt für Justiz (2018), p. 66 where the diagram indicates a value of ca. 10% for 2017 (ADR entities in the financial sector); Roder (2018), p. 204; Rott (2018), p. 125.

  101. 101.

    Fichtner (2017), § 14, margin no. 60.

  102. 102.

    Gössl (2015), p. 85, estimates that in case of a rejection on that ground, ‘it is not automatically to be expected that a court will deal with the dispute’.

  103. 103.

    Gössl (2015), p. 85; ADR entities have to indicate that the recommendation may differ from the result of court proceeding anyway when they render their result, § 19(3) sentence 1 VSBG.

  104. 104.

    § 9(3) VerfO Versicherungsombudsmann e.V. and § 7(2) VerfO söp_Schlichtungsstelle für den Öffentlichen Personenverkehr e.V.

  105. 105.

    § 214(5) VVG and § 57a(1) LuftVG respectively; additionally, the Versicherungsombudsmann’s solution is binding if the claim does not exceed an amount of 10.000 Euros, § 11(1) sentence 1 and § 10(3) sentence 2 VerfO.

  106. 106.

    Versicherungsombudsmann e.V. (2018), p. 19/20.

  107. 107.

    Isermann (2018), p. 286 with a pleading on the ADR entities’ possibility to provide an accessible and realistic solution for consumers even (and particularly) in cases which concern fundamental legal questions.

  108. 108.

    Rott (2018), p. 124.

  109. 109.

    Wernike (2019).

  110. 110.

    Criteria of other social spheres could also be linked to that data: Sachverständigenrat für Verbraucherfragen (2018), p. 60.

  111. 111.

    I.e. Nguyen (2011), p. 140; Schafer et al. (1999), p. 158.

  112. 112.

    Cf. Fries (2016), p. 2865 illustrating the ‘PayPal law’ example.

  113. 113.

    The possibility to be represented by a third party, e.g. lawyers, was rarely made use of, cf. Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 52.

  114. 114.

    Article 267(1) a) TFEU.

  115. 115.

    For instance, European Court of Justice Case C-681/17 on the right to withdrawal and the ‘concept of sealed goods which are not suitable for return due to health protection or hygiene reasons and which have been unsealed by the consumer after delivery’.

  116. 116.

    E.g. the website www.reklamieren24.de that calls itself ‘more than a complaint platform’—however the provider itself ironically declares not to participate in ADR procedures: www.reklamieren24.de/impressum.

  117. 117.

    See above: end of Sect. 9.1.

  118. 118.

    Cf. § 47a(1) Telekommunikationsgesetz; and above Sect. 9.2.1.

  119. 119.

    Deutscher Bundestag (2019), p. 32.

  120. 120.

    Concerning traders this realization came along with a more or less strong legislative support, which imposes in some sectors a cost payment obligation for traders if they do not participate in the ADR procedure: e.g. airlines have to pay 290 Euros for the a compulsatory ADR procedure when they are not assigned with a private ADR entity, § 57a LuftVG, § 16a Justizverwaltungskostengesetz and no. 1220 in the act’s appendix.

  121. 121.

    Braun et al. (2019), p. 58.

  122. 122.

    European Commission (2017a), p. 113/114 shows that differences in law/consumer protection rules (38.1% and 37.4% respectively) and potentially higher costs for cross-border disputes (36.2%) represent major obstacles for traders.

  123. 123.

    Höxter (2016), p. 32.

  124. 124.

    Regulation (EC) 1896/2006 of 12 December 2006.

  125. 125.

    Regulation (EC) 861/2007 of 11 July 2007.

  126. 126.

    Recital 3 ADR Directive; European Commission (2019a).

  127. 127.

    Recital 16 ODR Regulation.

  128. 128.

    European Commission (2017a), p. 94: consumers in Germany show a clear preference for domestic retailers, making it the only country with an above-average percentage of online buyers from domestic retailers and a below-average share of consumers buying online from other EU countries.

  129. 129.

    European Commission (2018a), p. 178.

  130. 130.

    For instance, deepl.com or translate.google.com.

  131. 131.

    Consequently, for the more complex translation of recommendations, the resources of the Translation Centre of the Bodies of the European Union are available, yet very little used: Translation Centre of the Bodies of the European Union (2017), p. 11.

  132. 132.

    https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/consumer-finance-and-payments/consumer-financial-services/financial-dispute-resolution-network-fin-net/fin-net-network/about-fin-net_en.

  133. 133.

    http://www.neon-ombudsman.org/tag/adr/.

  134. 134.

    Allgemeine Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle am Zentrum für Schlichtung e.V. (2018).

  135. 135.

    European Commission (2017c).

  136. 136.

    European Commission (2018d), p. 1.

  137. 137.

    Rott (2018), p. 124.

  138. 138.

    Deutscher Bundestag (2019), p. 38.

  139. 139.

    Deutscher Bundestag (2019), p. 37.

  140. 140.

    Liepin (2017), § 31, margin no. 12.

  141. 141.

    Deutscher Bundestag (2019), p. 40.

  142. 142.

    Cf. § 443 BGB about the commercial guarantee as defined in Article 2 no. 14 Directive 2011/83/EU.

  143. 143.

    Cf. BGH VIII ZR 11/16, margins 18 et seq. concerning the interpretation limits of a designated party in a court procedure.

  144. 144.

    Rott (2018), p. 124.

  145. 145.

    Roder (2018), p. 204.

  146. 146.

    European Commission (2018c), p. 1; Biard and Hodges (2019), p. 16 et seq., describing the French ADR landscape.

  147. 147.

    European Commission (2018b), p. 95.

  148. 148.

    This idea came up in the discussions on the amendment on the VSBG, Deutscher Bundesrat (2019), p. 3.

  149. 149.

    Berlin (2019), p. 57/57.

  150. 150.

    Hodges (2019), p. 17.

  151. 151.

    Schmidt-Kessel (2019), p. 10.

  152. 152.

    Cf. above Sect. 9.2.4.

  153. 153.

    Roder (2018), p. 202 evokes the air transport sector as an example showing that ADR cannot ‘get off the ground’ without pressure from politics and legislators.

  154. 154.

    Similar to the FIN-Net or NEON, residual ADR entities from Austria, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg have been meeting on a regular basis for those purposes since 2016.

  155. 155.

    Braun (2019), p. 132.

  156. 156.

    The (gold-plating) German transposition of Article 13(1) and (2) ADR Directive was subject of two decisions of the BGH (VIII ZR 263/18 and VIII ZR 265/18).

  157. 157.

    Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 68.

  158. 158.

    Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 68.

  159. 159.

    Some e-commerce traders do not seem to know that there is no compulsory ADR for distance contracts, nevertheless they inform their consumers ‘we are obliged to participate in ADR’.

  160. 160.

    BGH VIII ZR 263/18, margin no. 52; Rott (2018), p. 122.

  161. 161.

    At least the system of warning letters for traders not complying with the information obligation seems to have worked out in one way: traders in Germany were most likely to put the link to the European Commission’s ODR platform on their websites, European Commission (2017b), p. 28.

  162. 162.

    Braun (2019), p. 134.

  163. 163.

    Steffek (2019), p. 5.

  164. 164.

    Cf. the amended § 30(6) sentence 2 VSBG.

  165. 165.

    Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 63.

  166. 166.

    European Commission (2017a), p. 59.

  167. 167.

    Creutzfeldt (2016), passim and in particular the project reports regarding three German ombudsmen.

  168. 168.

    Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2018), p. 29.

  169. 169.

    A synopsis provided by Greger (2019c) and based on the annual reports 2018 is not yet complete due to the lack of the figures of one residual ADR entity (Außergerichtliche Streitbeilegungsstelle für Verbraucher und Unternehmer e.V. in Leipzig) and one sector-specific ADR entity (Ombudsstelle Immobilien des IVD/VPB - Grunderwerb und Verwaltung).

  170. 170.

    Deutscher Bundestag (2019), p. 20.

  171. 171.

    European Commission (2019c), passim.

  172. 172.

    Cf. National Energy Ombudsmen Network (2019).

  173. 173.

    Nordhardt (2020).

  174. 174.

    Universalschlichtungsstelle des Bundes am Zentrum für Schlichtung e.V. (2020).

  175. 175.

    Creutzfeldt and Steffek (2019), second to last paragraph.

References

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Weiser, S., Braun, F. (2021). Analysis–Defiances–Reflections in Germany. In: Kramer, X., Biard, A., Hoevenaars, J., Themeli, E. (eds) New Pathways to Civil Justice in Europe. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66637-8_9

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66637-8_9

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-66636-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-66637-8

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics