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Legalizing Artificial Intelligence

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Economics and Law of Artificial Intelligence

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Abstract

Current boardroom technologies concentrate on the production and distribution of information that boards want to assist in their supervisory and strategic roles which mean that many of these technologies do not tender the advantages of AI systems themselves but instead engender the data which is the necessary lifeblood that AI needs. Advanced analytics based on AI algorithms categorize more complex patterns than is possible by human intervention, predominantly in the context of identifying fraud and money laundering in the financial services context. AI can be considered as property and so making the obligation of the clients, owners, or producers if the damage is caused because of it. The European Parliament passed a resolution proposing a form of legal personhood for Artificial Intelligence regardless that legal personality is not lightly conferred in any jurisdiction. As AI entities function at an increasing distance from their developers and owners, these AI entities confront conventional legal frameworks for attribution and liability. This author (Georgios I Zekos) considers that there is a need for attributing legal personhood to AI entities, in their present configuration, in an analogous way that of traditional corporations and the only difference is that of their virtual dimension of function because humans are creating AI entities and put them in operation and so the occurrence of AI entities put in function by other AI entities is for the future where it is supposed to have a legal personhood attributing liability for the original AI entities and be forced in an AI way by AI entities in an AI world.

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Notes

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    Georgios I. Zekos

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Zekos, G.I. (2021). Legalizing Artificial Intelligence. In: Economics and Law of Artificial Intelligence. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64254-9_9

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