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Verifpal: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis for the Real World

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Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2020 (INDOCRYPT 2020)

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Abstract

Verifpal is a new automated modeling framework and verifier for cryptographic protocols, optimized with heuristics for common-case protocol specifications, that aims to work better for real-world practitioners, students and engineers without sacrificing comprehensive formal verification features. In order to achieve this, Verifpal introduces a new, intuitive language for modeling protocols that is easier to write and understand than the languages employed by existing tools. Its formal verification paradigm is also designed explicitly to provide protocol modeling that avoids user error.

Verifpal is able to model protocols under an active attacker with unbounded sessions and fresh values, and supports queries for advanced security properties such as forward secrecy or key compromise impersonation. Furthermore, Verifpal’s semantics have been formalized within the Coq theorem prover, and Verifpal models can be automatically translated into Coq as well as into ProVerif models for further verification. Verifpal has already been used to verify security properties for Signal, Scuttlebutt, TLS 1.3 as well as the first formal model for the DP-3T pandemic-tracing protocol, which we present in this work. Through Verifpal, we show that advanced verification with formalized semantics and sound logic can exist without any expense towards the convenience of real-world practitioners.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Not to be confused with the bug/flying-type Pokémon of the same name, which, despite its “ninja-like agility and speed” [62], does not appear to have published work in formal verification.

  2. 2.

    The full Verifpal and ProVerif FFGG models are available at https://source.symbolic.software/verifpal/verifpal/-/tree/master/examples.

  3. 3.

    ProVerif is also capable of outputting graphical representations of attack traces, which could make them easier to read and understand.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Symbolic Software, Paris, France

    Nadim Kobeissi & Georgio Nicolas

  2. University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

    Mukesh Tiwari

Authors
  1. Nadim Kobeissi
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  2. Georgio Nicolas
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  3. Mukesh Tiwari
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nadim Kobeissi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Inria Paris, Paris, France

    Karthikeyan Bhargavan

  2. University of Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria

    Elisabeth Oswald

  3. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India

    Manoj Prabhakaran

A Partial Extract of DP-3T Verifpal Model Automatic Coq Translation

A Partial Extract of DP-3T Verifpal Model Automatic Coq Translation

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Kobeissi, N., Nicolas, G., Tiwari, M. (2020). Verifpal: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis for the Real World. In: Bhargavan, K., Oswald, E., Prabhakaran, M. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2020. INDOCRYPT 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12578. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65277-7_8

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