Abstract
The case of the Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision (IORP) II Directive shows how strong interest-group opposition against recursive measures can hamper the development of the proposed governance framework altogether—against the intended governance approach of the policy-makers at the European level. A strong coalition of pension funds, employers’ organisations and trade unions gathered in the Group of Nine (G9). Their opposition was based on the argument that pension systems across the Members States were too diverse to regulate at EU level. Fundamentally, the chapter shows the importance of complex interdependence as a ‘possibility’ or scope condition for experimentalism. Interest groups argued that the issue of IORP regulation was not characterised by significant interdependence between states, and thus contested the need for EU-level policy altogether.
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Notes
- 1.
Other big pension countries who engaged actively are France (AFG as national occupational pension association), Italy (AIPE), and Ireland (IAPF) (cf. interview PGGM; interview Pensioenfederatie).
- 2.
The G9 consists of PensionsEurope, ETUC, BUSINESSEUROPE, social protection institution AEIP, asset managers EFAMA, investment association Invest Europe, and public sector employers’ organisations CEEP, EAPSPI for public sector pensions institutions, and SME association UEAPME (http://www.pensionseurope.eu/group-nine).
- 3.
In the case of PensionsEurope two different interviews were conducted. One interview with Pekka Eskola exclusively concerned the activities and role of PensionsEurope throughout the process. Another interview, with Matti Leppälä revolved primarily around his position as chair of the OPSG and initiator of the G9, and less around his position as chair of PensionsEurope.
- 4.
The comments by Sandra Hack on the IORP II Directive presented in this chapter reflect her personal view, and not necessarily that of EIOPA.
- 5.
Analysis of the arguments developed in discussion with Professor Van der Lecq.
- 6.
Through this OPSG interest groups already had an official role in EIOPA as the (potential) implementation institution, as opposed to the situation with the Article 29 Working Party in the GDPR. As a consequence, interest group involvement in itself in the institution was not a lobbying issue.
- 7.
This is in stark contrast with the situation in the GDPR, where although most stakeholders opposed the proposed Regulation, the different impacts differed almost per interest group to an extent that the spectrum of interests was fully scattered.
- 8.
This means that according to the statutes, for instance Claudia Menne represents not ETUC as such but the employees sector of Europe.
- 9.
Given the not necessarily convincing arguments raised by the G9, but the enormous impact their position has due to the sheer composition of the coalition, one may indeed speak of a ‘regulatory capture’ in the IORP II case—one that is possible extended from policy formulation phase to the implementation phase (for the debate on regulatory capture, see e.g. Claessens et al. [2008], Underhill and Zhang [2008], and Young [2012]).
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Truijens, D. (2021). Mobilisation by Mistrust in EU Pension Funds Regulation. In: Interest Groups and Experimentalist Governance in the EU. Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64602-8_7
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