Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Introduction to Incomplete Information

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Game Theory for Cyber Deception

Part of the book series: Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications ((SDGTFA))

  • 1041 Accesses

Abstract

In this chapter, we introduce games with incomplete information. The chapter first gives an overview of Bayesian games and then presents signaling games as an example of two-stage games of incomplete information. Signaling games will be used in several chapters within the book (Chaps. 4, 6-8).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that \((v_{1},v_{2})\) can be correlated, so there might be a joint distribution function. Here, for simplicity, we assume that they are independent.

  2. 2.

    Other payment rules such as the second price rule or the third price rule can also be used.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USA

    Jeffrey Pawlick & Quanyan Zhu

Authors
  1. Jeffrey Pawlick
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Quanyan Zhu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jeffrey Pawlick .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Pawlick, J., Zhu, Q. (2021). Introduction to Incomplete Information. In: Game Theory for Cyber Deception. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66065-9_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation