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Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

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Abstract

John Weymark’s conversation begins with some biographical remarks. The importance of his undergraduate teachers, notably David Donaldson, for his subsequent research interests is discussed. His graduate studies and his thesis under the direction of Karl Shell are recalled. The nature and origins of Weymark’s research on topics such as optimal taxation, inequality measurement, cartel stability, social choice with interpersonal utility comparisons, Harsanyi’s decision-theoretic foundations for utilitarianism, strategy-proof social choice, biological applications of social choice theory, and the political economy of taxation are explored. The conversation concludes with reflections on his teaching and editorial activities.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Erika Berthold, Chris Evans, and Risa Pavia for their assistance in preparing a transcript of this interview.

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Bierbrauer, F., d’Aspremont, C. (2021). John A. Weymark. In: Fleurbaey, M., Salles, M. (eds) Conversations on Social Choice and Welfare Theory - Vol. 1. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_16

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