Abstract
In this paper, we propose a framework for strategic interaction among a large population of agents. The agents are linear stochastic control systems having a communication channel between the sensor and the controller for each agent. The strategic interaction is modeled as a Secure Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Game (SLQ-MFG), within a consensus framework, where the communication channel is noiseless, but, is susceptible to eavesdropping by adversaries. For the purposes of security, the sensor shares only a sketch of the states using a private key. The controller for each agent has the knowledge of the private key, and has fast access to the sketches of states from the sensor. We propose a secure communication mechanism between the sensor and controller, and a state reconstruction procedure using multi-rate sensor output sampling at the controller. We establish that the state reconstruction is noisy, and hence the Mean-Field Equilibrium (MFE) of the SLQ-MFG does not exist in the class of linear controllers. We introduce the notion of an approximate MFE (\(\epsilon \)-MFE) and prove that the MFE of the standard (non-secure) LQ-MFG is an \(\epsilon \)-MFE of the SLQ-MFG. Also, we show that \(\epsilon \rightarrow 0\) as the estimation error in state reconstruction approaches 0. Furthermore, we show that the MFE of LQ-MFG is also an \((\epsilon +\varepsilon )\)-Nash equilibrium for the finite population version of the SLQ-MFG; and \((\epsilon +\varepsilon ) \rightarrow 0\) as the estimation error approaches 0 and the number of agents \(n \rightarrow \infty \). We empirically investigate the performance sensitivity of the \((\epsilon +\varepsilon )\)-Nash equilibrium to perturbations in sampling rate, model parameters, and private keys.
Research support in part by Grant FA9550-19-1-0353 from AFOSR, and in part by US Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Cooperative Agreement W911NF-17-2-0196.
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Notes
- 1.
The red line in the boxplot represents the median, the box represents the 1st and 3rd quartile and the whiskers represent the max and min values, with outliers shown as red crosses.
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7 Appendix
7 Appendix
In this section, we provide some necessary background material for completeness.
1.1 7.1 MFE of the LQ-MFG
Here we briefly discuss the MFE of the LQ-MFG which has been developed in a previous work [18]. We note from [18] that the dynamics of the generic agent in the LQ-MFG are given by,
Although \(w^0\) is assumed to be non-Gaussian (Sect. 2.2) the results of [18] (which assume Gaussian distribution) still hold, since we restrict our attention to the class of linear controllers. In the standard LQ-MFG, the multi-rate setup is not required since the controller has access to the true state of the agent. The generic agent aims to minimize the cost function,
where \(\bar{x}\) is the mean-field trajectory. Next we restate the existence and uniqueness guarantees of MFE for the LQ-MFG.
Proposition 1
([18]). Under Assumption 1 the LQ-MFG ((24)–(25)) admits the unique MFE given by the tuple \((K^*,F^*) \in \mathbb {R}^{p \times 2m} \times \mathbb {R}^{m \times m}\). The matrix \(F^* = \varLambda (K^*) = A_0 - B_0(K^*_1 + K^*_2)\), and controller \(K^*\) is defined as,
and \(P^*\) is the solution to the DARE,
and \(\bar{B}\) and \(\bar{Q}\) as defined in (11) and (12), respectively.
The DARE is obtained by substituting \(K^*\) in the Lyapunov Eq. (16) hence \(P^* = P_{K^*}\). An important point to note is that in the LQ-MFG the estimation error is 0, as the controller has perfect access to the state of the agent. This translates to the covariance matrix of estimation error \(\varSigma _C = 0\) and hence \(\hat{\varSigma }_C = 0\) for LQ-MFG. Using (15) the cost of linear controller K and linear trajectory defined by matrix F for the LQ-MFG will be
where \(P_K\) is the solution to the Lyapunov Eq. (15). Furthermore it can also be verified that
This MFE \((K^*,F^*)\) can be obtained by using the mean-field update operator as discussed in [18].
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uz Zaman, M.A., Bhatt, S., Başar, T. (2020). Secure Discrete-Time Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Games. In: Zhu, Q., Baras, J.S., Poovendran, R., Chen, J. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12513. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64793-3_11
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